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ABSTRACT

The International--Part I section of the Proceedings contains the following 20 papers: "Hollywood Attracts South Korean Capital" (Doobo Shim); "Worldview Differences of Natural Resources between Spain and Costa Rica: A Content Analysis of On-Line Newspapers" (Lorena Corbin); "Can the Leopard Change Its Spots: Parliamentarians' Attitudes about Press Freedom in Zambia" (Greg Pitts); "The Structure of International News Flow in Cyberspace: A Network Analysis of News Articles in 'Clarinet'" (Naewon Kang and Junho Choi); "Defining the Press Arbitration System: Its Impact on Press Freedom during the Sociopolitical Transition in South Korea" (Jae-Jin Lee); "Popular Literature and Gender Identities: An Analysis of Young Indian Women's Anxieties about Reading Western Romances" (Radhika E. Parameswaran); "Considering Alternative Models of Influence: Conceptualizing the Impact of Foreign TV in Malaysia" (Michael G. Elasmar and Kathleen Sim); "Fighting for New Export Markets: U.S. Agricultural Press Coverage of the Philippines Theater of the Spanish-American War (1898-1902)" (Dane Claussen); "Television News in a Transitional Media System: The Case of Taiwan" (Yu-li Chang and Daniel Riffe); "Korean Students' Use of Television: An Expectancy-Value Approach" (No-Kon Heo and Russell B. Williams); "South Asian Student Attitudes toward and Beliefs about Advertising: Measuring across Cultures" (Jyotika Ramaprasad and Michael L. Thurwanger); "The Role of Culture in International Advertising" (Niaz Ahmed); "Reporting under Civilian and Military Rulers in Africa: Journalists' Perceptions of Press Freedom and Media Exposure in Cameroon and Nigeria" (Festus Eribo and Enoh Tanjong); "Saudi Arabia's International Media Strategy: Influence through Multinational Ownership" (Douglas A. Boyd); "Factors Influencing Repatriation Intention, an Aspect of the Brain Drain Phenomenon" (Kingsley O. Harbor); "American Imperialist Zeal in the Periphery: The Rural Press Covers the Spanish-American War and the Annexation of the Philippines" (Dane Claussen and Richard Shafer); "A Content Analysis of 'The Jerusalem Post'--Bias in Syria-Related and Har Homa Articles" (Hala Habal); "Sources in 'New York Times'' Coverage of China before and after June 4th, 1989: A Content Analysis

Focusing on Influence of Crisis Situation on Sourcing Patterns of US Media in World News Coverage" (Guoli Li); "Finnish Women and Political Knowledge: What Do They Know and How Do They Learn It?" (Helena K. Sarkio); and "Beyond Asian Values in Journalism: Towards Cultural Politics in the Asian Media Globalization" (Min Soo Kim). (RS)

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(81st, Baltimore, MD, August 5-8, 1998).

INTERNATIONAL - Part I

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Hollywood Attracts South Korean Capital

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Abstract: This study investigates the reasons for the Korean chaebols' sudden participation in culture industry and capital investment in Hollywood in the 1990s. To do this, the Kim Young Sam government policy that made the change in the culture industry will be examined in view of the traditional economic system in Korea, especially with regard to chaebol policy. Finally, the implications of the globalization and the culture industry development on the whole Korean economy will be examined.

A new phenomenon arose in the early and mid 1990s: South Korean large conglomerates, or *chaebol*,[1] began to do business in the entertainment industry. Before, small and mid-sized companies dominated the Korean film industry and the government ran the broadcasting systems in the country; for the past 30-odd years, chaebols have focused on manufacturing such as heavy and chemical industries. What is more, the chaebols began to invest their capital in Hollywood. Cheil Jedang, the biggest food producer and distributor in Korea, invested $300 million in the newly-formed Hollywood studio DreamWorks SKG in 1995, for an 11.2% stake. Samsung Business Group bought Korean copyrights of films made by a Hollywood independent film studio, Regency Productions, in return for paying 7.4 percent of the production cost of movies made by the studio. Several other chaebols also invested in Hollywood ("Mi Youngwha").

This study investigates the reasons for the Korean chaebols' sudden participation in culture industry and capital investment in Hollywood. To do this, the Kim Young Sam government policy that made the change in the culture industry will be examined in view of the traditional economic system in Korea, especially with regard to chaebol policy. Finally, the implications of the globalization and the culture industry development on the whole Korean economy will be examined.

1. Globalization Policy of Kim Young Sam Regime

Historically, the existence of Communist North Korea and the experience of the Korean War provided a hegemonic ideology to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) to operate as a "developmental state." Since the mid-1960s, under the first Korean military dictator Park Chung

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[1] As "chaebol" is a Korean word, there is no English word such as "chaebols" in the plural. For a distinction, however, I use both "chaebol" and "chaebols" as the singular and the plural respectively.

Hee, economic growth, focusing on aggressive export promotion with protectionism, became a national goal for the country. For a nation of few natural resources, processing trade policy was the one and only way to survive. This policy succeeded: in 1962, Korea was ranked as the 40th biggest exporter to the U.S. and its standing rose to fifth in 1986. In 1997, Korea was the 11th exporter in the world (Wade 1992: 278). Until early 1970s as a late industrializer, Korea focused on light industry such as cotton textile. With comparative advantage in the lower labor costs and with the subsidies from the government, the Korean products could compete in the world market. From the mid-1970s as capital-intensive industries began to show higher profit rates than light industries, heavy and chemical industries replaced the former as the main export industry Korea.

Chaebols, as a dynamo of the national economy, have grown, receiving preferential treatment from the state-run banks.[2] Under the aegis of the government, the big firms favored bank loans over equity finance and their debt was almost four times their equity. To provide capital to the big firms, Korean banks borrowed short-term loan from foreign banks (this custom finally caused the economic debacle in late 1997) ("Hastening Slowly"). As the banks preferred chaebols to small firms, concentration of the economy was realized. The huge conglomerates expanded into new, often unrelated fields in order to spread risks and pursue market share in competition with each other.[3] The number of business units under the 30 chaebols was as many as 623 in 1994. The four biggest chaebols equaled a third of domestic sales and the top 30 chaebols accounted for 70 percent of Korea's annual GDP in the same year ("South Korea's"; Oh 1995: 8). With this size and diversification of the chaebols, economic transactions in Korea are less subject to the market, and more characterized as "intrafirm" (Wade 1992: 285). Hyundai Business Group proudly advertised:

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[2] In return, the military dictators acquired slush fund from the conglomerates.

[3] The "greed" of the Korean conglomerates, however, led them to be even import agents for goods and services ranging from toys, household commodities, express delivery service to luxuries, bringing severe

> Hyundai is globally recognized as the producer of 'From Chips to Ships' such as automobiles, semiconductor chips and telecommunications, LNG carriers and supertankers, construction projects, advanced iron & steel plants and petrochemicals. Based on such advances and innovative synergies, Hyundai will strive to further develop the utmost sophisticated areas ... (corporate advertisement inserted in *NewsWorld* Sep. 1996).

The logic of Miky Lee, a sister of the owner of Cheil Jedang and who promoted the company's Hollywood investment, was evident in view of the strategy of chaebol. She said, "We satisfied consumers with food. Why not with movies?" (Ahn 1997:15).

Kim Young Sam, proud to lead the first civilian government for 32 years, tried to reform the socio-politico-economic corruption rooted in the previous military regimes immediately after his inauguration in 1993. Once the motive power for the Korean economic growth, the collusion between politics and economy became the object of reform. The new government liberalized the banks, which previously were forced to provide low-rate capital to favored companies. According to an official in the president's office, it was a measure "to let firms make decisions on purely economic grounds, rather than waiting for the government to tell them what to do." Mr. Kim outlawed the anonymous bank accounts used to hide ill-gotten gains during the long years of military rule. This was aimed at forcing the money into legal accounts and improving small companies' chances of securing capital. The civilian government imposed a stiff ceiling on the money each candidate for the National Assembly could spend and purged over 1,000 corrupt government officials ("Role Reversal").

Mr. Kim's reform mind discovered a need for an initiative of "globalization" after his first overseas trip as a representative at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit

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criticisms from the small companies. Therefore, *Dongailbo*, an influential Korean daily newspaper, in November 1993. After the trip, confessing that he was astonished at the globalization trend in the world, the Korean president said, "We must steadily continue to eliminate the legacy of the authoritarian rule, corruption and misconduct of the past that are obstructing our efforts to internationalize and prepare for the future" ("Globalizing Korea's": 13). At the time, Korean products faced trouble in the world market from lesser priced goods from Southeast Asia. Highly dependent on overseas trade, the Korean economy was vulnerable to fluctuations in international markets. For example, Hyundai Motor Company relied for 48 percent of its 1.25 million auto production on exports in 1997 ("Hyundai Hopes"). Because of that, the protectionism that had lifted the Korean economy to its "miracle," could no longer work in an age of globalization. Kim realized that the octopus-like chaebol-style economy no longer fit the changing world market; the Kim government encouraged the chaebols to stick to a few core businesses. He cried out that "the whole nation must go all out to boost international competitiveness" by adapting to the globalization to survive in an era of global economic war" ("Kim Emphasizes").

"Globalization" became the most powerful and discussed topic in Korea during the Kim Young Sam era. Every company announced the need and plan for innovation to match globalization. In the article "US and Korea Semiconductor Industries: A Cooperative Future" in *NewsWorld*, a magazine written in English aiming to introduce the Korean economy to the outside world, in 1996, "globalization" was presented as the answer for the problems of the industry :

> ... in 1995, it purchased $652 million dollars [*sic*] worth of equipment from US firms alone. To overcome these obstacles, the Korean semiconductor equipment industry must continue to globalize (37p.).

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satirized them as doing every business "from the cradle to the grave" ("Yoram-eseo").

> ... Korean firms purchased $135 million of materials from U.S. suppliers. To increase its competitiveness, the Korean semiconductor materials industry must ... continue to globalize and seek international ties (38).

> Globalization is the best manner of addressing industrial weaknesses and international sharing of technology and ideas will help Korea to establish a more sound technological infrastructure (39).

As seen in these examples, the slogan "globalization" swept the Korean society. In early 1994, Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo conceptualized the Kim government's version of globalization and presented it to the people. It was: active participation in the globalizing market, politico-economic liberalization in Korean society, and globalization of civic consciousness ("Internationalization"). What was unique in the Kim government's globalization slogan was the intent to reform the consciousness of its citizens. The deep-rooted Cold War psychology under the long period of authoritarian rule had created irrationality, argued Mr. Kim.[4] Under the banner of globalization the government encouraged its citizens to have an open mind to the world by buying more foreign goods and by traveling overseas. During the period between 1991 and 1996, while foreign tourists who visited Korea increased 2.9% every year, Korean tourists overseas increased 20.3% yearly (Chae et al. 1998: 43). The rhetoric of globalization sent waves not only in trade, but also across the whole society.

2. The Need for Economic Restructuring

One of the driving forces for the "miracle" of the Korean economy was its cheap labor. However, since the summer of 1987, Korean laborers' wages have more than doubled as the power of the trade unions has increased. Korea Inc. no longer had a comparative advantage in the labor force. Many Korean firms escaped to Indonesia and China, where wages were still low.[5] Now the "strategic" businesses for the country should be those of "value added" products based on high technology ("Reaching Out").[6] As the industrialized nations raised economic productivity by adopting information technologies, the information industry loomed up as a strategic business for the Korean economy in a new age. Harvard international politics researcher Joseph S. Nye, Jr. argued that "information-rich" countries were more powerful than "capital-rich" countries in current international politics. "With the rise of an information-based economy," he wrote, "raw materials have become less important and organizational skills and flexibility more important" (Nye 1990: 164). Countries with new means of communication were able to reach and convey immediate information on market trends. High technologies made flexibility of manufacturing processes and cutdown of expenses possible. For instance, in the past a manager at a trading firm would be concerned about missed phone calls and inundated by hundreds of memos from other continents. With E-Mail, such annoyances have disappeared and expenses been saved. Computerization allowed factories to monitor their workers easily, cutting down on the number of supervisors. The list could go on forever.

The following excerpt of a speech by Rha Woong-bae, Deputy Prime Minister and Economy and Finance Minister in 1996, shows the nationwide appreciation of the importance of the information industry in the globalization era:

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[4] In addition, it had a political message: "since Korea had its first civil President, political debates and disturbances obsessed with the past should be stopped."

[5] While the government was xenophobic to foreign investment in Korea, it welcomed domestic firms' investment in foreign countries, assuming that the latter, not the former, was a sign of globalization. This shows the ironical reality of the Korean version of globalization.

[6] One of the value-added products is automobile. Based on this recognition, Samsung Business Group got into the race of automobile manufacture in 1994 in the small market where three makers already crouched--Hyundai, Kia, and Daewoo.

> Ideological confrontations are over with the demise of the socialist system and the rapid development of information and communication technology. This activity, coupled with liberalization policies instituted by governments around the world has removed international barriers, allowing economic activities to be pursued across borders ("Defining Korea's").

This recognition led to the establishment of the Ministry of Information and Communication in 1994, thereby expanding the former Ministry of Communication whose major duty was postal services. The minister Kang Bong-kyun set a goal of building an advanced infrastructure of communication and information throughout the nation. "Solving the problem with the international balance of payments deficit, and invigorating the economy," he said, "would be through the establishment of knowledge-intensive industry" ("Leading Information").

As a late industrializer, the Korean economy looked to U.S. and Japan for the advanced technologies. In the automobile business, Hyundai relied on both Mitsubishi and Chrysler, Samsung looked to Nissan, Kia depended on Mazda and Ford, and Daewoo on Isuzu and GM, with combined royalties of $227 million to Japan and America in 1993 ("Three's a Crowd"). For the information industry, Suh Jeong-Wook, chairman of SK Telecom, said that "The leading industry in the 21st century is information and advanced technology.... Information is the factor which enables a nation to survive.... We can find a model for information society in America...." ("Wollye Gangjwa"), and most of Korean firms were eager to learn from America. For example, the Korean firm, LG Electronics signed an agreement with IBM to form a joint venture firm, LG-IBM Co in 1996. LG, intending to become a multimedia giant, hoped to obtain IBM's technology and marketing know-how through the joint venture ("New Multimedia").

Korea, as a nation, was the third largest producer in global semiconductor market following the U.S. and Japan, occupying 21.6 percent in memory and 1.4 percent in non-memory chips as of 1994. Semiconductors comprised 13.5 percent of total Korean exports in 1994

("Semiconductors").[7] It was the right course for Korean chaebols, through their electronics units, to expand the semiconductor industry as their "strategic" business. The semiconductor is the basic component for the computers: it is a building material for microchips, which work as the "brain" of the computer. It is also the most important component for home electronics equipments such as HDTV (High Definition TV), video conference systems, satellite telecommunications, and 3-D graphics ("World's First 1G DRAM"). The importance of the semiconductor led the weekly *Time* to choose Intel's chairman Andrew Grove as its 1997 Man of the Year. Intel, the number one producer in world semiconductor industry, makes almost 90% of the world's PC microchips. *Time* called the microchip the dynamo for the United States' seven-year string of growth, record-low unemployment and, naturally, the digital revolution. All forms of entertainment and information are stored on microchips in digital form (Isaacson 1997).

Motivated by digital technologies, the trend toward the mix of hardware and software was occurring in the world telecommunications and information industry. Intel announced an alliance with CNN in 1994 ("Intelevisionary"). Microsoft and IBM have already stated their goals to tie computers, Internet and television (Fabrikant 1998: B1). Sprint, a telephone company, and Silicon Graphics, a computer firm, set up the Drums network, to combine TV, film, and advertising businesses into a digital network ("Welcome to the Cyberguild"). NBC teamed with Microsoft on MSNBC. Sony, the Japanese giant of audio and video equipment and semiconductors, bought CBS Records and Columbia Pictures in 1989 for synergetic effects. Without enough video tapes, the VCR cannot be sold. In view of the traditional chaebol business strategy, it was natural for chaebol-owned electronics companies to produce entertainment software and to invest in the culture industry. Therefore, the electronics companies are focusing on entertainment as seen in corporate advertisements of home electronics manufacturers:

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[7] The entire Korean semiconductor industry, however, relies on the U.S. for its advanced technologies. While the Korean semiconductor producers provide a high-quality, low-cost DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory) to US computer firms, Koreans acquire high value-added, high-technology system designs and semiconductor components and raw materials from the U.S. ("Semiconductors").

> Samsung is building tomorrow's home entertainment centers (Samsung Electronics, from *NewsWorld* Nov. 1996).
>
> Entertain me (in a photograph in which a baby looks at a computer) (LG Electronics, from *NewsWorld* Sep. 1996).
>
> Their grandfathers fought over toy trucks. Their fathers fought over electric trains. They fight over the remote. What will their kids fight over? (with a photo of two children) (Sony Electronics, from *Atlantic Monthly* Jan. 1998).

They say it is Information Age. In a sense, it is Entertainment Age. The new technologies have rendered the border between the information and entertainment indistinct.

Inasmuch as the changes in economy is closely related to the politics in Korea, Democratization facilitated chaebols' participation in the culture industry. During the Chun Doo Whan era, the two national broadcasting networks were state-run. Through the democratization process begun in 1987, when Korean people's protest forced a direct presidential election and a series of political reforms, the broadcasting system was liberalized. Seoul saw a nearly a three-fold increase in the number of dailies, from 30 to 100, between 1987 and 1993. A private TV network called Seoul Broadcasting System was born in 1989. Four new regional commercial broadcasting stations began to operate in 1994 and another four in 1997. And from 1995, 30 private-owned cable TV services started to operate (Korean Press Institute 1994: 299-313). Satellite TV was on the horizon. These conditions marked the beginning of the new telecommunication era. The chaebols jumped into the industry which was seen as "a goose that lays the golden egg."

The chaebols' awakening to the culture industry was boosted by national policy. Presidential Advisory Board on Science and Technology, which was organized following the government initiative of globalization, released its first report at its meeting in May 1994 that the film *Jurassic Park* directed by Steven Spielberg obtained a revenue worth 1.5 million Hyundai cars. The report stated that since the number of Hyundai's yearly sales overseas was about 640,000, a well-made film could earn more money than two years' production of cars. It surprised the people of Korea and later was cited whenever the importance of the culture industry was mentioned. The report pointed out that the success of the film was attributed to the digital technology. Based on this report, the Board proposed that the high value-added and pollution-free "image industry,"[8] which included diverse forms of audio/video software, such as motion pictures, video, computer graphics, and other popular cultural spin-off products from films, such as toys based on characters and theme park, should be developed as the national "strategic" industry for 21st century (Kim, Hong 1994). The people, business, and government officials of Korea were since confident of the profitability of a culture industry and its connection to the science and technology.[9]

Following the report, the Motion Picture Promotion Law was enacted in early 1995. The law was filled with diverse clauses to introduce both chaebol and foreign capital into the dilapidated film industry. By changing the license system to a report system, the law intended to encourage joint production of films with foreign studios. Through the law, film studios could receive tax breaks from the government (Byun 1995b: 12). The Korean chaebols, which made themselves proficient in computer and electronics technologies, were ready to devote themselves to the culture industry.

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[8] Literal translation of "Youngsang Industry" in Korean.

[9] Later, in 1995 when Steven Spielberg and Jeffrey Katzenberg of DreamWorks Studio came to Seoul for a signing ceremony for the Cheil Jedang-DreamWorks alliance, President Kim Young Sam even invited them (McDougall 1996:20).

3. Film Industry in Korea

The Korean government, seeing the motion picture as cultural asset, tried to protect and encourage the domestic industry, even though the local audience preferred Hollywood films to their domestic movies.[10] Since the 1960s, each Korean film company was awarded an import license for foreign films for the production of three local films.[11] This measure, however, resulted in careless production of crude films, which all the more alienated the domestic audience: familial melodramas (tear-jerkers) aimed at a female audience dominated the market, bringing contempt from the youth and intellectuals. Under these conditions, the vicious cycle of low-budget, low-quality movies and poor box office performances characterized the Korean film industry. While about 4.7 million Koreans went to theaters to see local films in 1978, the number fell to 2 million in 1987 (Doherty 1984: 841-42; "South Korean Films"; "Local Fans").[12]

Before 1987, Hollywood distribution companies did not set foot in Korea. Instead, the government-supported Motion Picture Promotion Corporation handled the import of foreign films. Under the charge of the Corporation, a network connecting Hollywood-based Korean film buyers, importers based in Seoul, and domestic distributors and exhibitors throughout the country governed the market (Sipe 1988: 50). Under pressure from the U.S., the Korean government agreed to open its market to the major Hollywood distributors in 1988. During the period between 1988 and 1994, the influence of Hollywood increased in the Korean market. In 1987, American movies accounted for about 53% of the whole theater attendance. The share increased to about 80% in 1994. While Korea paid about $10 million to Hollywood for royalties in 1987 ("Movie Industry"), the amount of royalties the country paid to foreign countries rose to $26.6 million for

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[10] Of the whole theater attendance in 1987, foreign films occupied nearly 81 percent, of which Hollywood accounted for 65%.

[11] In the 1980s, the requirement was reduced to one film.

321 films in 1989 and to $62.2 million for 420 items in 1993 ("Mal-ro Jugo").[13] The film *Ghost*, starring Demi Moore, drew 3.5 million audience in Korea, *Schindler's List*, 2 million and *Jurassic Park* attracted 1.47 million viewers ("Violence in Movies"). The revenue for the Hollywood major distributors increased 60% every year during this period. On the other hand, the number of Korean film production dropped from 121 in 1991 to 64 in 1993. During the period, over ten Korean film importers went out of business (Yi 1994: 45).

When the media reported on the chaebols' participation in the film industry, there was a debate on whether it was good for the domestic industry. More audiences and researchers in Korea welcomed it with an expectation of the expansion of film choices and more convenient theater facilities. With chaebol capital, it was hoped that the paltry film industry infrastructure would be strengthened. Chaebols showed their good intentions for investing in the film industry:

> We feel a certain responsibility to help the Korean movie market--Micky Lee (Groves 1997c: 60).

> It is our duty and responsibility to export Korean films overseas--Seong-Min Choi, senior manager at Daewoo's filmed entertainment division (Groves 1997f: 61).

Most of the criticism came from the existing film companies, in fear that the chaebol capital would force them out of the business. During the period between 1992 and 1995, eighteen chaebols participated in the media industry. They were Samsung, Daewoo, LG, Hyundai, SK, Doosan, Dong-A, JinRo, Byuksan, Haitai, Daesun, Nasan, E-Land, Miwon, Chong Gu, Hanbo, Sambo Computer and Cheil Jedang. That the electronics units of the chaebol started the film industry characterized the culture industry boom in Korea. "Based on semiconductor

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[12] The disdain for local films was confirmed in the fact that the Korean Film Archive was established as late as the early 1980s and contained no film made earlier than 1946 ("South Korean Films": 93).

technologies, we are developing products connecting home electronics and multi media, in priority," said Kim Kun-joong, an executive at Samsung Electronics (Kim, Kyung-ho 1995: 9). Before they established a company to take charge of diverse sectors of the culture industry, the electronics companies of Samsung, Daewoo, Hyundai, and LG set up task forces to take charge of software business in the years between 1992 and 1994, first to boost the sale of their home electronics hardware, and second to preoccupy in the coming telecommunications era. Most of the others participated in the industry in 1994 and 1995 not to be behind these first-runners. In December 1994, *Kookmin Ilbo*, a newspaper in Seoul, wrote on the trend:

> The image business is rising to the surface as a new field for chaebol competition. As the image business, including film, stands out as the leading business for the next generation, conglomerates such as Samsung, Daewoo, and LG are expanding their investment in the sector, forecasting a fierce "culture war." It is expected that movie channels on cable television, which will be started in March next year, are going to play a big role in image industry development as well as ignite a competition to take the lion's share in the industry ("Youngsang Soft").

Dongailbo explained why chaebols plunged into the industry:

> Image software is acknowledged as an industry of high value added with its characteristic that an item can be utilized in diverse media. As a result, the chaebol's advance into image industries is a strategy to survive in the 21st century when the new media are expected to make rapid progress.... Film, among the image industries, is a sector into which the big conglomerates are actively advancing because it is the base and mainstay of producing the image soft[ware]. Particularly, with the logic that only chaebol which have capital and organization can match the monster of Hollywood direct distribution, Samsung and Daewoo are actively participating in the image industry (Ko 1994: 35).

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[11] Hollywood accounted for at least 80% of this amount.

Each chaebol announced that they would develop the media industry as their core business. Another feature of the Korean culture industry was that the chaebol simultaneously invested in almost every sphere of media industry: they started businesses in cable, film, computer software, TV show, records, and film distribution and exhibition ("Youngsang Soft"; Im 1994).

As their promise to develop domestic film industry to match Hollywood, chaebols produced local films. In 1997, Daewoo funded partly or wholly half of all Korean films made (25 of the 50 local motion picture output). Samsung has produced about six films a year since its inception. Hyundai produced three Korean films in 1997. Despite the setback in the box office, they plan to increase the film production. Leo Kim, assistant director for the film business division at Hyundai Broadcasting System (HBS), said, "To have a good cinema business in the long term, we need to beef up Korean production" (Groves 1997e: 61).

To expand the number of cinemagoers, chaebols have built and plan to build multiplex cinemas. They estimate that 90% of cinema audiences are in their teens and twenties. To bring the older folks to the theaters, facilities such as more comfortable seats, parking lots, and more screens to exhibit diverse films are needed. Daewoo, which ran twenty screens in Seoul in 1997, plans to build almost twenty more multiplexes in the next five years with 100 screens. Samsung plans to build 54 cinema circuit and to have 100 franchisee screens by 2000. It also plans to set game arcades, theaters, music and multimedia outlets, and amusement parks in its own shopping malls. Cheil Jedang plans to build twenty multiplexes by 2000 in joint venture with Golden Harvest of Hong Kong and Village Roadshow of Australia. In all, the large conglomerates plan to build about 300 new screens before 2000, lifting the national total to nearly 1000 (Groves 1997a; Groves 1997b; Groves 1997c; Groves 1997d; Ahn 1997).

To prepare enough titles for their cable channels and theaters, they have agreements with foreign film productions and import foreign movies. Samsung has two cable channels: its pay cable channel Catch-One has exclusive licensing agreements with Disney, Warner Brothers, Paramount, 20th Century Fox, and Universal, and has 160,000 subscribers. However, the only pay channel in Korea has been losing money since its inception and is expected to reach break-even only when it has at least 700,000 subscribers. The Group's other channel, called Q Channel, is a Korean version of the Discovery Channel. To provide titles for this channel, Samsung has contracts with NHK of Japan, BBC, and Discovery (Groves 1997b: 61). Samsung invested $60 million for 7.6% of the stocks of Hollywood indie producer New Regency, with the condition that Samsung has the Korean right to the films made by NR ("Mi Youngwha").

Daewoo, which has a film cable channel, Daewoo Cinema Network, has an agreement with Hollywood indie New Line. Daewoo will bear 3.5 percent of production cost for New Line Cinema. For the first two years of the contract, Daewoo bore 6% of production costs. Hyundai, which has the general entertainment channel HBS, made an output deal with the French studio Canal Plus, in return for the exclusive copyright in the Korean market (Kwon 1996: 27). SKC also has an output deal with Hollywood indies, Cinergi and Mandalay Entertainment, with the condition that it pays 5% of each film's budget (Groves 1997d: 60). Through its investment in DreamWorks, Cheil Jedang acquired the films' distribution rights for the Asian market, except Japan, for ten years (Choi 1997a: 123). And to create a more efficient distribution network, CJ invested $15.7 million in M-Net cable channel, a Korean version of MTV, for a 55% stake (Groves 1997c: 60).

Before Cheil Jedang invested in DreamWorks SKG, both Samsung and Hyundai were interested in the studio. After the meeting of Lee Kun Hee, the owner of Samsung, with Steven Spielberg, David Geffen, and Jeffrey Katzenberg, the talks were broken off for two reasons. First, as it was known that MCA executives had suffered from communication problems with its parent, Matsushita, Spielberg noted, "I realized that whoever became our equity partners, we needed to communicate in the same language" (Corliss 1995: 58). Second, the views of those two parties on film business were far apart. "The word semiconductor must have been used about 20 times during that 2 1/2-hr. encounter," the director of *Jurassic Park* said. "How are they going to know anything about the film business when they're so obsessed with semiconductors?" (Corliss 1995: 57). As their starting points were different, the goals of Hollywood people and the Korean chaebols were also different.

According to Miky Lee, those two problems contributed to CJ's being selected to be the investor in DreamWorks. The Harvard graduate recalled that the dream team of the new Hollywood studio was pleased to meet her who was fluent in English (Choi 1997b: 119). Rather than announcing bold goals like other chaebols, CJ was modest. They have openly said that their business strategy was to take a roundabout way: focusing on "knowledge transfer" from DreamWorks to the Korean neophyte in film business was central in the deal, rather than plunging into "war" with other chaebols for a small piece of the Korean market. For this purpose, CJ plans to send its personnel to DreamWorks every year for "Hollywood know-how" (Choi 1997a: 122; McDougall 1996).

The chaebols' participation in culture industry has incurred harsh criticism. In international film markets, to get exclusive rights to a movie for the Korean market, they tend to outbid each other at any cost. Therefore, the monthly *Business Korea* wrote: "Quite a few Korean companies have long believed that every Hollywood movie has the touch of Midas ... Most of them did not hesitate to spend money like water" (Hur 1997: 32). The fierce competition among them resulted in the rise in import prices for foreign films. For example, Samsung bought the film, *Seven* starring Brad Pitt, for $2.6 million. "Die Hard 3" was imported at $2.8 million. SKC paid $3.4 million for "Evita" starring Madonna. Daewoo outbid others for *Last Man Standing* by paying $3.5 million and bought *Long Kiss Good Night* at $4.5 million. The story does not stop here. Samsung paid $5 million each for *The Fifth Element* and *Cutthroat Island*. Experts said that the proper price for these movies should have been between $300,000 and $760,000 (Byun

1995a: 2). According to *Chosunilbo*, the Korean daily with the largest circulation, *Hollywood Reporter*, a trade magazine, reported that Korea as a nation was second-ranked in paying for Hollywood movies in the world. It wrote that for the same film, Korea paid five times the rate Japan paid, twice what France paid, and eight times what Taiwan paid. Considering the size of the Korean market, the country paid too much ("Segye Youngwha"). *Business Korea* correctly pointed out that the major factor behind the ascending prices for imported films was "investment" in or "output deals" with Hollywood studios (Hur 1997: 32). Taking advantage of this situation, some Hollywood majors sold their films to chaebols instead of distributing them through their branches in Seoul (Ko 1995: 38).[14] The Korean papers argued that the intense competition among chaebols forced the small-sized importers, which could not match the chaebols' capital, out of the business, and made all the Korean importers easy marks in negotiating in international film markets. Therefore, the Korean large conglomerates did more harm than good to the local film industry ("Segye Youngwha"; Byun 1995a: 2; Hur 1997:32).

In 1997, Hollywood films occupied nearly 77% of the Korean market. However, the local films accounted for about 15%, a four-percent slide from ten years ago. For several years, Korean theater attendance was the lowest in Asia, with yearly ticket sales stuck at 45 million (Groves 1997a: 57). The expensive Hollywood films, *Long Kiss Good Night*, *Last Man Standing*, and *Cutthroat Island*, all miscarried in exhibition, inflicting a three-billion-won (about $3.75 million) loss to the importers.[15] Due to their miscalculations, Samsung, Daewoo, and SKC thus far have lost about 22 billion won, almost $27.5 million, from film imports (Hur 1997: 32). For the first year in cable television (1995), the industry lost 300 billion won, nearly $375 million.

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[14] For a time before the formal enforcement of direct distribution in Korea in 1988, to rake in more profits through their direct distribution in Korea, the U.S. film companies withheld the sale of such hit films as *007 Living Daylights*, *Beverly Hills Cop II*, and *The Untouchables* ("Movie Industry"). Traditionally, in dealing with foreign markets, Hollywood accumulated the know-how in "collective response." Hollywood's Motion Picture Export Association, now defunct, was well known for its role in preventing possibly destructive competition among its member companies (Guback 1985: 471).

Despite the setback, most of them showed their intention to expand their investment with expectation of the promises in VOD (video on demand) and satellite broadcast due in a few years. It was expected that the cable industry would reach its break-even point in 1998 (Park 1996: 18).

4. Conclusion

Kim Young Sam's globalization initiatives and reform were lame and eventually failed, even incurring a threat of national insolvency.[16] His government requested the biggest IMF (International Monetary Fund) bailout in history--a $57 billion injection. Korea Inc.'s short-term foreign debts exceeded its reserves by $40 billion to $50 billion as of early December 1997. An article in the *Economist* in late 1993 already noticed the inconsistency of the Korean economic reform:

> The Ministry of Finance commands foreign brokers in Seoul to sell a stock that is making them too much money.... The Ministry tells companies when they may issue equity, and how they should price it. With straight, solemn faces, ministry people declare their commitment to financial deregulation ("Hastening Slowly").

Even after President Kim's commitment to liberalization, the government still advised banks to grant loans to favored firms. Protectionism in the form of high tariffs on some imports did not disappear. Foreign ownership of listed Korean companies was limited at 10% in 1994. On Jan. 3, 1998, the country's Minister of Information, Oh In-Whan, confessed that the Kim Young Sam government failed because it was still xenophobic. And despite its slogan of globalization, it

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[15] At this point, $1 was rated at about 800 won, the Korean currency.
[16] He even suffered from slush fund scandal.

lacked the real understanding and vision to pursue it (Kim, Yeon-Geuk 1998). *Sisa Journal*, a Korean current issues weekly, claimed that the slogan "globalization" was only for the use of public relations (Chae 1998: 42). Ironically, with the help of IMF, Korea was forced into globalization.

After "globalization," "information industry" or "image industry" was the most popular term during the Kim era. Considering it as the next-generation "strategic industry," every chaebol strove after a piece of the market, which was not yet fully developed. Before their investment could reach the break-even point, the Korean economy failed and the large conglomerates were criticized as the "principal offender" for the debacle. Some chaebols that invested in culture industry collapsed. Chong Gu Business Group, the country's 37th largest conglomerate, filed for court protection on Dec. 26, 1997, and Nasan, the 57th, did on Jan. 13, 1998. The former was mainly a construction concern and the latter, a textile firm. Analysts attributed their failure to the accumulation of inordinate debt in an unsuccessful bid to diversify into retailing and the media industry (Im 1998: 1). The fate of Cheil Jedang is not yet decided, as the money Cheil Jedang invested in DreamWorks came from a bank loan. The interest charges will rise to as much as $90 million by 2002 (McDougall 1996: 21). With its investment in the culture industry, Cheil Jedang, translated into Cheil Foods and Chemicals, also planned to transform itself into a conglomerate, branching out into construction, bio-engineering, trade, and retailing (Ahn 1997: 14). In Korea the discourses on globalization and culture industry are still strong in the economic crisis. Interestingly, Kim Dae Jung, the new president of South Korea, held a video conference with Michael Jackson during his presidential campaign to show his ability to attract foreign investment in Korea. The pop star promised to build a theme park in the country (Hirsh 1997: 74).

In the analysis of the Korean chaebols' participation in culture industry, I found that this new stage of Korean industrialization followed the previous trajectory of the country's economic development. As a late industrializing country, the state was a shaper and protector of the industrial structure. In this process, Korea has adopted pro-active production policies, "borrowing" the technologies from the advanced industrialized countries. To some extent, this explanation can be applied to the development of the culture industry in the country. With the government initiative of "globalization," the state encouraged the restructuring of the economy, which the chaebols followed, focusing on information industry, eager to learn from America (Of course, the conglomerates also recognized its necessity).

In 1998, the Korean people confront different situations: new government and the IMF guidelines. I hope that Korea brings about another "miracle," this time, with real democracy in both politics and economy.

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Worldview differences of natural resources between Spain and Costa Rica: A content analysis of on-line newspapers

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Worldview differences of natural resources between Spain and Costa Rica: A content analysis of on-line newspapers

Abstract

The study analyzed the environmental content of two large circulation on-line newspapers, one from a developing country (Costa Rica) and one from a developed country (Spain). Olsen, Lodwick and Dunlap (1992) developed a paradigmatic model which presents the differences between the dominant worldview and the post-industrial worldview. Based on this, it was expected that the Costa Rican paper would emphasize the exploitation of natural resources (dominant), while the Spanish paper would emphasize environmental protection (post-industrial).

Worldview differences of natural resources between Spain and Costa Rica: A content analysis of on-line newspapers

Ever since scientists have used the media spotlight to warn about the deleterious effects of an enormous number of species becoming extinct and the consequent decrease in the genetic pool, people the world over have come to realize that the exploitation of natural resources is a problem that needs to be addressed. The public, in fact, has reason to worry because the loss of natural resources due to intensive exploitation has repercussions not only on the planet's intricate "web of life", but also will have profound economic impact. If overlooked, the problem will eventually lead to a loss of resources for different economic sectors.

Interest in environmental problems has been fluctuating over the years in Western countries. Meanwhile, one can only speculate how the topic has been revealed in the developing world since there is an absence of studies that examined the rise and fall of issues in these nations. Do people in the so-called "Third World" consider this an important issue at all? Do the "First World" media dedicate more time and space to the environmental concerns than the media in developing countries?

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Most research relating the influence of media with individuals' attitudes about the environment has been done in Western countries, and has suggested the emergence of postmaterialist values in these regions. Once basic needs are taken care of, humans can meditate about matters that do not seem to be of basic concern, such as the environment (Maslow, 1954; Inglehart, 1990). This suggests that until developing countries achieve a better life standard for their populations, they will not be concerned about the health of the environment.

That the developing world, struggling with issues of survival and preoccupied with how basic and fundamental human needs can be met, looks at environmental concerns as a non-issue, is an assumption that two different survey studies do not support. The Health of the Planet report (Dunlap, Gallup & Gallup, 1993) reveals that out of a total of 24 countries, the 12 developing countries were very concerned about the environment:

> "Environmental problems are salient and important issues in both wealthy and poor nations, and residents of poor nations express as much concern about environmental quality as do those living in wealthy nations" (Dunlap et al., 1993, p. 36).

The survey done by Louis Harris and Associates (1989) also comes up with the conclusion that environmental values are high among citizens of developing countries.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This research is looking at how the media cover stories about natural resources. The method that was used was a content analysis that compared two on-line newspapers, adapting for this purpose two worldview models that were developed by Olsen, Lodwick and Dunlap (1992). The authors point out the emergence of the post-industrial paradigm in modern societies, which advocates a more sustainable use of natural resources. Meanwhile, the dominant western worldview considers that the present exploitation of natural resources will not pose a problem for the future generations, even if the world population maintains the same growth rate.

To examine whether the values of the post-industrial paradigm are appearing only in media of developed societies, it is necessary to compare a medium from a so-called 'modern' country with one medium from a developing country. *El País*, the national newspaper of Spain, and *La Nación*, the national newspaper of Costa Rica, are the two on-line media that have been selected. The comparison between the newspapers is most easily accomplished if there are no language barriers.

CHARACTERISTICS OF COSTA RICA AND SPAIN

Costa Rica is considered to be a developing country. Its abundance of wildlife species and national parks, as well as the promotion of ecotourism can be seen as restraints to the exploitation of natural resources such as, for example, farming, raising cattle, or mining operations. These restraints can also be viewed in the opposite way, that the exploitation of natural resources can impede the full protection of certain natural environments of a country. And the fact that in 23 years almost 30 per cent of the forest has disappeared (Sittenfeld & Villers, 1993) makes this a very serious threat. The magnitude of this loss motivated the creation of INBio (National Institute of Biodiversity) in 1989. This private, non-profit organization collects information about the nation's biodiversity as a way to promote its conservation and sustainable economic development.

Spain, on the other hand, also has a concern related to tourism, although traditionally this tourism has marketed sunny beaches. Nevertheless, national parks do exist in Spain and they occupy 8.4 per cent of the total territory. These protected areas are increasingly attracting visitors that are not interested just in sunny weather. Interestingly, not all the landscapes of the different Spanish national parks evoke the same feelings toward conservation. A survey conducted among visitors of the Doñana National Park in the south of Spain showed how the flat landscape with patches of water characteristic of this park was not the most preferred among the respondents. "(T)he majority of the population prefers mountain landscapes, luxuriant vegetation and different manifestations of water (waterfalls, lakes, rivers) while arid and/or flat landscapes are rejected" (Múgica & Vicente De Lucio, 1996).

Costa Rica: society and democracy

The "Switzerland of Central America", the only country in the region without an army (abolished in 1949), the most democratic country in Latin America. These are a few of the stereotypes for which this small Central American nation is known outside its borders. It is the second smallest country of Central America (after El Salvador), with 51,200 square kilometers (19,965 square miles).

Costa Rica is a culturally homogeneous nation, with a commonly shared religion, Roman Catholicism, the Spanish language, and Hispanic American culture (Biesanz, Biesanz & Biesanz, 1982, Hall 1985). Costa Rica, as many other developing countries, has an economy which depends on the export of two agricultural commodities: coffee and bananas, which bring in over half of Costa Rica's foreign profits (Ameringer, 1982; Hall, 1985). The emphasis in producing for an export market has condemned the country to have to import grain, fruit and vegetables that could have been produced in the areas where coffee and bananas are grown (Hall, 1985). Another consequence is the lack of a manufacturing industry, which leads to the necessity of more imports (Hall, 1985).

This dependence on one or two products has exposed Costa Rica to the risks of economic crisis, due to the impossibility of controlling the prices of the commodities in the international markets. This situation also puts the Costa Rican welfare state in jeopardy (Ameringer, 1982).

La Nación

La Nación was founded in 1947 by ANFE (acronym in Spanish for National Association of Enterprise Federations). According to the Editor and Publisher Yearbook (1997), *La Nación* has a yearly circulation of 113,219 issues, and is followed closely by *Diario Extra* (Table 1).

Table 1. Circulation of major Costa Rican daily newspapers.

Newspapers	Date founded	Circulation per year
La Prensa Libre	1889	56,000
La Nación	1946	113,219
La República	1950	67,500
Diario Extra	1978	100,000
El Heraldo	1994	10,000

Source: Editor and Publisher Yearbook, 1997.

Mass media are in private hands in Costa Rica. The government does not intervene in the content of the messages, whether it is information or opinion (Fonseca, 1976, p.40). The mass media firms serve a double purpose: as a public service as well as an enterprise. *La Nación* has changed from a disproportionate use of public and governmental information to cover more information about *barrios*, intermediate organizations, human problems, and publish columns about popular matters. The emphasis on economic news was also changed, to be able to cover social and cultural topics. (Fonseca, 1976, p. 42).

In 1994, Costa Rica had 260 radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants; 142 television receivers (sets) per 1,000 inhabitants (UNESCO, 1997); and 130 telephone lines[1] per 1,000 inhabitants (UN, 1997).

Spain: mastering passion with business

The extension of the Spanish peninsula is ten times bigger (500,000 square kilometers) than the Costa Rican isthmus. Many of what were once the usual customs in dealing with business or official matters, such as *vuelva usted mañana* (come back tomorrow), and the *siesta* times, have been relegated to small towns. The main cities in the country have been groomed in appearance and in manners to keep up with business and administration policies in the European Union.

After a three-year civil war, Spain was under Francisco Franco's dictatorship from 1939 until 1975. The country was so impoverished due to the war that Franco's initial response was to expand the industrial network without any foreign trade (Schubert, 1990). In 1959, however, the Economic Stabilization Plan put a stop to the autarkic policy. The 1960s were a period in which the Spanish economy took off at a rate of 6.6 per cent of yearly growth. Spain was transformed from an agricultural economy to an industrial one, in which the car company SEAT, created in 1950, went from producing 36,000 vehicles per year without any exports, to produce 700,000, of which more than a fifth were exported. Three important factors helped to achieve this *miracle*: "foreign investment, tourism and emigration" (Shubert, 1990, p.208).

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[1] UN definition for telephone line: it connects the subscriber's terminal equipment to the public switched network and has a dedicated port in the telephone exchange equipment.

Tourism quickly rouse from 6 million visitors in 1960 to 42 million in 1982. In 1997, Spain became the second country, after the US, in ranking of income due to tourism (Burgos, January 26, 1998) making tourism Spain's most important industry.

Spain became a full member of the European Common Market in January 1986, and since then it has tried to excel in industrial, manufacturing and farming activities, as well as in the tertiary sector of the economy. However, structural economic difficulties have kept Spain from reducing its high unemployment level below 20 per cent (Portugal & Zamora, January 26, 1998).

As in Costa Rica, agriculture is an important industry for Spain, with the difference that it is diversified with crops of cereals, olives, grapes, fruits and citric fruits, potatoes, and vegetables. However, agricultural products no longer account for a big percentage of the total exports, with 9 per cent in 1994 (UN, 1997).

Other indicators that can give insight to the social and economic situation of Spain are statistics about access to communication appliances in the population. Figures of radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants are not very different from those found in Costa Rica, but television receivers and telephone lines per 1,000 inhabitants do differ. There are 312 radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants; 402 television receivers per 1,000 inhabitants, as opposed to 142 in Costa Rica; and 371 telephone lines per 1,000 inhabitants, compared to 130 in Costa Rica[2] (UNESCO, 1997; UN, 1997).

El Pais

El Pais is a relatively young medium. However, it has been a strong one ever since its creation in May, 1976. Its foundation, in the midst of the Spanish political transition, was endorsed by many businessmen, intellectuals, and politicians who were supporting the establishment of democracy in the country. The first director of the newspaper, Juan Luis Cebrián, is of the opinion that "because *El País* was the first national daily that appeared after the death of Franco, and thanks to the intellectual and social support with which it was born, it was destined to play a specific role in the transition from the very beginning" (Cebrián, 1987, p. 99). Quite early on, *El País* overtook in circulation figures those of the other major Spanish newspapers (Table 2), and became the most sold both in daily and Sunday circulation.

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[2] Data from 1994.

Table 2. Average daily and Sunday circulation of major Spanish daily newspapers, in thousands.

Years	**El País**		**La Vanguardia**		**ABC**		**Diario 16**		**El Periódico**		**Ya**	
	D[3]	**S**	**D**	**S**	**D**	**S**	**D**	**S**	**D**	**S**	**D**	**S**
1975-76	-	-	220	287	186	398	-	-	-	-	168	253
1976-77	129	144	206	273	157	341	-	-	-	-	140	221
1977-78	128	181	196	266	136	290	59	-	-	-	124	198
1978-79	146	203	186	255	124	269	47	-	53	-	122	199
1979-80	184	263	188	268	131	290	51	-	72	-	118	195
1980-81	234	357	193	281	136	300	84	-	99	-	112	184
1982	296	471	196	303	127	283	125	-	112	155	110	169
1982-83	340	553	192	303	146	302	130	-	127	160	105	159
1984	347	583	194	308	157	300	128	180	128	161	96	145
1985	348	613	191	NA	219	342	130	192	137	184	88	132
1986	360	682	195	313	235	405	135	193	151	235	80	112
1987	373	758	195	316	247	415	137	183	154	246	75	104

Source: Cebrián, 1989.

ENVIRONMENTAL SYMBOLOGY

Within both developed and developing nations, one can only guess that there are sectors that will be active advocates of the environment at any given time, while others will just be perennially apathetic to it. Indeed, different sectors of the population will assign different meanings and understandings to the same reality.

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[3] For each newspaper, first column is daily circulation and second column is Sunday circulation.

Differences in cultures will determine how populations view their relationship with nature, and how important they think nature and the environment are to them. This is a social constructionist perspective, where what is emphasized is a certain view of reality, not reality in itself. As Greider and Garkovich (1971) put it, "every landscape is a symbolic environment" (p.1), and every person will understand that landscape according to those symbols and cultural backgrounds.

It does not take long for one to realize that environmental problems derive from how human beings interact with nature. Some sociologists argue that environmental problems have arisen due to a commonly held belief that man should have dominion over nature (Bodain, 1993; Warren, 1993). Western civilization, historically, has perceived nature as something outside of humans, something dangerous, something that should be dominated. Nature exists to serve society, and apart from that function it has no meaning.

It has been suggested that this relationship between human beings and nature has its roots in Christianity. Lynn White (1967) was the first proponent of the idea that the Christian doctrines not only set the basis for the detachment of man from nature "but also insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends" (p. 1205). Respect toward nature disappeared, as humans did not consider themselves part of the natural environment: "We are superior to nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our slightest whim" (p. 1206). The perception that humans have about themselves and about the environment is not only explained by a set of beliefs and values, but also by a certain social, economic, political and historical context (Burgess, Harrison & Malteny, 1991, p. 499).

The differences in social constructions could not only be found across cultural and national borders. One nation can have several groups within it that will interpret their immediate surroundings in different ways (a good example is found in Bultena & Taves, 1961). The importance of discerning the different meanings different groups have with respect to the environment is key in understanding which groups perceive certain environmental situations as problematic and the degree of importance they attach to these environmental concerns.

LEGITIMIZING ROLE OF THE MEDIA

The constructivist approach recognizes the importance of looking at different cultures as well as "how different publics negotiate and interpret the environmental meanings offered by media coverage" (Hansen, 1991, p. 446). What is important to stress here is the fact that these social meanings have their supporters, some with more power than others.

Social movements are born from the differences within a system and lead to potential social change. This change may be confirmed if, in the first place, the social movement is tolerated by the system (Olien, Tichenor & Donohue, 1989). The conflicts that arise from the social movement evoke questions of power allocation. The way the media respond to this situation does not quite correspond with the myth of a "watchdog" function. Instead, the media have the role of controlling the conflict, and hence, the social movement or movements that are behind it. Consequently, the emergence of a social movement that challenges the system will hardly receive coverage "until the movement has been legitimized in the system" (Olien et al., 1989, p. 149). In this situation, there will always be groups happy with the coverage they receive from the press, while other less established groups will view the media as less helpful and attentive. This is true for environmental issues as well.

To figure out which groups are the most established ones, a look at who the claimers of the different positions are, and what legitimacy they attain from the media, is necessary (Hannigan, 1995). Their view of reality will differ from other less established groups. Furthermore, if only the well established groups have access to the media, the views of the less established groups may be, partially or completely, ignored (Neuzil & Kovarik, 1996).

ENVIRONMENTAL PARADIGMS

The messages transmitted by the media also carry with them the values and beliefs of the journalists themselves. This does not necessarily mean that ideological positions will influence the tone of the stories. However, inherent values will enter the reporting of events in what Gans (1979) calls "reality judgments". Journalists, as human beings, make assumptions about reality and develop concepts to understand it. This is an unconscious process and because it is commonly shared by professionals in the field, it is usually taken for granted. It is seen as the 'truth' unless the issue becomes controversial, then journalists become aware that it is an opinion. As a result, the reality judgments "may be abandoned, moderated, or transformed into stands" (Gans, 1979, p.199).

Worldviews are also a very pervasive factor of how individuals will view their reality, without realizing that there are other ways of thinking. It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that one worldview can, and does, encompass several cultural approaches inherent to different social groups.

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Olsen, Lodwick and Dunlap (1992) define worldview as the 'mental lenses' with which we see the reality that surrounds us. Most members of society hold the same worldview, as it is "normally learned through socialization and social interaction, and is constantly being reinforced by the culture of our society throughout our lifetime" (Olsen et al., 1992, p. 13). According to the authors, worldviews are comprised of beliefs and the social values that are linked to them. Although they did not mention it, one can assume that the mass media play a crucial role in the development and construction of such worldviews.

Olsen et al. developed a list of components that exist in the dominant western worldview in comparison with what they consider an emerging post-industrial worldview in modern societies. Table 3 lists the value components of these worldviews. However, the paradigms encompass many other elements, which are fully explained in the coding procedure.

Table 3. Paradigm components

Post-Industrial Worldview	Dominant Western Worldview
Human development	Material accomplishments
Social effectiveness	Economic efficiency
Valuative rationality	Instrumental rationality
Human scale is better	Bigger is better
Qualitative goals	Quantitative goals
Cultural heterogeneity	Cultural homogeneity
Future-oriented	Present-oriented

Source: Olsen, Lodwick & Dunlap, 1992, p. 8

HYPOTHESES

Based on the foregoing literature, the following hypotheses were formulated:

H.1a - *The components present in the post-industrial worldview will appear more frequently in the stories about natural resource use that El Pais publishes, while*

H.1b - *the components present in the dominant western worldview will appear more frequently in the stories about natural resources that La Nación publishes.*

H.2a - *Stories whose claimers are private owners of land, or governmental agencies will present more components from the dominant western worldview than stories whose claimers are intergovernmental agencies, international environmental NGOs, or local or indigenous NGOs.*

H.2b - *Stories whose claimers are intergovernmental agencies, international environmental NGOs, or local or indigenous NGOs will present more components from the post-industrial worldview than stories whose claimers are owners or governmental agencies.*

METHODOLOGY

The on-line versions of *La Nación* and *El Pais* were selected to be analyzed because both of them are the leading papers in Costa Rica and Spain, respectively, and can be considered as representative of the issues being raised and/or considered important in each country. The sampling period was two complete months, August and September of 1997, during which stories and editorial cartoons that touched on any of the topics described below were selected. This yielded a total of 708 stories and one editorial cartoon. The following guidelines constituted the basis for selection. The stories covered issues about:

- Natural resources, which is defined as materials supplied by nature used to answer human needs. Included were stories about the exploitation of basic products such as water, coal, petrol and the development of the primary sector, which encompasses the agricultural and livestock industries. Stories of economic, political and social interest about natural resources were selected. However, stories strictly about labor concerns in these sectors were not included.

- National parks.
- Extinction of species (animals and plants).
- Extinction of ecosystems.

The coding procedure

The content analysis for this research was performed taking both the manifest and the latent content into consideration. However, no inferences were made beyond what was actually present in each story. The main step to ensure reliability was having a sample of stories coded by three Spanish-speaking coders. A second intercoder reliability test was needed, and it achieved Scott's pi values close to 80 per cent of agreement not due to chance, and a composite reliability score of .92. Once the coding scheme was refined all the stories were coded by the author.

The main problem in this study was the difficulty in coding the stories according to the set of arguments that distinguish the post-industrial worldview from the dominant western worldview. The initial plan was to assign each natural resource story to either a post-industrial or dominant paradigm model and classify each story component in the same way. However, initial examination showed that many stories did not contain a number of the classification themes, and so could not be coded. The final strategy was to code each component only if it was present.

For the scope of this article, two independent variables are considered. First of all, the **newspaper** in which the stories appeared. If the story was published in *La*

Nación's web site, it was coded 1; if published in the web site of *El País*, it was coded 2.

The **main claimer** of the story refers to the point of view that gets the most coverage of all the actors that are considered for the purpose of this study: was the private owners, coded 1; governmental agencies, 2; intergovernmental agencies, 3; international non-governmental organizations, 4; and indigenous or local NGOs or communities, 5.

The dependent variables which comprise the post-industrial and the dominant western worldviews were modifications of Olsen et al.'s original conceptions. Of their eight original categories, seven are most relevant to this study. These are: environmental, technological, work, economic, political, interpersonal, and value components. Each one of the categories includes several elements, listed in Table 4, the presence of which in each story was identified using a binary code:

- 0 if the element selected does not appear and

- 1 if the element selected does appear.

To better explain how the elements were coded as 0s or 1s, especially taking into consideration that the latent content was also examined, selected examples and further explanation is provided (for more detailed information see Corbin, 1998). In the case of whether the story implies or mentions that "humans are part of the earth's ecosystem and must live within nature", here is an example that was considered to be present, and coded 1.

> The u'wa people —u'wa refers to the people who think—, a very religious community, say that their God, Sira, asked them to look after that land, under which the heart of the universe is hiding. (se2_p1)

Table 4. Worldview elements of both models.

POST-INDUSTRIAL WORLDVIEW	DOMINANT WESTERN WORLDVIEW
Environmental components	
Humans are part of nature	Humans control nature
Nature is valuable in itself	Nature is only valuable if it gives resources
Natural resources are limited	Natural resources are ample
World population must be controlled	Size of world population will not affect NR
Technological components	
Most adequate technology	Most advanced technology
There's always a need to assess the use of technology	NR will not decrease because of use of more and more technology
For every solved problem technology creates new ones	Technology solves most problems
Work components	
Creation of jobs that will not hinder NR	Creation of jobs is more important than depletion of NR
There is no need for job specialization nor division of labor	There is a need for job specialization and division of labor
Economic components	
Exploitation of NR for human needs	Exploitation of NR to maximize profits
There should be limits to economic growth due to ecological concerns	The story mentions "no limits" to economic growth
Defense of voluntary simplicity	Defense of maximizing consumption and personal income
Political components	
Role of decentralized government	Role of centralized government
Decisions should be / are made by citizens based on valuative concerns	Decisions should be / are made by experts based on factual knowledge
Authority is / should be non-hierarchical and participatory	Authority is / should be hierarchically structured
Interpersonal components	
Community activity or initiative	Individual activity or initiative
Organizational components	
Town is positively viewed	City is positively viewed
Value components	
Human development	Material accomplishment
Well-being of human society	Cost / benefit of any human activity
Human scale is better	Bigger is better
Values, traditions of other cultures	Values, traditions of one culture
Concern about future state of NR	Concern only about present state of NR

To fully understand this post-industrial element as well as its opposite from the dominant paradigm, another example is provided, this time to illustrate the presence of "humans can control nature and exploit it for their needs." This would include even the delimitation of areas in nature designated to be protected, such as national parks .

> Two internal reports of the Environmental Ministry, dated in April and May, respectively, sustain that hunting in the Picos de Europa National Park is illegal, unless the beats are justified for sanitary reasons or excessive population of the species that inhabit the park.(se23_p3)

In some cases, one same passage of a story illustrates both seemingly opposing elements. The content of the next example was coded 1 both for "ownership of natural resources is operated to serve human needs" and "ownership of natural resources is operated on the basis of maximizing profits."

> After decades of deforestation, Central Americans have now turned their eyes to the rain forest, which could become a source of wealth as well as a provider of beautiful scenery for the 30 million inhabitants of the region. (se21_n6) (original in English).

'Beautiful scenery' is considered to fulfill a human need, however the rain forest is also considered as a 'source of wealth'.

> In the political category, the item "decisions should be made by experts, based on factual knowledge", was coded as being present for the following paragraph.

> The civil servant said that every year the northwestern areas suffer from droughts, but the farmers, even though they know about it, sow between May and September, and always loose their crops. Now, she added, the experts from the Agriculture Ministry and the Nicaraguan Institute of Agricultural Techniques (INTA) are recommending them to only sow between September and November, known here as the last sowing. (ag15_n6)

To make the value category clearer one example was selected. The next paragraph illustrates what is meant by "human development".

> The mystical experience of communion with nature is one of the most wonderful feelings that the park can provide, and that is only possible in silence and solitude, not in the noise of engines or shouting of the big groups. Those who are looking for that spiritual good will always be willing to pay the price for the physical effort of walking by foot the steep paths.(se10-p3)

In this example, it is clear that "human development" refers to the amount of personal satisfaction that an individual gains through different activities, but not in any way related to the amount of possessions.

ANALYSIS

Frequencies of the variables

From a total of 709 stories, 521 articles were selected from *La Nación* (73.5 per cent), while only 188 stories from *El País* were considered relevant to this study. The reasons for this extreme difference lie in the fact that *La Nación's* web site offered each day more stories than the web site of *El País*. However, it is also necessary to point out that in relative terms, *La Nación* also offered a higher percentage of stories dealing with issues pertinent to this study.

Table 5. Proportion of articles selected

Newspaper	Total stories August	Selected stories August	Total stories September	Selected stories September	Total % stories selected
El País	2,563	87 (3.39 %)	3,212	102 (3.17 %)	3.27 %
La Nación	3,894	280 (7.20 %)	3,715	239 (6.40 %)	6.80 %

As is seen in Table 5, in both newspapers the overall percentage of stories dealing with natural resources is less than 7 per cent, which suggests that this is not a main issue for either one of the on-line media, who dedicate a higher number of stories to other topics. Despite the fact that the sample size is relatively big, it is important to keep in mind the low representation that these stories have in the bulk of news that each media publishes.

The main claimer in a majority of stories (62.9 per cent) was the governmental agencies. The private owners and the indigenous-local NGOs share the second position with a 14.5 per cent each. The intergovernmental agencies appeared as the main claimer of the story in 6.5 per cent of the articles, while the international NGOs only appeared in 11 stories (1.7 per cent). Nevertheless, in 46 stories it was not feasible to assign a main claimer, as not enough information was provided, or in some cases there were no identifiable actors in the whole story.

Dependent variables

Several of the elements that are included in the paradigms were not mentioned in the stories very often. This means that both in the dominant paradigm and in the post-industrial paradigm, the corresponding items were coded 0. It is interesting that only certain themes are being raised by these two newspapers, while other ones have been disregarded and set aside. As is seen in Table 6, the themes that appear most often are the environmental category (with the exception of the population elements), the political and the economic categories. On the other hand, the technological, interpersonal, organizational and work issues do not appear often in the stories selected. The value category is divided, as some elements have a high presence while others have a low presence. It seems, though, that basically economic and political themes, as well as a few environmental and value elements, are the ones that emerge the most.

Table 6. Presence of worldview items in the selected stories

POST-INDUSTRIAL WORLDVIEW		DOMINANT WESTERN WORLDVIEW	
Environmental components			
Humans are part of nature	X	XXXXXXX	Humans control nature
Nature is valuable in itself	XX	XXXXXX	Nature is only valuable if it gives resources
Natural resources are limited	X	X	Natural resources are ample
World population must be controlled	*		Size of world population will not affect NR
Technological components			
Most adequate technology	X	X	Most advanced technology
There's always a need to assess the use of technology	X	*	NR will not decrease because of use of more and more technology
For every solved problem technology creates new ones	*	*	Technology solves most problems
Work components			
Creation of jobs that will not hinder NR	*	*	Creation of jobs is more important than depletion of NR
There is no need for job specialization nor division of labor	*	*	There is a need for job specialization and division of labor
Economic components			
Exploitation of NR for human needs	XXX	XXXXX	Exploitation of NR to maximize profits
There should be limits to economic growth due to ecological concerns	X	*	The story mentions "no limits" to economic growth
Defense of voluntary simplicity	*	*	Defense of maximizing consumption and personal income
Political components			
Role of decentralized government	X	XXXXXX	Role of centralized government
Decisions should be / are made by citizens based on valuative concerns	X	XXXXXX	Decisions should be / are made by experts based on factual knowledge
Authority is / should be non-hierarchical and participatory	XX	X	Authority is / should be hierarchically structured
Interpersonal components			
Community activity or initiative	X	*	Individual activity or initiative

Table 6. (Continue)

POST-INDUSTRIAL WORLDVIEW		**DOMINANT WESTERN WORLDVIEW**	
Organizational components			
Town is positively viewed	*	*	City is positively viewed
Value components			
Human development	*	XXXXXX	Material accomplishment
Well-being of human society	XXXXX	XXXXX	Cost / benefit of any human activity
Human scale is better	*	X	Bigger is better
Values, traditions of other cultures	*	*	Values, traditions of one culture
Concern about future state of NR	XXXX	XX	Concern only about present state of NR

To be able to test which of the two paradigms was most prevalent in the stories selected, scores of the elements were computed. A score consists of a measurement of added items, whether the items measure the same thing or not, or whether all items head in the same direction or not. This is different from a scale, in which a reliability test would ensure that all items do indeed measure the same thing. The decision to compute scores versus scales lies in the fact that it is assumed that most stories will have a combination of both paradigms.

The first step was to create a score for each category in which there would be the dominant versus the post-industrial score, and afterwards an overall score for both paradigms that would include all the categories under the dominant paradigm, on one hand, and all the categories of the post-industrial paradigm, on the other hand.

The main difference between the two overall scores, which can be seen more clearly in Figures 1 and 2, is the almost normal distribution of the dominant score, versus the skewed distribution of the post-industrial score. This is explained by the great amount of stories (168) that do not contain any element of the post-industrial paradigm, which represent 23.7 per cent of the sample. The next 35.1 per cent are stories that contain 1 or 2 post-industrial elements. In other words, almost 60 per cent of the stories present 2 or fewer elements of the post-industrial paradigm.



Figure 1. Distribution of the dominant worldview score



Figure 2. Distribution of the post-industrial worldview score

HYPOTHESES TESTING

H 1a - *The components present in the post-industrial worldview will appear more frequently in the stories about natural resource use that El País publishes, while*

H 1b - *The components present in the dominant western worldview will appear more frequently in the stories about natural resources that La Nación publishes.*

As is seen in Table 7, hypothesis 1a is supported since *El País* presents a higher number of post-industrial components. The mean difference of the post-industrial score is -0.9702, and this is significant at the 0.001 level. Meanwhile, the mean difference between both newspapers for the dominant score is -0.1232, which is not significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed test). Thus, hypothesis 1b is rejected.

Table 7. T-test for mean differences between both newspapers in overall scores

Overall scores	La Nación mean	El País mean	Mean differences	T-value	p-value
Dominant	5.9194	6.0426	-0.1232	-.53	.296
Post-industrial	2.4607	3.4309	-0.9702	-3.71	.000

In addition to the analysis using overall scores, each category was examined to see whether they follow the same pattern, using as well one-tailed tests. As Table 8 indicates, there are only three categorical scores that follow the same trend as the overall score: the environmental, the technological and the value categories. The scores that measured the economic, interpersonal, organizational and work categories did not yield a significant difference for either of the two paradigms. The interesting finding is that for the political score, the mean difference between the two newspapers was significant for both paradigms. However, not as hypothesized since *El País* scored higher in the dominant as well as in the post-industrial paradigms.

Table 8. T-test for mean differences between both newspapers in categorical scores

Categorical scores	La Nación mean	El País mean	Mean differences	T-value	p-value
deconom[4]	0.5067	0.5479	-0.0412	-.73	.233
peconom	0.5125	0.5532	-0.0407	.68	.247
denviron	1.4760	1.4043	0.0717	1.05	.147
penviron	0.3109	0.5745	-0.2636	-3.66	.000
ditrper	0.0403	0.0372	0.0031	.19	.426
pitrper	0.1459	0.1383	0.0076	.25	.400
dorganiz	0.0000	0.0106	-0.0106	-1.42	.079
porganiz	0.0115	0.0160	-0.0045	-.47	.321
dpolit	1.3493	1.6170	-0.3204	-3.42	.000
ppolit	0.4568	0.6809	-0.2241	-3.43	.000
dtechnol	0.1766	0.1436	0.0330	.70	.243
ptechnol	0.2668	0.5213	-0.2545	-3.60	.000
dvalue	1.3913	1.3032	0.0881	.85	.198
pvalue	0.7486	0.9415	-0.1929	-2.70	.003
dwork	0.9789	0.9787	0.0002	.01	.494
pwork	0.0077	0.0053	0.0024	.25	.403

The results suggest that *El País* is presenting more often than *La Nación* ideas of the post-industrial worldview, but the dominant worldview is just as prevalent in both newspapers. The post-industrial worldview is not taking the place of the dominant worldview in *El País*.

H.2a - *Stories whose claimers are private owners or governmental agencies will present more components from the dominant western worldview than stories whose main claimer is intergovernmental agencies, international environmental NGOs, or local or indigenous NGOs.*

H.2b - *Stories whose claimers are intergovernmental agencies, international environmental NGOs, or local or indigenous NGOs will present more components*

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[4] The first letter of each categorical score identifies whether it represents the dominant worldview (d) or the post-industrial worldview (p).

from the post-industrial worldview than stories whose main claimers are private owners or governmental agencies.

The results in Table 9 indicate significant differences between the main claimer groups for both overall scores. The owner and government group scored higher in the dominant score than the NGO and agency group, with a mean difference of 1.6766. On the other hand, the NGO and agency group achieved a higher score in the post-industrial score than the owner/government group, with a mean difference of -2.6292. Both mean differences are significant at the 0.01 level, which means that both hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b are supported.

Table 9. T-test for mean differences between main claimers in overall scores

Overall scores	Owner/gov mean	NGO/agency mean	Mean differences	T-value	p-value
Dominant	6.5166	4.8400	1.6766	7.83	.000
Post-industrial	2.0175	4.6467	-2.6292	-10.43	.000

A more in-depth analysis of the different categories indicates that a majority of the categorical scores follow the same pattern as the overall scores, and that there is no major opposite tendency (Table 10). The economic, environmental, political, technological, and value scores present significant differences between the claimer groups, and all of them indicate that the owner and government group scores higher on the dominant paradigm, while the NGO and agency group scores higher on the post-industrial paradigm. The interpersonal category follows the same tendency showing a high post-industrial score for the NGO/agency group (significant at the 0.001 level). However, even though the owner and government group is higher on the dominant paradigm for the interpersonal category the significance level is only 0.07.

Table 10. T-test for mean differences between main claimers for categorical scores

Categorical scores	Owner/gov mean	NGO/agency mean	Mean differences	T-value	p-value
deconom	0.6335	0.2200	0.4135	8.66	.000
peconom	0.4288	0.7933	-0.3645	-6.51	.000
denviron	1.5283	1.3600	0.1683	2.27	.011
penviron	0.2398	0.5867	-0.3469	-4.48	.000
ditrper	0.0409	0.0200	0.0209	1.45	.074
pitrper	0.0682	0.4333	-0.3651	-8.67	.000
dorganiz	0.0039	0.0000	0.0039	.77	.222
porganiz	0.0078	0.0200	-0.0122	-1.01	.157
dpolit	1.5906	1.2067	0.3839	5.15	.000
ppolit	0.3684	1.1467	-0.7783	-9.79	.000
dtechnol	0.1969	0.1000	0.0969	2.25	.012
ptechnol	0.2768	0.4733	-0.1965	-2.62	.005
dvalue	1.5497	0.9400	0.6097	6.20	.000
pvalue	0.6179	1.2333	-0.6154	-8.74	.000
dwork	0.9727	0.9933	-0.0206	-2.10	.018
pwork	0.0097	0.0000	0.0097	.90	.183

The score composed of the work elements shows an interesting unexpected result, with the NGO/agency group scoring higher on the dominant paradigm. The post-industrial paradigm presents no significant difference between the claimers. The organizational category is the only one in which there is no significant difference between the claimers. In general, this last set of hypotheses is supported by the results of the t-tests.

DISCUSSION

Olsen et al. (1992) suggested that the post-industrial paradigm is an emerging set of beliefs and values which is starting to coexist with the dominant western worldview. The authors also mentioned that this new worldview is predominantly taking place in the modern industrialized societies. Even though this study cannot make a generalization in that sense, it does show that out of the two on-line newspapers the Spanish daily *El País* did present a higher amount of post-industrial themes than the Costa Rican daily *La Nación*.

The outcome for the dominant western worldview was different than expected between both newspapers. Results indicate that the dominant paradigm is equally prevalent in both papers. This is evidence that the beliefs and values related to the more capitalistic and money-driven worldview are widespread in these two media. Very possibly, this can be related also to the fact that if the post-industrial paradigm is an emerging one, most of the values and beliefs that get reported on, will still get portrayed through the dominant paradigm's "mental lenses".

It is important to indicate the well-defined differences between the main claimers of the stories, as well as an unbalanced amount of stories in both groups. Leading were the stories whose main claimer was governmental agencies, which along with those of private owners accounted for 77.4 per cent of the sample. This result seems to be in line with Neuzil and Kovarik (1996) who suggested that if only the well established groups have access to the media, the views of the less established groups may be ignored. The scope of this study cannot determine which actors have greater access to the two newspapers selected. Nevertheless, it has identified which actors are getting more coverage, and those certainly seem to be well-established groups.

As was hypothesized, the dominant worldview appears more often in those stories whose main claimers are governmental agencies or private owners, while the post-industrial conception of the world is present more frequently in stories whose main claimers are NGOs or intergovernmental agencies. These groups maintain a certain position towards the exploitation of natural resources according, not only to a set of beliefs and values, but also to certain social, economic, political and historical context (Burgess et al., 1991).

CONCLUSION

It is found that only certain themes are crucial factors in determining the belonging to a certain worldview. Olsen et al. (1992) assumed that the most important theme in which the emergence of a new paradigm would occur would be the ecological realm, but they did not believe "that a paradigm change in that realm is necessarily —at least at the present time— carrying over into other realms of life such as economic and political systems, organizational structures, or interpersonal interaction" (Olsen et al., p.8). This study cannot disregard the importance that some of these areas have in discerning between the paradigms. Nevertheless, it appears that the interpersonal, organizational and work categories do not help in that task.

It is possible to assume that the emergence of post-industrial ideas will be limited to certain areas of life, as for example environmental concerns and economic systems, while in other realms the post-industrial paradigm will hardly appear. This study cannot prove whether the post-industrial worldview is in fact emerging and shifting the dominant paradigm out of place. Rather, the findings suggest another possibility. The post-industrial themes may very well appear in certain affairs but without ever defeating the dominant paradigm. Furthermore, it will lead to a coexistence in which the dominant western worldview will maintain its position, while the post-industrial approach to the world will also exist but to a lower degree.

It is important to relate this situation to the advocates of each worldview. In the case of the sample studied, the articles in which private owners or sources from any governmental offices are the main claimers tend to show a higher number of themes from the dominant western worldview. On the other hand, stories that covered to a wider extent the point of view of NGOs or intergovernmental agencies had more elements from the nature-concerned and humanistic post-industrial worldview.

Certainly, governmental agencies and private owners will maintain a capitalistic-oriented philosophy which is the most appropriate to their needs and goals. The other actors identified in this study (NGOs and intergovernmental agencies) consider that nature concerns as well as human needs and values are more important than money making. However, they have a low representation in the sample studied, and possibly their views will not be adopted by the majority of the population. This alone suggests that the dominant western worldview will remain as the main way of thinking.

Overall, Olsen et al.'s model of two contrasting paradigms is effective in identifying themes that depart from the general philosophy of success and happiness in life related to competitiveness and the strive for lucrative businesses. They are also accurate in assuming that the post-industrial worldview is appearing only in some very specific realms of life and not in every aspect. However, the post-industrial worldview may never overthrow the dominant worldview. Rather, it may just be a phase of concern about the environment and the way human beings behave in relation to it.

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Web addresses of the two on-line newspapers

El País: http://www.elpais.es
La Nación: http://www.nacion.co.cr

Can the leopard change its spots: Parliamentarians' attitudes about press freedom in Zambia

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ABSTRACT

Democracies have a free press. In Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda's humanism defined the role of the individual and the press. Zambians experience greater freedom since multiparty elections in 1991 but humanism has shaped the values of current leaders.

This paper quantitatively investigates support for the press among the Zambian Parliament. Regression models show that perceptions of media accuracy and fairness are not indicators of press support. Zambia must experience intergenerational value changes to overcome Kaunda's humanism.

Can the leopard change its spots: Parliamentarians' attitudes about press freedom in Zambia

Introduction

Informing citizens as to what their government is doing and enabling them to make an informed electoral choice has been a goal of the press in Western culture, particularly in the United States. This idea has not however been universally adopted by countries in the developing world where democracies may assume a Western facade but don't necessarily operate in the same manner. When media are not free of government interference, they are unable neither to foster democracy by creating an informed citizenry nor to act as watchdogs of government. Most of Africa's journalists work for media either owned or tightly controlled by the state. Professional performance has been overshadowed by journalists' need to obey government orders to survive (Kasoma, 1994).

In Africa, the political climate has made it easier for journalists to align themselves with the government as propagandists for the ruling elite (Kasoma, 1994). Mwaura (1994) notes that governments in Africa have devised a labyrinth of measures and dirty tricks to control the media. Politicians think of the press as a tool of service for the government and the politicians in the government. When not working for the government, journalists are viewed as troublemakers (Mwaura, 1994). The longer the government remains in power, the more dictatorial it becomes in its efforts to pressure the media to conform to its wishes (Kasoma, 1995).

Literature Review

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In Zambia in particular, a country described as a "model of peaceful transition in (the) changing of governments" (Deasis & Yikona, 1994), recent government changes and economic reforms have failed to guarantee press reform. Multiparty elections in 1991, ended 28 years of governance by Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP). Under Kaunda, the patriarch of Zambian independence, Zambia operated with a socialist government founded by "...simple nationalists... {who} relied heavily on the practices and laws which were in place prior to independence... (Moore, 1991, p. 4). The government of Zambia was characterized as an authoritarian style of government. All print and broadcast media were operated by the state (Chirwa, 1996).

Not only did Kenneth Kaunda's government literally control the press, Kaunda's philosophy of humanism defined the role of the individual and the press. Moore (1991, p. 3), quoting from Zambia's *Second Republic* description of the government's humanist philosophy, notes that ". . . whatever his station in life--(MAN) has a place in society. Everyone regards himself as subordinate to his community and not above it." At the dedication of the Zambia Institute of Mass Communication, a government sponsored agency to provide training to working journalists, Kaunda placed the press squarely within his humanist philosophy:

> the journalist profession, in all its ramifications and specifications, must develop as an integral part of humanist transformation of Zambia just as those who practice it are an integral part of its people (Kasoma, 1997, p. 136).

Kaunda's humanistic perspective is not inconsistent with African thinking. Kasoma, writing about ethical perspectives among Black Africans, notes that, "for the African, it is survival of the family clan that is more important than that of the individual (1994, p. 27). When group

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values supersede individual rights, there is less societal tolerance for reporters maintaining a value system inconsistent with societal standards. It is no wonder that ethical traditions of the United States press, such as fairness and honesty, have been found of little value to reporters in Zambia (Kasoma, 1994).

An explanation not only for the impact of clan values over individual values, but also for Kaunda's humanistic perspective comes from Inglehart (1990) who notes that personal values derive from a scarcity hypothesis and a socialization hypothesis. The scarcity of resources, including food and water, molds one's values. Additionally, one's basic values reflect the conditions prevailing during one's preadult years, the socialization factor. Zambians experience resource scarcity; they are readily impacted by natural disasters that result in decreased food production or availability of clean water. Quality of life resources such as adequate housing, medicine, roads, and reliable transporation as absent from the lives of many Zambians. Socialization involves gradual change in fundamental values, perhaps over the course of a generation as elders are replaced by a younger generation (Inglehart, 1990). Current government leaders in Zambia received preadult socialization either during the British colonial period or during Kaunda's humanism.

Pratt and Manheim (1988) note the tendency of Africans to organize activities in group or interpersonal settings. This closeness, they suggest, comes close to resembling group think, "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative choices of action" (Janis, 1977, p. 9). Group think, if it is present, might be one more contributing explanation as to why Western journalism ethics are not readily adopted.

Zambia's decaying economy and infrastructure, including food riots and looting, university demonstrations, and an attempted coup, accelerated calls for the end of UNIP's domination and the return to multiparty elections (Chirwa, 1996). Multiparty elections saw the rise of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) and the election of Frederick Chiluba as President of Zambia. The MMD party campaigned on the platform of individual rights. According to the MMD Manifesto, the party was "determined and fully committed to ensuring that basic and universally recognised (sic) human rights are enshrined in the Constitution--the right to life; privacy of property; freedom of conscience and the freedoms of expression, association and worship." (In Chirwa, p. 11)

The Zambian press has gained significant freedom under the MMD government. The sheer number of newspapers being published has increased. Chirwa notes:

> It can thus be stated that since 1991, Zambia has witnessed the birth of such newspapers as *The Weekly Express*, successor of *The Daily Express* and *The Sunday Express*, *The Post* successor of *The Weekly Post*, *Zambia Crime News* fore-runner of *The Confidential*, *The Sun*, *The National Herald*, *The Weekly Standard*, *The Eagle Express*, *The Chronicle* and *Sport On Monday*. The (paper's) motto . . . is indicative of the character of the newspaper. Thus *The Post* "The paper that digs deeper"; *The Weekly Express* "We have nothing to hide"; *The Sun*, "An independent weekly"; *The Weekly Standard* "Truth and Justice"; *The National Herald* "On views of public interest", etc. (p. 9).

The MMD however has not been the champion of press rights that some observers expected (Chirwa, 1996 and Ogundimu, 1997). The Zambia Independent Media Association (ZIMA) and Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) commissioned a review of press freedom from 1991-1996, the first term of the President Chiluba's MMD government which is referred to as *The Third Republic*. In the report's executive summary, ZIMA/MISA conclude, "The government has been accused of stifling freedom of the Press and of providing a poor environment to the media personnel for them to effectively make the government demonstrate its avowed transparency and accountability" (Chirwa, 1996, p. 3) The report includes a call for ". . . government to stop its intolerance against the Press as demonstrated by incidents of wanton harassment, intimidation and arrest of independent media personnel." (pgs. 4-5)

MMD efforts to limit press coverage range from content control through prohibitions on advertising by opposition political parties in state run media, including Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Banda, 1997), to the seizure of issue 401 of *The Post* newspaper on February 5, 1996 (Chirwa, 1996). Perhaps the most far-reaching action was the MMD government's announcement of a media council to regulate the media ("Zambia media association," 1997). The government released a draft of the Media Council of Zambia (MCZ) bill that would have created minimum educational standards for reporters and would have established a reporter licensing standard ("Alarm over Zambia," 1997). The justification for the press council centers on the government's claim that some Zambians lack patriotism and fail to support the government. Deputy Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services Ernest Mwansa told members of Parliament that a press council was necessary "to promote democracy and freedom of the press" ("Alarm over Zambia," 1997) .

Some members of the press charge that the Chiluba government is corrupt and seeks to stifle criticism. Editor of *The Post*, Fred M'membe, claimed that Chiluba ran a corrupt government fearful of an independent press....("Alarm over Zambia," 1997).

For an outside observer, it should not be surprising that President Frederick Chiluba's government might attempt to suppress press freedom. That is, after all, the model by which the former government of Zambia operated. Governments in many other countries in Africa have historically operated in this manner. Zambian's again live in a multiparty democracy, but the quarter-century of Kenneth Kaunda's humanism permeated not only government but socialized all levels of Zambian society and likely created the perspective from which members of the MMD government view the media and the need for media regulation. Zambia Congress of Trade Unions President Fackson Shamenda noted that the media council bill was "a glaring attempt by government to kill journalism in Zambia and to remove the only watchdog the people have to check government (Wendo, 1997).

It should not be surprising that the MMD government, through Zambia's Parliament, has proposed media regulation. While the majority of the members of Parliament are now members of the MMD party, those members were educated under the humanist model espoused by Kenneth Kaunda, a model that promotes the community over the individual. Also, the newness of multiparty democracy and a free press in Zambia are likely to result in bruised egos as current and former government officials, bureaucrats, and businessmen find themselves being written about in the independent newspapers----perhaps in unflattering terms.

This paper will report the results of an investigation into the attitudes of elected members of the Zambian National Parliament about press freedom and press regulation. The following research questions will be addressed:

(1) What level of support do members of the Zambian Parliament have for a free press in Zambia?

(2) Do member of the Zambian Parliament support a press council to regulate the media?

(3) Do members of Parliament support increased press freedom?

Contemporary Zambia

Despite vast improvements in personal freedom and economic reform in Zambia, the press is still hobbled (Kasoma, 1997). *The Times of Zambia* and *The Zambia Daily Mail*, two of the three most widely read newspapers in the country, continue to be government run. When a member of Parliament representing the opposition Nationalist Party proposed selling the government-run newspapers as well as Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), Zambia Information Services and Zambia News Agency, the matter was quickly rejected by the MMD dominated Parliament ("State puts foot down," 1997).

The only other daily newspaper in Zambia is *The Post*, an independent paper with a strong anti-government agenda. That agenda is perhaps so strong as to prohibit the paper from assuming the position of "balanced voice" in the country.

Zambia's only national broadcasting service, ZNBC, is government run. ZNBC television broadcasts from studios in Lusaka and Kitwe. All areas of the country do not receive a television signal. Government radio consists of three services, Radio One, a vernacular service broadcasting in the seven dominant local languages; Radio Two, primarily airing English language programming; and Radio Four, FM service primarily for residents along the line-of rail towns of Livingstone, Lusaka, N'dola, and Kitwe (Banda, 1997).

Only three private radio stations operate in the entire country and two of those are affiliated with religious organizations. Radio Phoenix, a privately-owned commercial FM service, broadcasts from Lusaka. Radio Christian Voice, a noncommercial religious service, is licensed to

UK-based Christian Vision and broadcasts in Lusaka on FM and covers much of the African continent via shortwave. Radio Icengelo, a religious station licensed to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Ndola, broadcasts on FM to the Copperbelt towns of N'dola and Kitwe. Wireless cable and satellite dishes are available only to the wealthiest sector of the population through a partnership between ZNBC and South Africa's MultiChoice Entertainment (Banda, 1997)

Methodology

Assessing the attitudes of members of Parliament of the Republic of Zambia resulted in the creation of a three page survey that was distributed to the membership. During the spring of 1997, a mail survey was created for distribution to the members of Parliament. Distribution of such an instrument is relatively easy in the United States. A researcher may obtain a mailing list from the government printing office, contact elected officials' offices individually, obtain the information from a variety of special interest groups, or locate the information via the World Wide Web. In Zambia, an accessaible database of elected officials does not readily exist. Additionally, telephone service is limited, especially in the rural areas, and postal service does not include door-to-door delivery service in the capital of Lusaka, much less in the rural areas.

Telephone calls to the Clerk of the National Assembly of Zambia (the national parliament assembly building) resulted in the researcher being turned down in a request to obtain a mailing list. Whether the result of the previous regime's control over information, the desire to limit contact with members of Parliament by citizens or outsiders, or the slow nature of information gathering and distribution, a mailing list containing names and addresses of members of Parliament was not available from an official Zambian government source. Eventually, the researcher obtained a membership list from the political officer at the U.S. Embassy to Zambia. The First Clerk of the National Assembly agreed to allow distribution of the questionnaires to members of Parliament through the members' "pigeon holes" at the National Assemble Building. Officials at the National Assembly reported that this was the first time permission had been granted to allow data collection through the National Assembly building.

The surveys, along with personalized cover letters of explanation and stamped and addressed reply envelopes, were distributed to 144 members of Parliament. (There are 150 seats in the Zambian Parliament; four seats were vacant due to the deaths of members and two members were determined to be so seriously ill as to be nonparticipative.) The return envelope contained an address at a local post office in Lusaka. It was not feasible to send postcard reminders to encourage replies. Over a period of 12 weeks, 58 questionnaires were received producing a response rate of 40.28%. The last five questionnaires arrived just nine days before an attempted coup ("Zambian President foils," 1997).

The fundamental issue addressed in the questionnaire was the level of Parliamentary support for the media in Zambia. Support was measured by three dependent variables: the support for press freedom in Zambia, the suitability of a press council to review press operations, and the source for press regulation. These dependent variables were measured through level of agreement with the following statements: *Press freedom in Zambia should be increased. A press council, capable of reviewing the operations of the press, would be a suitable way to allow press freedom*. A one-through-five Likert Scale containing the options strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree, and strongly agree was used. Additionally, the forced-choice question, *"Who should regulate the media?"* was used. Respondent answer choices were Parliament, government, a ministry, the public, or the media should self-regulate .

The independent variables were measured as follows:

Parliamentarians' perceptions of bias in news reporting. Each member of Parliament was asked to respond to the statements, "Newspaper news reporting is unbiased" and "Broadcast news reporting is unbiased." A five-point scale ranging from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) was used. The midpoint was labeled undecided.

Parliamentarians' perceptions of accuracy in news reporting. Each member of Parliament was asked to respond to the following statements, "Newspaper news reporting is accurate" and "Broadcast news reporting is accurate." A five-point scale ranging from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) was used. The midpoint was labeled undecided.

Parliamentarians' views of citizen involvement in the democratic process. The item used stated, "Giving people more say in important government policy decisions is important." Each member of Parliament was asked to respond to the following statements with a five-point scale ranging from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1). The midpoint was labeled undecided.

Members of Parliament's perceptions of their relationship with the media. Each member of Parliament was asked to respond to the statement, "Legislators and members of the media can develop a wide range of relationships. Where would you place yourself with respect to your own overall relationship with representatives of the media?" A seven-point scale from (7) friendly relationship to (1) unfavorable relationship. The midpoint was labeled unsure of the relationship.

Age. Each respondent was asked, "What is the year of your birth?"

Gender. Each respondent was asked, "What is your gender?"

Tolerance for other points of view. Each member of parliament was asked to respond to the following statement, "I enjoy discussing ideas with other people even when I disagree with them." A five-point scale ranging from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) was used. The midpoint was labeled undecided.

Cognitive processing. Each member of parliament was asked to respond to the following statement, "I find a lot of satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours." A five-point scale ranging from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) was used. The midpoint was labeled undecided.

Source of information. Each Parliamentarian was asked, "Which of the following is your most important media source for information?" The answer selections were radio, television, newspapers, or other.

Preferred radio source. Each Parliamentarian was asked, "If you listen to the radio for news and information, which radio station or service is your preferred choice for news and information?" The answer choices were Radio 1, ZNBC; Radio 2, ZNBC; Radio 4, ZNBC; Radio Phoenix; Radio Christian Voice; International, BBC, VOA, etc...

ZNBC television news viewership. Each Parliamentarian was asked, "Do you regularly watch ZNBC television news? (At least four times each week.)"

Personal value type. Inglehart's short version, four-item scale was used to determine personal value type. Respondents were asked to rank order four goals according to their importance. The goals were maintaining order in the nation, giving people more say in important decisions, fighting rising prices, and protecting freedom of speech (Inglehart, 1990).

U.S. or European readers may wonder why obvious independent variables such as political party identification and ideology were not identified. About 90 percent of the members of

Parliament in Zambia belong to the Movement for Multiparty Democracy. Knowing this, it was felt that asking for political party identification would not contribute significantly to the study results. In fact, it might even discourage the few members of the minor parties from completing the survey.

Traditional political labels (liberal, conservation, middle of the road) did not appear to accurately identify political ideology. Prior to the 1991 elections, MMD members projected a liberal cause—the call for open elections—since those elections, the meanings of political labels seemed too confused to be of benefit. Additionally, party or ideological variables might have proven to be too specific an identifier for some respondents and might have discouraged participation.

Results

To gain a general understanding of what members of Parliament thought about the media, we viewed their descriptive answers to the three dependent variables. Table One reports the descriptive results of attitudes of members of Parliament about increasing press freedom in Zambia, the level of support for a press council, capable of reviewing the operations of the press, and who members of Parliament believe should regulate the media.

Table One about here

When asked about the value of the press council to regulate the media, 80.8% agreed or strongly agreed that a press council was a suitable way to regulate the media.

Surprisingly, more than half the members of parliament (57.1%) agreed or strongly agreed that press freedom should be increased. Respondents seemed to fall into two polar groups on this issue. Slightly less than 40% disagreed or strongly disagreed. Less than 4% were uncertain. Even respondents favoring increased press freedom also supported creation of a press council.

Members of Parliament also supported media self-regulation. More than half, 55.4%, view self-regulation as the preferred regulatory structure. Parliament was the second option, with 25% selecting Parliament as the source for media regulation. Media self-regulation is not necessarily inconsistent with support for a press council. In the discussions regarding establishment of a press council, some members of Parliament supported a council that would include press representatives.

The independent variables age and gender were initially thought to be suitable explanation for dependent variable responses. Crosstabulation statistics calculated for these variables, including measures of association Lambda and Pearson's *r*, did not find strong associations. A backward regression model was employed to determine which of the independent variables would best explain the attitudes of the members of Parliament toward the media and media regulation. The backward regression was selected to ensure that all of the independent variables were first inserted in the model and that common independent variables would be readily identified.

Table Two about here

The regression models produced with the independent variables provided mixed results. Only three independent variables, broadcast news is unbiased, what radio station do you listen to, and giving people more say is important, were significant predictors in all three models.

The regression model produced to explain members of parliament's attitudes about a press council to review press operations yielded an R^2 which explained approximately 64% of the variation.

The regression model produced to explain attitudes about media regulation explained slightly less than half the variation (48.5%).

The regression model produced to explain attitudes about increased press freedom explained less than one-third of the variation (31.4%).

Each of the three dependent variables was included as an independent variable in the three regression models. Who should regulate the media, when used as an independent variable, was a significant predictor in both the regression model explaining members of Parliament's attitudes about press freedom and members of Parliament's attitudes about a press council to review press operations.

Press freedom should be increased, when used as an independent variable, was a significant predictor in the regression model explaining members of Parliament's attitudes about a press council to review press operations and attitudes about who should regulate the media.

Attitudes about a press council to review press operations, when used as an independent variable, was not a significant predictor in either the regression model to explain members of parliament's attitudes about press freedom or the regression model to explain attitudes about who should regulate the media.

No independent variable was found to be not significant in all three models although one variable, parliamentarians attitudes regarding the accuracy of newspaper reporting in Zambia, was not a significant predictor in the model to explain members of parliament's attitudes about a press council to review press operations or the model to explain members' attitudes about press freedom.

Five variables were not significant predictors in the models to explain members of parliament's attitudes about press freedom and media regulation. Do you watch ZNBC-TV news, respondent gender, respondent's most important news source, regulating the media with a press council, and enjoying issue discussions all failed to be included in the regression model.

Discussion

Upon first review, the regression models would seem to produce more questions than answers as to members of Parliaments' attitudes about press freedom and media regulation. Perceptions of media accuracy and media bias might be the expected independent variables that would explain attitudes about the media among U.S. leaders but in Zambia other perspectives must be considered. When viewed not from a Western (U.S.) paradigm but an African paradigm, the responses and accompanying regression models make sense. Kenneth Kaunda's humanism model and UNIP's 27-year one-party monopoly continues to dominate Zambia.

Multi-party elections have been held but it is not possible for the MMD government to shake off a quarter century of tradition, especially when colonial rule existed before the UNIP government. Therefore, it is not surprising that 80% of the members of Parliament do support a press council to regulate the media but more than half favor increased press freedom and more than half believe the media should self-regulate. If there is inconsistency in this belief it may be due to the belief that press freedom makes a democracy. But with press freedom comes the ability of the independent press to challenge the ruling political party.

Zambia may be experiencing what Inglehart (1990) calls a process of intergenerational value change. While 27% of the members of Parliament were postmaterialists, 67% belonged to a "mixed" designation, a category Inglehart says could swing either way on an issue. If change is taking place in Zambia, it will be a gradual change. The Zambian media system is evolving but it is an incremental process. Media evolution depends not only on the government's (Parliament's) willingness to allow media autonomy but on the media practitioners' willingness to operate responsibility. Government and media will both contribute to socialization changes in the general population.

Outside facilitation to encourage openness by government and improved reporting by media practitioners is a significant contributor to the growth of the free press. As an example of donor support, the United States Agency for International Development launched a $15 million program in Zambia in 1992 to foster democracy. The program included creation of media workshops to promote balanced reporting and media ethics (Ogundimu, 1997).

Inglehart (1990) notes there is no one-to-one relationship between economic level and value evolution. Rather, postmaterialist values are a reflection of one's subjective sense of security. "Neither an individual's values nor those of a society as a whole are likely to change overnight. Instead, fundamental value change takes place gradually, almost individually (p. 69)."

Zambia will democratically succeed only if its citizens have access to accurate information. Citizens need information regarding social and cultural issues that likely can be obtained only from an active media.

But change is painful. Citizens must determine how they will evaluate news coverage from a variety of sources. Changes are painful for reporters trying to learn to operate in an open media environment. And the changes are certainly painful for Parliamentarians who are use to a government backed media system. Perceptions of accuracy and fairness will certainly influence Parliamentarians' support for press rights though it is simplistic to suggest that the media must strive for accuracy and unbiased reporting. Inglehart's value socialization combined with improved economic circumstances seem to be the factors that will determine whether a free press system exists in Zambia.

TABLE ONE

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Press council to regulate press	40.4%	40.4%	10.5%	7.0%	1.8%
Should press freedom be increased	21.4%	35.7%	3.6%	30.4%	8.9%

	Parliament	Government	Ministry	Public	Media Self-Regulation
Who should regulate the media?	25%	3.6%	1.8%	14.3%	55.4%

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TABLE TWO

Predictors of Members of Parliament's Attitudes toward Increased Press Freedom, Media Regulation, and Support for a Press Council to Regulate the Media

	Press Council	Press Freedom	Media Regulation
Independent Variables	Beta Values	Beta Values	Beta Values
Do you watch ZNBC TV?	.700096**	Not significant	Not significant
Newspapers unbiased	.065317**	Not significant	.279281*
Broadcast news unbiased	-.035348	.148433	-.468777*
Newspapers accurate	Not significant	Not significant	.079927
Broadcast news accurate	.177975**	-.296180	Not significant
Gender	-.057001*	Not significant	Not significant
Age	.125505**	Not significant	.298017*
Most important news source	.239204**	Not significant	Not significant
Relationship with media	-.147038**	Not significant	-.104023
What radio station do you listen to?	-.450606**	.129400	-.169210*
Higher order value	-.049223	Not significant	-.508436*
Giving people more say is important	-.190691**	.431514	-.483573*
Who should regulate the media?	-.019187	.268295	———
Regulate media with press council	———	Not significant	Not significant
Press freedom should be increased	-.076377*	———	.184271*
Enjoy deliberating	.278825**	Not significant	.081377
Enjoy discussing issues	.030695*	Not significant	Not significant
	R^2=.63926	R^2=.31443	R^2=.48453
	F=2.36280	F=2.75180	F=2.34999
	p= .0370	p=.0367	p=.0405

*Significant at $p<.01$ level

**Significant at $p<.001$ level

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The Structure of International News Flow in Cyberspace: A Network Analysis of News Articles in *Clarinet*

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Abstract

This paper examines the pattern of international news flow in cyberspace, using network analysis. It suggests that the world system perspective no longer effectively clarifies the global structure of the international news flow in cyberspace. For the better understanding of the dynamics of international news flow in cyberspace, this paper suggests that (a) single or comprehensive interpretation(s) like political significance, global commercialism, and sociocultural proximity would provide a more plausible explanatory framework.

The Structure of International News Flow in Cyberspace: A Network Analysis of News Articles in *Clarinet*

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to investigate the pattern of international relations represented in the international news flow in cyberspace. Cyberspace is "the conceptual space where words, human relationships, data, wealth, and power are manifested by people using CMC technology" (Rheingold, 1993, p. 5). It also includes a space in which information is exchanged and distributed across geographic boundaries.

The emergence of global satellite television has led to a rearrangement of the global news industry. Satellite television has brought into existence regional and global news channels; the most prominent is CNN International, which reaches over 200 countries, and thus a vast majority of the world population. However, the "big four" western news agencies—AP, UPI, Reuters, and AFP—still dominate the global print market (Herman & McChesney, 1997). In cyberspace, although news wire agencies like AP and Reuters themselves are in commercial online services, there are other online services supplying news gathered originally by news agencies. CliriNews's USENET service is an example of those services. Most national news agencies are operating their homepages in the Internet.

New communication technologies like computers have challenged our traditional notions of time and space, particularly as the virtual world of cybersapce evolves. With regard to news all over the world, fast growing global communication networks such as the "net"[1] have made news delivery faster and wider than ever before. News delivery on the net is significantly different from traditional news media not only in the applicable distribution technology but also in distribution pattern. International communication flow does not mean the delivery of media in material forms across the geographical boundaries of countries.

Previous research on international news flow has focused on specific news coverage or on overall media exchange (Hur, 1984; Hur & Jeffres, 1984). Global online news delivery services, however, have for the most part been overlooked. They seem to create a quite different type of news flow among countries than other media bearing other formats or contents, and thus deserve separate consideration. Unlike in other formats, geographical, temporal, technical, and monetary constraints on the online news flow are lessening. Put simply, only the issue or subject affects where the news article would be allocated on the net. Therefore, it is assumed that this global online news flow forms a new pattern of international news flow among international agents, e.g., countries, regions, and international organizations.

Traditionally, conceptions of international news flow involve distribution or redistribution of international news "across" the national geographical or spatial boundaries. But an alternative perspective of international news flow which takes into account the net needs to be developed based on the ability of news of international agents to be distributed and redistributed "within" cyberspace. In other words, international news flow in cyberspace is concerned with symbolic (or cognitive) boundaries set in cyberspace, while that of traditional perspectives is concerned mainly with geographical boundaries.

In order to map the international news flow in cyberspace, it is necessary first to examine the ways in which the content of the international news reports is gathered, structured (or re-structured), and eventually distributed by news agencies within a certain Internet domain[2]. The prevalence of the net in combination with its simultaneous tendencies toward globalization and localization in news distribution necessitates the study of a new geography of international news.

Research Question

This study focuses on the pattern of international news flow in cyberspace. Taking into consideration existing theoretical perspectives and possible substantial factors of international news flow, this study explores, first, the global structure of international news flow in cyberspace, and, second, its implications of a structure that differs from that inherent in traditional perspective of international news flow.

World-System Perspective and Globalization

The theoretical background of a structural approach to global communications flow can be found in a world system theory that is based on economic relationships between developed countries and developing or underdeveloped countries. Wallerstein (1974, 1979,and 1991) viewed the world as a global system in which countries are interdependently linked within the capitalist system. Although core processes and peripheral processes are constantly relocated in the course of the world system's development, their integration remains a central structural feature throughout the capitalist world economy (Hopkins et al., 1982).

World system theory explains the unequal relationship between core-periphery countries solely in terms of its economic interactions, such as the exchange of material products. However, Galtung (1971) argued that the core-periphery relation is actually a multidimensional structure of global imperialism, because of the addition of another type of exchange--the exchange of information. The structure of communication flow reflects existing unequal power relationships in the worldwide information exchange. In the world system, interaction between the core and the periphery is characterized by vertical relations and is dominated by the core countries. Peripheral countries tend to communicate only with a single core country and rarely interact with countries in positions similar to their own. Consequently, a country's interaction pattern with other countries is influenced by its centrality in the world system.

International news flow is one of the major means of information exchange. In a 1996 article, Kim and Barnett examine the structure and determinants of international news flow using network analysis. They reveal the inequality present in the international news media flow between the core and the periphery. Backed by empirical evidence, they contend that Western industrialized nations are the core countries in the global system and that they dominate international news flow while most developing and underdeveloped African, Asian, Latin American, and Oceanic countries remain dominated at the periphery. Hur and Jeffres (1984) suggest, however, that there is a distinction to be made between international news flow analysis and international news coverage analysis because the former deals mainly with the volume and direction of news media flow, while the latter focuses on the nature and type of foreign news disseminated across national boundaries.

There is little doubt that power relationships among international agents influence the structure of information flow and coverage among them. It should be noted, however, that media capacity, generally determined by the economic and technological level of a country, also plays a significant role in charting news flows. Flows between countries that have less media-capacity are mediated by a country that dominates the regional media. For example, news flowing between an Asian country and a Latin American country would be mediated by a Western country.

Globalization means that information, as well as material goods, are freely and frequently exchanged between different groups across national and cultural boundaries. The accumulation of exchanges between different systems cause those systems to become more consolidated, and thus provide a basis for a new larger system. However, it has been argued that the structure of international communications, when studied using the nation-state as a unit of analysis, is unequal and unbalanced as shown in the new world information order (NWIO) debate (Gonzalez-Manet, 1992; McPhail, 1987; UNESCO, 1980).

International communication studies have contributed to balancing the currently imbalanced communication structure that orders nations' news flows. The nation-state has been a major unit of analysis in the global interaction process. However, a new kind of paradigm is needed to explain and predict the movements of the fast-changing global information environments. Pointing to the centrifugal force of globalization and ethnic struggle after the Cold War era, Sreberny-Mohammadi (1991) contends that identity politics and the role of culture are more important issues to consider in the future than ideological politics and the role of the nation-state.

Sreberny-Mohammadi (1991) introduces the "global/local" model to demonstrate a useful perspective on changing information climates at the international and global levels. While nation-states are the key political systems of the modern world, the boundaries of a nation in terms of information exchange have been blurred. This is evidenced by the fact that conglomerated media firms have become multi-nationalized and globalized--that is, the unit of production and distribution of information and cultural goods extends beyond national boundaries. The structure of world communication cannot be wholly configured by observing interactions among nations. The actors in world communication may have multiple and diverse identities which are established by ethnic, racial, national, or regional cultures.

Substantial Factors in International News Flow

Generally, what constitutes international news is determined by the political, economic, social, and cultural importance or implications of the news to a country. We suggest here, therefore, that there are three comprehensive, influential factors that inform the dynamics of global news flow: (a) political significance, (b) global commercialism and a globalized economic system, and (c) sociocultural proximity (mutuality).

Political Significance

The global flow of news represents an inherent transfer of media artifacts that prescribe a certain ideological leaning in favor of certain global power alignments (Peterson, 1979; Ostgaard, 1965). The political power or weight of a country or a geographical region raises the newsworthiness of events involving that country or region and provides political incentives for international media organizations to allocate media resources and attention to them (e.g., Mideast countries). It is common that politically insignificant countries gain extravagant amounts of attention from Western countries and media when they become crisis centers that threaten Western political interests. As soon as the temporary political significance of these countries fades away, they lose their place in global news. For example, Musa (1990) criticizes the fact that Western media tends to play down or ignore African concerns and the role of Africa in the world community.

Global Commercialism and Globalized Economic System

Because of the influence of world economics over mass media industries, the dominant U. S. transnational corporations (TNCs) and advertising agencies began to invest heavily overseas. Following this trend, the commercial media also moved abroad and began to consolidate and establish empires across formerly distinct media industries, with leading media firms acquiring significant holdings in film, music, publishing, and broadcasting (Herman & McChesney, 1997). Stating that "western international news agencies, as part of a multi-national corporate system, are inseparable elements in the worldwide capitalist system of resource allocations, and invariably provide imagery and messages that create and reinforce their audiences attachment to the media's country of origin" (p. 51), Ebo (1992) contends that it is logical that many Third World governments are sometimes reluctant to import media technology and artifacts from the West. Presumably, international news flow on the net does not garner any resistance from the Third World, even though it also contributes to global commercialism. In addition to the global commercialism of the West in the international media industry, information flow in the global economic information is essential for TNCs not only in the West but in the Third World. TNCs can get international news concerning their economic practices through news services in cyberspace, as well as through their own information sources. Ultimately, international news flow seems to reveal the "free" flow of international news.

Sociocultural Proximity (Mutuality)

In most cases, news is culturally dependent by nature (Larson, 1984; McPhail, 1987; Nimmo & Combs, 1990; Sussman & Lent, 1991). Essentially news reflects sociocultural condition as well as political and professional conditions in the topics it addresses and the amount of coverage it devotes to each (e.g., Snow, 1979; Nimmo & Combs, 1985). Despite the interdependency of news and sociocultural factors, there is much disagreement about which culture global news reflects. Some news receivers have tended to be appealed by or vulnerable to news of culturally and socially proximate foreign countries. Other news receivers simultaneously have been in a different situation. Third World audiences, for instance, hardly have the ability to access the news of other Third World countries that are not politically or economically significant, without news being mediated by global news agencies. It is assumed, however, that in cyberspace access to and recognition of news flow and coverage by audiences in certain Third World countries would be much more likely.

Crossposting of News Articles in *Clarinet*

Compared to traditional patterns of international news flow, international news services in the Internet show a distinct way of news flow. News articles from these services have a form of distribution via e-mail or Usenet article by a method called crossposting. A news article may be sent to as many destinations as a sender wants, but is usually crossposted only to relevant individuals or groups. The crossposting of news distributions in on-line communication also is distinct in that it demonstrates the news coverage as well as news flow. In other words, by grasping the mechanism of news-article crossposting, we can figure out the volume and direction of international news articles and simultaneously the nature and type of international news disseminated "within" cyberspace. In our study, however, we focus mainly on analyzing frequencies and distances in terms of interaction among newsgroups. Our analysis of news flow will be interpreted, to some degree, in terms of news content when a specific pattern of news flow needs contextual explanation. In these regards, we dealt with the crossposting in cyberspace as news "content flow" rather than as news "media flow."

In a form of Usenet newsgroups, Clarinet[3] has a category for international news that has 60 newsgroups with a prefix of "clari.world." Newsgroups represent countries (e.g., asia.china, europe.italy), regions (e.g., africa.eastern, asia.southeast), and international organization such as the United Nations.

Take a news article in Clarinet for example. In Appendix A, a news article entitled "Iraq calls on Russia, France, and China to oppose US" was crossposted to six newsgroups in Clarinet: China, Iraq, the United States, France, Russia, and the United Nations. These six international agents are highly involved with the issue mentioned in the content of news article. The Great Britain, however, was not included in the crossposted newsgroups, though it was once mentioned in the content, because it has no direct stake in the issue described in the article.

Methods

Data

In this study, 25 days of Clarinet's "clari.world." archives in October 1997 were analyzed. During the period, a total of 12,436 news articles posted in 60 international newsgroups in the "clari.world." hierarchy were downloaded. "Clari.world.", however, does not include the United States. Instead, Clarinet has an independent hierarchy of "clari.usa." Because news articles concerning the U.S. in "clari.world." hierarchy are also crossposted to "clari.usa.", they can be detected and added into our analysis (for example, see some crossposted newsgroups in Appendix A). Prior to analysis, the 60 newsgroups were recategorized, since the units of analysis are international actors such as countries, regions, and international organizations. The recategorization produced a total of 45 groups, by the scheme that several specified subgroups (e.g., business subgroups) of an international actor were combined into a single homogeneous group in order to meet the conditions of the units of analysis. For example, <clari.world.europe.france> and

<clari.world.europe.france.biz> were merged into one group, and <clari.world.organizations.un> and <clari.world.organizations.un. conferences> were also into one. Topic-specific newsgroups were also excluded, because they could not be regarded as international actors. For example, newsgroups like <clari.world.top>, <clari.world.military> were excluded. Table 1 lists the recatergorized 45 groups.

Table 1 about here

Analysis of Crossposting

Each posted article in Clarinet has a header that includes its destinations. When it is posted to more than two newsgroups, links among the newsgroups become established. Whole sets of articles were analyzed to count the links with other newsgroups. By calculating the number of the links for each newsgroup, a symmetric matrix was constructed. Computer software programs were created by the authors to count the links in data archives, using Visual Basic Applications.

News crossposting can be explained by each network's attributes, such as link and weight. Actors are represented by specified nodes. When a node is connected to any other node, it creates links. A link is created when nodes are connected with each other without taking into account the amount of links, while a weight demonstrates the frequency (amount) of established connections between nodes.

Network Analysis

Network analysis is a set of research procedures for identifying structures in systems, based on the relations among their components (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982; Rogers & Kincaid, 1981). In order to describe the underlying structure, network analysis examines systems indicators such as centrality, connectedness, integrativeness, and system density. It provides useful tools for describing the structure of global-level interactions such as international telecommunication and trade networks (Barnett et al., 1993; Barnett & Choi, 1995; Barnett & Salisbury, 1996; Scott, 1986; Smith & White, 1992; Snyder & Kick, 1979; Sun & Barnett, 1994).

The basic network data set is an n x n matrix S, where n equals the number of nodes in the network. A node might be an individual or higher-level component, such as an organization or a nation from which the system is composed. Each cell, S_{ij}, indicates the strength of the relationship among nodes i and j. In communication research, this relationship is generally equivalent to the frequency of communication between the nodes. In the present study, international newsgroups are the nodes, and the relationship is the number of articles crossposted. For example, if a node i is <clari.world. mideast.iraq> and a node j is <clari.world.organizations.un>, S_{ij} would be the number of crossposted articles which are posted across both newsgroups. S is symmetrical ($S_{ij} = S_{ji}$) when one is not concerned with directionality. In those instances where the source and receiver of the communication are differentiated, S is asymmetrical ($S_{ij} \neq S_{ji}$). In our case, S is symmetrical because the crossposting simply indicates the allocation of news articles, and has no directionality.

To analyze the structure of the international news flow in *Clarinet*, three methods of network analysis were used: cluster analysis, metric multidimensional scaling, and Bonacich centrality (Bonacich, 1972). Cluster analysis was employed to identify subgroups within the intercultural communication flow network. Multidimensional scaling was used to examine the spatial structure of the network. Eigenvector centrality explains that actors are central if they have ties to other actors that are themselves central (Faust, 1997).

Cluster analysis is a method for finding groups of similar entities in data (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). It identifies those groupings or clusters of nodes that best represent their measured relations. From a similarity matrix of n nodes, the pair of nodes with the greatest similarity is combined to form a cluster, C1. Then a new $n-1$ x $n-1$ matrix is generated, with the pair of nodes combined as a single node. The process is repeated, with a third node added to C1 or a new pair of nodes combined to form C2. This procedure continues until all nodes are included to form a

Cn cluster. In our analysis, Johnson's hierarchical cluster analysis from UCINET IV (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 1992) was used. This form of cluster analysis was employed because it has been demonstrated in international news flow research that the global system is completely interconnected. Members in the network often form cohesive subgroups in which they interact with each other more than with other groups.

In multidimensional scaling (MDS), matrix S might be converted to a space of many dimensions, with each node located on a series of projections on orthogonal dimensions such that the stronger their relationship (the more frequently two nodes communicate) and the more similar their interaction patterns, the closer they are in the network space (Barnett, 1988). Mathematically, the process is equivalent to converting a matrix of inter-city distances to Cartesian coordinates. From these coordinates, a graphic representation--like a map--may be drawn. This process is known as metric multidimensional scaling (Torgerson, 1958). In our analysis, the metric MDS software from UCINET IV was employed. Matrix S is first made symmetrical by taking the mean of S_{ij} and S_{ji}. It does not separate coordinations for the rows and columns.

Centrality is, basically, the mean number of links required to reach all other nodes in a system. The degree centrality does not, however, consider the strength of links among nodes. It accounts only for the number of links required to reach each of the other nodes in the network. In our study, instead, Bonacich centrality from UCINET IV was employed, because it considers the strength of the relations among the nodes by taking the eigenvector of the largest eigenvalue of a matrix.

Results

Cluster Analysis

The cluster analysis shows how much each newsgroup has similar pattern of crossposting. The hierarchical cluster analysis resulted in several subgroups (see Table 2). Members in each cluster showed structural equivalence. The patterns of each member's crosspostings towards other newsgroups outside their cluster were quite similar to each other in the same cluster.

Table 2 about here

The hierarchical cluster analysis resulted in 10 subgroups (Cluster A through J) over a cut-off point of 10.0. Each subgroup was clustered based on geographical and issue-contextual proximity. Cluster A (Israel, Palestine, and other Mideast countries), B (Turkey and Greece), G (France and Germany), I (Indochina, the Philippines, and Southeast Asia), J (Eastern Europe and Russia) showed characteristics which reflected their geographical proximity. In Cluster C, the United States and China had a very strong relational similarity (cut-off point = 137) and also a higher number of crossposted news articles. Other members (Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and South American countries) had a similar pattern of relations to each other, and were included in the same cluster. With the empirical evidence, it is difficult to understand why South American countries are clustered with Asian Countries as well as the United States. According to news coverage in Clarinet during the period of data-gathering, there were Japan-Peru interaction because of the hostage situation in the Japanese Embassy at Peru, Japanese companies' investment to Brazil and Argentina, a visit of Chilean army chief to China, and Clinton's weeklong visit to Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina. In Cluster D, Great Britain and India had a higher number of crossposted articles (N = 87), and showed a strong relational similarity (cut-off point = 87). According to news coverage, they seemed to be caused by the Queen's visit to India during the data-gathering period. Central and South Asia had a relatively high linking pattern with India due to regional proximity (Cut-off point = 35.7). In Cluster E, the dyad of the UN and Iraq was highly central (cut-off point = 80), because the sanction of the UN on Iraq which was a "hot" issue in October 1997. With the higher number of links with the UN, Western Africa and Southern Africa regions were also included in the same cluster with a cut-off point of 13.5. Cluster F was composed of international organizations except the UN (e.g., IMF, NATO), Southeast Asian countries (e.g., Malaysia), and countries in the Balkans (e.g., former Yugoslavia, Romania). Although they were respectively involved in different international organizations such as IMF and NATO, countries in Southeast Asia and the Balkans had structural equivalence and thus came to be categorized into the same group.

Multidimensional Scaling

The two dimensions of the metric MDS of the international news flow network in cyberspace are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1 about here

At the center of the figure are the central countries—the United States, China, Central and South Asian countries, Japan, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Russia, Iraq, and international organizations. Around the edge of the figure are the peripherals from Africa, Oceania, some countries from Europe and Asia that are not at the center. The MDS figure does not support the world system perspective. Rather, this mapping results from the associated effects of the substantial factors of political significance, globalized economic system, and sociocultural proximity.

Centrality

The measure of Bonacich eigenvector centrality is presented in Table 3.

Table 3 about here

Centrality analysis showed considerable differences among newsgroups. Central and peripheral structure was identified in the newsgroup with higher number of links and crosspostings showed higher centrality. China shows the highest centrality (0.802). The top five groups of higher centrality also include Israel (0.271), Hong

Kong (0.198), the United States (0.196) and the United Kingdom (0.179). Regionally, Asian groups have relatively high centralities comparing with other regions. All Asian countries except the Philippines were listed above the rank of 20. This suggests that the centrality of these countries not only reflects their central positions in the network, but also their relatively higher number of group members (10 groups) and the consequent crossposting linkages among them. Among the Mideast groups, Israel and Palestine were highly ranked, while other Mideast groups such as Iran, Turkey, and Arabia were located in the semi-periphery. Oceanic groups (Australia, Oceania and New Zealand) and some European groups with a fewer number of links and crosspostings are listed as less central. A rough analysis of this distribution of centrality indicates that the regional or economic distinction loses its power to account for the news flow structure in cyberspace. Groups of International organizations like the UN, NATO, IMF, and World Bank have a higher number of links and also have relatively high centralities. However, this result of centrality should be interpreted with a caution because this network consists of several distinct cohesive subgroups in which members have most of their contacts with other members within a cluster.

Discussion

With the new technological development, journalism practices have been significantly changed. These changes have occurred both in information production and in information consumption. Due to Internet services, changes in journalism practice range from aspects of news delivery and marketing on the production side, to interactivity and asynchronous availability with news sources on the consumption side. This new type of journalism practice is usually called "on-line journalism" or "Internet journalism." As a new type of journalism practice, on-line journalism helps journalists who find the facts and construct stories and distributors who restructure and redistribute news on line for interested people. News receivers also have access to more channels and are exposed to a larger variety of perspectives on everyday life and world affairs than before. Although it is true that new communication media immensely affect existing communication patterns, on-line journalism seems to play yet a supplementary role to the current journalism practice.

Traditional media research on international news flow has shown that substantial news flow reflects the world system perspective. It has revealed inequality in the structure of international news flow, which may be interpreted as dependency.

The results of our study demonstrate distinguishable implications compared to the world system perspective. China and other developing countries in Southeast Asia were approaching to the core, while several Western countries like Canada and Italy were on the periphery. Asian groups, which have been regarded as peripheral nations, formed regional allegiances and move themselves to the core. Yet, the traditional core countries like the United States and the United Kingdom were still at the center.

We could conclude that the international organizations like UN, IMF, and NATO played significant roles in structural relations in the international news flow network in cyberspace. This implies that as mediators and facilitators, these international organizations are becoming more influential in globalized and simultaneously multiple-cored context of world affairs. Therefore, the present study showed that the pattern of news crossposting in cyberspace might draw more on a realistic map of international news flow than on a map of the international news flow of traditional media.

Communication flow basically consists of media flow and content flow. Most studies of international news flow have focused substantively on international trade relations of news materials, and revealed that media flow reflects the structure of international communication flow. It is significant, then, that the present study demonstrates that a pattern of international interest relations are represented in news distribution in cyberspace. News crosspostings in Clarinet, in our analysis, show the news content flow across the symbolic international boundaries set in cyberspace.

This study suggests that the pattern of news crossposting reflects a more realistic structure of international news flow. For instance, as shown in the previous section, the United States and China were both at the core with high centralities. Findings based on studies of world system perspectives have indicated that regional and cultural characteristics tend to decide the patterns of international communication flow. Therefore, a world system approach cannot be applicable to our example. Rather, the proximate relationship due to multiple crossposting between the United States and China need to be understood in terms of, for instance, their increasing economic interdependence and their international political significance.

International news flow through newspapers and periodicals is subject to the same rules of material export from one country to another country. Even television news via satellite requires governmental permission, for access of material source of transmission and reception. These characteristics which point to the materiality of media have had an influence on the construction of communication structures among countries around the globe. In terms of less material constraints, the Internet is expected to play a significant role in international communication. We must recognize, however, that the technological resources that can make the distribution of information possible are in the hands of the very limited number of powerful nations. These countries still hold the dominant power in the world system because they maintain these network systems. In spite of this pessimistic viewpoint, we hope that our study may contribute to the finding of hidden possibility of the Internet.

One major limitation of this analysis is that longitudinal data accumulation was not established. This analysis includes only a 25-day period of observation. In order to reach a more generalizable interpretation of international news content flow in cyberspace, a longitudinal study is extremely suggested. Another limitation of this analysis is that we cover only one Internet news service--Clarinet. The application of the findings of this analysis to other Internet news services should be needed.

Notes

[1] The net is "an informal term for the loosely interconnected computer networks that use computer-mediated communication (CMC) technology to link people around the world into public discussion" (Rheingold, 1993, p. 5).

[2] We will examine a service called *Clarinet* provided by an American commercial on-line news service, ClariNews. The description of Clarinet will be provided in the following section.

[3] ClariNews is the Internet newspaper established in 1989. It distributes more than 3,500 stories daily, organized into more than 500 categories. It obtains articles and photographs from an eclectic group of sources. Most Clarinet articles are crossposted to several groups, if their subject matter falls in multiple categories. Unlike most Usenet groups, Clarinet is not interactive. That is, you cannot reply to, or follow-up Clarinet articles. They are publications, not discussions (ClariNews, 1997).

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Table 1. The List of the 45 Recategorized International News Groups and Countries Involved.

Groups	Countries
<Africa>	
clari.world.africa.eastern	Sudan through Tanzania
clari.world.africa.northwestern	Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Sahara countries
clari.world.africa.south_africa	South Africa
clari.world.africa.southern	From Angola and Zambia southward
clari.world.africa.western	Gulf of Guinea states, Congo, Zaire
<Americas>	
clari.world.americas.canada	Canada
clari.world.americas.meso	Caribbean, Cetral America, Mexico
clari.world.americas.south	South America
clari.world.usa	The United States
<Asia>	
clari.world.asia.central+south	South and Central Asia
clari.world.asia.china	China
clari.world.asia.hong_kong	Hong Kong
clari.world.asia.india	India
clari.world.asia.indochina	Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar
clari.world.asia.japan	Japan
clari.world.asia.koreas	North Korea, South Korea
clari.world.asia.philippines	The Philippines
clari.world.asia.southeast	Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei
clari.world.asia.taiwan	Taiwan
<Europe>	
clari.world.europe.alpine	Austria, Switzerland, Liechtenstein
clari.world.europe.balkans	Former Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria
clari.world.europe.benelux	Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg
clari.world.europe.british	British Isles
clari.world.europe.central	Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary
clari.world.europe.eastern	Ukraine, Belarus, Baltics, Moldova
clari.world.europe.france	France
clari.world.europe.germany	Germany
clari.world.europe.greece	Greece
clari.world.europe.iberia	Spain, Portugal, Andorra
clari.world.europe.italy	Italy, San Marino
clari.world.europe.northern	Scadinavia, Finland, Iceland
clari.world.europe.russia	Russia
clari.world.europe.union	The European Union

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Table 1. (Continued)

Groups	Countries
<Mideast>	
clari.world.mideast.arabia	The Arabian Peninsula
clari.world.mideast.iran	Iran
clari.world.mideast.iraq	Iraq
clari.world.mideast.israel	Israel
clari.world.mideast.palestine	Palestine
clari.world.mideast.turkey	Turkey
clari.world.mideast	Other mideastern countries
<Oceania>	
clari.world.oceania	The Pacific Islands
clari.world.oceania.australia	Australia
clari.world.oceania.new_zealand	New Zealand
<Organizations>	
clari.world.organizations.misc	International Organizations like IMF
clari.world.organizations.un	The United Nations

Table 2. The Cluster Analysis for the Crossposting Network of 45 Groups. (Cut-off level > 10).

Clusters	Cut-off Point
Cluster A: <clari.world.mideast.israel> <clari.world.mideast.palestine> <clari.world.mideast>	85.3
Cluster B: <clari.world.mideast.turkey> <clari.world.europe.greece >	44
Cluster C: <clari.world.usa> <clari.world.asia.china> <clari.world.asia.japan> <clari.world.asia.hong_kong> <clari.world.americas.south> <clari.world.asia.taiwan> <clari.world.asia.koreas>	12.6
Cluster D: <clari.world.europe.british> <clari.world.asia.india> <clari.world.asia.central+south>	35.7
Cluster E: <clari.world.organizations.un> <clari.world.mideast.iraq> <clari.world.africa.southern> <clari.world.africa.western>	13.5
Cluster F: <clari.world.organizations.misc> <clari.world.asia.southeast> <clari.world.europe.balkans>	18.7
Cluster G: <clari.world.europe.france> <clari.world.europe.germany> <clari.world.europe.union>	15.6
Cluster H: <clari.world.africa.northwestern> <clari.world.africa.south_africa>	27
Cluster I: <clari.world.asia.indochina> <clari.world.asia.philippines>	24
Cluster J: <clari.world.europe.eastern> <clari.world.europe.russia>	18

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Table 3. Bonacich Eigenvector Centralities for the Crossposting Network of the 45 Groups.

Rank	Groups	No. of Links	No. of Crossposting	Eigenvector	Normalized Eigenvector
1	clari.world.asis.china	33	451	0.802	113.354
2	clari.world.mideast.israel	28	548	0.271	38.331
3	clari.world.asis.hong_kong	18	168	0.198	27.936
4	calri.usa	41	675	0.196	27.672
5	clari.world.europe.british	41	445	0.179	25.255
6	clari.world.mideast	28	468	0.172	24.283
7	clari.world.asis.japan	36	277	0.169	23.910
8	clari.world.mideast.palestine	20	350	0.147	20.850
9	clari.world.asis.southeast	31	217	0.140	19.805
10	clari.world.europe.france	38	300	0.128	18.095
11	clari.world.organizations.misc	41	393	0.103	14.577
12	clari.world.asis.indochina	25	175	0.090	12.689
13	clari.world.europe.russia	31	238	0.079	11.157
14	clari.world.asis.taiwan	22	118	0.077	10.869
15	clari.world.asis.central+south	26	217	0.073	10.331
16	clari.world.asis.india	20	183	0.054	7.668
17	clari.world.organizations.un	34	330	0.052	7.385
18	clari.world.mideast.turkey	19	264	0.047	6.659
19	clari.world.europe.germany	34	180	0.042	5.946
20	clari.world.asis.koreas	18	107	0.041	5.862
21	clari.world.europe.union	35	188	0.040	5.685
22	clari.world.africa.western	23	187	0.038	5.393
23	clari.world.mideast.arabia	27	163	0.038	5.312
24	clari.world.mideast.iraq	21	271	0.038	5.307
25	clari.world.mideast.iran	22	158	0.036	5.113
26	clari.world.europe.north	25	94	0.029	4.159
27	clari.world.africa.northwestern	26	155	0.027	3.756
28	clari.world.europe.balkans	21	119	0.021	3.018
29	clari.world.asis.philippines	17	92	0.021	2.982
30	clari.world.americas.south	15	70	0.020	2.774
31	clari.world.oceania.australia	17	85	0.016	2.319
32	clari.world.africa.canada	20	62	0.015	2.129
33	clari.world.africa.eastern	20	89	0.014	1.937
34	clari.world.europe.italy	26	90	0.013	1.859
35	clari.world.africa.south_africa	21	93	0.012	1.730
36	clari.world.europe.benelux	22	78	0.010	1.448
37	clari.world.africa.southern	17	85	0.009	1.306
38	clari.world.europe.greece	12	77	0.009	1.234
39	clari.world.europe.alpine	24	48	0.007	1.034
40	clari.world.africa.meso	19	52	0.007	1.019
41	clari.world.europe.iberia	17	38	0.007	0.983
42	clari.world.europe.eastern	18	56	0.007	0.939
43	clari.world.europe.central	16	46	0.006	0.786
44	clari.world.oceania	11	33	0.004	0.594
45	clari.world.oceania.new_zealand	9	29	0.004	0.514

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

Figure 1. Mulitdimensional Scaling for the Crossposting Network of the 45 International News Groups.

Legends:

F1: clari.world.africa.eastern
F2.clari.world.africa.northwestern
F3: clari.world.africa.south_africa
F4: clari.world.africa.southern
F5: clari.world.africa.western
C1: clari.world.americas.canada
C2: clari.world.americas.meso
C3: clari.world.americas.south
US: clari.world.usa
A1: clari.world.asia.central+south
A2: clari.world.asia.china
A3: clari.world.asia.hong_kong
A4: clari.world.asia.india
A5: clari.world.asia.indochina
A6: clari.world.asia.japan

A7: clari.world.asia.koreas
A8: clari.world.asia.philippines
A9: clari.world.asia.southeast
AA: clari.world.asia.taiwan
E1: clari.world.europe.alpine
E2: clari.world.europe.balkans
E3: clari.world.europe.benelux
E4: clari.world.europe.british
E5: clari.world.europe.central
E6: clari.world.europe.eastern
E7: clari.world.europe.france
E8: clari.world.europe.germany
E9: clari.world.europe.greece
EA: clari.world.europe.iberia
EB: clari.world.europe.italy

EC: clari.world.europe.northern
ED: clari.world.europe.russia
EE: clari.world.europe.union
M1: clari.world.mideast
M2: clari.world.mideast.arabia
M3: clari.world.mideast.iran
M4: clari.world.mideast.iraq
M5: clari.world.mideast.israel
M6: clari.world.mideast.palestine
M7: clari.world.mideast.turkey
O1: clari.world.oceania
O2: clari.world.oceania.australia
O3: clari.world.oceania.new_zealand
R1: clari.world.organizations.misc
R2: clari.world.organizations.un

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Appendix A: Clarinet Newsgroup Sample -- <clari.world.mideast.iraq>

Distribution: cl-3,cl-edu,cl-4
Approved: editor@clarinet.com
From: C-afp@clari.net (AFP)
NEWSGROUPS:
CLARI.WORLD.ASIA.CHINA,**CLARI.WORLD.MIDEAST.IRAQ**,**CLARI.USA**.GOV.POLICY.FOREIGN.MISC,**CLARI.WORLD.EUROPE.FRANCE**,**CLARI.WORLD.EUROPE.RUSSIA**,**CLARI.USA**.GOV.POLICY.FOREIGN.MIDEAST,**CLARI.WORLD.ORGANIZATIONS.UN**,**CLARI.USA**.GOV.POLICY.FOREIGN
Subject: Iraq calls on Russia, France and China to oppose US
Organization: Copyright 1997 by Agence France-Presse
Message-ID: <Qiraq-unURyNV_7OL@clari.net>
Lines: 59
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 1997 9:21:58 PDT
ACategory: international
Slugword: Iraq-UN
Threadword: iraq
Priority: regular

BAGHDAD, Oct 21 (AFP) - **Iraq** called Monday on **Russia, France** and **China** to stand firm against **US** domination of the **UN** Security Council and to resist attempts to slap new sanctions on Baghdad.

The official al-Jumhuriya newspaper called on the three permanent Security Council members to "adopt an offensive rather than defensive stance against aggressive American resolutions under discussion."

The paper urged **China**, **France** and **Russia** "to suggest their own resolution recognising that **Iraq** had fulfilled its obligations and that the charges that it had not cooperated (with **UN** arms inspectors) only concern minor issues and not the armament programme."

Diplomats at the **United Nations** said **the United States** yielded to **French** and **Russian** demands Monday by offering to delay for six months the imposition of new sanctions against **Iraq**.

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The embargo was eased in December to allow limited oil sales to meet **Iraq'**s humanitarian needs, but **the United States** and **Britain** insist the sanctions cannot be lifted until UNSCOM is satisfied **Iraq** can no longer produce weapons of mass destruction.

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Defining the Press Arbitration System: Its Impact on Press Freedom during the Sociopolitical Transition in South Korea

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Defining the Press Arbitration System: Its Impact on Press Freedom during the Sociopolitical Transition in South Korea

Introduction

One of the most important principles in a democratic society is to strike a balance among essential but conflicting social interests. A government is responsible for the harmonious adjustment of contending rights. Thus, a government is expected to establish standards to reconcile those competing social interests by weighing their relative significance in the given society. A government also needs to provide its people with the remedies when their rights are unlawfully infringed. This proposition is also true for the Korean government.

A functional institution that the Korean government established for the purpose of striking a balance between conflicting interests between the media and the individuals is the Press Arbitration Commission. It is mainly aimed at resolving libel disputes in which press freedom and individuals' reputational rights clash.[1] The Commission has served as a central apparatus for resolving libel problems outside courts, while providing individuals with the means to recover from damages to their reputation.

Present media environment in Korea, along with rapid sociopolitical changes of the last decade, displays a quite different structure of relationships among the government, the press, and the individuals than in the past. While the Korean press has been traditionally under the control of an authoritarian government, people tended to regard the press as an agent that wields power over them in affiliation with the government.[2] These traditional relationships have profoundly changed as Korean society advanced to a more democratic situation since 1987.

---

[1] The Press Arbitration Commission was established as a preliminary legal institute. Before 1996, it was mandatory for a person who wanted to ask a court to order a right of reply to first apply for arbitration to the Commission. The arbitration process is free for both the public and the press. Press Arbitration Commission, *The Press Arbitration Commission: Introduction*, 62 Press Arbitration Quarterly 191-194 (1997).

The main objective of this study is to redefine the press arbitration system in relation with press freedom in current media environment. This study will first examine the historical background and social forces that resulted in the press arbitration system in Korea. Then, it will look into how the press arbitration system has affected the current media environment during 1987 to 1996.

Although there is a body of literature that has examined the Korean press arbitration system, only a few of the studies addressed the importance of the system from the perspective of social changes. In other words, most research failed to incorporate social changes into a discussion about the press arbitration system. Even when researchers combined the social changes into the analysis, they appraised the press arbitration system just as a part of whole media circumstances.

A basic assumption of this study is that the press arbitration system should be appraised not merely as a part of the media environment, but as a main impetus in shaping the present media environment. In order to theoretically account for the current media environment, this study employs Jeffery Smith's media control hypothesis that the more the media are independent of the political power, the more the media will be controlled by individuals.[3] This study is not based on the case law because in Korean case law is not the starting point to study a legal phenomenon.

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[2] Herbert Altschull, *Agents of Power* 298 (1984).

[3] Jeffery A. Smith, *Further Steps Toward a Theory of Press Control*, 8 Journalism History 91-94 (1981).

The importance of this study lies in attempting a macro-level observation about the press arbitration system in conjunction with sociopolitical changes. This study is also of great value in that it may offer some insights to a society which is seeking alternative ways for the resolution of libel problems outside courts.[4]

Press Arbitration System in Korea: Background and Statutory Framework

Each society develops its own style of resolution of libel disputes. The paths to accomplish the goal differ among societies; that is, different societies employ different approaches to resolve the clashes between freedom of press and individual's right to his/her reputation. As Frederick Schauer points out, how each society approaches the balancing of reputation and freedom of expression reflects different sociopolitical assumptions of the given society.[5]

Observing that while U.S. law accords press freedom a "preferred position" by way of the "actual malice" standard, British libel law recognizes no preferential status of speech and press rights vis-à-vis reputation, Schauer maintained that the content of libel laws represent the underlying values that societies place on the importance of reputation and on an uninhibited press.[6] In other words, libel laws in a society reflect "the assumptions of that society respecting the relative importance of an unstained reputation on the one hand, and an uninhibited press on the other."[7]

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[4] The Korean press arbitration system can be viewed as a good example for the alternative in resolving libel disputes outside the courts. For example, in *Iowa Libel Research Project*, which studied non-litigation alternatives, Bezanson et al. pointed out that both the plaintiffs and the defendants were dissatisfied with the current system. Exploring the libel and privacy cases between 1974 and 1984, they observed that while the plaintiffs are frustrated by the obstacles in the course of law suits and their loss in the suits, the media defendants, whether they win or not, always have to take a risk of being financially threatened. They found that the libel suit so far seems to be a particularly apt candidate for efficient and effective resolution through non-judicial processes. R. Bezanson, G. Cranberg, and J. Soloski, *Libel Law and the Press* (1987).

[5] Frederick Schauer, *Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A Comparative Analysis*, 1 J. Media L. & Prac. 1, 3 (1980)

[6] *Id.*

An examination of the Korean press arbitration system should start from this notion.[8] To put it differently, the Korean press arbitration system reflects how conflicting rights are reconciled in the social context of Korea. It mirrors the situation of the media environment in which the government, the press, and the public are interrelated with each other.

The Korean government founded the Press Arbitration Commission as a mechanism to enforce the right of reply, based on the now abolished Basic Press Act in 1981.[9] The Periodicals Act and the Broadcast Act now provide for the right of reply based on the notion of "human worth and dignity" recognized in the Korean Constitution.[10] Article 16 (1) of the Periodicals Act states:

> Any person who is injured by a factual assertion published in a periodical . . . may request in writing an insertion of a corrected report to the publisher or editor within fourteen days after it is published, in case of daily newspapers or communication, and within one month, in case of other periodicals.[11]

In 1991, the Constitution Court of Korea upheld the right of reply provision in the Periodicals Act and Broadcast Act and ruled that it is based on "the constitutionally guaranteed right of character and allows the injured party an opportunity to respond to a factual allegation."[12] The Court claimed that right of reply can contribute to the public's discovering truth and forming diverse public opinion, and that the right of reply requirement could create a more open marketplace of ideas by enhancing the objectivity of news information with the participation of non-media people in forming balanced public opinion.[13]

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[7] *Id.* at 5.

[8] A commentator notes that a distinctive feature of Korean libel laws is that they have developed with no consideration of the importance of the press freedom. Kyu-Ho Youm, "Libel Laws and Freedom of the Press: South Korea and Japan Reexamined," 8 Boston Univ. Int'l L.J. 53, 54 (1990).

[9] Basic Press Act, art. 50 (repealed 1987).

[10] Korean Constitution, art. 10 (stating that all citizens shall be assured of human worth and dignity and have the right to pursue happiness. It shall be the duty of the State to confirm and guarantee the fundamental and inviolable human rights of individuals).

[11] Periodicals Act, art. 16 (1).

The Korean press arbitration system is "unique" because there are no similar legal apparatuses in European countries where the right of reply is widely recognized. Even in Germany, from which the right of reply was imported, there is no such independent statutory foundation as the Korea Press Arbitration Commission to carry out the right of reply.[14]

In Germany, the right of reply is derived from the basic rights of personality and identity as guaranteed by Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law. The Basic Law prevents the "essential substance" of the fundamental civil rights from being restricted by application of the general laws.[15] The right of reply is regulated by the press law of the respective German state, which elaborates the rights and responsibilities of the press in accordance with the Basic Press Law. For instance, Hamburg press law illustrates how the right of reply is recognized as a statutory concept at German law. Under the Hamburg law, the right of reply is restricted to a statement of fact published in a periodical. Thus, opinion and subjective expression of value judgments are excluded from the right of reply. The exclusion of subjective opinions from the German right of reply is distinct from the French right, which applies to expressions of both fact and opinion.[16]

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[12] Constitutional Court, 89 Honma 165: Constitutional Petition for Review of Periodicals Act, arts. 16 (3) and 19 (3), Sep. 16, 1991, 40 Press Arbitration Quarterly 169-77 (1991) (Korean).
[13] *Id.* at 177.
[14] Yong-Sang Park, *Basic Press Act, in* Laws Relating to Politics 211 (Chin Kim ed., 1983) (Korean).
[15] Helmut Kohl, *Press Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, in* Press Law in Modern Democracies: A Comparative Study 214-216 (1985).

In 1980, the Korean government established the press arbitration system because it was concerned about increasing "press violence" against individuals.[17] Kyu-Ho Youm, a media law scholar, pointed out that the statutory right of reply was mainly aimed to provide an "expeditious means" for individuals to recover from their press-related injury.[18] Similarly, Sam-Sung Yang, former Press Arbitration Commissioner and Seoul High Court judge, commented that it is necessary to remember that the major purpose of the arbitration system is to provide people injured by the media with an opportunity to respond in the press rather than to address the liability of the press for the damages.[19]

From a broader viewpoint, Jin-Sok Jung, a media history scholar in Korea, claimed that the Press Arbitration Commission was founded to cope with recent changes in media environments.[20] Thus, with the formation of the Commission, the Korean government intended to resolve libel problems outside court so that individuals could avoid the intricate proceedings involved with suing the media, and so that they could save spending an excessive amount of money in libel action.[21]

Although the Korean press arbitration system was created to meet the needs of both the individuals and the press in changing social circumstances, the structure and efficiency of the system had been questioned by many legal and journalism scholars. Most of all, because the Press Arbitration Commission's decisions have not been legally binding until 1996, which is the case with other arbitration bodies, the Commission's proceedings are likely to end up a "mere repetition of legal processing" when either party does not agree on the result of the arbitration.[22] Accordingly, there exists a reasonable likelihood that the Korean press can be subject to two different types of suits for the same news story.[23]

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[16] Charles Danziger, *The Right of Reply in the United States and Europe*, 19 NYU J. Int'l L. & Politics 184-69 (1986).

[17] Kyu-Ho Youm, *Access to the Press: Right of Reply*, *in* Press Law in South Korea 127 (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1996).

[18] *Id.*

[19] Sam-Sung Yang, *Right to Claim Corrected Report: A Legal Perspective*, 3 Press Arbitration Quarterly 14, 15-20 (1982) (Korean).

[20] Jin-Sok Jung, *Press Arbitration System and Changes in Media Environments*, 38 Press Arbitration Quarterly 10 (1991) (Korean).

[21] *Id.* at 13.

In this regard, Jin-Sok Jung suggested that a single statute, which would affirm the status and scope of the Commission, ought to be enacted to facilitate the function of the Press Arbitration Commission in Korean society. He commented, "[T]he provisions of the Periodicals Act and Broadcast Act cannot afford to achieve the real purpose of the Commission while the role of such an institution as the Press Arbitration Commission in modern society is quite important."[24] His suggestion was hailed by many legal and journalistic scholars.

However, according to Won-Soon Paeng, the fundamental problem is that the Press Arbitration Commission was originally founded and operated by the government, not by the media.[25] In other words, the Commission is not a voluntary institution organized by the media for their own monitoring, but is a manipulative governmental institution. Therefore, Paeng argues that the function of the Commission should be strictly supervised so that it may not impair press freedom.[26]

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[22] Sung-Nam Kim, *A Legal Perspective on Press Arbitration System*, 32 Press Arbitration Quarterly 7 (1988) (Korean). The law required people who seek for the remedy to apply for the arbitration from the Commission before they go to courts.

[23] *Id.*, 9.

[24] Jung, *supra* note 20, at 12-14.

[25] Won-Soon Paeng, *New Perspectives in Mass Media Law* 327 (1991) (Korean).

Another criticism comes from the perception of the individuals on the arbitration process. More than anything else, it is pointed out that individuals do not still distinguish "right of reply" from "right for corrected reports" which was a misnomer of right of reply. Thus, even though the "right for corrected report" was renamed "right of reply" in the amendment of Periodicals Act in 1996, most of the people still appeal to the Commission for the imminent remedy of a correction by the media outlets, which was the main function of right for corrected report.[27]

Also, there is a criticism about how the Korean courts defined "right of reply." Analyzing libel cases for the right of reply during the last decade, Jong-Soe Kim criticizes how the Korean courts misled individuals in the actual enforcement of the right of reply.[28] He observes that first, the courts did not set up a standard to distinguish "factual report" from "opinion." Second, the courts failed to measure the degree of injury based on a consistent scale. Third, the courts allowed the news companies to publish corrected reports in an "advertisement section," which could minimize the originally intended effect of the right of reply. Finally, the courts counted on very subjective standards of judges rather than on objective, definitional rules in deciding whether a right of reply should be granted.[29] Saying that Korean courts lack consistency in decisions, Kim concluded that the key element to the successful operation of the right of reply is to set basic, consistent rules by which the court judges come to a decision.[30]

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[26] *Id.* at 328.

[27] Sang-Jae Hwang, *Changes in Media Environments and Reconstructing the concept of the Press*, 62 Press Arbitration Quarterly 6-15 (1997) (Korean). Now, "right for corrected reports" coexists along with "right of reply."

[28] Jong-Soe Kim, *Issues and Problems in Korean Press Arbitration System*, 54 Press Arbitration Quarterly 6 (1995) (Korean).

[29] *Id.* at 22.

In the latest study, Nak-In Sung summarizes the general arguments about social functions of the press arbitration system in conjunction with freedom of the press, the changing media environment, and recent efforts of legal reformists to award more authority to the Press Arbitration Commission.[31] First, Sung examines how the concept of freedom and responsibility of the press was developed in the course of political changes in Korea. Here, he claimed that as the political system changed from an authoritarian to a more democratic structure, the concept of press freedom shifted from that of a passive right to one of an active right.[32]

Second, Sung askes whether the Press Arbitration Commission played a substantial role in the resolution of the conflicts between the rising needs of the public and a more liberated press. Despite some suspicions of the public about its effective operation, Sung maintains that the Press Arbitration Commission played a crucial role in building grounds for the public to stand on when their rights were violated by the media. Saying that the core of press arbitration system is the right of reply as a statutory right, Sung claims that now there is no other effective way but "self-regulation" for media organizations to avoid being sued by the public.[33]

Third, Sung observes that the legal authority of the arbitration processes should be more consolidated. He states that recent legal reform in the function of the Press

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[30] *Id.* at 23.

[31] Nak-In Sung, "Social Responsibility of the Press and Press Arbitration System," *Law and Society* 14 (1997): 6-35 (Korean).

[32] *Id.* at 27.

[33] *Id.* at 34.

Arbitration Commission, by which the Commission acquired more discretionary authority, will contribute to more effective "arbitration," not mere "mediation."[34]

Press Freedom and Libel Laws in Korea

Freedom of press is constitutionally protected in Korea. The Korean Constitution stipulates, "All citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association."[35] Freedom of the press, however, is guaranteed as long as it does not violate the "honor or rights of other persons."[36] Further, the Constitution provides for ways to "claim for the damage" resulting from the infringement by the media.[37]

In brief, freedom of the press in Korea is a constitutional right that needs to be harmonized with other individual rights such as reputation and privacy. Some studies show how freedom of press has been perceived in Korean society, corresponding to changing sociopolitical environments. Among them, Kyu-Ho Youm's study well expoundes, from legal and sociopolitical perspectives, how the concept of "press freedom" has been developed in Korean society since its liberation from the Japanese in 1945.

Youm observes that sociopolitically, Confucianism contributed to the emergence of an authoritarian rather than libertarian press in Korea, and statutorily, that press freedom guaranteed by the Korean Constitution was frequently turned into empty words in its implementation.[38] Youm emphasizes that under authoritarian governments, repressive statutes such as the National Security Act and Anti-Communist Act were frequently and effectively invoked to restrict the Korean press. His findings are noteworthy in that he offered a framework to explore how the Korean press was interrelated with the government and the public.[39]

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[34] *Id.* at 35.
[35] Korean Constitution, art. 21 (1) (amended 1987).
[36] *Id.* art. 21 (4).
[37] *Id.*

From a similar viewpoint, Dae-Kwon Choi, a legal scholar, examines how the Korean press has been restricted politically. Choi argues that traditionally there was a huge disparity between the constitutional guarantee of press freedom and its implementation.[40] He maintains that despite the constitutional warrant, the Korean press was often regulated and restricted by a myriad of press-related laws, including the Criminal and Civil Law, the National Security Law, and the Basic Press Law. However, Choi noted that the press had been more heavily suppressed by the political power and press owners than by press laws. Those external forces often violated the fundamental value of press freedom in a democratic society.[41]

As a matter of fact, libel laws in Korea mainly have served as a guide for determining the dynamics of freedom of the press and individuals' reputational rights. They sometimes have been used as a means to control the press rather than to protect individuals from the media. The libel laws include some provisions in Criminal Code, Civil Code, Periodicals Act, and Broadcast Act. For a long time before the 1980s, the Criminal Code functioned as substantive parts of libel law. It was with the enactment of the

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[38] Kyu-Ho Youm, *Freedom of the Press in South Korea, 1945-1983: A Sociopolitical and Legal Perspective* 32-37 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation., Southern Illinois University-Carbondale, 1985).
[39] *Id.* at 128.
[40] Dae-Kwon Choi, *The Press and the Law*, 11 Seoul Nat'l Univ. L. Rev. 13 (1981) (Korean).
[41] *Id.* at 17-19.

Criminal Code in 1953 that statutory rights to an individual's reputation were first recognized. Articles 307-310 were invoked as core libel laws.[42] The Code stipulates that if the facts alleged are "true and solely for the public interest," the defamatory act shall not be punished.[43] The Civil Code is primarily intended to safeguard general individual rights. Some provisions, including Article 751 and Article 764, were invoked as part of libel laws in Korea.[44] However, given the law provisions that can be invoked to control the media, media were in most cases controlled by severely repressive laws such as the National Security Act or Anti-Communist Act before 1988.

The traditional concept of press freedom and the relationship between the government and the press in Korea within the legal boundary can be better explained by the perspective of Pnina Lahav, who provided the groundwork for a comprehensive examination of the features of press laws essential for a functioning democracy.[45] Examining mass media laws in several countries, Lahav noted that the press law of any particular democracy is not determined so much by the availability of a constitutional commitment, or by the presence of a special press statute, as by a particular political and legal culture. Thus, the search for understanding the law of press freedom should focus both on the forms of regulation and on the political theories that underpin the system of regulation.[46] Lahav's findings elucidate the situation of Korean media after 1980.

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[42] Criminal Code of Korea, Law No. 4040 (revised in 1988) *translated in* Current Law of Republic of Korea 761-812 (1991). Art 307 (2) stipulates: " A person who defames another by publicly alleging false facts shall be punished by penal servitude or imprisonment for not more than five years or suspension of civil rights for not more than ten years."

[43] *Id.* art. 310.

[44] Civil Code of Korea, Law No. 4199 (revised in 1991) *translated in* Current Law of Republic of Korea (1991): 761-812. Art 764 provides: "If a person has injured the reputation of another, the court many, on the application of the latter, make an order requiring the former to take suitable measures for the restoration of the latter's reputation either in lieu of or together with compensation for damages."

[45] *Mass Media Law in Modern Democracies: A Comparative Study* 339-354 (Pnina Lahav ed., 1985).

Focusing on the sociopolitical changes, Byung-Soo Lee describes how Korea's press freedom was conceptualized and regulated, and how the media's relationship with the government was determined during the 1980s in the political changes.[47] Lee argues that freedom of the press in Korea should not be considered so much in terms of legal protection as in terms of how the press is free from "political power."[48] He states, therefore, the extent of press freedom in Korea largely relied on whether the government would honor the law that provides press with protection.[49] He observes that even though a series of political reform steps starting in 1987, including the abolition of the Basic Press Act, brought considerable freedom to the press, current laws that replaced the Basic Press Act still have some repressive provisions that can be abused by political actors.[50]

From a more theoretical perspective, Tae-Woo Park explores the relationships between the government and the media during the Chun Doo-Whan and Rho Tae-Woo governments (1980-1992).[51] Park points out that the major factor that determined the relationship between the media and the government was the "nature of dominant political forces."[52] Park, based on the theoretical framework of Rivers, Miller, and Gandy that defines the relationship of the media with the political forces in a society as pendulant, not fixed,[53] claims that the Korean media had kept a relationship with the government in the form of "synergism" and "intimacy."[54] Even though Korean media gained more freedom from political control since the end of 1980s, Korean media were criticized as being the voice of the established political system and power groups, not being the monitor of the governmental power.

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[46] *Id.* at 353-354.

[47] Byung-Soo Lee, *Press Freedom During Korea's 5th and 6th Republics*, 1 Sungkok Journalism Review 13 (1990).

[48] *Id.* at 14.

[49] *Id.* at 15.

[50] *Id.*

[51] Tae-Woo Park, *A Comparative Study of the Media Policies During the 5th and 6th Republics* 43-45 (unpublished M.A. thesis, Korea University, Seoul, 1995) (Korean).

[52] *Id.* at 17.

While the relationship between the government and the media in Korea was formed by changes in the political situation, the relationship between the media and individuals has not been examined systematically until recently. The recent increase in libel litigation, however, has led many journalism and media law scholars to pay attention to the media-individual relationship. Kyu-Ho Youm points out that Korean people generally look upon the mass media as too powerful to challenge.[55] Youm observes that this attitude primarily arose from an assumption that the media are superior organizations of those forces that wield power in Korean society.[56] Youm concludes that this social atmosphere discourages those people whose reputation was injured by the media from going to court to seek a remedy. Besides, prior to the establishment of the press arbitration system, when libel happened, individuals had no choice but to appeal to the courts for the recovery of damages to reputation. Therefore, it is natural that libel litigation was very rare and was not a "chilling threat" to the Korean media at least before 1988.[57]

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[53] William R. Rivers et al., *Government and the Media*, *in* Political Communication: Issues and Strategies for Research 221 (Steven H. Chaffee ed., 1975).
[54] *Id.* at 45.
[55] Kyu-Ho Youm, *The Libel Law of Republic of Korea*, 35 Gazette 183 (1986).
[56] *Id.* at 193.
[57] *Id.* at 196.

In particular, Won-Soon Paeng, mainly discussing how injury to one's reputation had been perceived in Korean society, argues that no tradition had evolved to promote the idea that infringement on one's reputation ought to be recompensed in terms of monetary damages.[58] He adds that it was a prevailing idea in Korean society that a person who injured another's reputation should be subject to penal punishment as part of retributive justice. In cases of litigation for damages, Paeng observes, the amount of damages awarded was so small that it had no chilling effect on the Korean media.[59]

Paeng's observations confirm what Chul-Soo Chin found in 1971. In a study that made a comparative examination of libel phenomenon in Japan and Korea, Chin argued that scarcity of libel cases reported reflected three standards of legal thought: the authoritarian concepts of law as an aggregate of legal rules imposed by sovereign authority, which accompanied the importation of European models; the tradition of emphasizing harmony and conciliation, which are influenced by Confucianism; and the relatively new concept of the supremacy of the law, which views administration as part of the legal process.[60]

Reputation and Confucian Influence in Korea

Although reputation has been perceived in almost all modern democratic societies as one of the basic human rights, the concept of reputation has remained vague. A commonly shared concept about reputation is that it derives from the fundamental act of recognition in which one individual takes the role of the other into account.[61]

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[58] Won-Soon Paeng, *Mass Communication Law Theory* 156 (rev. ed. 1988) (Korean).
[59] *Id.*
[60] Hamid Mowlana & Chul-Soo Chin, *Libel Laws of Modern Japan and South Korea are Compared*, 40 Journalism Quarterly 326-330 (1971).

Robert Post points out that the term "reputation" can signify at least three different things: property, honor, and dignity.[62] First, reputation is the "property" produced by one's efforts as much as any physical possession, so any damage to reputation suggests property loss.[63] Such a view of reputation is essential to business and economic relationships, with the good name of the individual understood to be a form of "capital" that "creates funds" along with "patronage and support."[64] Second, the model of reputation as a form of honor looks upon the good name of an individual as having its source in the status of the defamed party rather than being earned through his or her labors. Third, reputation as a measure of individual dignity seeks to ensure individual happiness and community identity.[65]

Some sociologists claim that reputation by its nature is indelibly social, presenting a perspective that the concept of reputation is socially determined. Robert Bellah argues:

> [R]eputation is the extension and elaboration of the recognition on self-realization which lies at the basis of our social existence...[66]

From a similar view, Green finds reputation not so much a property or possession of individuals as a relation among persons. Injury to reputation, in this vein, should be regarded as injury to the individual's right to general social relations with others.[67]

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[61] George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, & Society* 141 (1934).

[62] Robert Post, *The Social Foundation of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution*, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 691, 693-94 (1986).

[63] Van Vechten Veeder, *The History of the Law of Defamation II*, 4 Colum. L. Rev. 33 (1904) (arguing that one's good name is as truly the product of one's efforts as any physical possession; indeed, it alone gives to material possessions their value as sources of happiness).

[64] Post, *supra* note 62, at 694.

[65] *Id.*

[66] Robert N. Bellah, *The Meaning of Reputation in American Society*, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 743, 744 (1986).

These definitions indicate that the concept of reputation in a society can be influenced by the social values shared and emphasized by that society. So, reputation should be approached with the unique context of a given society in mind.

The still-prevailing Confucian system of ethics might contribute to the concept of reputation in Korean society. Confucianism regards respect for benevolence and virtue as an ideal and stresses the practice of "filial piety."[67] Also, Confucianism emphasizes the need of shared values for the collective well-being.[68]

Korean society may still be called a Confucian society. About this, Sang-Hyun Song comments:

> Confucianism has been the most persistent, persuasive and influential teaching in East Asian history. More than any other thoughts, it has molded the minds and behavior of the people in China, Korea, and Japan for many centuries. Confucianism has provided these people with their ethical and moral norms as well as suggested methods of government, and the impact of this Confucian theory and its ideology upon their political and social life is still discernible today.[69]

As many scholars have indicated, the influence of Confucianism on Korea's beliefs, culture, and social system has been critical throughout history.[70] As Grayson observes, although Confucianism no longer holds a formal pre-eminence in the sphere of politics and culture, it still influences Korean society in the social sphere on both the structural and cognitive levels.[71]

On the structural level, Confucianism reinforces the traditional kinship of Korean people, which was highly stratified and based on an extended-clan system. On the cognitive level, attachment to one's family, loyalty to one's friends, and respect for one's teachers all owe their existence to the continuation of Confucian social influence on Korean culture.[72]

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[67] Alan Green, *Relational Interests*, 31 U. Ill. L. Rev. 35, 37 (1936) (distinguishing an individual's right to protection from family relations, trade relations, professional relations, and political relations).
[68] Selwyn G. Champion and Dorothy Short, *Readings from World Religions* 127 (1959).
[69] *Introduction to the Law and Legal System of Korea* 43 (Sang Hyun Song ed., 1983).
[70] Doo Hun Kim, *Confucian Influences on Korean Society*, 3 Korea J. 7, 40 (1963).

Above all, reputation in Korea has been conceived as pertaining more to family, school, and community than to a person's individual performance or achievement.[73] Accordingly, Korean people have considered injury to reputation as a "loss of face" to the individual's "familial" group rather than the damage to the individual.[74] Thus, as Paeng notes, recovery for an injured reputation should be accomplished in the mode of retaliation or punishment rather than monetary compensation, which influenced the interpretation and application of libel laws.[75]

Korean families, schools, and communities have been efficient institutions for the inculcation of modesty, moral virtues, responsibility, respect, and humility in the face of authority. Violations of these values and norms in self-enhancing behavior, such as boasting and conspicuous presentation of the self, have been punished by shaming, ridicule, and rejection.[76] A display of modesty and humility in social interaction is of great importance in the Korean value systems. Because of the need for self-regard, the individual judges his or her experience in terms of the social values of the larger society. According to Rogers, if these values are contradictory, or if the individual's experience

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[71] James Huntly Grayson, *Korea: A Religious History* 215 (1989).
[72] *Id.* at 216.
[73] Young C. Kim, *Japanese Journalists and Their World* 71 (1981).
[74] Paeng, *supra* note 58, at 155.
[75] *Id.* at 156.
[76] *Id.*

and actions are contrary to his or her sense of worth based on these values, "a state of incongruence, threatening to the self-structure, is created."[77]

A person's reputation relating to the press is protected as a constitutional right in Korea.[78] For the first time in the constitutional history of Korea, the 1980 Constitution clearly ensured the importance of protecting a person's reputation by making the press specifically liable for damage stemming from violation of the personal honor of citizens. Article 21 (2) of the 1980 Constitution emphatically prohibits the infringement on an individual's right to reputation, obligating the state to assure Koreans of their human worth as part of their fundamental and inviolable human rights as individuals.[79] In line with the constitutional adoption of a person's reputational right, Korean people have gradually modified the notion of their right to reputation. This change was accelerated by a social atmosphere that required the realization of human rights during the end of the 1980s.

Korean people were traditionally very reluctant to battle the press, even when their reputations were injured. Koreans, who have long been educated to place harmony and conciliation before legal warfare, tended to regard it as being beneath their dignity to seek a remedy through the judicial process.[80] The late legal scholar Peong-Choon Hahm observes:

> To the Korean a litigation is a war.... A litigious man is a warlike man to the Koreans. He threatens harmony and peace. He is a man to be detested. If a man

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[77] Carl R. Rogers, *A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships, as Developed in the Client-Centered Framework*, in *Psychology: A Study of a Science* 196 (Sigmund Koch ed., 1959).
[78] Korean Const. (amended 1987), art. 20 (4).
[79] Korean Const. (amended 1980), art. 10. Article 10 states: "All citizens shall be assured of human worth and dignity and have the right to pursue happiness. It shall be the duty of the State to confirm and guarantee the fundamental and inviolable human rights of individuals."
[80] Paeng, *supra* note 25, at 101.

cannot achieve reconciliation through mediation and compromise, he cannot be considered an acceptable member of the collectivity.[81]

Even though conflict, struggle, and legal resolution are the essence of the Western man, Koreans had a tendency to avoid legal processes whenever possible. For this reason, it is not surprising that libel litigation aimed to recover for an injured reputation is very unusual in Korea.[82] Jae-Chun Yu, a Korean journalism professor, maintains that the legal and ethical issues facing the Korean press are in part a result of the tendency of the defamed to forgo suing the news media.[83]

The Korean media have been said to be reckless in regard to a person's right to reputation.[84] Analyzing the decisions of the Korean Press Ethics Commission from 1961 to 1980, Yu observes that media violations of citizens' reputational rights in Korea resulted primarily from the "sensationalism of news reporting," the "unprofessional practices of news reporters," and the "journalists' lack of knowledge of laws and professional ethics."[85] Moreover, Yu adds this aspect was to a considerable degree caused by undemocratic political circumstances that did not allow the press to criticize the government or to provoke anti-government activities in Korea.[86] In this climate, the Korean media had to conform to the governmental policy only to become an authoritarian press instead of serving for the public good.

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[81] Peong Choon Hahm, *Korean Jurisprudence, Politics, and Culture* 117 (1986).

[82] Hamid Mowlana and Chul Soo Chin, *Libel Laws of Modern Japan and South Korea are Compared*, 48 Journalism Quarterly 326, 330 (1971); Kyu Ho Youm, *Libel Law and the Press in South Korea: An Update*, 1 Contemporary Asian Studies Series 1, 2 (1992).

[83] Jae-Chon Yu, *Hankuk Eonron kwa Eonron Munhwa* [Korean Press and its Culture] 171 (1986).

[84] *Id.* at 173.

[85] *Id.*

[86] *Id.*

Sociopolitical Changes and Present Media Environment

Sociopolitical circumstance of Korea have changed since 1981. This was true especially after 1987, when the government set political reforms into practice. In line with the changes in the political situation, social values that prevailed the Korean people have changed. Based on the assumption that libel laws are affected by the underlying sociopolitical values of a society, such changes would bring on broad changes in the libel milieu.

The most significant change was the improved status of the Korean courts as a more independent branch in the midst of an increasingly functional democracy. In the judicial history of Korea, the judicial department was under the pressure of the powerful executive branch until 1987.[87] Therefore, jurisprudence about politically sensitive issues was at the mercy of the executive branch. Even though an independent judiciary is considered the key to democracy, the constitutional guarantee of an independent judiciary in Korea was sometimes not kept.

Chief Justice William Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court comments how important it is to have an independent judiciary in a democracy. He points out, "Many nations have impressive guarantees of free speech, free elections, and the like. But these have not had the same meaning in those countries because of the want of an independent judiciary to interpret them."[88]

In a similar vein, Wallace, who studied the influence of the American constitution on Asian countries, maintains that an independent judiciary can best assure democratic progress, increase stability, and lessen the supposed need for a dictator.[89] Furthermore, Wilcox, a journalism scholar, emphasizes the independence of courts in a functional democracy in connection with press freedom. He states, "A nation's press system is free, not necessarily because of a constitutional guarantee, but because an unintimidated judiciary protects the press against government encroachment."[90]

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[87] Dae Kyu Yoon, *Law and Political Authority in South Korea* 38-52 (1990).

[88] William Rehnquist, *The Constitution: An Independent Judiciary Makes it Work*, 9 Trial 69, 74 (1987).

Regarding the guarantee of judicial independence, the Korean Constitution provides: "The judicial power shall be vested in courts composed of judges" and that "[t]he judges shall judge independently according to their conscience and in conformity with the Constitution and laws."[91] While 1972 Constitution endowed the president the power to appoint all judges, the 1980 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution empowered the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to appoint judges of lower courts with the aim of better guaranteeing the independence and autonomy of the judiciary branch.[92]

These provisions can be considered protection of the judicial power from the intervention of other branches. Despite these constitutional provisions, however, there still exist problems in the practical application of the Constitution.[93] In particular, the independence of the judiciary from the pressure of the executive branch has long been a legal issue in Korea. About this, Yoon, a constitutional law scholar, states: "[T]he actual operation of the court will, by and large, rely on the political atmosphere of the day."[94]

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[89] Clifford Wallace, *The Influence of the United States Constitution on Pacific Nations*, 16 The Korean Journal of Comparative Law 14, 22 (1988).

[90] Dennis L. Wilcox, *Black African States* in *Press Control Around the World* 222 (Jane Leftwich Curry and Joan R. Dassin eds., 1982).

[91] Korean Const. (amended 1987), art. 101 (1) and art. 103.

[92] *Id.* art. 105 (4).

[93] Notes, *The Amended Constitution of South Korea*, 26 International Commission of Jurist Review 22 (1981) ("[T] he provisions of the newly amended Constitution do not seem to provide for any greater independence of the Judiciary of the future. Although the power of dismissal by administrative disciplinary action has been removed, transfers to another court of [sic] forced resignations may still be used to punish judges who have displeased the President").

Considering that the judiciary has been under the influence of the executive branch, Yim observes that Koreans had little confidence in the validity and fairness of the judicial process in the operation of laws in Korea.[95] Youm affirms that this social atmosphere (the pressure of the executive branch on the judicial power and people's inconfidence over legal validity) discouraged libel victims from going to court to seek a remedy through judicial intervention.[96] Now Koreans believe that Korean courts are no longer dictated by the established leadership in Korea. At the same time, the possibility of court action against the media is more of a reality now than in the past.

Another important factor that affected the current media situation is the change in the attitude of Korean people toward the media. Traditionally, the Korean people believed the media were too powerful to challenge.[97] This attitude has gradually changed during the 1980s. Korean people became aware that the media, controlled by the government, did not serve the public as a watchdog.

According to Hye-Bok Lee, the attitude change of the Korean people toward the media is the outcome of the Korean people's enhanced "right-awareness" since 1987.[98] Lee says:

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[94] Dae-Kyu Yoon. *Judicial Review in the Korean Political Context*, 17 Korean Journal of Comparative Law 151 (1989).

[95] Sang-Won Yim. *A Study on Legal Values in Korea: An Analysis of Attitude Toward Law*, 2 Soc. Sci. J. 59, 70 (1974).

[96] James M. West and Dae Kyu Yoon. *The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea: Transforming the Jurisprudence of the Vortex?*, 40 The American J. Comp. L. 73, 119 (1992).

[97] Chong Tak Kim. *Press Republic* 223-25 (1991) (Korean).

[98] Hye-Bok Lee. *An Analysis of News on Accidents and Violations of Individual Rights*, 35 Press Arbitration Quarterly 16 (1990) (Korean).

> Our citizens' consciousness of rights enormously rose. In the past, people were so intimidated by the power of the news media that they dared not assert their rights against the media, although they had their rights violated by the media. At present, however, they would claim their rights openly enough to confront the press.[99]

Also, Lee comments that a "declining sense of professional ethics" among Korean journalists promoted the Korean people's attitude change toward the media.[100] Considering the expanded media industry, Lee points out that the fast-growing media industry, facing a lack of professionally trained journalists, hired less qualified people.[101] As a result, the overall quality of journalistic work had suffered, often precipitating complaints.[102]

As complaints about the media rapidly grew, citizen groups came to publicly criticize the reckless reporting of the media which could critically injure a person's reputation.[103] These citizen groups are composed of a wide variety of people, including lawyers, college professors, religious leaders, women leaders, anti-government activists, college students, and former journalists. These organizations primarily (1) hold seminars to discuss how to prevent media from violating the rights of individuals, (2) monitor the media, (3) educate citizens about how to be critical in understanding the media, (4) assist individuals injured by the media to seek legal remedies for the recovery, and (5) try to raise national support for their movements against the media.[104] Jung argues that although they could not provide the people who were injured by the media with a feasible way to recover for their media-related injuries, current movements of the Korean people can be shown as a radical departure from its long-lasted attitude toward the media.[105]

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[99] *Id.*

[100] *Id.*

[101] *Id.* For example, by the end of 1996, the number of daily newspapers increased to 282, which is nearly ten times as many as that in 1987. Korean Press Institute, *The Korean Press 1997* 125 (1997).

[102] *Id.* at 18.

[103] Jin-Sok Jung, *The Realities of Remedies for the Press Related Injuries and the Recent Movements of Media Audience*, 40 Press Arbitration Quarterly 19 (1991) (Korean).

[104] *Id.* at 22.

To grasp a better understanding of the social changes and the relationship between the press, the public, and the government, Jae-Kyung Lee's perspective is of great help. Unlike other scholars who gave much credit to political reform, Lee sought the reasons for democratic changes in Korea since 1987 in the emergence of "civil society."[106] Defining the democratization process as "society led" change, not an elite-initiated one, Lee explained that the changes resulted from the movements of a variety of voluntary institutions, including student organizations, church associations, citizen and labor groups, and the unexpected outcome of the success of authoritarian development projects.[107] Thus, according to Lee, under the changing circumstances, the Korean press had to find another relationship with the government and with political forces, escaping from the previous repressive policy from those in power.[108]

In conjunction with Korean people's enhanced right-awareness, another feature in sociopolitical changes is that the number of libel suits has increased at a huge rate since 1988, while political or any other types of suppression on the media have diminished. Regarding this, Youm observes that the numerical increase during the last decade indicates a notable departure from the traditionally timid posture of the Korean public to its overbearing press.[109] At the same time, the "explosion" in libel suits brought about notable changes in the function of the Korean press, which led Korean journalists to handle potentially damaging stories more carefully.[110] Youm, observing that libel suits in the United States effectively functioned as "a deterrent on the publication of false and injurious speech" and as "a check and balance on the media's great power" by individuals, stated that a similar phenomenon has arisen in Korea since the middle of the 1980s.[111]

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[105] *Id.* at 31.
[106] Jae-Kyung Lee, *Anti-Americanism in South Korea: The Media and the Politics of Signification* 53 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation., University of Iowa, 1993).
[107] *Id.* at 55.
[108] *Id.* at 59.
[109] Kyu-Ho Youm, *Libel Law and the Press in South Korea: An Update*, 1 Contemporary Asian Studies Series 1, 2 (1992).

It is also notable that since 1987, there has been a parallel increase in the press arbitration cases.[112] Analyzing the press arbitration cases for the past six years, Joong-Wha Kwon maintains that the increase in arbitration cases indicates that the press arbitration system had worked as a timely mechanism that had systematically prevented the press from violating the rights of the public.[113] Kwon finds the increase in press arbitration cases due to two reasons: the government's political reform that enabled a number of new dailies, magazines and a commercial broadcast company to start,[114] and the hostile response of the public to the sensationalism and reckless reports of the mushrooming media.[115] He adds that the quantitative expansion caused the low quality journalism due to high competition among the media.[116] Under these circumstances, the Press Arbitration Commission had worked as a central institution both for the remedy and for the protection of the rights of Korean people.

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[110] *Id.* at 3.
[111] *Id.* at 261.
[112] Of a total of 2,802 press arbitration cases since 1981, it was found that 2,502 (89.3%) cases had appeared during 1988 and 1995. Press Arbitration Commission, *Press Arbitration Yearbook* 52 (1995).
[113] Joong-Hwa Kwon, *An Analysis of Recent Press Arbitration Cases: 1988-1993* 3, 95 (unpublished M.A. thesis, Korean Foreign Language University, 1994) (Korean).
[114] The total number of dailies, weeklies, monthlies, and other periodicals registered in 1996 was 8,084. This is about 3.5 times as much as that in 1987 (2,412). Korean Press Institute, *The Korean Press 1997* 125 (1997).
[115] Kwon, *supra* note 113, at 5.
[116] *Id.* at 95.

The drastic changes in sociopolitical circumstances in Korea are more apparent during the 1990s. In response to arising criticisms under changing sociopolitical circumstances, major dailies responded with forming "Readers' Pages" and "Ombudsman" systems by 1993.[117] The Reader's Pages are primarily aimed at publishing the letters to the editor for correction of wrong news or for discussion of controversial issues. They have become an outlet for the frustrated public. As a result, the rate of arbitration applications against the news organizations that held Readers' Pages has declined sharply.[118] Likewise, ombudsman systems accepted by a major dailies were believed to play a substantial role in reducing the number of libel suits and press arbitration.[119]

According to Jung, however, unlike the newspaper ombudsmen in the United States, the Korean press used the ombudsman as a mechanism to defend itself rather than to advise the executives to reduce the number of incorrect reports.[120] Jung argues that despite a positive evaluation that ombudsman effectively works not only to correct the libelous news, but also to prevent publication of libelous news, Korean press should be more actively responsive in publishing corrected reports when news turns out to be incorrect.[121]

Changes in sociopolitical circumstances and in the relationship among the government, the press, and the public in Korea during 1987 -1996 can be more theoretically explained based on Jeffery Smith's media control hypothesis. This hypothesis, questioning under what conditions and to what extent press controls appear and function in society, offers a useful perspective in understanding the relationship between control of the government and control of the individuals over the media.[122] Smith stated: "[T]he more a mass medium is subject to government control or regulation, the more insulated it will be from legal actions taken by individuals....Legal control by government acts against legal control by individuals."[123] He adds that press controls differ in purpose and extent among nations, and media controlled by the government live with rules and regulations which are typically consistent with the existing legal and political system.[124]

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[117] Press Arbitration Commission. *Symposium: News Reporting and Right of Reply*, November 29-30, 1996, Final Report of Annual Seminar, at 26.

[118] *Id.*

[119] *Id.* at 27.

[120] Jin-Sok Jung, *The Press and the Right of Reply*, 53 Press Arbitration Quarterly 7-15 (1994) (Korean).

From Smith's viewpoint, a libel suit can be considered a means by which individuals are interrelated with the press in terms of control. Libel actions have been brought before courts as a way of showing public hostility against the media which historically enjoyed superior power over the individuals in Korean society. Considering the number of libel suits was very small and the damages awarded in courts were minimal,[125] the recent increase in libel suits and press arbitration cases indicates that there happened great changes in the tradition press-public relationship.

Summary and Conclusion

This study focused its analysis on the impact of the press arbitration system on the media environment during the transitional period from authoritarian to more democratic

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[121] *Id.*
[122] Smith, *supra* note 3, at 93.
[123] *Id.*
[124] *Id.* at 94.
[125] Youm, *supra* 17, at 129. In the United States, a result of the failure of the media to defend themselves, the media sometimes come across financial threat for their existence. Exorbitant legal cost of the media in libel suits, even when the media successfully defend themselves, was considered the most problematic factor in libel suits for the media.

regime. The main purpose of this study was to redefine the press arbitration system as a major force in the present state of the Korea media. In order to explain the changes in the media environment, this study employed Jeffery Smith's media control hypothesis.

Sociopolitical changes after 1987 not only brought unprecedented freedom to the media which had been oppressed by both legal and political control by the government.[126] Before 1988, the press arbitration system was seen as a sort of legal device to put the media under the control of the government rather than as a means to help people recover from their injuries by the media. Moreover, because the Korean people traditionally thought of the press as an enormously powerful organization, they were unwilling to fight against the media in the course of using legal apparatus like the press arbitration system.

This study found that the system is now widely recognized as an indispensable mechanism to resolve the clashes between press freedom and individuals' right to reputation. A recent national survey by the Press Arbitration Commission showed how the public and the press perceived the current press arbitration system. The survey mainly asked to what degree both the media and individuals are satisfied with the function of the Commission. In the final report, the researchers found:

> First, the public respondents thought while press freedom is now well guaranteed, the "responsibility" or "obligation" of the press to the society is under expectations. The public considered that there are still too many reputational injuries to the individuals inflicted by the media. However, the press respondents thought otherwise. The press argued that it tries its best to live up to its social responsibility and obligation. The only problem, the press maintained, is that the press sometimes intends to make stories look more "sensational" in the course of seeking scoops;
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> .. Second, most of the public respondents felt that having a press arbitration system is necessary to protect the basic rights of individuals and to help the individuals recover

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[126] *The Unfolding Lotus East Asia's Changing Media* 10-13 (Jon Vanden Heuvel & Everette E. Dennis, eds., 1993). Since 1987, with the abolition of censorship and licensing system, the press has been as free as to criticize the government and to write probing stories about topics that were previously off-limits.

damaged reputations. The people who answered negatively pointed out that the actual remedy is nearly impossible because the rate of mutual compromise is very low in the arbitration process. However, most of respondents stated that they still believe the Press Arbitration Commission to be the most reliable institution to appeal to when their reputation is injured by the media;

Third, in many cases, the public was found to be dissatisfied with the content of the corrected report. The reason was because the press did not correct the wrong stories as the public wanted the press to do. Thus, the public argued that the Commission should have the "authority" to have the press faithfully follow whatever is decided in the arbitration process.[127]

It has been almost two decades since Korean society adopted the press arbitration system as an alternative, more efficient way to resolve the libel disputes outside courts. It is arguable whether the press arbitration system has been a chilling threat to the freedom of Korean press. Indeed, however, the press arbitration system has functioned as a powerful agent to result in the current media environment, bringing a huge alteration to the relationship between the press and the public.

It might be safe to say, from the Smith's perspective, that Korean society seems to be entering the new era of control of individuals over the media. First of all, the press arbitration system in Korea has been a main mechanism that promoted the Korean people to fight against the press. Also, the press arbitration system had a great impact on the press in transforming it into a value-checker on the governmental power for the first time in its history, normalizing its relationship with the public.

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[127] Press Arbitration Commission, *A National Survey on the Degree of Satisfaction in Using Arbitration* 98-103 (1996) (Korean).

Popular Literature and Gender Identities: An Analysis of Young Indian Women's Anxieties about Reading Western Romances

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Popular Literature and Gender Identities: An Analysis of Young Indian Women's Anxieties about Reading Western Romances

> I don't understand why everyone fusses so much. I read Mills & Boons for fun--I really am not going to do all those things the heroines do in these books. I am tired of explaining to my mother why I like these books. She says I can read these books and do whatever I want after I get married but until then she has to tell me what to do. She says my Mills & Boons are not for decent girls whatever that means.

I was listening to Rachna, a young college-educated woman, as she showed me her favorite romance novels on her bookshelf in her small room. She looked anxious and sounded defensive as she pointed to the bookshelf where she stored her favorite romances and explained her parents' dissaproval of her romance reading. The brightly-colored paperback romance novels that Rachna referred to as "Mills & Boons, " which are exported to India from the United Kingdom, are popular all over urban India among young, English-educated middle- and upper-class women (Baghel, 1995, p. 17). These readers of romance novels in India constitute the largest market for Mills & Boons barring the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada (Dasgupta, 1996, p. 8). Rachna who had cheerfully and generously given me her time was one among numerous young Indian women I spoke to for my research on romance reading in India. In this paper, which takes an ethnographic approach to romance reading, I explore the significance of the popularity of Western romances among young urban middle- and upper-class Hindu women in postcolonial urban India.

Scholars who have studied audiences interpretations of popular culture have demonstrated the potential of ethnographic research to provide a rich portrait of the meanings that people make of the structures within which they live and draw from to fashion their identities (Ang, 1985; Derne′, 1995; Gillespie, 1995; Mankekar; 1993; Morley, 1992; Press, 1991; Radway, 1984). These scholars have argued that ethnographies can give us a glimpse of the dynamic and complex cultural interaction between audiences' everyday experiences within social structures and the pleasure they derive from the texts of popular culture. In the United States, within the field of audience studies, feminist media scholars have used ethnographic methods to reveal the impact of patriarchal norms on women's responses to genres such as soap operas and romance novels (Brown, 1994; Christian-Smith, 1990; Jensen, 1984; Moffit, 1990; Press, 1991; Radway, 1984).

While ethnographic media studies in Europe, Australia, and the United States have made a valuable contribution to our knowledge of female audiences in Western nations, there is little work on woman as audiences of popular culture in the Third World. As feminist scholar Leslie Steeves (1993, p. 41) has pointed out in her review of scholarship on women and media studies, we still know very little about non-Western women's interactions with the mass media. Commenting specifically on the lack of academic work on romance reading in non-Western contexts, Margaret Jensen (1984) wrote, "The home market [United States] is nearly saturated, but Harlequin's sales abroad have steadily increased. . . What messages do readers in developing countries receive from North American romances? What impact do romances have on diverse national, racial, and ethnic cultures?" (p. 161). Analyzing women's responses to popular culture in postcolonial nations such as India can provide a glimpse into the impact of patriarchy and nationalism on women's lives.

My research on romance reading by a group of young, middle- and upper-class women in urban India contributes to the literature on global audience studies and to feminist media studies. There is very little work on the reception of Western popular culture among audiences in the Third World, particularly the reception of popular literature, a phenonmenon that becomes marginalized in comparison to the attention paid to television. The field of feminist media studies, which continues to be dominated by the experiences of women from the Western World, will be enriched by my analysis of the consumption of Western popular culture as one practice where Indian women negotiate the politics of ideal Indian womanhood.

The broad ethnographic question I pose in this paper is: How do young middle- and upper-class Indian women who have to conform to social norms that constrain women's sexuality negotiate their own sexual identity in the process of reading Western romance fiction? Young Indian women's engagement with Western popular culture takes place within the social context of a patriarchal Hindu culture, which has been shaped by the ideals of the nationalist movement.

Young urban Indian women who are expected to be modern yet traditional experience contradictory messages from their culture. Women are encouraged to pursue careers and be successful in the public sphere of paid work and professional employment, but continue to lead restricted social and private lives. The most prevalent form of marriage for young, single women is the arranged marriage system which demands that women be virgins.[1] In addition, young women's behavior is controlled in various ways; they have to be home before sundown, they are formally initiated into housework and cooking, and they have to seek approval from parents or authority figures for their activities outside of home. Young, single women are told repeatedly that the honor of their families depends on their sexual behavior. Most young urban Indian women also live with their with parents or relatives, even if they are economically independent, perform a bulk of the domestic chores, and after marriage are expected to take care of their families and elders in their husbands' families. By contrast, Indian men enjoy much more freedom than women; men are rarely warned of the consequences of losing their chastity, of being single, or of having poorly developed culinary skills. Although young middle-class Indian women are not constrained in terms of intellectual achievements, when it comes to the realm of sexual politics, they experience considerable constraints on their behavior (Nandy, 1976).

It is also important to examine the impact of the rising tide of nationalism in India on women's lives. Since India achieved independence from Britain in 1947, there has been an effort on the part of the government, entertainment industries, and politicians to recast the idea of nationhood, the ostensible purpose being the construction of a genuine and authentic Indian cultural identity. One of the ways in which this identity is being constructed in postcolonial India is by exalting traditional images of womanhood in India, drawn from upper-caste Hindu patriarchal texts, to emphasize the chastity and purity of Indian women. Young women who read Mills & Boon romances in India read these novels, which describe the courtship rituals and sexual lives of Western women, against the backdrop of such a nationalist rhetoric.

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[1] An article in *The Times of India* (August 19, 1995) "Trendy Girls Walk the Traditional Path," by Seema Kamdar discusses the strong preference for arranged marriages in urban India by even the so-called "trendy" girls" who are Westernized in terms of their taste for music, films, and food. By citing arranged marriages as part of the lives of Indian women, I do not mean to make the problematic distinction between "love" and "arranged" marriages, rather I am merely pointing out that the institution of marriage is structured differently in India.

Additionally, the path of modernity for women in India was charted by Hindu nationalist reformers. These reformers urged Indian women to enter the public sphere to struggle against British colonialism and encouraged women to be successful in certain spheres of education and employment, but discouraged them from imagining their lives without being dutiful wives and mothers. Given the contradictory ways in which nationalism has liberated Indian women in some ways yet maintained control over their sexuality, an analysis of romance reading in India can provide a glimpse of how media practices become implicated within the nationalist vision of modernity for women.

Methodology

This analysis of romance reading is part of a larger project, which is based on an ethnographic approach to romance reading by young Indian women. I conducted my interviews and participant observation in the city of Hyderabad in South India over a period of four months beginning from May through September of 1996. My ethnographic approach encompassed the following; reading Mills & Boon romances; interviews with 42 women in group sessions; individual interviews with 30 romance readers; and interviews with readers' parents, teachers, library and book-store owners, publishers, and used-book vendors. In addition to the interviews, I also spent time observing and participating in various activities connected to romance reading. I visited lending libraries, used book vendors, and other bookstores with several women. I spent time with many young women eating snacks at cafes, going to the movies, dining with them at their homes, and shopping. At my request, twenty three readers also volunteered to write essays in response to the question: "Why do you prefer reading Mills & Boon romances over other reading material?"

The women I interviewed and observed for my exploration of romance reading were middle-and upper-class, single, college-going women, between the ages of 17 to 21 years old, a majority of whose parents were teachers, bankers, entrepreneurs, government officials, and various other professionals. I decided to focus on this group of readers because my own personal experience of living in India and anecdotal evidence suggested that romance reading is intense among young middle- and upper-class Indian women of these ages. I gained access to romance readers through two channels: women's college campuses and lending libraries. The colleges I visited were women's colleges because higher education in the city of Hyderabad in India, particularly for junior college and for undergraduate education, is segregated except for a few engineering and medical schools. I selected the four most well-known and largest women's colleges; three undergraduate colleges and one junior college. Three out of the four colleges I visited were private, Catholic institutions and one college was a public institution, which was affiliated with the local state university, Osmania University.

I visited ten lending libraries and became a regular member of three libraries. Lending libraries are one of the main sources for young Indian women in Hyderabad to obtain romances because it is much cheaper for them to check out books on a daily basis than buy them from bookstores. The lending libraries I refer to here are different from public libraries in the United States. In India, there are no public libraries that are funded by the state other than university libraries, which stock educational material and are only accessible to students, faculty, and staff of the university. Lending libraries in urban India are small, privately-owned stores, where only popular fiction, popular magazines, and maybe a few video and audio tapes are stacked on shelves, and there is very little room to sit down and read. The purpose of these libraries is for the customer to walk in, quickly browse, choose what they want, check them out for a daily fee, and leave. The books themselves are rented out by the library-owner (not a librarian, since the people who set up these libraries are just entrepreneurs and not trained librarians) and these libraries can be best thought of as similar to the video stores in the United States such as Blockbuster, except that these are not glittery chain stores, but small businesses run by individuals who live in the local communities.

I used snowball sampling as a means of finding my informants. Snowball sampling is a technique of sampling where the ethnographer starts with a small number of key respondents, usually referred to as informants, who introduce the researcher to others (Douglas, 1985; Lindlof, 1995). The strength of snowball sampling lies in its ability to locate informants who have attributes that are central to the research problem and are also involved in an active social network (Lindlof, 1995, p. 127). I arrived at a sample of thirty readers by drawing on the logic of "creative sampling." Jack Douglas (1985) describes "creative sampling" as a method of sampling in which researchers conduct as many interviews as needed to explore the issues being posed and continue until they stop hitting new issues. Feminist scholars Janice Radway (1984), Lana Rakow (1992), Purnima Mankekar (1993a), and Andrea Press (1991) who used ethnography as a method to study audiences also relied on this technique of snowball sampling. To minimize the bias that may arise in this sampling method, in which all the informants in the snowball may be connected with one another, I visited four colleges and three lending libraries that were far apart and found seven groups of readers.

I located the women I interviewed by approaching groups of women at the college grounds or outside lending libraries. Among the forty-two women I spoke to in group situations, I identified thirty women who regularly read Mills & Boon romances (over three books a week) and interviewed them in individual one-on-one situations. I refer to these thirty women as "informants" in this study. I use pseudonyms wherever I quote or cite the people--informants, parents, lending library owners, publishers, and used book vendors--I interviewed.

Background

The romances that these young Indian women read are popularly known as "M & Bs" or "Mills & Boons" after the British publishing company Mills & Boon Ltd., which exports these books to India. The British company Mills & Boon is a subsidiary of the Harlequin company in Toronto, which publishes the well-known Harlequin romance novels, which are popular in North America. Although these books have been read by generations of middle-class Indian women, there is no research that has studied the popularity of Mills & Boons among readers in urban India using ethnographic methods.

While exact sales figures of Mills & Boons are not available for India,[2] we can get a glimpse of the popularity of these Western romances among middle-class women in urban India through the comments of Vijay Joshi (1994), an Indian journalist:

> Bashful Indian teen-agers for years have secretly lived out their fantasies in the pages of romance novels imported from Britain. (p. 7A)
>
> Known among aficionados as "MBs," the British publishers' series has provided a daily fix to a generation of Indian women who devoured the novels between classes, at beauty parlors or while commuting to work on buses. (p. 7A)

The popularity of imported Mills & Boon romances among urban Indian women has prompted the Indian publisher Rupa Books to produce romance novels written in English by Indians to capture some of the profits that multinationals were earning.

The readers I interviewed in Hyderabad picked the "Contemporary Romance" series, one among eight other series offered by Mills & Boon, as their "favorite" line of books. Books in the Contemporary Romance series of Mills & Boon were 188 pages in length and the distinctive covers of these novels, which were in single bold colors consistently bore the logo of a rose that was spread out horizontally on top of the multi-color illustration. The Contemporary Romance series, the oldest of all the sight series, represents an evolution of the romances that were first published by Mills & Boon and defined by the publishers as “simple, modern love stories.” As the word “Contemporary” suggests, these novels are always set in contemporary times in the United States, United Kingdom, and other “exotic” locations all over the world. The basic formula for the romantic story was based on a hero and heroine, always white, who meet and fall in love but they encounter obstacles to their love, which included lack of communication, pressing family responsibilities, conflicting loyalties, problems in the workplace, and occasionally social class differences.

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[2] The popularity of romances in India in terms of readership is very difficult to gauge from actual sales figures because romances unlike in the West, are not bought regularly, but checked out for a daily rental fee from small lending libraries.

Heroines were usually young (in the early to mid-twenties) and sexually inexperienced while heroes were older with much more sexual experience. While heroines in earlier decades were mostly secretaries, governesses, clerks, and waitresses, since the 1970s, heroines have also been journalists, advertising copywriters, filmmakers, artists, and designers. In contrast though, heroes are predominantly upper-class and ranged from being rich business-owners to self-employed professionals. The focus of the story was the developing relationship between the hero and heroine, however, an important part of the plot development was also the descriptions of houses, cars, gardens, meals, clothing, and everyday rituals of the main characters.

Public Images, Private Pleasures

When I began interviewing young women in their colleges, I noticed that some women, particularly those who identified themselves as heavier readers of Mills & Boon romances, would say to me half-seriously and half-jokingly, ”You mean you want to talk to the bad girls?” On probing further the meaning behind the phrase “bad girls,” I found that these readers were referring to their enthusiasm and interest for reading Mills & Boon romances, which often carried fairly sexually explicit descriptions. According to my informants only “bad girls” in India could express an interest in sexuality. To explain concretely what they meant by the phrase “bad girls,” Ritika and Mythili, who read at least one Mills & Boon a day, pulled out two books and showed me short, scribbled messages that they said were written by men in the neighborhood on the margins of those pages that had descriptions of sexual encounters. I was surprised to see that there were sentences marked in red on the sides of these pages such as: "You bad girls, why do you read these things," "You should be ashamed of your selves," and "Do your parents know you are reading this" all of which indicated to me that these young women's interest in sexuality was seen as shameful and deviant by certain men in their communities. These women who showed me these scribbled messages immediately clarified that their strong preferences for Mills & Boons did not mean they were actually interested in "sleeping around." Some others even defensively argued that good girls who did not read Mills & Boons were probably hiding their promiscuity under the guise of following society's prescriptions for good behavior.

How does the culture's disapproval of female sexuality affect these young women's Mills & Boon romance reading, especially in their everyday lives at home and in public where they have to conceal their interest in sexuality? Some women discussed their parents' strong disapproval of Mills & Boon romances and said that they rarely or never read their novels in the living room area or while guests or relatives visited. These women did most of their reading in their rooms or at college and since they could not visit the lending library in their neighborhood frequently without raising their parents' suspicions, they visited the library close to their college and also relied on friends for their supply of romances. Out of the eight women who reported various degrees of parental disapproval of their Mills & Boon reading, three even asked me not to visit their homes to interview them because they feared their parents might find out that they regularly read romances.[3] Others said that their parents either tolerated or mildly disapproved of their reading romances and did not openly complain as long they complied with rules such as not staying out late, not talking to strange men, helping with chores, and doing well in their studies.

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[3] One young woman Rachna told me that six months earlier her father had caught her reading a Mills & Boon romance and had slapped her on her face really hard and screamed at her that she would not be allowed into the house again if he saw her reading romances.

Some women also spoke about being uncomfortable with displaying their enjoyment of Mills & Boon romances in public settings with the exception of their college grounds where parents and others could not intrude. Sangeeta, one of the most outspoken of my informants, spoke about covering romances with sexually explicit covers with sheets of newspaper when she read in public so that people would not label her as immoral:

> If I am reading one of the newer Mills & Boons, you know the books that are from the nineties, I cover them up with newspaper. Some of those covers are really too much and then people in the buses will think we do that stuff that they see on the covers. Just last week I read two books, one by Anne Mather [1994] called *Brittle Bondage* and the other was Penny Jordan's *Trusting Game* [1995], and the covers were really bad. One even showed a half-naked bottom of a woman. The other did not do that but it had the man and woman really close and kissing. People who see those covers think we're like that and if someone we know sees those covers it is worse because then my parents might hear and they would be really ashamed of us.

Other women reported that they also took care to cover books with really explicit covers when they read at home because they might be especially embarrassed about their fathers, brothers, and other male relatives catching sight of these books. The stigma about being seen in public with sexually explicit material also becomes manifested in women's behavior when they go to big bookstores to buy Mills & Boon romances. Venkat Prasad, the floor manager of Waldenbooks, the biggest and most plush bookstore of the three bookstores in Hyderabad that stocked Mills & Boons, pointed out that many young women were too shy to ask him where Mills & Boons were shelved in the bookstore:

> They will not ask me where the Mills & Boons are. I have seen many new customers who will wander around this big bookstore and spend a lot of time looking but will not ask me. I recently asked one of my regular customers why she had behaved that way when she first came into the store and she said that she felt shy about it. Now, I have hired two young boys who stand around and when they see young women wandering looking a little lost they direct them to the Mills & Boons section.

In addition, when I discussed what guided the particular location of these novels on the floor of the store, he continued, "I put the Mills & Boons somewhere in the middle of the store and also put them in the lower shelves so these women can sit down on the little stools and remain hidden and undisturbed. I also always put them very close to the rotating cosmetics display case because it makes it easy for women who come to buy cosmetics to see those books." Prasad also informed me that he never displays Mills & Boons in a prominent location in the store, especially as individual books with covers facing customers because they were explicit. He also said he preferred to display these books only with their spines stacked next to one another on the shelves and never with their covers openly facing customers. In yet another bookstore that sold romances, A. A. Husain's in Abids, one of Hyderabad's busiest and most upscale shopping areas, some young women said they feared the disapproving stares of the manager who glared at them when they came to buy romances. As a consequence of his disapproval, these women said that they had devised the strategy of visiting the store only during those hours when the manager was not on duty.

Given the strong undercurrent of disapproval for Mills & Boons as unsuitable books for young women from good and honorable families to read, it is not surprising that many of my informants would not openly disclose their possible interest in descriptions of female sexuality in romances. Among the few scholars who have studied romance readers in the United States (Jensen, 1984; Moffit, 1990; Radway, 1984; Thurston, 1988), none except Janice Radway have dealt with the issue of readers' responses to representations of sexuality in romances in depth. Janice Radway (1984) found that readers in the United States expressed low interest in sexuality in romances and she argues that romances are not primarily a titillating experience, rather one of the reasons women read romances is because they want to experience a world in which strong men nurture women. While Radway's analysis of readers' interest for romances as a search for nurturance seems valid, her easy acceptance of readers' low ranking of sexual descriptions reflects a certain loss of critical distance from readers' responses towards female sexuality. She does not consider that these women's expressions of lack of interest in sexual descriptions may arise out of their motivation to present themselves to her (an academic) according to socially acceptable gender norms in Western culture, especially when romances are seen as pornographic trash by outsiders.

Readers' Favorite Romances: Socially Possible Fantasies

Given my own experience of the strong taboos surrounding female sexuality as a young woman in India, I was fully aware that my informants might not directly or immediately address the sexual content of romances in group interviews. Therefore, I attempted to probe this sensitive area by examining their preferences for certain types of Mills & Boons and for books by certain authors who many readers chose as their favorite authors.

From my interviews, I found that among the eight different subgenres of Mills & Boon romances that are made available to young women on the market, the most popular series is the "Contemporary Romance series," slimmer books with straightforward and simple plots set in contemporary times in which the heroines are career women but relatively virginal and the men are older, affluent, and sexually experienced.[4] The popularity of these books among readers is also evident from the large numbers of these books, more than any of the seven other subgenres, that are stocked and displayed by lending library owners and booksellers who try to cater to their customers' tastes. Discussing the extent of the popularity of the Mills & Boon "Romance" series among young women, Mrs. Khan, one library owner explained, "I spend extra money on getting the "Romance" series books stitched as soon as I get them. I send them out to this local binding place where I get the books stitched over the publishers' binding so that they don't fall apart. These books circulate so fast and are read over and over again so to make sure I get the maximum out of them before the pages fall out, I spend extra money."

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[4] The eight kinds of Western paperback romances that are available are Romance, Temptation, Silhouette Desire, Silhouette Special, Silhouette Sensation, Silhouette Intrigue, Legacy of Love, and Love on Call (personal interview, Khaisar, paperback sales representative, India Book House, June 11, 1996). Temptation and Silhouette Desire books are as long as the Romance books (187 pages) but the heroines are frequently older and divorced. Silhouette Special and Silhouette Sensation also feature older heroines who are more sexually experienced than the heroines in the Romance series but these books also run longer (250 pages) and feature other secondary characters who play a fairly important role in the plots. Silhouette Intrigue combines mystery and romance and a crime is usually solved to the accompaniment of romance. Legacy of Love features romances set in historical eras and Love on Call books are romances set in the medical field where love develops between doctors, usually male, and nurses, usually female.

The popularity of the "Romance" series books among my informants, all young women who are single, anticipating marriage, and with it sexual intimacy is not surprising since these "Romance" books facilitate the greatest reader-identification by usually tracing the sexual awakening of young independent, and white career women (between the ages of 18 to 30 years old) who fall in love and marry at the end of the book. The heroines in these books are virginal or sexually inexperienced, they are either single or have been married once, and it is only when they are with the hero that these women become aware of their latent sexuality. Representations of female sexuality--the women in these books experience sexual intimacy with the men they ultimately get married to--in the "Romance" series reach out to the comfort level of young Indian women who are told by their culture (parents, media, religion, and schools) that sexual intimacy with a man has to be sanctioned by the institution of marriage. Since dating and even contact with men are considered taboo for young women who are supposed to preserve the honor of the family by vigilantly guarding their virginity until marriage, these "Romance" books which affirm and celebrate marriage allow for "socially possible" fantasies pertaining to sexuality that do not defy or violate social norms.[5] Some other reasons these readers provided for preferring the Romance series, among the many other kinds of romances, was the shorter length of these books and the contemporary and modern settings.

Given the basic story of love and courtship followed by marriage, which is common to "Romance" books, I found that the favorite authors ranked by my informants--Penny Jordan, Charlotte Lamb, Emma Goldrick, Emma Darcy, Miranda Lee, Carole Mortimer, and Sally Wentworth (listed according to popularity, from greatest to least)--were those who featured young, independent, and strong women who were sexually innocent (mostly virgins or sexually inexperienced) but were relatively more open than female characters in other "Romance" books (by authors such as Rosemary Carter, Sara Wood, Marjorie Lewty, Carol Grace, and Betty Neels) to thinking about their sexuality and to also physically expressing their sexuality with the hero. Although my informants did not explicitly mention "more descriptions of sexual encounters" as an important ingredient for their preferences for certain authors, they expressed the view that the most "boring" author, the one they disliked the most was Betty Neels because the heroine was too submissive, passive, and "goody goody." Betty Neels' books, of which I read several, always feature prim and proper young women, have many more secondary characters, and very little explicit sexual descriptions other than a few kisses spaced throughout the story. [6] It is thus important to note that among the books which contained socially possible fantasies of romance and sex ending in marriage, my informants preferred books that permitted them to explore intimate heterosexuality to a greater extent.

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[5] In her study of Tamil magazines and Tamil magazine readers (Tamil is one of the Indian languages widely spoken in the state of Tamilnadu in South India), K. Srilata (1994) finds that many Tamil magazines, even those written for women, glamorize housework and feminine beauty and some of the stories show women expressing resistance but only towards minor issues that don't really challenge patriarchal definitions of womanhood. Srilata argues that the popularity of these magazines for female readers lies in the fact that they create "socially possible" fantasies where fantasy emerges out of their glamorizing and glorifying women's mundane everyday experiences and women's restricted lives as dutiful wives and mothers (p. 37).

Manuals on Sexuality: Negotiating the Uncertainties of Marriage

Readers' responses to my questions regarding some of their comments in their written essays indicated that the sexual content of romances filled a void in their lives as a form of sex education in a culture where sex education is almost non-existent for all young people and particularly for women who feel intimidated about discussing sexuality even among themselves. In their written essays about why they enjoyed reading Mills & Boons, which twenty three of my thirty informants wrote, many alluded to their feelings of resentment about people's disapproval of the sexual content of romances:

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[6] Radway (1984) shows in her own work that it is important for researchers to consider the romances that readers say they don't like in addition to those that they indicate a strong preference for because "failed" romances can provide us a glimpse of how women can resist, even in only limited ways, some patriarchal norms that they feel are particularly restrictive (pp. 157-185). In her study, Radway finds that readers reject romances that portray rape and excessive brutalization of women. In my own interviews, I found that readers completely rejected the whole sub-genre of romance books that are historically based where usually rape scenes or scenes of brutalization are depicted. For the Indian women I spoke with historical romances were "fat" (thick], uninteresting, unrealistic, and often pornographic. Readers' views about historical books were also supported by library owners and distributors who told me that historical books were unpopular among their customers.

> Essay # 17: What are we doing anyhow? We are just reading books. I never lie to my parents or hide anything from them. I would like to know what men and women do in bed. Is that wrong? I could never ask my parents or teachers or even friends.
>
> Essay # 4: I never talk to guys or meet them in secret places, which some good girls do in our college. They go during college hours to see their secret boyfriends. I would never do something like that. So why should my parents be so concerned about these books? I just sometimes want to know what being with a man is all about. No one tells us anything anyhow and I feel too shy to even discuss all this with my friends.

During my individual interviews, several young women spoke about their biology lessons and said that even the little opportunity for sex education offered to them via their lessons on reproduction was denied because their teachers refused to lecture on the topic and instead suggested that they learn the material by themselves. Revathi who was now focusing on biology in her undergraduate work explained, "We had a male teacher for a while in the tenth grade because our own teacher left to have a baby and he would not even include the material on human reproduction on our tests!" In their assertions that romances are a form of sex education, several readers described the complete lack of sex education in their schools, colleges, and in families and argued that Mills & Boons helped them understand and learn about sexuality.

These young women's fears about asking parents, teachers, and even friends about sexuality is echoed by many other young men and women in other urban areas in India; several youngsters when interviewed in a telephone survey in *Femina* magazine (Lifestyles of the young and the restless, 1994, April 8) commented on the complete lack of information about sexuality in their lives and the magazine notes that in the absence of information, teenagers, especially boys, learn about sex from programs such as *Baywatch* on television, videos, and novels while girls would not openly disclose their sources of information (p. 18). One informant drew my attention to the "Letters to the Editor" columns in many women's magazines and wrote in her essay, "Many women write and ask crazy questions. One woman asked if she will get pregnant because a man kissed her and another did not know what happened in bedrooms that was so secretive. I've been reading Mills & Boons for five years and I know a lot more than these women who show that they don't know anything when they write such letters."

The use of Mills & Boons by young women in Hyderabad as a source of information about heterosexual activity is thus not surprising given the woeful lack of sex education in their lives. The situation of these young Indian women in Hyderabad is not very different from the situation faced by women all over India who remain ignorant of the facts about human sexuality (Balse, 1976; Femina, 1994, April 8; Kakar, 1989; Kothari, 1994; Nabar, 1995; Reddi, 1996; Sen; 1994).[7] Commenting on the urgent need for sex education in India, the Indian expert on sexuality, Prakash Kothari (1994) writes, "In India, sex education is a grossly neglected aspect even in the curricula of medical institutions (p. 11)" and writer Anima Sen (1994) notes, "It has been reported that most Indian boys and girls harbour wrong notions about sex mainly because their sources of information are seldom authentic. . . Little or no information is obtained from parents nor are schools forthcoming in imparting adequate sex education (p. 7)." Even if my informants' construction of romances as "sex education" is validated by the lack of sex education in schools and in families, it is important to note that in their responses to my questions about female sexuality in romances, these young women preferred to frame their discussions through the framework of "sex education," a more respectable and medical/scientific way of talking about sexuality, rather than the pleasure that these sexual descriptions might provide.

Since dating and contact with men before marriage are taboo practices for many Indian women who are told by authority figures that they have to remain virgins until they are married, my informants suggested that the sexuality in Mills & Boon romances becomes a source of knowledge about future sexually intimate relationships with their husbands. Some readers said in their essays that their knowledge about female sexuality learned from Mills & Boons would help to reduce fear and anxiety of sexual relationships with future husbands. They also wrote that that they did not intend to use this information about sexuality to date men or to have pre-marital sex. Since the arranged marriage system, where parents or elders choose a husband and then get the consent of their daughters, still continues to be the dominant system of marriage, for many young Indian women the prospect of sexual intimacy with future husbands, whom they often do not know very well, can be intimidating. One of my informants, Shailaja, spoke a little self-consciously about the impact of the lack of sex education on women's married lives with husbands:

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[7] The summer I conducted my interviews in Hyderabad, I had the opportunity to witness an interesting debate regarding sex education and youth in the editorial pages of the local paper *Deccan Chronicle*. One person, Dr. Ram Subba Reddi, wrote a letter to the editor (*Deccan Chronicle*, 1996, June 21) urging parents and schools to provide sex education to teenagers, especially since more and more women are entering the public sphere of work and there is bound to be more interaction between the sexes. He argued against the notion that sex is bad and asked people to abandon puritan ideas about sexuality. There were many responses to his letter in the following weeks and some letters attacked him for advocating an immoral society where prostitution would be encouraged and women would no longer behave modestly.

> We as women should know about this. I know for sure that my mother or grandmother did not know and I am sure they were really nervous and terrified when they got married even though they will never speak to me about all this. Well, since I have been reading Mills & Boons I at least know some basic things like what really happens when men and women make love and maybe I won't be as terrified as they were.

Echoing Shailaja's words, Rachna described a female friend's traumatic experience when she got married, "My friend had no clue what was going to happen and she was completely shocked and said it was all very painful. She will not speak to me about it of course but at least I will not be like her when I get married. I learn something from my Mills & Boons and so I am not so ignorant." Describing the anxiety and fear of her older sister who had recently been married, Samhita recalled, "My sister will not of course discuss anything like that with me. But she said her husband was very kind and they did not do anything until a month after they got married. He wanted to get to know her better. But all men may not be that understanding so we as women should learn about love between men and women."

While some informants preferred to speak about the sexuality in Mills & Boons as "sex education" that would help reduce anxiety about the prospect of sexual intimacy with husbands, a few others who were more open reported that their familiarity with heterosexual intimacy in

Mills & Boons might help them enjoy and take pleasure in the sexual intimacy they anticipated with future husbands. These readers described their frustration with their parents and other relatives who assumed that their Mills & Boon reading would lead to promiscuous behavior. They argued that they had no intention of deceiving their parents to indulge in secret sexual liaisons, however, they felt they had a right to enjoy reciprocal sexual intimacy with their husbands. Two informants wrote in their essays about how they were different from their mothers and other women from previous generations:

> Essay #12: Mills & Boon romances show that the women have feelings, express them to men, and the men do not mind. I hope to have a husband who will understand my feelings and be gentle and loving. We know that women are not supposed to talk about their feelings or emotions, especially about love with husbands. My mother would probably be horrified to know that I would like to be close to my husband you know how and even have fun with them when we are together in private--women like my mother do not even probably expect anything from their husbands.

> Essay #7: Well, we read Mills & Boons and so we know what all this stuff is about so I feel like I can be closer to my husband. We are modern women you know--I plan on doing my MBA and being in management. I hope to be able to express my feelings to my husband not like my mother or grandmother who probably were so shy that they did not even try to be close to their husbands. I am sure that they did not even think they should enjoy it.

In strongly expressing their desire for sexual intimacy in marriage, these women were trying to find a way to negotiate the complexities of conforming to Hindu patriarchy's stricture that women remain "pure, asexual, and virtuous" but at the same time as modern, educated women who resented familial control they also wanted to assert their right to experience and enjoy sexual feelings at least within the approved relationship of marriage. Sudhir Kakar (1989, p. 22) discusses Indian women's longing for intimacy and romance within marital relations and writes that many Indian women long for a "missing intimacy with the husband as a man" and for the "two-person universe" of the married couple.

Expressing their resistance to social norms that require women to be sexually passive and deny their desire for sexual intimacy, these women argue that Mills & Boons are a resource for them to learn about sexuality so they could participate equally in sexual relationships with husbands. These young women's expressions of desire for sexual intimacy within marriage is a form of resistance because social science researchers who have interviewed Hindu women in the past regarding their sexuality have found that many women report painful and ambiguous feelings towards their sexuality due to societal norms that deny women sexual feelings (Dhruvarajan, 1989; Gupta, 1972; Kakar, 1989; Nabar, 1996; Roland, 1991). Given the religious and social norms that restrain Hindu women's sexuality and the disapproval of Mills & Boons by authority figures, my informants' insistence on their right to read Mills & Boons and to enjoy sexuality within marriage, can be seen as a form of resistance to Hindu patriarchal definitions of womanhood.

The frustration of my informants with authority figures' anxieties over their Mills & Boon reading arises out of the great emphasis placed by Hindu families on family honor being dependent upon young women's virginity before their marriage and on women's unquestioning acceptance of their non-threatening and asexual roles as dutiful daughters, nurturing mothers and obedient wives (Gupta, 1976; Roland, 1991, p. 600). The considerable emphasis placed by Hindu families on young women's virginity can be traced to the prescriptions contained in upper-caste Brahminical Hindu religious texts (Babb, 1970; Das, 1993; Goldman, 1993; Jha, 1979; Kakar, 1989; Kumari, 1988; Marglin, 1985; Wadley, 1988).[8] Some scholars explain that the importance placed on virginity in Hindu texts arises out of the dual and opposing images of women as creative/good and destructive/evil (Kumari, 1988; Wadley, 1988; Babb, 1970). Women are seen as creative and benevolent only when they relinquish control of their sexuality to men and in their malevolent or destructive role women are perceived as possessing dangerous and uncontrolled sexuality and female power (Babb, 1970, pp. 235-236). Sudhir Kakar (1989) suggests that the duality of women's roles is related to the mother-whore dichotomy, a dichotomy that splits women into images of the benevolent mother goddess and the dominating sexual being who is capable of devouring men (Kakar, 1989, p. 17).[9] As a consequence of this perception of women's sexuality as dangerous and uncontrolled, there is a great emphasis in traditional texts on women's virginity and chastity.

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[8] Upper-caste Hindu religious texts are the Brahminical texts used by the highest caste, the Brahmins, such as the epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata; the ManuSamhita or The Laws/Codes of Manu the lawmaker; the Puranas, that is, the religious popular stories; the Upanishads or what are called the philosophical treatises; and the Vedas, the sacred scriptures. In the feminist scholarship on romance reading in the United States, there is little analysis of the possible connections between the representation of female sexuality in romances and the construction of female sexuality in Christianity. The blindness of Western feminist scholars to the impact of Christianity on representations of sexuality in popular culture in the United States is a topic worth pursuing as a whole research question.

Locating Hindu patriarchy's control over Hindu women's sexuality within a material and historical context, Joanna Liddle and Rama Joshi (1986) argue that the ideology underlying the control of women's sexuality--to maintain caste purity and to preserve economic resources--continues to influence the lives of Hindu women in modern India. In their pioneering work *Daughters of Independence*, Liddle and Joshi write that the control over Hindu upper-caste women's sexuality developed not only as a symbolic marker of caste superiority but also to fortify the economic position of the community because daughters received movable property in the form of dowry, which they carried with them to their husbands' families: "The more property a woman had, the more important it was to control her sexuality, since the distribution of her property coincided with her sexual attachment" (p. 65). Tracing the movement of certain lower castes to upper-caste status, Liddle and Joshi (1986) note that one of the most important characteristics that developed among lower castes that were attempting to gain caste mobility, in addition to gaining economic resources, was increased control over women's sexuality.

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[9] It is important to note here that Ann Gold (1994) argues that the mother/whore dichotomy arises out of an upper-caste Hindu male ideology, which does not take into account Indian women's resistances to this ideology in their everyday lives. In her pioneering work on representations of sexuality in Rajasthani village women's songs, Gold (1994) criticizes several scholars who have proposed dualistic images of women as benevolent/destructive in Hindu texts. She argues that these scholars who were mostly male themselves relied on upper-caste Hindu texts and did not take into account women's own understandings of their sexuality. Describing her own perspective, Gold (1994) writes, "The perspective I shall offer here, drawing on Rajasthani women's oral traditions of celebration and worship is arguably a women's perspective on women. But it is also a nonliterate folk perspective that contrasts with Sanskritic textual traditions (p. 38)." Gold finds that Rajatshani village women loudly celebrate their bodies, erotic sexuality in fertility and reproduction, and adulterous love in their songs. While Ann Gold's study of Rajasthani songs is invaluable for showing us spaces in which women resist male ideologies of sexuality, it is equally important to note that these songs are a part of the everyday life of village women who have access to some oral women's traditions whereas urban, upper-caste Hindu women do not have the same access to more expressive and oral folk forms.

Nationalist Discourses and Gender: Sexual Identity and Romance Reading

The denial of sexual feelings to Hindu women through society's control over their sexuality--such as the emphasis on virginity and on women's reproductive capacities alone--affects my informants' ambiguous responses to female sexuality in Mills & Boon romances. Specifically addressing the dilemma and contradictions of young Hindu women who were expected to be educated, modern, and have careers but at the same time adhere to rigid forms of patriarchal control over their sexuality, some of my informants constructed their sexual identity as a complex negotiation of independence and conformity. Samhita who had expressed the greatest resentment about her parents' disapproval of Mills & Boons explained:

> We like Mills & Boons because in a strange way the heroines in some ways are like us. They are independent and they all want to be economically independent. And then even if they are close to a man before marriage, something we will not do, they at least marry the man and are able to express their feelings to that one man. We try to study hard and we want careers. We obey our parents in everything important. We have a right to our feelings.

Sangeeta who was present at this interview since both of them had asked me if I could interview them together chimed in, "We have a right to our Mills & Boons. We do everything else they say. I would never bring any shame on my family or let anyone say they did not bring me up the right way. I am doing well in school and I will always earn the money I need. I have a right to at least decide what I can read." Many other readers also constructed their preferences for Mills & Boons as a "right" and as a harmless "youthful" leisure activity that they should be allowed to enjoy because they deserved some independence and choice in their lives as educated women who wanted to have careers and be economically independent.[10] The dilemma of these women who asserted their choice to read Mills & Boons as a right that modern, young, and independent career women like them deserved for their good behavior, their repeated arguments for Mills & Boons as sexual education for their future married lives and not for casual sexual liaisons before their marriage, and their frustration with the expectations of being "pure and virtuous" is a consequence of the trajectory that nationalist discourse in India charted out as modernity and liberation for Indian women.

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[10] Many of the readers I interviewed stressed that their Mills & Boon reading was harmless because it was a youthful phase that would end when they got older, got married, and had children. Some readers spoke disparagingly about older and middle-aged women who continued to read these books and a few referred to older Mills & Boon readers who were acquaintances and neighbors as not performing an age-appropriate activity.

Many feminist and postcolonial scholars have analyzed the contradictory implications of nationalist discourse for women's liberation in some Third World nations in South Asia and the Middle East (Chaachhi, 1991; Chatterjee, 1989; de Alwis, 1995; Grewal, 1996; Jayawardena, 1986; Kandiyoti, 1991; Mani, 1991; Mankekar, 1993a; Moghadam, 1994; Thomas, 1989). Nationalist discourse introduced some progressive changes in women's lives in nations such as India, Iran, Egypt, and Turkey where women were encouraged to get an education, travel around the world, and even gain success in certain careers such as medicine, teaching, politics, and social work (Grewal, 1996; Jayawardena, 1986; Kandiyoti, 1991). In India, nineteenth century nationalism opened the doors for education for middle-class women (Chanana, 1994; Jayawardena, 1986; Karlekar, 1994). However, Indian nationalism conceived of education for women within a traditional patriarchal framework; education was supposed to improve women's abilities to perform their roles as mothers, daughters, and wives with refinement and to enable educated women to cater to the educational and medical needs of other women in a gender-segregated society (Chanana, 1994; Jayawardena, 1986; Karlekar, 1994). Also, while many upper-caste Hindu male reformers campaigned against certain oppressive Hindu practices such as Sati (widow burning), child marriage, and polygamy (Chaterjee, 1989; Jayawardena, 1986; Mani, 1991), they did not challenge the fundamental tenets of upper-caste Hindu patriarchy, which advocated the construction of Hindu women as chaste, virtuous, and asexual.[11] In fact, in their urge to portray Hinduism as "civilized" to counter the charges of "barbarism" that were made by the British, Hindu nationalists drew on and naturalized the conceptions of womanhood as "pure and virtuous" described in Hindu upper-caste (Brahminical) scriptures, mythologies, and texts as the normative definitions of ideal Hindu womanhood (Chakravarti, 1995; Chaterjee, 1989).[12]

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[11] The focus on eradicating certain "dreadful" practices such as Sati and child marriage was an effort by nineteenth century Indian social reformers to respond to British colonial discourse that framed these oppressive practices against Hindu women as evidence of the barbarism of Hinduism. Hindu nationalist reformers who took

Partha Chaterjee (1989) locates the idealization of Hindu women as pure and virtuous within the ideology of Indian/Hindu nationalism, which constructed a powerful distinction between "inner/outer worlds" and correspondingly between "home, private/material world, public." Nineteenth century nationalists wanted to show that British colonization had not affected the inner essential identity of Hindus, which according to them was characterized by distinctive superior morality and spirituality. Hindu women, who were seen as part of home, the private world, became the symbols of this unpolluted, spiritual and superior inner life and thus became the ground for establishing moral superiority and difference from Western society.[13] In nationalist discourse of the twentieth century, women were enthusiastically urged to enter the public sphere to protest and struggle against colonialism, but they were also simultaneously exalted as mothers and essentialized and glorified as being passive, nurturing, sexually abstinent,

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charge of campaigns against these practices did so as a reaction to charges of barbarism from British colonialists and out of a concern that these signs of the visible oppression of Indian women would indicate a lack of "civilization" among Hindu Indians (Jayawardena, 1986). Lata Mani (1991), follows this issue of control over women, in her in-depth analysis of colonialist as well as nationalist discourses over Sati. Neither the reformers nor the colonizers, asserts Mani, talked about women as agents, rather they made women the ground for debate. Exposing the superficiality of the British and the nationalists in the nineteenth century who claimed they were liberating Indian women, Mani writes that both colonialists and nationalists were only interested in eliminating certain practices that visibly represented the end-product of women's oppression and not the process that produced it.

[12] Steve Derne' (1997b) critically reviews the work of scholars who have analyzed nationalism in India and identifies different strands in nationalist thought. While Derne' shows us that various strands of nationalism opposed colonialism by offering differing reactions to colonialism, all these strands agreed on constructing Hindu women as subordinate to men and argued for controlling women's sexuality.

[13] Even as Hindu men embraced Western science and technology and new forms of food and clothing, women became the preservers of Hindu religious traditions because the honor of the nation became dependent upon "modesty and submissiveness of the female body" (Van der Veer, 1994, p. 85).

and non-violent (Derne', 1997b; Katrak, 1989; Nandy, 1983; Tharu and Lalitha, 1993; Thomas, 1989; Zutshi, 1993).

The twin arguments pursued by Indian nationalists, that of educating Hindu women to portray a civilized image and simultaneously asserting the superiority of Indian women as sexually chaste and pure and as nurturing mothers meant that Indian women, especially middle-class women were given trappings of education and superficial freedoms, but were not really allowed to question the fundamental premises of Hindu patriarchal structures. Partha Chaterjee writes that the desexualization of the bourgeois Hindu woman in post-independent India was achieved by displacing all notions of active female sexuality as promiscuous sexuality practiced by the lower-castes[14] and "Europeanized" or Westernized others. The purity and virginity of educated upper-caste Hindu women were thus contrasted with two opposing images, one of the low-caste and poor Indian women who were constructed as coarse, vulgar, and sexually accessible and the other of Western women as immoral and sexually promiscuous (Chaterjee, 1989).

The overt construction of Western women (read white women) as "sexually promiscuous" in nationalist discourse in India since the nineteenth century continues to be a strong influence in contemporary India. One strong debate that permeates discussions about youth and media consumption in India, especially with the arrival of television and foreign programming, is the harmful influence of "Western values" on Indian culture.[15] A strong undercurrent that runs through such debates over sexuality, youth, and Indian culture is the particular impact of representations of supposedly sexually promiscuous Western women on young Indian women; the concern here for the behavior of Indian women becomes a matter of the superiority of Indian culture over Western culture.[16] Concerns about the corruption of ideal Indian womanhood by exposure to Western culture, particularly Western women's sexually immoral ways, is strongly manifested in contemporary popular cultural representations on films and television (Bhaskar, 1984; Derne', 1997a; Rao, 1989; Thomas, 1989; Zutshi, 1993).[17] For example, Indian women are predominantly represented as pure, asexual, and virtuous in their roles as mothers, wives, and daughters in mainstream films where their purity and chastity metaphorically stand in for the cultural superiority of the Indian nation.

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[14] Sharmila Rege (1995) argues that the lower-caste female performers of the lavani, a particular folk form of rural erotic song and dance in Maharashtra, India, were constructed as immoral and promiscuous by the upper-caste ruling Brahaminical patriarchy that simultaneously appropriated the sexual and productive labor of these lower-caste women. She notes that in many lavani songs, active female sexuality is represented through the voice of a "whore" who demands pleasure from men while chaste upper-class wives only express displeasure at their husband's demands for intercourse. Discussing gender as a significant force in organizing caste and class hierarchy, Rege argues that the lower castes were seen as impure because of their lack of control over their women's sexual insatiability. The image of lower caste women's strong sexual desires serves to characterize them as erotic while denying them respectability By contrast Rege writes that "the upper caste women, whose reproductive and domestic labor is appropriated within the space of the familial, are constructed as gharandaaz or passive and moral, but are denied the space of the erotic" (p. 33).

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[15] The two areas that form the core of public discussions regarding the corruption of youth are representations of violence and sex; while discussions about the effects of violence on children mirror to some extent similar debates in the United States, public debate about the impact of sexuality usually takes on the different framework of the imposition of Western notions of sexuality on Indian culture. Also, public discussions about the corrupting influence of Western values rarely refer to the consequences of the acquisition of Western material goods on Indian culture; therefore there is approval for acquiring and possessing material objects that are seen as Western such as washers, dryers, pizzas, Coca Cola, however, it is the infiltration of Indian cultural values by Western values regarding female sexuality that is seen as the most important issue for concern and alarm.

[16] In a front-page article entitled "Invasion of Innocence" in the local newspaper *Deccan Chronicle*, the author Margaret Jemima Eliot (1996, June 31) notes that Indian parents are usually concerned about the effect of violent television on the behavior of boys, however, when it came to their daughters most parents expressed concern about the impact of programs such as MTV, Baywatch, and Bold and the Beautiful on their daughters' sexual behavior: "While aggression seems to be the malady of boys, for girls it is the awareness of their sexuality at a very young age. . . With satellite TV, girls are aware of so much. They watch MTV and other channels all day and by evening they want to look like those foreign women (p. 4)." Apart from this one article in the local paper, several articles appeared the summer of 1996 when I was in Hyderabad, in newspapers and magazines that expressed concern over the impact of foreign programming on young girls' minds (Kripalani, 1996; Rao, 1996; Sharada Prasad, 1996). Concerns similar to those expressed over the impact of foreign television programming on young women's sexuality also strongly underlie the anxieties of authority figures regarding the reading of Western romance fiction by young Indian women. However, since romance fiction is consumed in private, unlike television which is watched in a family situation where parents and other elders may be present, there is greater likelihood that these authority figures are also exposed to the same foreign programming that their daughters like to watch. In addition, graphic visual representations are seen as much more damaging to young minds than printed representations. Therefore, concerns over the more private practice of reading Western romances are not as publicly discussed as the impact of television.

[17] The perception of overt sexuality as being the defining characteristic of Western women is apparent even in vernacular popular magazines. In her analysis of textual and visual representations of women in Tamil magazines (Tamil is a South Indian language), K. Srilata (1994) writes that while the textual narrative glorifies and describes the lives of Tamil women who ultimately conform to social norms even if they try to initially challenge these norms, the visuals usually depict Indian women in Western clothing such as tight shirts and T-shirts that reveal the contours of their bodies. Srilata argues that since female sexuality is symbolically seen as the property of Western women in India, for Indian women to even appear "sexy" and desirable they have to wear Western clothing: " . . the face and figure of women in these illustrations are clearly coded as Indian, even Tamilian, but their

In the responses of the young Indian women I interviewed, I could see that they were very keenly aware of Indian society's disapproval of women's expressions of sexuality and they were also conscious that female sexuality was constructed as the property of those "Western women" and not "good" Indian women. I found that in describing their identities my informants tried to position themselves as modern and independent--and therefore they had a right to their choice of leisure reading and the right to expect to enjoy sexual intimacy with their husbands--but at the same time they did not want to be identified as women who might abuse their independence by being sexually promiscuous like "American" (read "white") women.

In discussing and clarifying their attitudes towards female sexuality in the Mills & Boon romances, many readers, to my surprise, defined their Indianness by skeptically contrasting the "unreal" or "fantasy-like" descriptions of female sexuality in Mills & Boons with their knowledge of what "real" Western women were like. Purnima tried to express her complex sense of reader identification--of attachment and simultaneous detachment--with the Western heroines of her favorite Mills & Boon romances:

> In some ways I feel like the books were written for us. In Mills & Boons the heroines are sometimes virgins and sometimes very inexperienced. I know that is not true for women in America. Many of them have several boyfriends by the time they get married. Virgins are really rare there! On the other hand, Indian women are really virgins until we get married. In some of these books like one of my favorite ones by Charlotte Lamb [1995], *Deadly Rivals*, the hero is very happy and surprised that the heroine is a virgin. In many books I have noticed this sense of surprise and happiness in the heroes when they find out that the heroines are virgins. My friends and I discuss this you know and we say that in India it will be the opposite! In India, the man will be ***surprised*** and ***angry*** if women are ***not*** virgins because they expect it as their right.

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desirability hinges on the revealing Western clothes that they wear. These clothes also signify a certain sexual boldness. At the same time, however, the woman's gaze is always averted coyly from the reader" (p. 30).

Interpreting Mills & Boon heroes' sense of surprise at heroines' virginity to mean that the sexually inexperienced women in Mills & Boons are the exceptions rather than the norm in the West, Purnima found that these books echo the reality of women in India (who fear the loss of virginity) even more than the reality of women in the West. Like Samhita, Sangeeta, and Purnima, many of my other informants too talked about the paradox of Mills & Boons, which featured sexually innocent white women who were in reality rarely virginal or innocent, but it was precisely this emphasis on innocence that they preferred because they felt it applied much more to their own lives as Indian women.

Constructing Western women who are virgins as anomalies because they are supposed to be "sexually promiscuous" allows these readers to negotiate their feelings of guilt over enjoying sexually explicit material by displacing the expression of female sexuality onto the figure of "American women." Making this point in a guarded manner about the failure of Indian romances, Aditya Mukherji, the editor of the unsuccessful Indian romances launched by Rupa, said, "Many college women in Delhi joked about the lack of "Masala" [masala meaning spice is often used to refer to sex] in our romances with my female colleague who interviewed them. But when we asked them if we should include more "masala" they also said they could not see Indian women in that way." Many of my other informants also strongly expressed the point that reading Mills & Boons would not motivate them to start behaving like Western women; in fact, some women could not understand why the Mills & Boon romances they enjoyed were even popular among Western women.

While many readers said they did not approve of the practice of dating, a few outspoken readers said they would like to have the opportunity to date but not in the way they understood it as being practiced in Western countries and recently in Bombay and Delhi. Discussing the practice of dating and courtship in Western society about which they had read in Mills & Boons and learned through other sources such as films, soaps, magazines, and relatives visiting from the United States, one reader Anuradha commented:

> I think it is nice that men and women can go out and be together and no one thinks anything. In Mills & Boon romances you know they have a great romance, roses, wine, dancing, and then they get married and they are supposed to live together happily ever after. But we know it is really not like that. Women there go out with men even when they are very young like when they are thirteen. They have teenage pregnancies and lots of divorces because they are not faithful. They also have AIDS now there because of that kind of behavior.

One outspoken reader, Beena, too spoke about the favorite parts in Mills & Boons being the descriptions of dating and courtship between the heroine and hero. She articulated her desire for a similar practice in India but under different cultural norms:

> I think it is nice that they have dating there and maybe we too should have something like that. But it should be only after the age of eighteen when we know what is good and what is bad. Also, the woman should definitely marry the guy she dates and it is good for us not to do anything until our marriage of course. So yes, I would like to have a Mills & Boon romance but it will be in the Indian way. I would like to go steady with a guy after I know what I really want and then I will marry the guy and we will be happy forever and it will be real because in India we don't get divorces. Husbands and wives stay together.

In her interviews with middle-class women in Delhi, Purnima Mankekar (1993a) found that one of her informants, Renuka, similarly articulates the united and stable Indian family as the strongest characteristic of Indianness and the Indian nation unlike Western societies that lacked stability, respect for elders, and fidelity in marriage (p. 385). Even more interestingly, some other readers who discussed dating, contrasted their attitudes not only with those of Western women but also with "Westernized" upper-class Indian women from Delhi and Bombay and with Anglo-Indian women from Hyderabad:

> Hyderabad is different. We are not like those girls in Delhi or Bombay where we hear all kinds of things are going on--many women wearing mini-skirts and behaving badly in public. We are not so crazy and we don't want to imitate American women like they do. In Hyderabad, only Anglo-Indian women do that you know--go out in public with men all the time, dance, and wear mini-skirts.

In a nationwide survey of *Femina* magazine readers regarding their attitudes towards sex, the authors (*Femina*, 1994, April 8) note that in many cities in India, apart from New Delhi, Bombay, and Goa, conservative attitudes towards sexuality are prevalent, especially in cities in the South such as Hyderabad, Trivandrum, and Madras. The statements of many *Femina* readers from these cities regarding their attitudes towards sexuality reveal that they, like many of my informants, think that sexual relationships are appropriate only within marriage and that women, if they date, should go steady with one man and get married to that man. The Anglo-Indian women that my informants referred to are women from the Anglo-Indian community, a community that was formed by the children born out of sexual relationships between British men and Indian women who were taken as mistresses and concubines during colonialism. As Europeanized "others," this community is marginalized and stigmatized by Indian Hindus, Muslims, and Christians alike who see Anglo-Indians as belonging neither in Britain nor in India. One of the stigmas attached to this community is the stereotype of Anglo-Indian women as loose and sexually immoral because they do not practice the arranged marriage system.

We see here that the construction of Western women as sexually immoral and of Western society as characterized by unstable families, teenage pregnancy, and AIDS, in short, as sexually chaotic, leads my informants to feel a complex sense of reader-identification with the heroines in Mills & Boon romances. Even as they identify with young sexually innocent white women who marry strong and successful men, they simultaneously assert a sense of moral superiority over Western women, Westernized Indian women, and Anglo-Indian women by arguing that Mills & Boon romances paradoxically represent the reality of their lives as Hindu women rather than the lives of white Western women.

Conclusion

My analysis of young Hindu middle-class women's responses to representations of sexuality in Mills & Boons gives us a glimpse of young Indian women's *struggles* with the restrictions they experience in a culture dominated by upper-caste Hindu and nationalist ideologies. We find that these women use their romance reading to *partially resist and subvert* patriarchal norms in certain ways; they devise strategies to pursue their romance reading without earning the label of being bad girls and they express their romance reading as a right that they deserve for complying with other social norms. However, we see that these women simultaneously *do not challenge* dominant constructions of ideal Hindu womanhood so they can read these books without feeling that they are different from the so-called good girls; they justify their reading as sex education that will enable them to experience intimacy with future husbands and they use the rhetoric of nationalist ideology to express their sexual identities. They construct Mills & Boons as books that speak to their own real lives rather than the "real" lives of Western women who according to them are rarely sexually inexperienced or virginal. My emphasis on the *struggles* young Indian women experience is to draw attention to the complex nature of women's responses to Western popular culture, responses which include resistance as well as accomodation.

My analysis here resonates with feminist athropologist Purnima Mankekar's work on female television viewers' interpretations of the popular Hindu epic *Mahabharata* in the city of New Delhi in India. Mankekar (1993), who carried out an ethnography of television viewers, analyzes Indian women's responses to nationalist constructions of womanhood on television and writes that women do not express complete anger or "opposition" towards patriarchal norms nor do they passively accept all the restrictions placed on them, rather they experience their consumption of popular culture as a space where they *struggle* with patriarchal norms (p. 557). Mankekar urges feminist scholars to adopt a more complex view of "resistance" and "compliance" as being simultaneous and as never being mutually exclusive categories.

The complexity of women's engagement with popular literature which I analyze in this paper has also been discussed by other non-Western feminists. Feminist anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod (1990, p. 47) urges feminists to use resistance as a diagnostic tool to understand power. In her ethnographic work on Bedouin women's lives, Abu-Lughod analyzes how these women *resist* and *support* systems of power. Drawing on Foucault, she argues that the statements "where there is resistance there is power" and "where there is power there is resistance" are equally relevant for women's lives. Feminist historian Nita Kumar conceptualizes South Asian women's everyday lives as a dialectic between expressions of agency and submission to a "repressive normative social order" (Kumar, 1994, pp. 1-22). She points out that there is no clear cut division between domination and resistance since structures of power and everyday life are always speaking to one another.

Western romance fiction thus allows these young Indian women to mediate and interpret a particular course of modernity that has been charted out for them by nationalism--Indian women can pursue higher education and attain success in certain careers but at the same time they are urged to be good daughters, wives, and mothers who are virginal, chaste, and pure and nurture and support families. However, in understanding how these Indian women struggle with patriarchy, it is important to avoid the framework of passivity, which has characterized so many anthropological accounts of South Asian women. In seeking a more nuanced understanding of young Indian women's experiences with Mills & Boon romance reading, I have tried to show that readers' interpretation of the meanings they make from Western romances represents their struggle to find some degree of autonomy in their lives even as they minimize the risks of violating social norms.

My paper also shows that the reception of Western popular culture in a non-Western context cannot be easily classified as "cultural imperialism" because readers translate and interpret the stories in romance fiction to fit their own lives and reveal their contempt for Western culture. The "West" [especially, the United States] is accepted and celebrated with regard to material culture,[18] however, Western values are simultaneously feared and denigrated with regard to family life and moral character. My interviews with middle-class Indian women revealed that their denigration of "Western values" in postcolonial India can be traced to nationalist ideology of the nineteenth century, which embraced Western science, education, and technology but insisted that Indian culture was morally and spiritually superior to Western culture.

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[18] My work in progress "Pleasure, Privilege, and Leisure Reading in Postcolonial India: Romance Reading and Class Identities" analyzes the appeal of representations of Western material culture in Western romances for the young Indian women I interviewed.

The value of an ethnographic approach to media reception lies precisely in its ability to discover and describe the complex manner in which audiences use the media and talk about the pleasure they experience in the viewing and reading process. In discussing my work at different forums, I have found that women from other parts of South Asia (Sri Lanka and Bangladesh), from countries in the Middle-East, and from Africa (Kenya, Burundi, and Zaire) have said with excitement in their voices that they too read Western romances and could relate to the many of the issues I brought up. Ethnographic studies of romance reading in other postcolonial contexts could provide new insights regarding the gender dimensions of the reception of Western media in other non-Western cultures. It would be interesting to explore the relationship between social structures and women's romance reading in these countries and to examine how nationalism and modernity have affected other non-Western women's engagement with Western popular culture.

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Considering Alternative Models of Influence: Conceptualizing the Impact of Foreign TV in Malaysia

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CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF INFLUENCE: CONCEPTUALIZING THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN TV IN MALAYSIA

When television made its debut in developing countries, it began relying on imported programming content. This foreign TV content came primarily from developed countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States was the main exporter of TV programs (Nordenstreng & Varis, 1973). The presence of foreign TV programs in domestic television schedules progressively raised concerns on the part of policy makers and international observers. These concerns grew louder as television grew in popularity. The assumption behind their concerns was as follows: television programs are said to be imbedded with the values of the society in which they are produced. When shows produced in society A are imported in society B, viewers in society B are exposed to the values of society A. It is feared that, after being exposed to the television programs of society A and the values imbedded within them, viewers in society B will progressively adopt those values and lose their indigenous ones. These assumptions have led policy makers in many countries to draft cultural preservation legislation that curtail the importation of foreign TV programs. The fear of cultural invasion through television has even prompted developed countries, such as France, to be critical of imported U.S. television. This concern has also prompted some international observers to theorize about the consequences of exposure to foreign TV while others were driven to investigate the relationship between exposure to foreign TV and a variety of impacts.

After reviewing the different views on the impact of foreign TV, this paper asks: Does the current dominant theoretical paradigm about the impact of international television adequately explain the impact of foreign TV on a domestic audience?

Foreign TV: A Source of National Ills

Lee (1980) summarizes the various concerns expressed about imported TV programs: 1) The programs make products manufactured in cities intensely attractive and encourage their consumption; 2) In many locales, audience members will be greatly frustrated since they cannot obtain or afford most of the products that these TV programs depict; 3) The values embodied in these programs will influence the value structures of audience members. This last concern is the basis of one of the most intense arguments against imported TV: it is an instrument of cultural imperialism (Schiller, 1969). Cultural imperialism (CI) is said to be "a verifiable process of social influence by which a nation imposes on other countries its set of beliefs, values, knowledge and behavioral norms as well as its overall style of life," (Beltran, 1978, p. 184). Goonasekara (1987) contends that CI refers to an effect that stems from the documented flow of television programs from Western countries into Third World television schedules. CI advocates claim that in "the face of this media invasion, the indigenous cultures of the Third World disintegrate consistently and without resistance," (Goonasekara, 1987, p. 11). Some believe that international television is used by industrialized countries as a device to broaden their domestic commercial activities (Hadad, 1978). Hadad (1978) asserts that this goal is best achieved "by launching a 'cultural invasion' of developing nations," (p. 19). This concern about domination has even affected how some perceive a popular U.S. educational program for children that is imported into Latin America. Sesame Street, contend Goldsen and Bibliowicz (1976) will:

> lay down an important part of the cultural scaffolding that Latin American children will build on. They expose the continent's children to a massive cultural assault whose consequences are incalculable (p. 125).

Herbert Schiller, the prominent advocate of cultural imperialism during the 1960s, still claims that "...the global preeminence of American cultural products is being not only maintained but extended to new locales," (1991, p. 22).

While some see foreign TV as a source of cultural domination, others contend that it has either unknown or minimal effects.

Foreign TV: Limited or Unknown Effects

Tracey (1985) argues that the idea of foreign TV as a source of cultural domination is supported by those who "have tended to study company reports, rather than the realities of individual lives," (p. 45). As early as 1967, Browne took into account the individual viewer to explain the many factors that hinder foreign TV from having a homogenous impact on domestic audiences. He stated that

> Experience should have already taught us that there is no universal visual language, any more than there is universal spoken or written language... [which means that] if one picture is indeed worth a thousand words, those words will not mean the same thing to everyone (p. 206).

This notion is supported by Salwen (1991) who maintains that foreign TV cannot be seen as a direct cause for the loss of individuals' indigenous cultures. "At the very least, factors inherent within cultures... account for different responses to foreign media messages," (p. 36). These last two researchers are referring to the notion of audience activity. The contention of audience activity is that the individual audience member is not merely a passive receiver of television messages; rather, he or she actively selects among the many available messages. The notion of audience activity contradicts the belief that those who watch foreign TV are helplessly victimized by messages of ruthless conspirators. The idea that an audience is made up of active receivers does not sway cultural imperialism advocates. For example, Schiller (1991), believes that "much of the current work on audience reception comes uncomfortably close to being apologetics for present-day structures of cultural control" (p. 25).

In addition to those who point out the barriers that foreign TV faces in achieving an effect on its audience, there are those who say that we are not ready to make any assessments simply because we don't know enough about the topic. Tracey (1985) asserts that "we have barely begun to scratch the surface of understanding the function and consequence of TV as an international cultural process" (p. 50). Lee (1980) contends that "research on the likely influences of alien television programs on the decline of traditional cultures and arts is inconclusive" (1980, p. 103).

Some researchers arrive at conclusions about the effects of foreign TV after carrying out a narrative review of the existing literature. Yaple and Korzenny (1989), for example, find that the studies to date:

> have concluded that media effects across national cultural groups are detectable but relatively small in magnitude, and that ... the environment, cultural situation, and context affect selectivity and the interpretation of content (p. 313).

A similar narrative review of the literature was conducted by Hur (1982) who concluded that "exposure to American television and film content by local populations has few cognitive and attitudinal effects, much less behavioral effects" (p. 546).

The assessments concerning the impact of foreign TV reviewed so far have been done in one of two ways: 1) By following a set of arguments heavily grounded in political ideology; or 2) By carrying out a narrative literature review of selected studies. Elasmar & Hunter (1996) overcame the limitations of the current body of knowledge by using a more objective methodology--meta-analysis--to assess the entire body of quantitative studies about the topic. After an extensive quantitative analysis of the results of past studies, Elasmar & Hunter (1996) concluded that "at most, foreign TV exposure may have a very weak impact upon its audience members" (p.64).

Earlier in their study, the same authors had found that the second most frequently used theoretical framework for the quantitative studies reviewed was cultural imperialism theory. The assumptions of this same theory are at the roots of all international legislation to protect indigenous cultures from influence through foreign television. These assumptions are also used as a basis for international debates and resolutions about the same topic (for a discussion of these debates, see McPhail, 1987). Thus, for all practical purposes, cultural imperialism theory and its assumptions as applied to the media are the dominant paradigm when it comes to conceptualizing about the effect of imported TV programs. For the purposes of this paper, the term media imperialism will be used instead of cultural imperialism since the analysis is limited to the role of foreign media in influencing indigenous cultures. Whereas cultural imperialism is often viewed as a result of foreign influence from many different sources, media imperialism (MI) confines its arguments to the influence of imported media including television and movies.

Media Imperialism Detailed

Proponents of media imperialism make the following arguments:

1) The foreign audio-visual content present in domestic television schedules and/or on domestic movie screens was placed there as part of a conspiracy against the local population;

2) The conspiracy is to erode the local values and replace them with those imbedded in the foreign A-V content;

3) This foreign media content is imposed upon local viewers;

4) The ample presence of foreign TV content in domestic television schedules is evidence of the conspiracy;

5) Associations between exposure to foreign TV content and adoption of foreign attitudes, behaviors and the like on the part of local residents are further evidence of the success of the conspiracy.

Proponents of media-based cultural imperialism, then, contend that some countries are intentionally influencing the culture of other countries through media products. They provide many observations as evidence for their contentions. The country most often cited as the perpetrator of MI is the United States. Typical observations made are similar to the following: Teenagers in Turkey can be seen wearing t-shirts with the name of an American baseball team and wearing baseball caps backwards. This is evidence for the media imperialism effect. Hamburgers and other American fast food products are popular among teenagers in Hungary, Jordan or the Philippines. This is also evidence of an effect. The presence of U.S. audio-visual media in the schedules of local Turkish, Hungarian, Jordanian or Phillipine TV channels and/or on the local movie screens, is usually cited as the cause for these types of effects.

The MI argument can be broken down into two distinct components:

1) The conspiracy component - there is a conspiracy on the part of some countries to influence other countries' cultural systems.

2) The effect component - when audio-visual messages produced in country A are present

in country B, and/or when individuals in country B are exposed to these messages, the culture of audience members in country B will be strongly influenced by country A's media messages.

The observations made earlier about teenagers in many parts of the world behaving in ways consistent with those of American youths cannot be disputed. In this paper, however, we question whether these apparent effects are due to imported audio-visual messages and if so, whether media imperialism is the best label for the process of influence at hand. As a label, MI carries negative connotations. It embodies the revolting idea that group A is conspiring against group B. Group A wants to take away the indigenous culture of group B and replace it with group A's own culture. Is MI the best and only explanation for the potential influence of foreign A-V content?

Questioning the Adequacy of Media Imperialism in Explaining the Impact of Foreign TV

Studies that adopt media imperialism as their theoretical framework conceptualize the existence of a direct link between foreign television exposure and subsequent audience beliefs, attitudes, and/or behaviors (see Figure 1).

Figure 1


Exposure to country A's TV
Preference for country A's way of life

The existence of a link between exposure to imported TV from country A and an effect such as a preference for country A's way of life is frequently used to quantitatively support the theoretical contentions of media imperialism (e.g. Oliveira, 1986). Such a link, if found, could possibly be used to support the second component of the MI argument - the influence. The first component - the conspiracy - is usually lumped with its second component. The reasoning goes: if an effect is found then it is indicative of conspiracy and influence. If this line of reasoning is correct, then there should be no other plausible explanation for a cross border effect other than that of a conspiracy.

Key research questions at this stage thus are:

> Research Question I: Is there a link between exposure to foreign TV and subsequent attitudinal/behavioral or other effects?
>
> Research Question II: If an effect is found, is there an alternative explanation to MI that can account for the existing effect?

The Exposure-Effect Link

The first research question can be easily answered by consulting previous reviews of the literature about this topic. It was noted earlier that reviews of the body of literature about the influence of foreign TV on a domestic audience find the strength of this link to vary across studies (e.g. Hur, 1982; Yaple & Korzenny, 1989; Elasmar & Hunter, 1996). This same conclusion was reached independently by both narrative reviewers (Hur, 1982, Yaple & Korzenny, 1989) and quantitative reviewers (Elasmar & Hunter, 1996). So, yes, there seems to be a link, although the strength of this link is not stable across studies.

An alternative explanation for the observed link:

Regardless of the strength of the link in question or its stability across studies, does this direct link provide an adequate explanation of the co-variations between exposure to foreign TV on the one hand and audience beliefs, attitudes and/or behaviors on the other hand? This paper follows the line of questioning made by Elasmar & Hunter (1996) in the conclusion of their article. These authors believed that:

> family members (including those studying, working, or residing abroad), peers (including those who have family members abroad), religious leaders (including those affiliated with institutions abroad), dominant political ideologies within particular groups, as well as other factors, could very well influence viewers' attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, and behaviors. These, in turn, may influence exposure to or avoidance of foreign TV programs. In this case, the actual exposure would be influenced by knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors, and not the other way around (p. 64).

Elasmar & Hunter (1996) question the direction of the assumed causality between exposure to imported television and attitudes, beliefs and/or behaviors. In their case, they ask whether the arrow could be pointing from existing attitudes, beliefs, and/or behaviors to the selection of and exposure to foreign TV. This paper raises the possibility that non-media environmental factors may lead an individual to develop an affinity toward country A. For example, people having relatives who have immigrated to country A due to economic or security factors may indeed turn their attention to country A. Country A becomes a source of hope for those who stay behind. They seek information about it, discuss it with their children, and idealize it. Progressively, they develop an affinity toward that country where they hope to go one day , or perhaps to send their children in order for them to experience a better life. As part of seeking information about country A and adding information to their hopes and dreams for a better life there, individuals will select and be exposed to foreign audio-visual products from country A. Then, if indeed a direct link is found between exposure to foreign TV from country A and a preference for some aspect of that country's way of life, the preference would be attributed to an indirect influence of the preexisting affinity toward country A. This line of reasoning follows the selective exposure perspective. Zillman & Bryant (1985) state that selective exposure "designates a behavior that is deliberately performed to attain and sustain perceptual control of particular events" (p.2). The preexisting affinity, in this case, would be an antecedent for selective exposure of foreign TV on the part of domestic audiences. The preexistence of one or more affinity factors that influence exposure will result in a modification of the myopic direct link approach of cultural imperialism illustrated earlier in Figure 1.

An Affinity-Motivated Foreign-Media Selection and Exposure (AM- FM- SE) Model

By broadening the context used to examine the relationships at hand, the explanations proposed by media imperialism become insufficient and inadequate. Instead our expanded approach illustrates an affinity-motivated foreign media selection (AM-FM-SE) explanation for the observed effect (see Figure 2).


Pre-existing affinity toward country A
Exposure to country A's TV
Preference for country A's way of life

Figure 2

The question in the mind of the reader becomes, if there is an effect and this effect can be attributed to a pre-existing affinity, then where does this pre-existing affinity come from? There is no doubt that an entire manuscript could be devoted for the discussion of this topic. Since this is not the primary objective of this paper, we will attempt to propose one explanation in a brief manner. (An extended version of this explanation will be forthcoming in a future paper).

Explaining the Source of Affinity

The following example will focus on the United States. There is no doubt that, in 1997, people worldwide are more conscious about the United States than any other country. Proponents of media imperialism (MI) point fingers to the U.S. worldwide communication networks, which they blame for capturing world attention and dominating world perceptions. This perspective, however, is myopic. A broader perspective consists of looking at the development of events in previous centuries. Doing so will reveal a patter of country-specific consciousness on the part of humans. Different countries have been at the center of focus at different periods in history

The country at the center of focus is one that possesses great power, usually achieved through one or more great accomplishments of worldwide proportions. Historically, these accomplishments have often been military or administrative. We cite here examples of civilizations all of whom had captured world attention during a given time of history, including as far back as the Egyptians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans and others. These centers of power attracted the attention of individuals throughout the known world. Often these centers of power were also centers of commerce and opportunity. These economic opportunities created population migration patterns. As individuals immigrated from their own countries to the centers of power, the attention of these individuals' families were further turned toward these centers of power. Those who stayed behind vicariously shared the hopes of those who left to improve their quality of life. These hopes and dreams turned into an affinity toward the power center.

Information about these power centers were sought by those left behind in order to elevate the level of vicarious sharing of hope for a better life. This pre-existing affinity led individuals to actively process information contained in letters, drawings, maps and other early media. Today, the center of world power is the United States and the media are audio-visual. It is yet another cycle in the history of human civilization.

According to this broader perspective, when an effect is found between exposure to imported U.S. TV content and a preference for the U.S. way of life, such an effect would have been influenced by a pre-existing affinity toward the United States. Since individuals vary in their level of satisfaction with their current environment and the type of information they have about the dominant country, their levels of pre-existing affinity will also vary. This diversity will result in corresponding variations in the levels of exposure to information about the dominant country and thus, variations in the strength of any effects stemming from such an exposure. The finding reported earlier about a lack of a consistent exposure effect across studies is consistent with this model.

AM-FM-SE Model Detailed:

This model makes the following arguments:

1. At different times in history, different countries dominate world attention due to various accomplishments and other geopolitical factors;

2. Individuals living outside the dominant country and who hear about it through parental discussions, extended families or friends living abroad or via other nonmedia influences may begin to idealize the dominant country and associate their hopes and dreams with it;

3. Such association, can turn into an affinity toward the dominant country;

4. Individuals select foreign audio visual content because of a pre-existing affinity toward the dominant country originating that content;

5. Individuals who regularly choose audio visuals from the dominant country do so in order to increase their levels of vicarious living in the ideal environment they associate with that dominant country;

6. A relationship between exposure to foreign A-V from country A and a preference for country A's way of life is indirectly affected by the pre-existing affinity toward country A.

A Test of the AM-FM-SE Model: Malaysia as a Case Study

For the purpose of this study, foreign media are defined as foreign television and foreign cinema regardless of how they are distributed (cable, videocassette, laserdisc, movie theater, etc.). We will use to term audio-visuals (A-V) as a substitute to foreign TV and foreign cinema.

Hypotheses

Based on the assumptions of media imperialism we expect that,

H1: There is a direct link between an individual's exposure to audio-visuals imported from country A and that individual's preference for country A's way of life.

Based on our AM-FM-SE approach we expect that, if a direct link is found,

H2: There are antecedent factors that influence an individual's selection of and exposure to audio-visuals imported from country A, and indirectly influence that person's preference for country A's way of life.

Methodology

This study used the survey method to examine the relationship between exposure to foreign audio-visuals and its correlates in the multi-ethnic society of Malaysia. It is part of a larger research program initiated by Elasmar (1993). The measures used were modified from the survey instrument developed by Elasmar & El-Koussa (1994). Additional measures were especially developed for this study and items unrelated to the study's central theme were included in the instrument. The questionnaire was created in English and translated into Bahasa Malaysia, Malaysia's national language. The instrument was then back-translated for verification, following which some modifications were made for a more accurate version. The data collection took place in the summer of 1996 in Ipoh, a major city in the state of Perak. Six secondary schools were randomly selected for the survey. The study was approved by the *Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia* (Malaysian Ministry of Education) and data collection was permitted by the *Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri Perak* (Perak State Department of Education). The random selection process resulted in two co-educational schools, two all-boys schools, and two all-girls schools. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for data analysis.

Survey Measures

The following measures were included in the survey:

A. Demographic Variables. The respondents' age, gender, race, religion, and academic stream were measured. The students were also asked how long they have been living in Ipoh. Socioeconomic status was assessed using questions on how many cars their family owns and how many times they have traveled abroad.

B. Consumption of U.S. Audio-Visuals. Respondents were asked to indicate how often they watched U.S. dramas/series, U.S. game shows, and U.S. movies on television, representing the different genres of imported U.S. TV in Malaysia. Respondents were also asked to indicate how often they watched U.S. movies at the cinema or on video cassettes or laser discs.

C. *Interpersonal Exposure to the U.S.:* The number of relatives living in the U.S. and friends living in the U.S. .

D. *Direct exposure to the U.S.:* The number of times the respondents have visited the U.S.

E . *Parental Influence:* How much their parents told our respondents about the U.S. when they were growing up.

F. *Preference for the American way of life.* Preference for American food was taken to estimate a preference for one dimension of the American way of life. Respondents were asked to indicate how much they preferred American food and how often they eat American food.

Measurement Analyses

The reliability and validity of the survey measures were estimated using a confirmatory factor analysis and reliability estimates. Hunter & Hamilton's (1988) CFA, a least squares, oblique multiple groups program to do confirmatory factor analysis, was used to test the unidimensionality of the items forming three factors: consumption of U.S. audio-visuals, preference for U.S. food, and interpersonal exposure to the U.S.

Consumption of U.S. audio-visuals was measured in terms of exposure to U.S. dramas/series, U.S. game shows, and U.S. movies on television and exposure to U.S. movies at the cinema or on videocassette or laserdisc. These items were tested for unidimensionality. A significance test for deviation from a unidimensional within cluster correlation matrix that allows for variation in quality was computed. This analysis resulted in a Chi-square = 9.452, $p>.05$. The unidimensional model posited was found to fit the data. The corresponding standard score coefficient alpha for the index of U.S. A-V exposure is .77.

Respondents' preference for American food was measured using two items which asked for how much the respondent preferred American food and how often the respondent eats American food. A significance test of the unidimensionality was not possible in this case since such a test requires a minimum of three items. Nevertheless, these items were found to have strictly uniform factor loadings, a strong indication of unidimensionality. A standard score coefficient alpha of .81 was obtained for these two items.

Interpersonal exposure to the U.S. was measured as the number of relatives living in the U.S. and the number of friends living in the U.S. A significance test of the unidimensionality was not possible for the items forming this factor since such a test requires a minimum of three items. Here again, these items were found to have strictly uniform factor loadings, a strong indication of unidimensionality. A standard score coefficient alpha of .75 was obtained for these two items.

Results

Of the 453 questionnaires distributed in six randomly selected schools, 445 were usable.

Descriptive Statistics

The respondents of this survey were from the Form 4 level only. This is equivalent to the junior year in high school in the U.S. educational system. The respondents' ages range from 15 to 18 years (M=16.13, SD=.56). 45% of the respondents were male, while 55% were female. The breakdown of races were 32.4% Malay, 48.3% Chinese, 12.8% Indian, and 14.8% others. This is representative of the racial distribution in Ipoh.[1] The length of time spent living in Ipoh ranged from less than a month to 18 years (M=13.9, SD=4.54). 34.3% of the respondents indicated Islam as their religion, while 34.5% indicated Buddhism. 10.1% of the respondents reported to be Hindu, 10.8% reported to be Christian, and 5.6% said that they had no religion. These statistics on race and religion indicate a representation of the Malaysian population in the sample.

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[1] According to the population statistics from the City Council of Ipoh, the racial distribution in Ipoh is 28% Malays, 60% Chinese, 11.5% Indians, and 0.5% Others; total population size 511,500. (1995).

Beginning at the Form 4 level, Malaysian students are streamed into different areas of study -- Science, Arts, and Commerce. These were also measured to make sure that the different categories are represented in the sample. The results show that 60% were in the Science stream, 14.8% were in the Arts stream, and 25.2% were in the Commerce stream.

Socioeconomic status was indirectly determined by the number of cars owned by the respondent's family. Unlike in the U.S., cars are not very affordable in Malaysia. Therefore, ownership of more than one car is usually a good indicator of higher economic status. 23.6% of the respondents indicated that their family did not own a car. 41.9% had one car in the family, 25.9% had two cars, 6.7% had three cars, 1.2% had four cars, and 0.7% had five cars. The number of times respondents reported to have traveled abroad was used as the next indicator of socioeconomic status. The results indicated 49% of the respondents have never traveled abroad.

The Influence of U.S A-V Consumption on the Preference for U.S. Food

Preference for foreign food on the part of an individual indicates that individual's inclination toward one foreign value dimension: food value. Finding a relationship between exposure to U.S. A-V and preference for U.S. food would establish the influence of foreign A-V on the adoption of one U.S. value. We assume, of course, as proponents of media imperialism do, that this foreign value did not exist among domestic television viewers prior to the exposure to U.S. A-V. Testing this relationship, we find a strong positive and statistically significant correlation between U.S. A-V exposure and preference for U.S. food ($r=.45$, $p<.001$). The result of the model tested by this bivariate zero-order correlation is illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3



* $p<.05$

Note that this model tests a direct effect between one variable and another. Proponents of media imperialism would find this obtained result of great interest. This strong correlation would be used to quantitatively support their contention of strong influence between exposure to U.S. A-V and adoption of American values, U.S. food in this case. One weakness of using a zero-order correlation to test the relationship between two variables is an inability to rule out the direct and indirect influence of other variables on the relationship between the predictor and criterion. It is possible that the relationship is spurious. The testing can be improved by introducing other variables to the equation. The equation thus changes from a simple regression to a multiple regression. The competing explanations which we measured include: 1) Interpersonal exposure to the U.S., through relatives and friends who live there; 2) Parental teachings about the U.S., estimated through the extent to which the respondents' parents talked to them about the U.S. while they were growing up; and 3) Direct exposure to the U.S., through the number of visits they had there.

The variables identified above, in addition to the U.S. A-V exposure variable, were simultaneously entered as direct predictors in a multiple regression analysis for which the criterion was preference for U.S. food. The analysis resulted in an Adjusted Multiple R = .49. The detailed results of this analysis are reported in Figure 4.

Figure 4



* $p<.05$

The outcome of the multiple regression equation reported in Figure 4 shows that U.S. A-V exposure remains a stable direct effect ($\beta=.41$, $p<.001$) even after entering alternative direct effects in the equation. It is interesting to note, however, that having relatives and friends in the U.S. ($\beta=.14$, $p<.05$) and visiting the U.S. ($\beta=.13$, $p<.05$) are also positive and statistically significant but smaller direct effects. According to these results, parental teachings about the U.S. while growing up is not a direct predictor of preference for U.S. food.

Most researchers would stop at this point and conclude that U.S. A-V exposure has indeed a direct quantitative effect on preference for U.S. food (e.g. Oliveira, 1986). Stopping here, however, could result in a deceptively simplistic explanation due to a myopic examination of the data. One possibility worth pursuing is the finding of no direct effect for parental teachings about the U.S. reported earlier. Note that all of the analyses thus far test the direct effect of each of the variables examined onto preference for U.S. food. What about indirect effects? Could parental teachings about the U.S. have an indirect effect on preference for U.S. food? Looking at both the direct and indirect effects of the variables at hand may further clarify the relationships. By broadening the context in which we examine the direct effect of U.S. A-V exposure onto preference for U.S. food, we reduce the risk of looking at the relationship myopically.

We use path analysis to simultaneously examine the direct and indirect effects at hand. The proposed model is illustrated in Figure 5. This model begins with the variables on the left and ends with the preference for U.S. food on the right.



Figure 5

Variable 1: The first variable in this model is the number of friends and relatives in the U.S. We hypothesize that having friends and relatives in the U.S., due to immigration or other reasons, associates some aspects of the U.S. (e.g. opportunities, lifestyle, quality of life, etc.) with these friends and relatives in the mind of our respondents. Such an association means that any feelings toward these friends and relatives become associated with certain aspects of the U.S. Feelings of warmth toward friends and relatives in the U.S., for example, may translate to an affinity toward certain aspects of the U.S. on the part of our respondents. The reverse may also be true. Negative feelings toward parents and relatives in the U.S. can translate into an aversion toward certain aspects of the U.S.

Variable 2: The second variable in this model is the teachings of the parents about the U.S. while our respondents were growing up. We hypothesize that parental teaching would be more active for those who have relatives abroad. We also hypothesize that how our respondents' parents feel about some aspects of the U.S. can be transferred to our respondents through the process of socialization. Parental influence on how these respondents feel about some aspects of the U.S. can be translated into either an affinity or aversion toward those aspects of the U.S.

Variable 3: The third variable in our model is direct exposure to the U.S. through travel. We hypothesize that both having friends and relatives in the U.S. and parental teachings about the U.S. influence our respondents' choice of visiting/not visiting the U.S.

Variable 4: The fourth variable in our model is exposure to U.S. audio-visuals. We hypothesize that parental teachings about the U.S. and having friends and relatives in the U.S. influence our respondents' selection or rejection of U.S. audio-visuals.

Variable 5: The fifth variable in our model is level of preference for U.S. food. We hypothesize that direct and mediated exposure to the U.S. combine to directly influence the level of preference for U.S. food among our respondents. However, both having friends and relatives in the U.S. and parental teachings about the U.S. also indirectly influence our respondents' level of preference for U.S. food.

Path, an ordinary least square statistical package for the analysis of structural equations, was used to carry out this path analysis (Hunter & Hamilton, 1992). The resulting coefficients are added to the model and reported in Figure 6. A test of fit resulted in Chi-square=1.01, p>.05. It was determined that the model fits the data.


Interpersonal Exposure to U.S.
α=.75
18*
U.S. A-V Exposure
α=.77
.15*
19*
.27*
.23*
Preference for U.S. Food
α=.81
.16*
Parental Teaching about U.S.
α=1.0
.10
Direct Exposure to U.S.
α=1.0
*=p<.05

Figure 6

The data reported in Figure 6 shows that having friends and relatives in the U.S. has a moderate positive influence on the amount of information about the U.S. conveyed from the parents to our respondents while they were growing up. Having friends and relatives in the U.S. also has a moderate positive influence on how often our respondents visited the U.S. and how frequently they sought exposure to U.S. A-V. The amount of information about the U.S. conveyed from the parents also had a moderate positive influence on U.S. A-V exposure but a small positive influence on visits to the U.S. Finally, both exposure to the U.S. via U.S. A-V and directly through travel combine to influence our respondents' preference for U.S. food. The influence of U.S. A-V is strong while the influence of U.S. travel is moderate.

Discussion and Conclusion

We began this paper by reviewing the various views about the influence of imported U.S. audio-visuals on the domestic audiences that consume them. The result of the review demonstrated that the current dominant paradigm concerning this relationship is known as "media-based cultural imperialism" or "media imperialism". Quantitatively, medial imperialism is usually supported by citing positive bivariate correlations between exposure to U.S. A-V and adoption of one or more values associated with the U.S.

After reviewing the assumptions made by proponents of media imperialism, we asked whether this theoretical perspective adequately explains the relationship between consuming imported TV programs and being influenced by these programs. For proponents of media imperialism, finding a link between these two variables is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy against indigenous cultures. If this reasoning is correct then there should be no other explanation for a link between exposure to foreign TV and a subsequent effect. This paper presented an alternative and more plausible explanation for an observed link between the two variables in question. We labeled this new explanation the Affinity-Motivated Foreign-Media Selection and Effect (AM-FM-SE).

The results of a survey carried out in Malaysia was used to quantitatively test the contentions made by the proponents of media imperialism and our own. The results of our analyses revealed a strong positive association between exposure to U.S. A-V and preference for U.S. food. When moving from a bivariate to a multivariate level of analysis, though the quantitative strength of the relationship remained stable, its qualitative meaning changed dramatically. U.S. A-V exposure can no longer been seen myopically. We showed that it does not occur in a vacuum. Instead, it is affected by many antecedents some of which were included in the AM-FM-SE model that we proposed.

In view of the AM-FM-S model tested here and the perspective on world history given earlier, calling the process of U.S. A-V consumption and effect on the part of individuals "cultural imperialism" is indeed myopic. This process of influence in this part of the 20th century is no different than other processes of influence that have preceded it and that have shaped and molded the evolution of human civilization. The reader should note that not all of these processes were favorably perceived at the time nor were all of them beneficial to human civilization. Nevertheless every one of them contributed and shaped the civilization that we have today. While it is not within the scope of this paper to recount these various processes of influence (which will be the subject of a forthcoming paper), we can note one of them below for the purpose of providing an example.

Notable among evolutionary processes is the invention of the ancestor of our modern phonetic alphabet by the Phoenicians. The Phoenicians invented relatively few notations or as we know them today - letters - that, when put together, result in sounds that convey meanings. The phonetic alphabet was not designed to improve world civilization but rather to facilitate trade and expand earnings for the sea merchants who invented it (see Harden, 1962; Herm, 1975). The cultural influence of that invention were devastating for the other existing forms of communication at the time and is still very strongly felt today (see Logan, 1986). If it weren't for that influence we would not be able to express these ideas in the form that the reader is now processing them. The Phoenicians were dominant at the time when their invention was diffused and influenced the cultures of those surrounding them. If we apply the same criteria that cultural imperialism proponents use today on imported A-V programs, to analyze the influence of the Phoenicians on the culture of a multitude of humans we would make the following observations: Homogenizing a system of communication, as the Phoenicians did, has some serious negative effects - it can be used for insulting others who can read and correctly interpret the insult; it can be used to defame others as many can understand the defamation; it can be used to declare wars as leaders can decipher the threats; and it most certainly did eradicate other systems of written and oral communication among non-Phoenicians which could have evolved but were not given a chance to develop.

According to the above reasoning, all those who use a variation or derivative of the Phoenician alphabet would be a victim of the Phoenician cultural empire. Of course, labeling the process described above as "cultural imperialism" or making accusations as the ones made above would be considered frivolous today. Had they been made at the time (and perhaps they were) some would have taken them very seriously due to the inability of those making them to exceed the myopic perspective that they take in their analysis. These same individuals would have looked at an association between two variables to make qualitative conclusions without referring to the broader picture. In the case of the variables, as was demonstrated earlier, the broader picture consists of looking at other variables which precede them and influence their relationship. In the case of U.S. consciousness on the part of humans, the broader picture consists of looking at world history and the evolution of human civilization. In both cases, if we broaden our perspective, we reach different conclusions that modify our perceptions.

In order to further understand the relationship at hand, the AM-FM-S model needs to be further expanded and detailed. The variables currently included within it by no means explain all of the variability of the data. There is plenty of room for improvement. Future studies may wish to expand upon our model and test it in other locales.

By broadening the scope of investigation, we hope that this study contributes to turning the attention of international communication scholars away from ideological debates and toward a more objective analysis of the relationships at hand.

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Fighting for New Export Markets: U.S. Agricultural Press Coverage of the Philippines Theater of the Spanish-American War (1898-1902)

Abstract

1890s farmers were politicized by economic/legal issues represented by Nebraskan Bryan's popluarity. In the 1898 Spanish-American War, most early volunteers were from western states, and farmers could closely follow war news in general newspapers. But agricultural publications varied in coverage levels, were conflicted by simultaneous anti-imperialism and patriotism, and--despite understanding that the War's true goals were capitalistic--failed to inform farmers about new markets or new competition posed by overseas possessions.

Dane Claussen

Fighting for New Export Markets: U.S. Agricultural Press Coverage of the Philippines Theater of the Spanish-American War (1898-1902)

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U. GA

Fighting for New Export Markets: U.S. Agricultural Press Coverage of the Philippines Theater of the Spanish-American War (1898-1902)

Introduction and Background to U.S. Colonial Expansion into Asia

One hundred years ago, when Congress declared war against Spain on April 25th, 1898, the majority of American citizens were rural, and most of the media from which they received their information about U.S. foreign policy and the course of the war were local newspapers and agricultural publications. Of course, many of the editors of these publications were influenced by urban newspapers, particularly the New York-centered "Yellow Press," lead by papers such as *World, Journal, Sun, and Herald.* The often manufactured stories from such papers about the dastardly deeds of the Spanish and their colonial enslavement of the Cuban people were sent westward--because such papers were readily available nationwide to those who wanted them, and because local newspapers reprinted New York papers' stories. Such stories thus stirred the righteous indignation and patriotic sentiments of America's heartland, while likely titillating farmers and miners and store clerks after a hard day of labor.

This Yellow Press influence, however, was fleeting and composed only one factor in forming public opinion in the American heartland about the Spanish American War, the ensuing colonial expansion into Asia with the capture of Guam, and defeat of the Spanish naval forces in the Philippines in the war's first month. Farmers had access to much information in the already complex international market for agricultural commodities, although whether they could and did use this information is much less certain. They also had been politicized, if not earlier, by William Jennings Bryan, who appealed to such strong political elements as the radicalized farmers of the Midwest, miners and ranchers of the West, and loggers in the Northwest; such voters formed a base that nearly defeated the urban business class candidate, William McKinley, in the turbulent election of 1896. The underlying rural versus urban conflict with the on-going demographic shift was very much reflected in the rural media, including its coverage of the war and issues related to the annexation of the Philippines. This paper is unique, we believe, in focusing on the agricultural press' coverage of issues related to American colonial expansion into Asia, and in reflecting upon what influence that coverage might have had on the larger debate on America's direction as an emerging power in the struggle for colonial and international market influence.

Fighting for New Export Markets: U.S. Agricultural Press Coverage of the Philippines Theater of the Spanish-American War (1898-1902)

Taking the War to Asia

By the time the United States Congress declared on April 25th, 1898, that war existed with Spain, much of the nation was in a jingoistic fury over "yellow press" reports of allegedly cruel acts of repression by the Spanish in Cuba, and particularly over the sinking of the US battleship Maine on Feb. 15th, with the loss of 266 of its crew. This extension of the Spanish-American War to Asia was the result of the success of Commodore George Dewey and his Asiatic Fleet's defeat of a decrepit Spanish naval forces in Manila Bay on the morning of May 1, 1898. That American expansion into Asia with Dewey's victory came as a surprise to most Americans is evidenced by then-President William McKinley's reaction to news of this naval victory, when he is reported to have asked, "where are the Philippines?"

Harry Hawes wrote that McKinley was originally anti-expansionist, saying that before the war he had entertained vigorously anti-expansionist ideas. He quotes McKinley: "Forcible annexation, according to our American morals, would be criminal aggression."[1] Hawes says part of McKinley's change in attitude toward annexation was due to his railroad tour of the far West in 1898, where he sensed a collective support for permanent domination over the Philippines to be strong among the crowds he addressed from the platform. Hawes says what was lacking was the sober conservative feeling that seldom finds utterances in such assemblies. He also notes the revulsion against imperialism which was to grow in the rural sector as such jingoistic fervor abated.

That even in the far West of the United States, much of which had been taken from Native Americans only in the previous two decades, news and information about the war was of significant quantity to stir this jingoistic and imperialistic fervor, is evidence of the great strides that had been made in communication technology, particularly the telegraph and the trans-oceanic cables.

Although the communication technologies had grown more sophisticated, the level of reporting on the expansion of the war to the Philippines was in many ways unsophisticated, racist, and geographically and culturally inaccurate. Christopher Vaughan writes that even as it launched Asia's first anti-colonial revolution in 1896, the Philippines remained far outside American consciousness, and virtually absent from press accounts and public discourse alike. Vaughan adds that, "Geographical and cultural ignorance formed a basis for the international knowledge deficit that hindered American efforts at peaceful domination of the strategic soil and water contested for most of the first decade of the encounter." He adds that in 1897, the Philippine archipelago and its nearly eight million inhabitants lay so far beyond the horizon of American popular awareness, that it had to be explained in the most elementary of terms.[2]

When the US press had virtually exhausted glorification of Dewey and his relatively easy victory at Manila, it began to deal with the issue of whether to continue with military operations against the Spanish garrison at Manila. It also began to cover issues of annexation and colonial policies effecting the islands and their inhabitants. The momentum of the naval victory at Manila and war hysteria in much of the United States helped to speed the McKinley administration's decision to continue with operations against Spanish land forces in the Philippines, which would lead to fighting a tragic three year guerrilla war against the Philippine "insurrectionists."

On May 7, Dewey telegraphed from Manila Bay to Washington that, "I control bay completely, and can take the city at any time, but I have not sufficient men to hold." [3] By late July 1898, more than 11,000 American troops had arrived in Manila Bay, with 5,000 more on the way --commanded by Gen. Wesley Merritt, who was appointed Philippines governor-general. These first land forces disembarked at the town of Cavite on the Bay. Because the bulk of the American regular army was engaged in fighting the Spanish in Cuba, much of the Philippine expeditionary force was comprised of 19 voluntary units, all but two (Tennessee and Pennsylvania) units were from west of the Mississippi River. The majority were probably farmers or sons of farmers.

When the American people began to embrace imperialism in the late 1800s, the United States was still predominately an agricultural nation. In 1900, it was 45.8 million rural and 30.2 million urban. This rural majority existed in an internal colonial relationship with the industrialized and metropolitan sector of the nation, and the larger Western European metropolis of which some consider New York City to be a part. In fact, at the nineteenth century's end, "colonials" in rural America exerted a great influence on American views of foreign policy, opposing European market restrictions and pushing the metropolitans for overseas economic expansion, writes Williams.[4]

Metropolitan businessmen and intellectuals were forced by the colonials in the agricultural sector to devote more attention to the fortunes of commodity and food exports, and politicians began to advocate for market expansion. This translated into concern in Washington for expanded market opportunities and the need to satisfy both the needs of the larger system dominated by the metropolis and the political needs of the producers of the raw materials -- the colonials in new agricultural states and territories in the West. Williams says, "The colonials, not the metropolitan manufacturers or bankers, alerted the rest of the world to the challenge and the dangers of the rising power of the American economy," [5] adding that:

> Hence the problem is devined as delineating the way the internal colonial majority came either to accept or acquiesce in imperialism. And the answer lies in understanding that the domestic colonial majority embraced overseas domestic expansion as the best way of improving its relative and absolute position within the system. The reason for this is that the domestic colonials were commercial farmers. They did not go to the land to escape the marketplace and live a life of quiet contemplation. They turned the sod and chopped the cotton to win a healthy share of marketplace rewards. They intended to be, and they were, men of the marketplace. And they knew that, in order to improve their position, they had to have either: (1) a domestic market capable of absorbing their vast production, (2) a foreign market sufficient unto their surpluses, or (3) a willingness to change their existing outlook and embrace some form of socialism.[6]

In much of the Midwest, farmers embraced the promise of expanded markets for their spring wheat. So when this expansion into the Caribbean and Asia failed to improve the export market for their products, and failed to relieve their level of dependency on the railroads, flour mills and banks centered in cities such as Minneapolis and St. Paul, they then turned to the socialist experiments led by the Non-Partisan League, and eventually to a hard isolationist stance that included opposition to entering the First World War. Certainly in Midwestern and Western states farmers showed their adaptability--if not also their ignorance about what market changes would or would not improve their profits--both politically and economically, on both the domestic and international fronts. Farmers were generally bitterly dissatisfied with government economic policies, particularly following the Panic of 1893 and the agricultural depression that followed.

These dissatisfied farmers were often reluctant to accept the dominant explanation of overproduction for their economic woes. The depressed condition of agriculture was often attributed to other factors such as high freight rates, usury by bankers, price gouging by "middle men," and a contraction of currency. It was argued that underfed people could not afford agricultural products because of the withdrawal of money from circulation. Trusts were also blamed for inflated prices for agricultural inputs such as coal, lumber, twine and machinery. These were among the factors that tended to make Western and Midwestern farmers reject the projectionist and tariff policies proposed by the Democrats and to embrace the imperialist rhetoric put forth by leaders like Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and their own adopted son of the Wild West, Theodore Roosevelt. To some of these farmers territories such as Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines looked like home to potentially millions of new customers for their superior grain, meat and other agricultural commodities. Thus they were willing to go overseas and fight for these new markets, or at least support their countrymen in the effort..

The Press Debates Annexation of the Philippines

The colonial relationship between the United States and the Philippines rapidly deteriorated with the first news reports of attacks by Filipino "insurgents" upon American occupation troops in February 1899. These large-scale attacks followed a relatively peaceful period after the quick and glorious victory over Spanish forces in Manila the year before. The attacks by the Filipino "insurgents" did a lot to damage public opinion initially favoring Philippine independence.

Without this change in American public opinion, it is unlikely the U.S. Congress would have ratified the Philippine annexation treaty with Spain negotiated in Paris. This treaty not only delayed Philippine independence for almost half a century, it handicapped Filipinos in establishing a national identity and political integration that facilitate the national development process. Strong objections to colonization of the Philippines were carried out both in the U.S. Congress and in the press. The farm press fully participated in the debate, although it never provided adequate information with regard to the effects of the war on the agricultural economy.

The debate quickly degenerated into a caustic and partisan one. On Jan. 7, 1899, Illinois Senator William Mason introduced a Senate resolution holding that the principle of self-determination ruled out annexation, stating that: "The government of the United States of America will not attempt to govern the people of any other country in the world without the consent of the people themselves, or subject them by force to our domination against their will."[7] And on December 10, 1899, Missouri Senator George Vest introduced a resolution outlining constitutional impediments to Philippine annexation, stating: "Nowhere in the Constitution is there a grant of power authorizing the President to acquire territory to be held permanently as a colony. All land held by the United States must be prepared for eventual statehood."

In the U.S. press, Harvard professor William James, writing in 1900 for several influential newspapers, called the annexation "the most incredible, unbelievable piece of sneak-thief turpitude that any nation has practiced." James further attacked the proposed policy of "benevolent assimilation" as being criminal and contributing to the murder of another culture, adding: "God damn the U.S. for its vile conduct in the Philippines."[8]

Despite American news reports of such atrocities by American troops, mostly from farm states in the Midwest and West--such as extensive use of torture, the burning of villages and the internment of Filipino civilians in camps--by October 1899 popular support for Philippines annexation had gained such momentum in the United States that President McKinley, initially opposed to it, finally lent his full support. Speaking in Springfield, Ill., in a classic defense of Manifest Destiny, McKinley said: "My countrymen, the currents of destiny flow through the hearts of the people. Who will check them? Who will divert them?...And the movements of men, planned and designed by the master of men, will never be interrupted by the American people."

Later McKinley justified his decision to annex the Philippines by saying that, "No imperial designs lurk in the American mind. They are alien to the American sentiment, thought and purpose. Our priceless principles undergo no change under a tropical sun, they go with the flag."[9]

As the Philippines insurgency dragged on through 1902, and as newspapers reported mounting casualties, the American public began to lose heart for the campaign, but no so much so that Americans were willing to forego a successful conclusion to the guerrilla war. The effort required 126,500 American troops, of which 4,200 were killed and 2,800 were wounded. On the Philippine side, 18,000 partisans were killed in battle, and an estimated 100,000 Filipino civilians died as a result of the fighting and of related hunger and disease. It was a Vietnam-like conflict that grew increasingly unpopular in the United States and resulted in strong sentiments among Americans for granting Filipinos their independence.

As it did later during the Vietnam War seven decades later, the American press beginning in 1898 became a forum for a national debate with regard to the moral and practical value of the war being carried out against Filipinos. Anti-imperialist leader Mark Twain said that after the occupation of Manila, the stars and bars of the American flag should be replaced by the skull and crossbones. Twain added that, "We cannot maintain an empire in the orient and maintain a republic in America." In a reply that would especially appeal to Westerners, Roosevelt replied:

> Every argument that can be made for Filipinos could be made for the Apaches, and every word that can be said for Aguinaldo could be said for Sitting Bull. As peace, order and prosperity followed our expansion over the land of the Indians, so they'll follow us in the Philippines.[10]

The Agricultural Press and Philippine Annexation Issues

The agricultural press joined the mainstream press in first reporting the beginning of the Spanish American War, and then the consequences as the Spanish were defeated and the military turned to putting down the Philippine insurgency. Within the agricultural press there was great diversity in support for the war and annexation, as well as a diversity of views on the potential economic effects of expansion and colonization. Many farm papers ran ads for discount subscriptions to the major New York dailies, wherein for one price a subscriber could get a Hearst or Pulitzer paper, along with their local daily or weekly. This indicates that even the most rural citizen--especially with the help of the Rural Free Delivery Act of 1896--could have relatively inexpensive access to important foreign news and foreign policy debates. It also meant that they were susceptible to the Yellow Press' pro-war hysteria that raged in 1898. We must not assume, however, that only one or two factors influenced the position farmers took related to the war and to annexation of the Philippines.

The effects of the "Panic of 1893," a depression that especially hit the agricultural sector, were still being felt at the beginning of the Spanish American War. These effects had added a very radical element to American agriculture, which especially rallied around the free silver issue that almost won Bryan the presidency in 1896. Richard Hofstadter says of the period:

> To middle class citizens who had been brought up to think in terms of the nineteenth century order, things looked bad. Farmers in the staple-growing area seemed to have gone mad over silver and Bryan; workers were stirring bloody struggles like Homestead and Pullman strikes; the supply of new land seemed at an end; the trust threatened the spirit of business enterprise; civic corruption was at a high point in the large cities; great waves of seemingly unassimiliable immigrants arrived yearly and settled in hideous slums.[11]

Polls showed that leading Republican newspapers were pro-expansion as the war was starting in 1898. A sample of 65 newspapers taken by *Literary Digest* in August 1898 showed that 43 percent were for permanent retention of the Philippines, 24.6 percent were opposed, and 32.4 percent were wavering. Wavering was said to mean they had previously opposed expansion. A *New York Herald* poll of 498 newspapers the same year found that 61.3 percent were in favor of annexation, with the New England and Middle States showing clear margins in favor. The West was reported to be strongly opposed to annexation, and the South was in favor by a thin margin. In a 1900 poll the *New York Herald* found that of 241 Republican papers, 84.2 percent favored expansion, and for Democratic papers, 71.3 percent were opposed.[12]

A review of major agricultural publications indicates that farmers, who tended to be Democrats, were generally opposed to United States foreign policies related to "expansion," "imperialism" or "manifest destiny." It is apparent that many in the agricultural sector were conflicted with regard to this opposition, which was often tempered by strong feelings of patriotism. Early in the war it was difficult to resist the robust jingoism of the era, and the propaganda the New York-based Yellow Press was able to disseminate across the nation.

It appears that patriotism was the strongest motivation for farmers supporting expansionist policies, or who were hesitant to openly criticize them. In the Northeast, Midwest and West, this patriotism was very much a remnant of the Civil War, which had ended only 33 years before. Many Union veterans were Midwesterners or Westerners and many of these were farmers. It was easy for the Republican party of President McKinley to "wave the bloody shirt" of the Civil War to gain support for the Spanish American War. The Philippine "insurrectionists" were even accused of the same disloyalty to the Union that Confederacy and its sympathizers had once exhibited, despite the fact they had never been American citizens or professed any semblance of loyalty.

At the same time U.S. farmers tended to be very suspicious of the motives of politicians, business executives, military leaders and expansionist newspaper editors. If farmers supported the war, they tended to express the feeling that it should be brought to a swift conclusion. Even Democratic leader Bryan, who would soon become the most vocal and effective critic of annexation, would seek a commission as an officer of Nebraska volunteers in the Spanish American War, fearing that any appearance of disloyalty would tarnish his image.

Anti-imperialism was initially an unpopular stance to take and it was often the radicals who led the way, particularly farmers, miners and loggers in the West and Northwest, who had been hurt hardest by the Panic of 1893 and the resulting depression. The rationality of the market seemed to win the debate, although all sectors of the economy seemed to influence the debate over expansion and annexation. Williams says[13]:

> Watching the statistics, and evaluating the evidence, metropolitan businessmen and intellectuals increasingly devoted more attention to the fortunes of commodity and food exports, and to the relevance of that pattern for their own operations. Politicians began to act within the framework of that new metropolitan concern for market expansion as well as respond to colonial agitation and pressure for the same objective.

Method

In order to analyze coverage of the Spanish-American War and Philippine-American War in U.S. agricultural publications, nine such publications were examined for the period between mid-1898 as the war was beginning, to July 1902 when the Philippine theater of that war was winding down. Exact beginning and ending dates for examination could not be adhered to, because of the variation in publishing schedules. Content specifically related to the war and its effect on agriculture as well as political opinions expressed about the war were. Accounts of battles and strategy were primarily from wire and other news services or lifted from urban newspapers. These often lengthy and detailed accounts were for the most part ignored for the purposes of this study. The analysis is qualitative for the reason that it was relatively easy to isolate stories or content directly related to agricultural economics and the war. As we will report later, there wasn't much of it. For that reason a systematized and quantitative content analysis generally did not appear to be the most effective method for utilizing the data and carrying out a productive and comprehensible analysis. Publications examined are: The Farm Journal, a monthly newspaper published in Philadelphia (additional information is available in Quebral, 1970); The Maine Farmer, a weekly newspaper published in Augusta; The Massachusetts Ploughman, a weekly newspaper published in Boston. The Michigan Farmer and State Journal of Agriculture, a weekly newspaper published in Detroit; The Progressive Farmer, a weekly newspaper published in Raleigh, North Carolina; The Southern Cultivator, a semi-monthly published in Atlanta, Georgia; The Southern Planter, a monthly published in Richmond, Virginia; Wallace's Farmer, a weekly published in Des Moines, Iowa (additional information is available in Schapsmeier & Schapsmeier, 1967); and The Dakota Ruralist (later named The Dakota Farmer), a weekly published in Aberdeen, South Dakota (avowedly socialist). These nine publications were not randomly selected, but are thought to be generally representative of agricultural publications of the period. Hundreds of farming periodicals--weeklies, biweeklies, and monthlies; local, statewide, regional and national; specialized and general--were being published at the turn-of-the-century in the United States.[16]

The Farm Journal and Wallace's Farmer were two of the largest farming publications of the period; the other six were included because they were high quality, and/or distinctive publications representative of variations in geographical regions, in dominant crops and in production methods. Of course, another reason for their selection was availability on microfilm to the researchers. Microfilmed volumes of alternative agricultural publications were often unavailable for the 1898-1902 period, or there were too many missing volumes and/or issues for those years.

Early Indications of Optimism for the War Boosting Agricultural Prices

The March 26, 1898, issue of The Michigan Farmer was a very early instance of a newspaper speculating about what a war with Spain would do to the prices of farmers' products. The article did not specifically advise farmers to attempt to sell goods to the U.S. military, but instead implied that a farmer could increase profits when a war is on regardless of whether he or she is a military supplier or not. The predicted impact was significant for virtually all agricultural products, including for horses, mules and cowhide. With regard to demands for food, the paper reported:

> In articles of food, the government supplies its army with hard bread, barreled pork and beef, bacon, coffee, sugar, and fresh beef and salt. These are called marching rations, and in camp are reinforced with various vegetables, soft bread, vinegar, etc. All these articles are of good quality, free from adulteration, and provided in quantity ample for even the ravenous appetite of a soldier during a campaign. The sudden and large demand that would at once be made for the articles enumerated above would be sure to advance values, and this would be reflected in higher prices for cattle, hogs, wool, hides, wheat, oats, corn, hay, and sugar..... The highest range of values would probably materialize soon after war was declared, and future values would be gradually reduced when once the enormous productive capacity of the country was directed into the special lines which would be required for the use of army and navy when engaged in active hostilities. That is what we think would be the effect of a foreign war upon the value of farm products.

There seemed to be no follow up on any such predictions made early in the war. Readers of The Michigan Farmer never were very informed by the paper whether such speculation was accurate. Little evidence was found in the content analysis that readers were informed effectively of the war's actual impact on the agricultural economy. Readers were warned that there might be a temporary shortage of imported goods such as sugar and coffee, as the war progressed. The Michigan Farmer and other papers continued to explicitly and indirectly speculate on what effects the war was having on its readers, with little effort to provide a reliable analysis. The May 7, 1898, Michigan Farmer pointed out:

> If, as some predict, the war comes to an end within a few weeks (which we do not believe), another strong prop would be knocked from under the [wheat] market. If, on the other hand, it should be extended indefinitely, the result would be a strengthening in values of breadstuffs. It is likely to last until the fall months at least, and it must be a strong support to the market until it ceases.

Perhaps because of market complexities and apparent lack of data, farmers' opportunities to benefit from the war were never adequately reported, alternative market factors related to the war were routinely discussed but never resolved with hard evidence in the papers. A May 28, 1898, Michigan Farmer article speculated on whether wheat prices had increased because of the war or because lower yields in other wheat producing nations were increasing U.S. prices. The Dakota Farmer identified factors of the war that echoed the major campaign issues of the agitated 1896 presidential election, particularly the issue of the money supply, when it provided this somewhat indecisive and questionably reliable report on May 15, 1898:

> If war continues for any length of time it will result in much good to the producer, said a member of one of the leading commission firms in Chicago and one of the largest individual feed-

> ers in the state, who was at the yard looking after some business interests. A two months or a six months war, on the other hand, will operate just the other way....Dealers in Chicago have already begun to feel the hardening effect on the money market. The large money lenders of the east are drawing in their money as fast as possible, no doubt to be prepared to take up any interest bearing bonds the government may be compelled to issue, and this has tightened money correspondingly with us.

The Dakota Farmer from the beginning of the war avoided the kind of jingoistic optimism about the war that many papers borrowed from the New York-based Yellow Press, although the Dakota Farmer did early in the war publish its share of maudlin and sentimental tributes to the soldiers who were fighting and dying in Cuba and the Philippines. For instance, on June 1, 1898, a page one article beginning, "Where Sleep the Brave," begins:

> In these closing hours of springtime, while we anxiously await the latest news from the battlewaves, listening to hear above the scream of shot and torpedo the cry of victory, and to see above the smoke and din the star and stripes streaming heavenward, we turn reverently and with love-laden hearts and flower-laden arms to the graves of those who fell fighting for an immortal principle.

The June 1, 1898 Dakota Farmer reported a large increase in foreign trade, especially for wheat for the ten months ending April 30 (five days after the declaration of war), indicating that the export economy was already strong as the war was beginning. As in all articles about the war between 1898-1902, it fails to mention the war as a factor at all in the agricultural economy, at least as that economy impacted its readers. The article titled, "Our Enormous Foreign Trade," never speculates on the acquisition of Cuba or the Philippines as factors in increasing export market opportunities, stating:

> Our trade in merchandise, corrected for May 14th, shows a very large increase of exports over imports. During the ten months ended April 30, 1898, the exports of merchandise exceeded by $127,497,435 the exports during the corresponding period of 1897...The cause of this most gratifying condition of our foreign trade, for almost the whole of it is due to the phenomenally large foreign demand for American agricultural products.

Those few publications that did engage in speculation about the effect of the war on agricultural commodity markets, agricultural newspapers also tended to engage in attempts to persuade the military to consume more of the agricultural products their state or region produced in quantity. On June 4, 1898, for example, the Michigan Farmer claimed that soldiers at the front should be eating pork and bacon, not beef, due to alleged logistical problems of providing fresh beef while the army was in the move. On July 2, 1898, the Michigan Farmer also endorsed cheese in soldiers' diets, and on July 9, explicitly said they should eat cheese rather than beef.

Farm editors seemed to understand that provisioning the military during the war was unlikely to provide significant economic benefits to their farmer subscribers. Rather, there was speculation and guarded optimism expressed that the results of the war, particularly annexation and colonization, would eventually produce a positive increase in consumption and exports. The July 30, 1898, Michigan Farmer (in addition to information about trade with Cuba and Puerto Rico), noted that trade with the Philippines had actually declined since the war began. The paper went on to suggest that annexation of the Philippines would result in a reverse in this trend..

The Dec. 24, 1898, Massachusetts Ploughman professed to answer the "ultra conservative" question, "What kind of market can eight to ten million naked savages make for American manufactures?" It assured its readers that, "Contact with American civilization will change them and make them want more and more of American goods, and will also train their people to work so as to supply their increased needs."

The Southern Cultivator raised the question: if the United States had a larger market, would farmers be smart enough to take advantage of it? The Sept. 1, 1898, Southern Cultivator explained that, "We have so few large cities that our home markets are easily supplied. We must depend largely upon foreign markets." The editorial urged farmers to study the existing markets and to develop strategies to succeed in them, rather than relying on the vagaries of new foreign markets. As in other commentary and coverage in our sample publications, there was little concrete information provided that might assist a farmer in taking advantage of expanding foreign markets created by the war. And Southern Cultivator expressed little confidence that farmers would or even could take its advice, as it said on March 1, 1899:

> It is time for Southern farmers to wake up and keep well to the front. Everybody else is alive and looking for opportunity, but the Southern farmers are many of them still asleep or rubbing their eyes to see if day is breaking.

The Dec. 24, 1898, Massachusetts Ploughman minimized the importance of the Philippines as an export market but detailed the benefits and advantages of trade with China[14], citing annexation of the Philippines as a means of expanding and securing the vast China market. It said:

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> Providential interposition that the Philippine Islands have come to us without our seeking, at just the time when we are feeling the need of wider markets, and when we have shown in nearly every kind of production that we can produce nearly everything more cheaply than can anybody else. The fact that the Philippines are under our control gives us a right to interfere in this defense of our own commerce as we could not do without it. We are on the great highway to Asia, and can reach it from our Western coast States more easily than European nations can by the round-about way through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean...."All the indications now favor an enormous traffic in American manufactures across the Pacific Ocean within the next few years.

The Jan. 13, 1899, Wallace's Farmer also suggested that annexation of the Philippines was primarily an advantage with regard to securing favorable trade with China. It suggested that if the U.S. followed an "Open Door" policy on free trade with the Philippines, it would have a greater moral influence on negotiating for an open door policy with "all parts of the Chinese empire, whether under Russian, German or English influence."

Reporting Actual Market Advantages Created by the Acquisition of the Philippines

A year after the beginning of the war, there was a significant unfavorable trade imbalance with the Philippines, although this could be blamed on Dewey's extended naval blockade and on continued fighting between American troops and Filipino insurgents. The April 1, 1899 Michigan Farmer quoted the U.S. Bureau of Statistics figures to the effect that the U.S. was importing $250 million in goods from its new possessions and exporting only $100 million to them, including $22 million to the Philippines. Confidence was expressed that development of the islands would reduce the imbalance. The Jan. 5, 1899 Maine Farmer simply claimed that "Power in the world's markets comes with a demand for breadstuffs and other necessities never before equaled," and told its readers on Feb. 21, 1899, that with regard to the Philippines, "a richer land or group of islands, as regards area and population, variety of agricultural, mineral, and forest resources undeveloped, cannot be pointed out on the map of the world." Combined import and export trade with the Philippines was only $30 million in 1894, but would surpass the $200 million mark, the newspaper asserted. The April 13, 1899 Maine Farmer, drawing from the U.S. Bureau of Statistics report, went into extensive detail about Philippine products and exports, teasing that only one-ninth of the islands' "very fertile" land was under cultivation.

By Aug. 17, 1901, the Massachusetts Ploughman was reporting that farmers were becoming nervous about potential competition from all of the new possessions, but asserted that there was little need to worry. A year later it was able to report that trade with the Philippines doubled between 1899 and 1901, although it hadn't doubled from much and anti-imperialists cited the enormous cost of the war in lives and property to belittle the improved trade figures. They were easily able to produce convincing statistics indicating that trade with the Philippines could not rectify the tremendous military expenditures for the war for many decades, nor could it atone for the loss of over 7,000 American lives.

There were other negative impacts of the war cited by farm publications. For example, the July 21, 1898 Maine Farmer complained that farmers were having to pay more for Philippine twine due to Dewey's blockade. The Dakota Farmer on July 15, 1898 published two large ads, headlined: "The Binding Twin Famine" and "Cordage Famine!: One of the Unfortunate Results of Admiral Dewey's Blockade at Manila Harbor." Portions of the text of the second ad suggest that the blockade would create a cordage dearth throughout the "civilized world," adding that the blockade has, "doubled the price of manila rope and twine in this country, and by doubling the price of manila hemp has made fortunes for manufacturers who had large stocks in reserve." Both ads suggest that a bumper wheat crop would result in farmers having to regress to the "old fashioned method" of binding their sheaves with straw.

Anti-Imperialist Sentiments Reflected in the Rural Press

Although the Spanish American War was ostensibly fought to free the Cubans from the Spanish, there is little to indicate that American troops fighting in the Philippines, who were mostly from agricultural states in the West, had such high aspirations with regard to freeing Filipinos. With the defeat of the Spanish in Manila, a hatred for the Philippine insurgents developed among the occupation troops. This animosity soon turned against the Filipino people as a whole, who were often referred to as "niggers" by the American troops and in agricultural press accounts. According to Cooper and Smith, conditions for the troops had rapidly declined by mid-August 1898.

All Midwestern and Western governors who had mobilized their National Guard units for the fight against the Spanish were under tremendous pressure to bring their troops home after the Spanish forces quickly surrendered in the Philippines. Cooper and Smith state that:

> Most American troops lacked sleep when logistics broke down completely in the confusing days after the battle (for Manila). While many went hungry, others became sick from eating the native food. Tired, hungry, confused, they took their anger and frustration out on the jostling Filipinos. The majority probably did not yet hate the Insurgents, but they did not trust them either.[15]

Many of these farm boys began to fill their letters home with descriptions of their plight and of the folly of the polices and planning that were causing their suffering. These letters found their way into the rural newspapers, swaying opinion away from support for the war. The soldiers themselves provided strong arguments against annexation of the Philippines, and further colonial expansion. Volunteers, their families and officials of the states that had sent volunteer regiments began to press the War Department, which was not prepared to release any such volunteer units, since it was only beginning to execute a long and drawn out war to exterminate or to force the capitulation of Gen. Aguinaldo and his well organized Filipino insurgents. Both morale and condition of the U.S. troops declined as they were informed that they would not be returning home as expected. Their despondency and anger were further aggravated by the policy quarrels that were beginning at home, including the rise of strong anti-imperialist sentiments.

Occupation duty tended to be monotonous and hard on military discipline. Among the troops prostitution and related diseases flourished. There were many incidents of drunk and disorderly behavior, insubordination, sleeping or drinking on guard duty, and harassment and striking of Filipino natives. There were also epidemics of dysentery, malaria and other tropical diseases. By October 1898, the sick rate for units like the First North Dakota Volunteer Regiment were as high as 21 percent.[16] The Dakota Ruralist was scathing in its attacks on what it called "Our Imperial Army." On March 2, 1901, it reported the "Infamous Disease Record of the Philippine Army," with an accompanying chart showing an increase from 210 in 1898 to 3,678 1900 in soldiers on the "sick list" for venereal disease. This could hardly have had a positive effect on the wives, girlfriends, and relatives of the men serving in the Philippines.

The volunteer units, like the regular Army units, engaged in torturing of prisoners, the looting and burning of villages, and increased harassment of civilians. One officer, Lt. Charles Gentile, described a Feb. 5, 1899 advance on Pasay, "as an opportunity to go looking for niggers." Sergeant William H. Lock wrote to a friend at home, "I tell you the way the insurgents were killed was something awful. There was such a feeling among the boys towards them that they shoot them down like they were hunting jackrabbits." Later he wrote that: "most of the boys say, as the cowboys did of our North American Indian: A dead Philipino is a good Philipino." John Kline described an incident where a volunteer accidentally shot a woman through the chest as she held a baby, while his unit attacked suspected insurgents in a village.

Volunteer John Russater noted in his diary on Feb. 7, 1899, that his unit had orders to burn every house where there was evidence of occupation by insurgents, as well as permission to shoot any insurgent who resisted being searched.[17] They also began to plunder food from the villages, even when they had plenty of their own. Looting, burning and intimidation of Filipinos was said to mark American behavior throughout the insurrection, although there were orders by commanders to control their men in the field. Such restraint became more important as a policy to pacify the Filipinos developed, partly due to the increasing cost of the war and a growing American public aversion to military actions and atrocities reported from the Philippines.

Reports of atrocities and public sentiment against annexation began to be reflected in agricultural publications such as the *Dakota Ruralist*, which under a February 21, 1901 headline, "Our Duties to the Heathen," the writer vividly expresses the disgust many Americans were feeling about the war in the Philippines, which had been going on for three years:

> From Greenland's icy mountains and Manila's coral strand, the poor benighted heathen call away to beat the band. They're achin' ter be civilized, in every heathern land, an' we've gotter have an army fer the job. The heathern are a-callin to our noble Christian race. America with all the rest has got to set the pace, and for our surplus produc's we must have a market place -- and we've gotter have an army for the job.

The Press Debates Annexation of the Philippines

Strong objections to colonization of the Philippines were echoed in both the U.S. Congress and in the press. The rural media fully participated in the debate, such as covering the Senator Mason introducing his resolution on Jan. 7, 1899, and Senator Vest introducing his resolution on Dec. 10, 1899,"[18] or publishing the commentary by William James.[19]

On March 27, 1902, the Dakota Ruralist printed a letter from an American soldier describing the "water cure" practiced against recalcitrant Filipinos who wouldn't provide information. It details how a victim would be bound, laid on his back and have water, kerosene or coconut oil forced down his throat until he was bloated. He would, according to the description, be kicked or punched in the stomach. A May 15, 1902 front page story in the Dakota Ruralist is equally graphic in its description of the water cure, using it to reinforce its obviously anti-imperialist sentiments:

> An army of brutalized men were sent over to the Philippine Islands, in the name of Christian civilization, to subjugate the people to the United States government, by shooting them down like dogs. The soldiers treat the Filipinos very cruelly. They often receive orders to shoot every human being that comes in sight, man, woman and child. The "water cure" is a new punishment, invented for the sake of finding out secrets from people who know something about the army forces. By the command of an officer, they take a man, bind his hands and feet, take him over to a tank and full his body with water; then some of the soldiers throw themselves upon him, squeeze the water out again, and when he recovers a little, they again do the same thing to him. This is kept up so long till he either tells all he know or dies.

Despite American news reports of such atrocities by its own troops, such as extensive use of torture, the burning of villages and the internment of Filipino civilians in camps, by October 1899 popular support for annexation of the Philippines had gained such momentum in the United States that President William McKinley, initially opposed to it, finally lent it his full support. Speaking in Springfield, Illinois in a classic defense of the concept of Manifest Destiny, McKinley said: "My countrymen, the currents of destiny flow through the hearts of the people. Who will check them? Who will divert them?...And the movements of men, planned and designed by the master of men, will never be interrupted by the American people."

Later McKinley justified his decision to annex the Philippines by saying that, "No imperial designs lurk in the American mind. They are alien to the American sentiment, thought and purpose. Our priceless principles undergo no change under a tropical sun. They go with the flag."[20]

As the Philippines insurgency dragged on into 1902, and as newspapers reported mounting casualties, the American public began to lose heart for the campaign. Still support remained strong enough to bring the guerrilla war to a successful conclusion for the Americans, although the effort required 126,500 American troops, of which 4,200 were killed and 2,800 were wounded. On the Philippine side, there were 18,000 partisans killed in battle, and an estimated 100,000 Filipino civilians who died as a result of the fighting and of related hunger and disease. It was a Vietnam-like conflict that grew increasingly unpopular in the United States and resulted in strong sentiments among Americans for granting Filipinos their independence.

It may have been too late to change the public perception about how the war in the Philippines was being carried out. McKinley and his administration had much to defend. Teddy Roosevelt, as war hero and vice presidential candidate in 1900, was one of the chosen apologists for McKinley's foreign policy. He was a natural, since he had done much to lobby for the fight with Spain and the annexation of the Philippines.

It appears, in fact, that the agricultural press, even those papers opposing imperialism, were reluctant to admit that the United States had engaged in ignoble acts with regard to the Philippines. The Sept. 23, 1899, Michigan Farmer, for example, offered:

> There is no question but the commercial results of Dewey's victory in Manila Bay will outweigh anything we had ever imagined as to our Pacific Ocean trade....But this is not the issue at stake. If it is, God pity us! If we cannot justify before the world our position to date in the Philippines, and the policy concerning them, which is generally accredited to the present administration, we shall have to take our place among the nations as a most brutal example of force employed for greed--an example of high promises and unworthy attainment. The issues involved in the Philippine question are moral. We believe the problem will be settled on moral lines.

Press Speculation on Philippine Competition With U.S. Farm Products

Both the Dec. 3, 1898, and Feb. 11, 1899, issues of the Michigan Farmer raised the specter of U.S. farmers competing against those in the Philippines, especially with regard to sugar, and to a lesser degree with regard to tobacco. Under the headline, "Future of the Beet Sugar Industry," the Dec. 3rd story argued that it would be years before U.S. farmers felt the competition from Philippine cane sugar, by which time dropping prices would increase consumption anyway. It did hint, however, that imports eventually could put the domestic sugar growers out of the sugar business. The second article was even less optimistic, concluding that sugar beet farming hinges on contingencies such as development of the sugar industry in our new territories, maintenance of the state bounty, and continuation of the tariff duty on foreign sugar. The story advised farmers to continue growing beets, regardless of the risks, but to avoid investing capital in sugar factories. This was one of the few stories identified in the sample of farm publications that made an attempt at advising farmers. Since sugar was the main export commodity of the Philippines, we suspect it was easier to provide a sound market analysis.

Sugar was the primary concern of farmers with regard to issues of Philippine annexation. Sugar and abaca made up roughly 75 percent of Philippine exports, while tobacco and coffee comprised about 13 percent. American occupation was to lead to preferences for Philippine sugar imports, causing a significant growth in production until the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1934 set quotas for all exporters to the United States[21]

Starting at the end of 1898, when it became clear that the Philippines might be annexed by the United States, the agricultural press began publishing information about farming in the islands. This information generally was printed without editorial comment, so that farmers had to calculate for themselves the degree of threat the Philippines posed with regard to market competition for U.S. products. Both the Dec. 20, 1898, and June 6, 1899 issues of the Progressive Farmer, for instance, included information about agriculture in the Philippines.

The Dec. 24, 1898 Michigan Farmer reported that a federal expert would go to the Philippines to study the agricultural situation there, and the May 27, 1899 issue of that paper published a glowing report of all of the islands' crops and exports, including rice, corn, fruit, coconuts, and cigars. In fact, information about Filipino agriculture seems to have appeared increasingly frequently, including in the Michigan Farmer on Nov. 11, 1899, and in 1900 in the issues for Nov. 11, Feb. 10, May 12, May 26, June 9, July 14, Aug. 11, and Aug. 18. Such stories also appeared in issues of the Massachusetts Ploughman on Nov. 18 and Dec. 30, 1899, and on Jan. 27, 1900.

The Nov. 11, 1899 Michigan Farmer was one of the few publications to provide detailed import and export statistics for each new U.S. possession. For example, it reported that the U.S. exported 42,289 tons of coal to the Philippines in the first nine months of 1899, versus 11,085 tons during the first nine months of 1898. It also reported exports of 143,293 yards of cotton cloth in 1899 versus 1,714 yards in 1898. The Jan. 27, 1900, Massachusetts Ploughman detailed Spanish exports to the Philippines in 1896, the last year before the American occupation, to provide a base of comparison for markets since the U.S. acquisition of the islands. The newspaper editorialized, "Not only is all this trade likely to come to the United States in the future because of better goods and cheaper transportation, but it is likely to be largely increased by the better condition of the people under our Government...." As was usually the case, the newspaper failed to offer advice on how readers could act to take advantage of these new market conditions.

The powerful sugar lobby was one that generally opposed Philippine annexation and began a struggle for the imposition of tariffs against competitive Philippine products. The Feb. 4, 1899, Michigan Farmer reported such trade debates at length. Under the headline, "Working the Agricultural Press," the publication detailed the objection by some US senators to inserting anti-imperialist articles from the farm press into the Congressional record, saying many of these papers were engaged in "a very systematic and subtle attempt to mislead the people of the country with respect to the question of expansion." It reported Sen. Charles Fairbanks of Indiana as arguing:

> The agricultural press of the country as a rule has occupied a high position in the confidence of the people, and we are sorry to see its influence used in promoting the projects of any schemer. It will surely end in lowering its own self-respect and forfeiting the good opinion of the agricultural classes. Let us all be frank and honest in expressing our opinions, and fair to those who differ from us, but keep clear of all schemes and combinations, which will assuredly make this great engine of progress and advancement liable to the suspicion of being mercenary and dishonest.

The Indiana senator acknowledges the power of the agricultural press to sway national public opinion and political forces at the time of the Spanish American War, lamenting that many in the rural sector had come to reject colonial expansion.

Summary and Conclusions

It would be assumed that the traditional functions of the agricultural press during the late 19th century were to inform agricultural producers about the economic, legal, meteorological, technological, demographic, and other conditions directly impacting their readers. But a reading of the agricultural press of the Spanish American War period reveals a very limited amount of space devoted to agricultural news. Pages were filled with news and commentary concerned with management of the farm house, medicine, fashion, poetry, and with political and economic news and commentary generally unrelated to farming.

Farm publications, such as those in our sample, were often sold in combination with general interest and general circulation newspapers and magazines, but it appears that the farm press was meant to provide virtually all the reading a farmer or his family would require. This might reflect an inability for most farmers to afford more than one or two publications

A closer reading reveals clearly that the agricultural press was not fulfilling the functions that might be expected of a trade press. In the midst of rapidly expanding import and export opportunities, the agricultural press devoted very little, if any space to import and export information. Even when such information was provided, there was no advice as to how the farmer might act upon it by increasing their profits, decreasing losses, increasing productivity, or lowering their workloads.

Agricultural publications had no need to appear impartial or passive with regard to the possibilities of exploiting new markets overseas. Most of their readers were small farmers assumed to be generally allied against the power elite of politicians, retailers, bankers, transportation executives, although it is true that taking a hard stand against the McKinley Administration's foreign policies and adventurism might in some way alienate major advertisers or Republican political patrons. There was little to indicate that this was the case, however, since there was no particular indication of a strong endorsement for such policies in the papers analyzed.

When these agricultural publications did address foreign trade, such as in articles about beef exports to Cuba, or competition from imported sugar, they provided seemingly factual and statistical detail, but this type of reporting was rare from our observations.

It is also possible that the audience for these publications was relatively uneducated and unable to absorb complex information about the international agricultural market. Again, this assertion could be challenged on the basis of the complexity of much of the other content of the agricultural publications, which included sophisticated news and analysis on hundreds of other topics unrelated to agriculture. The *Dakota Ruralist*, for instance, carried long and complex pieces by Leo Tolstoi, detailing his social and political theories for rural transformation. The papers also carried long analysis pieces on the Spanish American War and its projected effects, along with other international news and commentary.

This paper set out to demonstrate the agricultural sector was very much integrated into the world economic system by the late 1890s, and that the agricultural media reflected the sophistication of this integration. Although it is obvious the rural media was sophisticated in its analysis of the causes and execution of the war, it was unsophisticated in regard to its analysis of issues specific to agricultural economics and market exploitation.

Rural states, despite their physical isolation, fully participated in a collective analysis, through the press, of the factors of American imperialism and colonial expansion, actively supporting President McKinley's foreign policy at the beginning of the Spanish American War. They then tended to turn against these policies as the Philippine Insurrection dragged on. This initial support for the war was the result of rural economic and social conditions at the time, including an agricultural recession resulting from factors of the Panic of 1893. It was also the result of historical factors such as remnant patriotism and nationalism from the recent Civil War era.

Farmers could only get the impression from the papers analyzed that overseas markets such as the Philippines and Cuba would not solve their economic problems. There is clearly a lack of adequate agricultural market information to sustain farmer interest or optimism with regard to the conflict. A farmer could only conclude from the coverage that the war was not producing the agriculture market results that had been predicted in mid-1898, as the war was beginning.

It is most likely that reliable international agricultural market information was simply not available for the Philippines, and what was available was primarily in regard to crops that most farmers weren't producing themselves, or in regard to crops that were unlikely to reach the same markets that these farmers traded in.

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TELEVISION NEWS IN A TRANSITIONAL MEDIA SYSTEM: THE CASE OF TAIWAN

by

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Abstract

This paper examines TV journalists' views of the burgeoning cable news industry in Taiwan, which has been undergoing transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The survey results showed that private cable news operations still are partisan. Journalists' experiences of autonomy and job satisfaction are all affected by the partisan nature of cable news media. Those who work in organizations with neutral editorial policies enjoy a higher degree of autonomy. Those whose personal politics matches with the company's editorial policy tend to be more satisfied with their work. They also believe that media should function as watchdogs and educators, not as advocates as prescribed in the authoritarian system.

TELEVISION NEWS IN A TRANSITIONAL MEDIA SYSTEM: THE CASE OF TAIWAN

Introduction

Many studies have supported the theory that a nation's media system reflects the philosophy and structure of its political system (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956; Pye, 1966; Merrill, 1974; McQuail, 1987; Hachten, 1996). Among these scholars, Pye (1966) and Merrill (1974) have focused on media systems during political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. During the process of transition, media undergo changes towards liberalization, autonomization, and independence from being power instruments (Manaev, 1993). Since the end of Cold War, the world has witnessed the growing number of regimes in transition from communism or authoritarianism to democracy (Huntington, 1991; di Palma, 1990).

Taiwan joined this wave of democratization in the late '80s. The formation of an opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986 and the lifting of the 38-year-old martial law in 1987 signaled the transformation from an authoritarian rule to a democracy (Wu, 1995). By 1990 more than 40 political parties had registered with the government (International Center on Censorship, 1991). In addition to the Democratic Progressive Party, which advocates Taiwanese independence, another important opposition Chinese New Party (CNP), which advocates reunification with China, was established in 1993 (Baum, 1993). On 23 March, 1996, Taiwan held a direct presidential election. This marked the first time in Chinese history that voters cast direct votes to elect their president. In late 1997's mayoral election, DPP, for the first time beat Kuomintang, 12 seats to eight. After this election, in which several legislators were elected as mayors, the legislature, composed of 159 seats, has undergone some minor reshuffling with the ruling Kuomintang barely managing to sustain a majority – 81 seats. All these changes have pushed Taiwan further in its transition to a multiparty democracy.

Taiwan's multiparty transition has brought about changes in its media. On 1 January, 1988, the government ended its ban on new newspapers and a page limitation was also lifted (Gunther, Hong

& Rodriquez, 1994). According to an IPI Report in 1991, "the Taiwanese press witnessed an almost entire absence of restriction on press freedom (p. 28)." In 1992, the legislature revised the sedition law, formally allowing open discussions about the Taiwan independence movement (Rampal, 1994). Since the lifting of martial law, the number of newspapers in Taiwan skyrocketed, from 31 in 1987 to 300 by the end of 1994 (Government Information Office, 1996). Among these new newspapers, the first "opposition" daily newspaper started in June 1989 -- the *Capital Morning Post.* (However, this paper went out of business 14 months later, due to inability to attract advertisers [International Center on Censorship, 1991].) At present, the number of daily newspapers has declined to 25 (Lee, 1998).

While print media have enjoyed freedom since 1988, electronic media remained under stringent government control through licensing, ownership and the appointment of top managerial personnel who serve as news gatekeepers (Gunther, Hong & Rodriquez, 1994). The three broadcast television stations – Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV), China Television Company (CTV) and Chinese Television System (CTS), the only outlets of television news until 1993, have been owned and controlled by the provincial government, the ruling Kuomintang, and the Ministry of Defense, respectively (Lo, King, Chen, & Huang, 1996). The situation started to change in the early 1990s. By 1993, the Cable Act had passed, allowing private ownership of cable channels. Since then, the cable television industry has boomed; more and more private cable ventures have become involved in news, offering alternatives to government-owned broadcast networks' news programs (Government Information Office, 1996).

Just five years after the Cable Act, there are more than 10 cable channels that offer news. These news channels could reach 70% to 92% of cable households nationwide (Cable and Satellite Magazine, 1997). Two channels have died. The first failure was the Po Hsin news channel, owned and operated by the ruling Kuomintang. The other failure was a short-lived channel called Champion, launched by the oldest broadcast station in Taiwan, TTV. This channel lasted only 14 days because major cable systems refused to carry it (Shan, 1997). Despite failure of several cable news operations, however, newcomers are still venturing into this business (Yo, 1997). Taiwan now has 11 national cable news operations, with eight offering 24-hour news services, while four other over-the-air broadcasters also offer newscasts. The proliferation of television news has turned this small island of 13,900 square miles with a population of 21 million into a society where "news happens anytime, everywhere."

Purpose of the Study

This study seeks first to examine cable TV journalists' views of this burgeoning industry, in particular whether owners' motives are "pure"? Journalists working under these cable news operations may have the clearest understanding of their bosses' motivations, which often translate into policies in newsrooms (Breed, 1955). By exploring journalists' views on cable owners' motivations for setting up news operations, one can judge whether private ownership of cable has made television news in Taiwan independent from serving as political instruments. This independence of media from political control, according to Pye (1966), Merrill (1974), and Manaev (1993), reflects the degree of maturity of a transitional political system from authoritarianism to democracy.

Secondly, this study looks at how cable journalists feel about their work in Taiwan's changing media environment. Do they experience job satisfaction? How much autonomy do they have? What are the predictors of job satisfaction and autonomy? Thirdly, this study examines cable journalists' perceptions about media role in relation to the state. As journalists under a transitional political system, do their job satisfaction, autonomy, and perceptions on media role differ from the journalists in the United States?

Literature Review

Eastern Europe has also been undergoing political transition from Communism to democracy. Ognianova (1997) found that even though Communism had died in the political system, the ideology of regarding media as a means to further party interests lingered and affected media operations in post-Communist era. The press in Bulgaria in the early 1990s remained partisan. Also reflecting on media development in Eastern Europe, Brzezinski (cited in Jakuboqica, 1995) argued that in a transitional political system where a stable democracy has not emerged, a conflict-ridden and highly politicized society will drag its media into this conflict and use media for partisan gains. In this process, media are deprived of their independence. For journalists working under this partisan media environment, their autonomy is threatened.

Studies have been conducted to explore journalistic autonomy. Johnstone (1976) reported that three-fourths of all reporters in the United States experienced a high degree of autonomy at the news writing stage. By comparison, autonomy in choosing stories to work on was not as high. In large organizations, bureaucratic control often eroded autonomy. In a survey, Weaver and Wilhoit (1996) found a startling decline of newsroom autonomy experienced by American journalists. Barely half of respondents reported autonomy in selecting stories to cover and deciding which aspects to emphasize. This decline of autonomy is related to factors, such as editorial control, inadequate staffing, time-space limits, and external pressures from government, advertisers, or a hostile public. Predictors of autonomy include organizational ownership, staff size, level of experience and income.

Journalists' autonomy is related to job satisfaction. Johnstone (1976) reported that although factors such as income, job status and the reputation of a news organization all contribute positively to job satisfaction, professional autonomy consistently pops out as a significant predictor of higher job satisfaction. He also found that journalists on the whole were fairly satisfied with their work. Shaver's (1978) study about job satisfaction among journalism graduates supported Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory, postulating that job satisfaction is related to content of the job (motivation), e.g. task achievement, recognition for achievement, intrinsic interest in the task, advancement and occupational growth; job dissatisfaction is affected by context of the job (hygiene), e.g. company policies and administration, working condition, salary, interpersonal relations among colleagues, job security, etc.

Weaver and Wilhoit (1991) found 84% of American journalists were satisfied with their work and 17% were dissatisfied. Although most journalists felt satisfied, the percentage of the very satisfied dropped from 40% in the early '80s to 27.3% by 1992 (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996). Autonomy, interest or challenge, salary, management or coworker, and impact on communities are related to job satisfaction. Dissatisfied journalists' reasons include management policy, salary, and promotion opportunities. Comparing journalists' job satisfaction over three decades, Weaver and Wilhiot (1996) concluded that autonomy has continuously been an intrinsic factor in job satisfaction among younger journalists.

Equally revelant to this study was research by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956), who argued that in authoritarian systems media functioned as servants of the state. Under a libertarian model, media were to educate people in participatory democracy and to serve as watchdogs to guard against deviations by government from its original purposes. In Merrill's (1974) analysis, media in authoritarian systems were educators and propagandists by which the power elite exercised social control. Under libertarianism, media acted as the "fourth branch of government." John Keane (1993) said modern democracy required mechanisms of representation and the institutional division of state and civil society. The state was held accountable to civil society through political parties, legislatures and communications media which kept open the channels between state and society. His analysis also emphasized media's role as watchdogs or fourth branch of government in a democracy.

In analyzing media role under the social responsibility theory, Donohue, Olien, and Tichenor (1987) found three categories emphasizing different attributes: the "Fourth Estate" watchdog, the agenda setter, and the authority supporter. They added a fourth media role, the "guard dog". Previous studies have also investigated whether journalists from different parts of the world perceive media roles differently. In looking at the relationship between Japanese media and government, Pharr and Krauss (1996) identified a "trickster" role, concluding that media incorporate conflicting roles as spectators, watchdogs, and servants.

Method

In summer 1997, a survey was conducted in Taipei, Taiwan. The questionnaire (see Appendix) examines cable journalists' perceptions of proliferation of cable news; autonomy and job satisfaction; media role in relation to the state; and some basic demographic questions. Some questions were derived from Weaver and Wilhoit's (1996) national survey of American journalists.

About 350 questionnaires were distributed in person at eight of 11 major cable news companies in Taiwan, including Chinese Television Network (CTN), Chinese Satellite Television (CSTV), Formosa Television (FTV), Global Television (Global), Taiwan News Network (TNN), Television Broadcast Satellite Service (TVBS), United Television Network (U2), and Super Television (Super). Editors and reporters, including cameramen, in these eight organizations were target respondents.

The total returned questionnaires were 233 (67%). Some incomplete questionnaires were discarded, leaving 222 for final analysis.

Findings

Eight of 10 respondents (83.4%) were reporters or cameramen and 16.6% worked as editors. Nearly two-thirds (59.1%) were male and 40.9% were female. Three-fourths (75.8%) were in the 20-30-year-old age group, while 23.7% were between 31 and 40. One-third (35.7%) had worked in journalism for a year or less. Another 38.6% had from one to three years experience. Most had university (57.1%) or college (18.7%) degrees, and another 19.6% had graduate degrees. Two-thirds (63.5%) majored in journalism or mass communication. About three-fourths (76.2%) claimed "neutral" political orientation. Of the others, 15% describe themselves as pro-Democratic Progressive Party; 6.1% as pro-Chinese New Party; and only 2.8% as pro-Kuomintang. Respondents were also asked about their perceptions of their own organization's editorial policy: 57.7% think the organizations they work for are editorially neutral and 36.5% report organizational policies biased toward a certain political party (17.1% -- pro DPP, 11.3% -- pro CNP and 8.1% -- pro KMT.) In short, about half of all respondents view their organizations as partisan.

Table 1: Percentage of Agreement and Disagreement
on Belief about Cable News in Taiwan

Statement:

Cable news has grown because of owners' desire to:	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	(N)
Counteract biased news coverage	34.8	33.5	(221)
Offer different news perspectives	71.8	10.9	(220)
Fulfill cable founder's vision about news	29.4	40.3	(221)
Build cable founder's political influence	70.3	14.4	(222)
Journalist autonomy -- How much freedom do journalists have:	A lot	Not at all	(N)
In selecting stories to work on	64.4	8.8	(216)
In deciding aspects of story to emphasize	60.5	7.9	(215)
From superior's instructions on political news	29.2	40.6	(212)
In news reporting/editing, overall	61.7	7.0	(214)
Job satisfaction/dissatisfaction – How satisfied do journalists feel with their job:	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	(N)
	37.9	53.6	(218)
Media's role in relation to the state	Agree	Disagree	(N)
Media should observe and report what happens uncritically.	21.1	62.4	(218)
Media should support government policy in order to promote political stability.	6.0	71.6	(218)
Media have a responsibility to criticize government policy.	77.3	6.5	(216)
Media should be neutral, giving equal reportage to different opinions.	78.0	6.9	(218)
Media should be adversarial to the state.	18.9	49.3	(217)
Media should educate the public about government policy.	68.7	8.3	(217)

Table 1 shows responses to a set of questions about how proliferation of cable news stations in Taiwan is related to the goals or motives of ownership: e.g. to counteract biased news coverage; to offer different news perspectives; to fulfill owner's visions about the news; and to build owner's political influence. Most journalists agreed that cable news operations were established in order to offer audiences different news perspectives (71.8%). A similar percentage (70.3%), however, also believe stations were established to extend the founder's political influence. This perception suggests that journalists think they are working in an environment where news media may be used as tools for political gain. Thus, media independence is jeopardized and media tend to become partisan.

How do these journalists feel about their autonomy and job satisfaction? Most respondents have autonomy in selecting stories and deciding aspects to emphasize. One third report having received certain amount of instructions from superiors, while 40% experience little or no superior instruction. In terms of overall freedom in news reporting/editing, about 62% report a high degree of autonomy. Over half (53.6%) of respondents are dissatisfied, including 12.2% who are very dissatisfied; and 37.9% are satisfied, including 5.9% who are very satisfied.

Three-fourths (71.6%) believe media should not support government policies to promote political stability, a concept ingrained in an authoritarian or totalitarian political system. One in five (21%) believe media should only "observe and report" without being critical; 77.3% agree media have a responsibility to criticize government policies. Being critical, however, does not necessarily mean media should hold an adversarial position toward the state. About 49% of respondents stop short of advocating an adversarial posture, and only 18.9% think an adversarial role is important. Most (78%) believe media should be neutral, giving equal reportage to different opinions. About 69% think media should inform or educate the public about government policies.

Table 2 shows the results of factor analyses used to examine relationships among variables and create summary indices. Factor analyses showed that three of the four statements about reasons for proliferation of cable news could be combined as a single factor. The three statements (counteracting biased news coverage; offering different news perspectives; and fulfilling the founder's vision about news) seem to reflect pro-democratic or normative ideals. A single statement that did not load on the factor reflects respondents' views of cable news as agents of power, for those who finance the cables.

Table 2: Means and Loadings of Variables Used in Index Construction

	Loading	Mean
Motivation Index		
Cable news has grown because of owners' desire to:		
Counteract biased news coverage	79	2.0
Offer different news perspectives	74	2.6
Fulfill founder's vision about news	58	1.9
EIGENVALUE = 1.52 VARIANCE = 51%		
Autonomy Index		
How much freedom do journalists have:		
In selecting stories to work on	91	3.8
In deciding aspects of stories to emphasize	84	3.7
From superior's instructions on political news	-59	2.8
In reporting/editing, overall	89	3.7
EIGENVALUE = 2.68 VARIANCE = 67%		
Role Indices		
I. Watchdog	Loading	Mean
Media have a responsibility to criticize government policy.	-80	4.1
Media should observe and report what happens uncritically.	78	2.3
Media should support government policy in order to promote political stability.	57	2.0
EIGENVALUE = 1.68 VARIANCE = 28.1%		
II. Educator		
Media have a responsibility to educate the public about government policy.	80	3.9
EIGENVALUE = 1.29 VARIANCE = 21.5%		
III. Advocate		
Media should be adversarial to the state.	79	2.5
Media should be neutral, giving equal reportage to different opinions.	-67	4.2
EIGENVALUE = 1.03 VARIANCE = 17.2%		

The four statements about journalistic autonomy yielded a 4-variable factor autonomy index.

Factor analysis of the six statements about media role in relation to the state yielded three factors. The first factor deals with the media's role as watchdog. The two statements -- media should observe and report what happens uncritically and media should support government policy in order to promote political stability, were recorded so that higher scores represent more pro-watchdog role. The second, single-statement "factor" addresses media's role to educate the public about government policy. The third factor refers to a media role as advocate. The statement that media should be neutral, giving equal reportage to different opinions was recorded so that higher scores represent more pro-advocate role.

Differences on indices based on the factor analysis (motivation index, autonomy index, watchdog index, educator index, advocate index) and the single-variable dimensions (proliferation of cable news motivated by owner's desire to build political influence) were examined through oneway analysis of variance or t-test. Table 3 shows how respondents' perceptions differ, depending on which company they work for. Respondents working in CTN, TNN, TVBS, U2 and Super tend to believe more in a view of cable's purpose as offering audiences different perspectives. TVBS employees were more likely to see motivation to gain political influence, followed by Super, TNN and FTV employees. Similarly, perception of journalist autonomy differs significantly among companies. Respondents from Super TV report the highest level of autonomy, followed by Global, U2 and CSTV. Those who work in TNN and FTV have the least autonomy. Belief in media' role as an advocate is also significantly different among these companies.

How do journalists perceived their organizations in terms of editorial policy? Crosstabs (see table 4) show that 90% of the respondents from CTN, 100% from CSTV, 87.5% from Global, 95.7% from Super, and 71.8% from U2 think their organizations are editorially neutral; 90.2% of respondents from FTV view it as pro-DPP. Over half (57.1%) of TNN respondents view it as pro-CNP. TVBS respondents show mixed views about their organization: 47.6% think the company is editorially neutral; 42.9% think it pro-KMT; 4.8% regard it pro-DPP; and another 4.8% regard it pro-CNP. These cable stations, if labeled by editorial policy, can be identified as: CTN – neutral, CSTV – neutral, Global – neutral, Super – neutral, U2 – neutral, FTV – pro-DPP, TNN – pro-CNP, and TVBS – mixed.

Table 3
Means of Index Scales and other means, by Employer

Employer	CTN	CSTV	FTV	Global	TNN	TVBS	U2	Super	Total mean	oneway prob.
Motivation Index	10.73	9.25	9.75	9.09	9.90	9.96	10.03	10.30	9.82	.4709
Cable news has grown because of owners' desire for political gain.	3.82	3.38	4.02	3.47	4.07	4.14	3.70	4.09	3.85	.1035
Autonomy Index	14.00	14.60	13.84	15.24	12.72	14.04	14.81	16.52	14.45	.0009
Watchdog Index	10.60	11.67	11.56	12.48	12.45	12.07	11.24	12.00	11.84	.1609
Educator Index	4.00	4.13	3.85	3.88	3.72	3.68	4.05	4.13	3.91	.5983
Advocate Index	3.90	3.73	4.85	3.97	5.03	4.21	4.49	4.09	4.40	.0340

Table 4
Crosstab Results of Employer and Editorial Policy

Employer	Editorial Policy Pro-KMT (%)	Pro-DPP (%)	Pro-CNP (%)	Neutral (%)	(N)
CTN	10.0	0.0	0.0	90.0	10
CSTV	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	15
FTV	0.0	90.2	0.0	9.8	41
Global	3.1	0.0	9.4	87.5	32
TNN	0.0	0.0	57.1	42.9	28
TVBS	42.9	4.8	4.8	47.6	21
U2	17.9	0.0	10.3	71.8	39
Super	0.0	0.0	4.3	95.7	23

Clearly, journalists working in organizations such as CTN, CSTV, Global, Super and U2 stations, perceived as having neutral editorial policies, enjoy significantly more autonomy. Journalists working in pro-CNP TNN have the least autonomy. Those from pro-DPP FTV and TVBS with an mixed editorial policy also have less autonomy. Journalists working in FTV, TNN, and TVBS (all with partisan editorial policies) tend to think that cable founders established news operations mainly to gain political influence. This perception is especially strong in TVBS.

Table 5 and table 6 show how education level and type affect respondents' perceptions about cable news. Those who have had university and graduate degrees and those who majored in journalism or mass communications tend to believe more that cable founders are motivated by building political influence. They also tend to place more importance on a media's watchdog and advocate roles.

Table 5
Means of Index Scales and other means, by Education

Education	H. S. Grad	College Grad	Univ. Grad	Graduate Grad	total mean	oneway prob.
Motivation Index	11.11	10.12	9.77	9.49	9.83	.2704
Cable news has grown because of owners' desire for political gain.	3.40	3.27	3.90	4.30	3.86	.0010
Autonomy Index	14.50	14.03	14.28	15.39	14.46	.1941
Watchdog Index	10.10	10.88	12.16	12.46	11.88	.0005
Educator Index	4.30	3.98	3.91	3.71	3.90	.3323
Advocate Index	3.50	4.08	4.52	4.50	4.39	.1342

Table 6
Means of Index Scales and other means, by Journalism Major

Journalism Major	Yes	No	t-test prob.
Motivation Index	9.71	9.97	.109
Cable news has grown because of owners' desire for political gain.	3.95	3.83	.040
Autonomy Index	14.23	15.11	.992
Watchdog Index	12.33	11.29	.346
Educator Index	3.87	3.97	.940
Advocate Index	4.48	4.18	.503

The relationship between respondents' views about cable news and income is demonstrated in table 7. The higher a person's income, the more he or she believes that cable operations were established to build political influence. Respondents with higher income report more autonomy than those with lower income. Respondents in higher income groups also place more emphasis on the media watchdog role. Gender also makes a difference: females place more emphasis on a media watchdog role than males (see table 8).

Table 7
Means of Index Scales and other means, by Income

Income	13300 & less	13301 to 22000	22001 to 26600	26601 to 33300	33301 & above	total mean	oneway prob.
Motivation Index	10.30	9.37	10.19	9.67	10.23	9.81	.1777
Cable news has grown because of owners' desire for political gain.	3.68	3.81	4.07	4.08	4.38	3.88	.1938
Autonomy Index	13.18	14.22	15.36	15.75	17.08	14.47	.0002
Watchdog Index	12.06	11.51	11.55	12.73	13.69	11.84	.0138
Educator Index	3.89	3.81	4.08	3.91	3.92	3.89	.7244
Advocate Index	4.44	4.41	4.25	4.45	4.00	4.39	.8171

Table 8
Means of Index Scales and other means, by Gender

Gender	Female	Male	t-test prob.
Motivation Index	9.91	9.71	.112
Cable news has grown because of owners' desire for political gain.	3.94	3.86	.641
Autonomy Index	14.48	14.48	.732
Watchdog Index	12.15	11.61	.047
Educator Index	3.86	3.95	.606
Advocate Index	4.51	4.32	.850

Table 9 shows the relationship between respondents' perceptions of reasons for cable news and future plans. The more autonomy journalists report, the more likely they intend to remain working in news. Those who emphasize media watchdog and educator roles tend to opt for staying in the news business.

Respondent satisfaction with work affects perception of cable news (see table 10). Those who express satisfaction with their job score higher in their perceptions of cable founders' motivation to offer different perspectives; their experience of autonomy; and media role as educators. Respondents who are dissatisfied tend to think that cable news is for its founders to build political influence and that media should place more emphasis on advocate and watchdog roles.

Table 9
Means of Index Scales and other means, by Where to Work in the Future

Future Work	News Media	Somewhere Else	Don't Know	total mean	oneway prob.
Motivation Index	9.99	9.81	9.09	9.84	.1591
Cable news has grown because of owners' desire for political gain.	3.88	3.82	3.91	3.88	.9550
Autonomy Index	14.86	13.82	13.06	14.47	.0066
Watchdog Index	12.01	10.75	11.97	11.88	.0792
Educator Index	3.99	3.81	3.55	3.90	.0597
Advocate Index	4.32	4.71	4.59	4.40	.4338

Table 10
Means of Index Scales and other means, by Satisfaction

Satisfaction	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	p (t-test)
Motivation Index	9.67	9.90	.578
Cable news has grown because of owners' desire for political gain.	3.98	3.70	.125
Autonomy Index	13.61	15.86	.054
Watchdog Index	12.01	11.73	.186
Educator Index	3.89	3.94	.910
Advocate Index	4.58	4.12	.050

Job satisfaction or dissatisfaction is also related to demographic variables, such as employer, years of experience in journalism, age and income (see table 11). Oneway analysis of variance shows that journalists at Super TV are most satisfied with their work, followed by those in TVBS and Global. Journalists in the other five cable companies all expressed more dissatisfaction. Those working in TNN are the most dissatisfied. The longer respondents work in journalism, the more satisfied they are. Those with higher income tend to be more satisfied with their work.

Table 11
Means of Job Satisfaction, by Demographics

	Satisfaction mean	oneway prob.
Employer		
CTN	2.36	.0000
CSTV	2.44	
FTV	2.70	
Global	2.97	
TNN	1.86	
TVBS	3.04	
U2	2.67	
Super	4.04	
	2.78(total)	
Year in Journalism		
One & less	2.51	.0267
Over one to three	2.83	
Over three to five	2.92	
Over five	3.30	
	2.79(total)	
Age		
20 to 30	2.57	.0000
31 to 40	3.38	
41 & above	5.00	
	2.78(total)	
Income		
Less than 400,000	2.21	.0000
400,000 to below 600,000	2.69	
600,000 to below 800,000	3.12	
800,000 to below 1000,000	3.25	
over 1000,000	3.92	
	2.77(total)	

Under a transitional political system where news media become partisan, partisan journalists' job satisfaction may be affected if they work at organizations whose editorial policies unmatch their personal politics. Analysis of variance shows that respondents whose personal politics clash with the organization's editorial policy show dissatisfaction with their job. Respondents whose political orientations match the organization's editorial policies are significantly more satisfied. Respondents who are politically neutral and who work in organizations with neutral editorial policies also feel more satisfied (see table 12).

Respondents were also invited to explain their answers about job satisfaction in their own words (see table 13). Respondents attributed to two factors for job satisfaction: the work is challenging and provides learning opportunities (57.4%); they enjoy freedom and autonomy in their work (29.6%). Major sources of dissatisfaction deal with low salary (20.2%) and bad management (19%). Heavy workload (11.9%), lack of autonomy (11.9%) and lack of learning and challenging opportunities (11.9%) also account for feelings of dissatisfaction.

Table 12
Means of Journalists' Satisfaction Scores, by Whether Personal Politics and Editorial Policy Matches

	Personal Politics/Editorial Policy				
	Matched	Unmatched	Neutral	total Mean	oneway prob.
Satisfaction	2.60	2.10	2.57	2.35	.0002

Table 13
Crosstab Results of Job Satisfaction and Reasons

	Dissatisfied (%)	Satisfied (%)	(N)
Freedom/autonomy	11.9	29.6	26
Learning/challenging	11.9	57.4	41
Leader professionalism	4.8	0.0	4
Journalist professionalism	2.4	0.0	2
News quality	1.2	0.0	1
Salary	20.2	5.6	20
Workload	11.9	1.9	11
Management	19.0	3.7	18
Outside environment	3.6	0.0	3
Morale	3.6	0.0	3
Vision of company	3.6	0.0	3
Internal power struggle	6.0	1.9	6
total	100.00	100.00	138

Conclusions

Most cable journalists in Taiwan are neutral or non-partisan in their political orientations. They have to work, however, in some news organizations with definite political partisanship. While over half of respondents regard their companies as editorially neutral, a third think the editorial policy of their organizations is biased toward a certain political party. Cable news in Taiwan clearly has not shed its partisanship. The partisan nature of cable news operations is proven further by journalist perceptions of cable news founders' motivations in starting news ventures.

Most respondents ascribe two motivations to cable founders. First, respondents recognize cable founders' efforts to offer audiences different news perspectives. Of course, before the late '80s when the Kuomintang (KMT) regime imposed authoritarian rule in Taiwan, television news was dominated by the three state-owned broadcasters: TTV, CTS and CTV. For thirty years (until today) television news from these three broadcasters has been strongly criticized as biased toward KMT (Lo, King, Chen, & Huang, 1996; Lo, Chen, & Lee, 1994). With the transition from authoritarian to democracy, the electronic media scene has been changing because of private ownership of cables.

Even though respondents recognize cable founders' efforts in offering different news angles, they also realize how hard it is for the old idea of using news operations as tools for power to die. As perceived by cable journalists, cable founders set up news operations to gain political influence. With this motivation intact, even though cable news stations are privately owned and free from direct government control, they still fail to function independently of political interference.

Most respondents perceive cable news operations as founders' agents for political gains, jeopardizing these operations' independence. This perception, however, is not universal among all respondents. Those journalists who view their companies as editorially neutral tend to stress less on media as agents to gain political influence. It is those respondents in organizations with partisan editorial policies who are more inclined to perceive cable news as not independent from political influence.

Despite working within this partisan media environment, 62% of respondents think they have autonomy in their daily reporting and editing. While this percentage is not low compared to results from a recent survey about American journalists' autonomy, the factors that have affected Taiwanese cable journalists' and American journalists' perceptions on autonomy differ in some aspects. For Taiwanese journalists, the organization's editorial policy influences the degree of autonomy they experience. Respondents working in organizations with neutral editorial policies exercise more autonomy than those working in editorially biased companies. This finding again proves that media's partisanship in a transitional system has certain influence on journalists' daily work.

Journalists' experience of autonomy also affects their job satisfaction. The more autonomous journalists feel, the more satisfied they are with their job. The survey, however, presents a gray picture of cable journalists in Taiwan because they are a dissatisfied group. More than half of them feel dissatisfied with their work and only 38% of respondents are satisfied. Respondents cite having challenging work and providing learning opportunities as major sources for job satisfaction; and low salary and bad management as main reasons for job dissatisfaction. Like American journalists, age and income also affect Taiwan cable journalists' job satisfaction. This study again finds the unique factor in a transitional system that has affected journalists' job satisfaction, namely, respondents whose political orientations match the company's editorial policy tend to be more satisfied than those who find the company's editorial policy clashing with their political beliefs.

What roles should media play in this transitional system? Most respondents perceive that media should perform the roles of watchdog and educator. Respondents reject the authoritarian concept that media should support government policies in order to promote political stability. They, on the contrary, think that media should be watchdogs who report what happens critically. Being critical does not translate into being adversarial. Respondents don't think that media have to hold an adversarial attitude toward government; they emphasize more the media's responsibility of being neutral, giving equal reportage to different opinions. While this study lacks a longitudinal design showing directly whether Taiwanese journalists' views on press role have changed, a study by Lee (1993) described journalists under KMT's authoritarian rule as holding libertarian philosophy. This study found that journalists working under the present transitional system in Taiwan continue their beliefs in libertarian views on press role. Their perceptions resemble those of the American journalists, who emphasize more the media's interpretive and information dissemination functions and less the media's adversary role (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996).

In conclusion, Taiwan's political reform toward democracy has brought changes in its media system. The television news arena is no longer dominated by government-controlled broadcasters. Private ownership of cable has boosted local entrepreneurs to venture into news business and this freedom has resulted in a proliferation of cable news channels. This phenomenon, as perceived by cable journalists, can be explained by cable founders' desire to offer audiences news perspectives different from the government-controlled broadcasters. This change, however, has not brought independence to private cable news channels because the founders are also motivated to use the news operations for their political gains. Electronic media in Taiwan, after all, still function under partisanship.

For journalists working under these partisan media, even though they enjoy quite a high degree of autonomy, many of them are dissatisfied with their job. Their experiences of autonomy and job satisfaction are all affected by the partisan nature of cable news media. Those who work in organizations with neutral editorial policies enjoy higher degree of autonomy. Those whose personal politics matches the company's editorial policy tend to be more satisfied with their work. These journalists' views about the role of media correspond to the libertarian thoughts in Western democracies. They believe that media should function as watchdogs and educators, not as advocates as prescribed in the authoritarian system.

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Questionnaire (Appendix)

Introduction: It is an interesting and intriguing phenomenon that many cable networks have been swarming into the news business in Taiwan. We would like to know your opinions about the recent development of television news in Taiwan. Your answers are extremely valuable to help us understand the present situation of television news in Taiwan. Thank you for your participation.

A. Below is the first set of statements about why you think there are so many cable news stations in the recent development of television in Taiwan. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement by circling the number next to each statement that best represents your feeling.

	STRONGLY DISAGREE				STRONGLY AGREE
To counteract biased news coverage of the three over-the-air broadcasters	1	2	3	4	5
To offer audiences different news perspectives	1	2	3	4	5
To fulfill cable founder's ideas about news	1	2	3	4	5
To build cable founders' political influence	1	2	3	4	5

B. Below is a set of statements about how much freedom do you experience in your work. Please indicate the degree of freedom from not at all to a great deal by circling the number next to each statement that best represents your feeling.

	NOT AT ALL				A GREAT DEAL
How much freedom do you usually have in selecting the stories you work on?	1	2	3	4	5

How much freedom do you usually have in deciding which aspects of a story should be emphasized?	1	2	3	4	5
How much instruction do you usually get from supervisor about news dealing with the politics?	1	2	3	4	5
Overall, how much freedom do you have in news reporting?	1	2	3	4	5

C. Below is a set of statements, identifying the media's role in relation to the state and society. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.

	STRONGLY DISAGREE				STRONGLY AGREE
Media should only observe and report on what is happening without being critical.	1	2	3	4	5
Media should support government policies to promote political stability.	1	2	3	4	5
Media have the responsibility to criticize government policies.	1	2	3	4	5
Media should be neutral by giving equal amount of reportage to different opinions.	1	2	3	4	5
Media should be adversarial to the state.	1	2	3	4	5
Media have the responsibility to educate the public about government policies.	1	2	3	4	5

D. Finally, please answer the following questions which relate to your background. This information will be strictly confidential.

The media are often classified as pro-KMT, pro-DPP, or pro-CNP. Which category would you place the editorial policy of your organization?

_____ Pro-KMT _____ Pro-DPP _____ Pro-CNP _____ Neutral

And which category would you place yourself?

_____ Pro-KMT _____ Pro-DPP _____ Pro-CNP _____ Neutral

What news organization do you belong to now? ______________________________

What is your current position? _____ Editor _____ Reporter

What is the ownership of your organization?

_____ Private _____ Party _____ Government _____ Other

How long have you worked in journalism? ________________________ Years

Where would you most likely to be working in five years?

_____ In news media _____ Somewhere else _____ Don't know

All things considered, how satisfied are you with your present job?

_____ Very dissatisfied _____ Somewhat dissatisfied

_____ Somewhat satisfied _____ Very satisfied _____ Don't know

What are the most important reasons you say you are (dissatisfied or satisfied) with your present job?

____

____

____

____

____

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

_____ High school _____ College _____ University _____ Graduate school

Were you a journalism or communication major in college, university or graduate school?

_____ Yes _____ No

How old are you?

_____ Below 20 _____ 20 - 30 _____ 31- 40 _____ 41 and above

What is your gender? _____ Female _____ Male

What is your annual income?

_____ Less than 400,000 _____ 400,000 to 600,000 _____ 600,000 to 800,000

_____ 800,000 to 1000,000 _____ Over 1000,000

* * * * *

Thank you again for your time and cooperation in this project.

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Korean Students' Use of Television
An Expectancy-Value Approach

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Korean Students' Use of Television
An Expectancy-Value Approach

ABSTRACT

A questionnaire was administered to extend previous research on the expectancy-value judgments of media use in a study of Korean students' television viewing experiences. Consistent with the previous findings, the data showed that students' expectancy-value judgments were important in their viewing decisions. Above all, information seeking was the most expected outcome of television viewing among Korean students.

The use of mass media among foreign students studying in the United Stated has been a topic of interest to several scholars in communications and sociology (e.g., Choi & Tambourine, 1993; Mowlana & McLaughlin, 1969; Okigbo, 1983; Semlak, 1979; Spaulding & Flack, 1976). Evidence from this research indicates that mass media play at least some role in the formation of foreign students' attitude toward and perceptions of the United States. For example, in a multi-national study of political socialization among foreign students studying in the United States, Mowlana and McLaughlin (1969) found that foreign students rely primarily on television and newspapers for information used in determining their attitudes toward the United States. It has also been noted that the media play important roles in such crucial areas as foreign students' perceptions of United States political leaders and political institutions (Semlak, 1979), and students' expatriation decisions (Okigbo, 1983).

Although these studies have demonstrated that the use of mass media can influence foreign students' attitude formation and other important decision making processes, more research is needed with regard to the media use patterns by these students to determine any possible effects of the media on the students. In fact, it has been pointed out that very little attention has been devoted to the systematic examination of the media uses among foreign students since the early works on this topic(Mowlana & McLaughlin, 1969).

Past research has measured students' media uses by simply asking how often he or she attended to a selected medium or media. What can be useful is to establish the motivational bases for the media uses by foreign students. Communication researchers have demonstrated that "audience motives (i.e., desires, wants, or gratifications sought from the media) exert a constructive influence on audience experiences and thereby condition various media effects"

(Babrow 1989; Blumler, 1979; Carveth & Alexander, 1985; Levy & Windahl, 1984; Rubin, 1986). Moreover, it is well documented that various audience motives (e.g., information seeking, escape, entertainment, etc.) are associated with audience exposure levels (Blumler, 1979), which may be related to exposure consequences such as cultivation (Gebner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1986). Therefore, an understanding of foreign student media use patterns has wide significance. This study examines foreign student media use patterns, television viewing motives and exposure levels in particular, from a general model of volitional action: expectancy-value theory.[1] Television is selected because it is the most available and maybe most popular medium for foreign students studying in the United States. Moreover, past research has focused on the consequences of print media uses rather than on those of audio-visual media.

An Expectancy-Value Model of Television Viewing

As "a general theory of action" (Weiner, 1972: 257), expectancy-value theory (Edwards, 1954; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, Tolman, 1932; Triandis, 1977, 1980) specifies in a mathematical way the relationship among beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. Its authors argue that most human behaviors can be predicted and explained almost exclusively in terms of individual beliefs and attitudes.

According to the theory, volitional human behavior is guided by the strength of the belief

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[1] Communication researchers point out that media exposure is not always volitional. Habit (Babrow, 1988) or social-structural variables (Webster & Wakshlag, 1983) may constrain exposure behavior.

(bi) that the person has about the act's consequences in terms of the subjective probability that the act truly leads to particular consequences and evaluations (ei) or attractiveness of the consequences to the person.

In the context of media-related motives and exposure levels, television in particular, several researchers have incorporated this proposition in several gratification models and generated a handful of studies indicating that expectancy-value judgments are associated with exposure levels (Babrow, 1989; Babrow & Swanson, 1988; Galloway & Meek, 1981; Palmgreen & Rayburn, 1980, 1982). Among these, Palmgreen and Rayburn's model suggests that media exposure can be predicted by gratifications sought from the media and attitude toward the exposure to the media (Palmgreen & Rayburn, 1982). It also posits that "gratifications sought from media experience are a function of both the belief (expectations) that audience members hold about media sources and the affective evaluations they attach to media attributes" (Palmgreen & Rayburn, 1985: p. 63). The authors also suggest that the same expectancy-value judgments give rise to attitude toward the object of exposure. They argued that "antecedents (belief and evaluation) of attitude toward a medium, program... are also the antecedents of gratifications sought from the medium or program" (Palmgreen & Rayburn, 1982: p. 567).

Although their proposed model received empirical supports in studies of television news viewing motives and exposure levels (Babrow & Swanson, 1988; Palmgreen & Rayburn, 1982; Rayburn & Palmgreen, 1984), it is criticized for a lack of clarity in operational definitions and analytical model (Stanford, 1983)[2] and other variables mediating the relationship between expectancy-value judgments and exposure levels (Babrow & Swanson, 1988). In fact, as Palmgreen and Rayburn acknowledged, their model explained only small amount of the variance in news watching, and the relationship between expectancy-value judgments and exposure levels was nonsignificant when other variables were controlled indicating the relationship is indirect (Palmgreen and Reborn, 1982).

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[2] Palmgreen and Reborn's model was criticized because it suggests the sum of b x e products, the sum of GS, and Attitude are theoretically redundant.

A Complete Model

Babrow (1989) has developed a more complete account of the model by incorporating other specifications from two major expectancy-value models in the attitude-behavior literature: Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of reasoned action (1975) and Triandis's theory of interpersonal behavior (1980). According to these theories, the immediate determinant of a person's overt behavior (B) is the person's intention (I) to perform (or not to perform) that behavior. So, if we know what a person's intention is regarding some object or person (e.g., does the person intend to watch television; does the person intend to vote for Candidate A or B), this would be the single most important piece of information that we can have in attempting to predict the person's eventual behavior.

Attitude. The theory of reasoned action also posits that a person's intentions can be predicted by knowing two things: (1) the person's attitude toward the behavior (A) and (2) the person's subjective norm (SN). The first component refers to the person's positive or negative feelings about engaging in the behavior and can be measured verbally by responses to evaluative semantic differential scales (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). It is a result of the information that a person has about the attitude object. Fishbein and Ajzen argue that a person's attitude can be predicted by multiplying the strength of the beliefs (bi) about the consequences of the act weighted by evaluations (ei) of each consequence and by summing the products. In other words, their model specifies how the different salient beliefs are combined to arrive at an overall evaluation of the behavior under consideration. For example, if we wanted to know a person's attitude about watching television news, we could ask the person to list and rate his/her beliefs about the consequences (i.e., news viewing motives or gratifications) of viewing the news. Then we could combine the different salient beliefs to arrive the person's attitude toward the act of news viewing.

In the context of television viewing, this additive belief model received a lot of empirical support (Babrow, 1988; Babrow & Swanson, 1988; Palmgreen & Rayburn, 1982). For example, in a study of the determinants of exposure to television news, Palmgreen and Rayburn (1982) found a relatively strong ($\beta = .54$) relationship between viewers' expectancy-value judgments and attitudes toward news viewing experiences. The result was replicated by Babrow (1989) who found that students' expectancy-value judgments of soap opera viewing was positively related to students' attitudes toward soap opera viewing. Given the theoretical underpinnings of the expectancy-value theory and empirical evidence to support them, we can expect that

Hypothesis 1: Students attitude toward television viewing will be positively related to the students' expectancy-value judgments of television viewing motives.

Subjective Norm. According to Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of reasoned action, the second predictor of a behavioral intention is the person's perceived subjective norm (SN). It refers to the person's perceptions of the social pressures to perform or not perform the behavior in question. Fishbein and Ajzen argue that, like attitude, we can measure the person's subjective norm directly or by assessing the specific beliefs that comprise it.[3] For instance, a direct measure of a person's subjective norm about watching television news programs could be obtained by having the person to rate the following question: "People who are important to me and whose opinions I value think I should watch the television news programs."

The importance of social pressure in a television-viewing context is documented by several researchers (e.g., Blumler, 1979, 1985; Babrow, 1989; Babrow & Swanson, 1988; Palmgreen and Rayburn, 1979, 1982; Webster & Wakshlag, 1983). For example, in a study of public television viewing, Palmgreen and Rayburn (1979) found that, among those respondents who did not make their own television viewing decisions in the household, public television viewing was best predicted by the viewing behavior of the decision maker. Babrow (1989) also found a small but statistically significant impact of a generalized social expectation on students' intention to watch soap operas.

Behavioral Intention. As discussed above, the theory of reasoned action posits that a person's behavioral intention is a function of the person's attitude toward and perceived subjective norms about the behavior in question. The model suggests, however, that attitudes and norms should not always be weighted equally in forming behavioral intentions. Different people might have characteristically different weights that they apply to each component, or different types of issues might lead to differential weighing of the components. In fact, the accumulated research in attitude indicates that both the attitude and subjective norm components uniquely contribute to the prediction of intentions, although their relative importance may vary with people and issues. For instance, in predicting college students' intention to engage in premarital sex, Fishbein (1966) found that for females, the attitude component was more important in determining intentions than the subjective norm, but for males, the subjective norm component was more important than attitude. In a study of television soap opera viewing, Babrow (1989) also found differential contributions of both components in predicting college students' intentions to watch soap operas. The multiple correlation of attitude and normative perception with intention to watch soap operas was .48. The relative contribution of attitude was much greater than the normative perception in soap opera viewing decisions. Babrow (1989) argues that television viewing, soap opera in particular, is associated with strong emotional responses that might cause student viewers to weigh their attitudes greater than perceived social pressures. Therefore we can expect that

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[3] Fishbein and Ajzen argue that we can measure the person's subjective norm indirectly by multiplying the person's *normative belief* (one's assessment of another's endorsement of performing the behavior) and one's *motivation to comply*, and summing the products. In this study, however, only the direct measure of subjective norm was used.

Hypothesis 2: Students' intentions to watch television will be positively related to the strength of the attitude toward watching weighted by perceived subjective norms.

Hypothesis 3: Students' attitudes, compared to the perceived subjective norms, will be more strongly related to the intentions to watch television.

Fishbein and Reborn's the theory of reasoned action not only conceptually distinguishes the key components (i.e., expectancy-value judgments, attitude, subjective norm, and behavioral intention) but also specifies a recursive-chain causal structure underlying them. It assumes that behavioral intention is directly caused by attitude, which in turn reflect beliefs about the consequences of behavior weighted by the subjective evaluations of the consequences. In other words, the model suggests that students' expectancy-value judgements of television viewing motives affect students' intention to watch television only indirectly through their effects on attitude. This is why Palmgreen and Rayburn (1982) found no significant relationship between college students' expectancy-value judgments of television news viewing motives and exposure levels when attitude toward watching was controlled constant. Likewise, Babrow (1989) also found an only trivial contribution of expectancy-value judgments to variance in intention to watch soap opera. Therefore, it is likely that

Hypothesis 4: The effect of students' expectancy-value judgments of television viewing on viewing intention will be nonsignificant when attitude toward watching is controlled constant.

Exposure Behavior. Of course, the ultimate goal of the theory of reasoned action is not to predict behavioral intentions per se but to predict and understand the determinants of actual behavior. To reiterate, Fishbein and Ajzen's model conceptualizes behavioral intention as the immediate cause of behavior, mediating the effect of the other two components: attitudes and subjective norms. The authors argue that to the extent the behavior in question is under volitional control only requiring motivations or intentions, we can predict a person's eventual behavior through the person's behavioral intention. Babrow (1989) found a positive relationship between students' intentions to watch soap operas and their actual exposure levels. This suggests that

Hypothesis 5: Students' intention to watch television will be positively related to exposure level.

Hypothesis 6: The effects of attitude and subjective norm on students' exposure level will be nonsignificant when viewing intention is held constant.

Method

Participants

The data were collected among Korean students enrolled at a large Midwestern university. Questionnaires were administered to 100 students to measure Korean students' media use, attitudes toward television viewing, expectancy-value judgments of television viewing motives, viewing intention, and demographic information. Students took about twenty minutes to complete the questionnaire.

Complete data were obtained for 95 students (95% of the respondents). The sample was consisted of 64.2% male and 35.8% female students, about two third (69.1%) of them were ranged in ages between 25-34. About the same number of students (62.9%) were married, and almost ninety-two percent were identified as full-time students. Sixty-seven students (70%) were identified as graduate students, while others were undergraduate students.

Measurement

Television use. Participants were asked to estimate the number of hours they spent watching television on a typical weekday. They were also asked to rate their viewing hours on the weekends. Data for television use were obtained by combining the two measures.

Viewing intention. Television viewing intention was measured by asking students to rate on a five-point scale (*very likely*= 5, *very unlikely*= 0) their intention to watch television.

Subjective norms. Following the procedure suggested by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), students' subjective norms were measured directly by asking them to rate whether most people who are important to them (e.g., family members, friends, and etc.) think they should watch television. This variable was measured on a five-point scale anchored by *very likely* (5) and *very unlikely* (0).

Attitudes. To measure students' attitudes toward television viewing, three bipolar attitudinal items adapted from Fishbein and Ajzen (1980: appendix B) were used (very good / very bad, very wise / very foolish, very beneficial / very harmful). For composite score of attitudes, scores on each three item were summed with possible range of 3 to 15. The internal consistency of the items was fairly high (Cronbach's $\alpha = .74$).

Expectancy-value judgments. Twenty-three perceived consequences (see Table 1 for complete list) of television viewing were adapted from the earlier work done by Greenberg (1974) and Rubin (1980). Greenberg's scale and Rubin's adaptation are the most widely used measures of television viewing motivation. The scales have been adapted to several contexts, such as television use by college students (Bantz, 1982), watching television news and information (Rubin, 1981a), public television viewing (Palmgreen & Rayburn, 1979), music television (Sun & Lull, 1986), soap operas (Rubin & Perse, 1987a), and religious television viewing (Abelman, 1987). To measure students' belief strengths, they were asked to rate on a five point scale their perceived probability that television viewing would provide them with each of the twenty-three characteristics identified above. The five-point scale ranged from *very definitely* (5) to *very definitely not* (1). Students also evaluated each of the twenty-three consequences of television viewing on a five-point scale ranging from very good to very bad. They were asked to rate how important it is for television to have each of the characteristics identified above. Expectancy-value scores were obtained by summing the products of the beliefs strengths and evaluations with a possible range of 1 to 25.

Data Analysis

The primary analytical tools used in this study were exploratory factor analysis and regression analysis as they were used in expectancy-value and television viewing motives research in the past (Babrow, 1989). Exploratory factor analysis was intended to identify underlying dimensions of students' expectancy-value judgments of television viewing. The factors identified in this way were then used in subsequent analyses to test hypotheses regarding attitude and media use behaviors.

Results

Expectancy-Value Judgments

For each of the twenty-three gratifications respondents completed regarding television viewing, their belief strengths and evaluations were combined. These products were then factor analyzed using principal components extraction with varimax (orthogonal) rotation. The result of this analysis confirmed that twenty-three television viewing consequences grouped into the four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Table 1 represents the primary factor loadings. These factors together accounted for 73.9 percent of the variance.

Factor 1, Escape-Companionship, explained 51.2 percent of the total variance. This factor reflects students' perceived opportunities for companionship, passing time, and forgetting problems of daily lives. According to Rubin and Perse (1987), this reflects *ritualized* television viewing to occupy one's time for lack of alternatives and personal interaction. Factor 2, Entertainment-Relaxation, explained 10.7 percent of the total variance. It reflects opportunities for relaxing and enjoyable entertainment from television viewing. Factor 3, Information, explained an additional 6.7 percent of the total variance. Students expected to obtain useful information to explore what is going on in the world and new environment. The factor reflects *instrumental* use of television to acquire and share information (Rubin and Perse, 1987). Factor 4, Arousal, explained 5.2 percent of the total variance, and only two items (thrilling and uncensored programs) were loaded on this factor. Factor 1 and Factor 2 were related most significantly $r = .73, p < .01$), while Factor 3 and Factor 4 were related least $r = .21, p < .05$).

Table 1
Expectancy-Value Judgments of Television Viewing: Factor Loading

	Companionship/ Escape	Entertainment/ Relaxation	Information	Arousal
Make thrilled	.14	.45	-.10	.70
Provide	.09	.18	.84	.02
Amuse me	.13	.76	.37	.22
Pass time	.61	.58	-.01	.00
Make me relaxed	.46	.74	.11	-.13
Make me enjoyable	.34	.74	.25	.17
Feel excitement	.24	.61	.25	.36
Feel	.58	.53	.16	.27
Something to see	.19	.28	.74	.18
Uncensored	.22	-.05	.16	.67
Make me	.20	.63	.49	.28
Feel less lonely	.69	.48	.20	.08
No one to talk	.80	.30	.20	-.00
Emotional feelings	.67	.35	.23	.27
Talk to others	.71	.20	.36	.14
Forget problems	.75	.33	.16	.11
Release tensions	.44	.70	.13	-.10
Escape daily life	.79	.30	.12	.10
Useful information	.22	.15	.87	.02
Interesting to others	.69	.06	.40	.31
World information	.18	.10	.90	.02
Peps me up	.59	.26	.33	.40
Time with others	.79	.09	-.01	.20
Cronbach Alpha	.95	.96	.90	.44
Eigen Value	11.77	2.46	1.54	1.20
% of Total	51.2	10.7	6.7	5.2

Construction of Indexes

Based on the factor-analytic results, composite expectancy-value judgement scales were created by summing up all the scores of the products of belief strengths and evaluations across variables that loaded at .50 or more on one of the factor. The companionship and pass time items loaded on both Factor 1 and Factor 2 were included in Factor 1. The items in those four factors were used to create four separate additive indexes: Escape-Companionship (Cronbach α = .95), Entertainment-Relaxation (Cronbach α = .96), Information (Cronbach α = .90), and Arousal (Cronbach α = .44).

Attitude Toward Television Viewing

General attitudes of students toward television viewing in general were rated on the three adjective-pair statements on a five-point scale. The sum of the three scores resulted in a composite attitude score (*Mean* = 8.44, *SD* = 2.23, Cronbach α = .74).

Subjective Norms

A single subjective norm item asked students about the extent to which "Most people who are important to me (e.g., family members or friends) think I should watch television" (*Mean* = 3.19, *SD* = 1.02).

Viewing Intention

Students' intention to watch television was measured on a single behavioral intention item of ranging from very likely (5) to very unlikely (1), with mean of 2.72 (*SD* = 1.15).

Exposure Level

Students estimated the number of hours they spent watching television in a typical week day and weekend day separately. The two numbers then added to obtain the exposure level (*Mean* = 19.78, *SD* = 3.69).

Testing Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 predicted that students' expectancy-value judgments of television viewing motives would determine students' attitudes toward television viewing. The hypothesis was strongly supported when students' attitudes were significantly regressed on the summed products of twenty-three expectancy-value judgments of television viewing motives $R = Beta = .33$, $F(1,94) = 10.58$, $p < .01$). Students' attitudes were then regressed on the four composites of expectancy-value judgments of television viewing motives $R = Beta = .48$, $F(4,93) = 6.61$, $p < .01$). As hypothesized, the composites of expectancy-value judgments of television viewing motives was a significantly related to students' attitudes toward television viewing. However, among the four composites, Information was the only significant predictor of the attitudes ($Beta = .29$, $p < .01$; see Table 2). It is suspected that the nonsignificant relations of the other three factors may be due to multicollinearity among them since the pearson correlation coefficients among these factors were very high. In sum, the results of the regression analyses indicate that students' attitudes toward television viewing are strongly related to their expectancy-value judgments, information acquisition in particular, of television viewing.

Table 2
Regression of Attitude on Composites of Expectancy-Value Judgments

	B	SE	Beta	t
Escape/Companionship	-5.68	.006	-.001	-.10
Entertainment/Relaxation	2.06	.013	.232	1.564
Information	3.67	.015	.290	2.522**
Arousal	1.77	.022	.057	.539

Note. Total N = 95. *R* = .48, *R-Square* = .23, *F* (4,90) = 6.6, $p < .01$. Standard error is for unstandardized coefficients.
**$p < .01$.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that students' intentions to watch television in general will be positively related to the strength of the attitude toward watching weighted by perceived subjective norms. The multiple correlation of students' attitudes and the subjectively perceived norms with intention to watch television was .67 (*R-Square* = .45, *F* (2,92) = 37.46, $p < .01$). The relative contributions of each of the two variables were shown in table 3.

Table 3
Regression of Viewing Intention on Attitudes and Subjective Norms

Predictors	B	SE	Beta	t
Attitudes	.166	.044	.323	3.788**
Subjective Norms	.545	.097	.477	5.593**

Note. Total N = 95. Standard errors are for unstandardized coefficients.
R = .67, *R-Square* = .45, *F* (2, 92) = 37.46, $p < .001$. **$p < .01$.

Hypothesis 3 predicted a stronger effect of the students' attitudes than perceived subjective norm on the viewing intention. The results from regression analyses in Table 3 indicate that general subjective norm was a better predictor of the viewing intention (*Beta* = .47, $p < .01$).

Table 4
Stepwise Regression of Intention on Attitude and Expectancy-Value Judgments

Variables	Step entered	R	R^2	R^2 Change	Beta	T	Sig
Attitude	1	.52	.27	.27**	.437	4.20	.01
Expectancy-value	2	.57	.32	.05**			
Escape/Companionship					-1.367	-.947	.34
Relax/Entertainment					.246	1.651	.10
Information					-.010	-.080	.93
Arousal					.148	1.419	.16

Note. Total N = .95. Step 1: F (1,93) = 31.45, $p < .01$. Step 2: F (5, 89) = 7.75, $p < .01$.
**$p < .01$.

Hypothesis 4 predicted a nonsignificant relationship between students' expectancy-value judgments and intention to watch television viewing when their attitudes toward television viewing were held constant. Results from stepwise regression analyses supported the expectation (see Table 4) when viewing intention was regressed on students' attitudes (Step 1) and the four composites of expectancy-value judgment scales (Step 2). When the four composites were entered in the second block, they increased the *R-Square* only slightly. Partial coefficients for each of the four expectancy-value composites indicated that none of them was statistically significant contributors to the prediction of viewing intention. The perceived opportunity for Escape-Companionship was negatively related to the intention (*Beta* = -1.367, $p < .34$). Only Entertainment-Relaxation scale barely approached significance (*Beta* = .246, $p < .10$).

Table 5
Stepwise Regression of Exposure Level on Viewing Intention and Attitude and Subjective Norm

Variables	Step entered	R	R^2	R^2 Change	Beta	T	Sig
Viewing intention	1	.533	.284	.28**	.532	4.417	.01
Attitude/Subjective norm	2	.541	.292	.01			
Attitude					-.900	-.857	.39
Subjective norm					.076	.671	.50

Note. Total N = 95. Step 1: $F(1, 93) = 35.273$, $p < .01$. Step 2: $F(3, 91) = 11.98$, $p < .01$.
$^{**}p < .01$.

In sum, the results seem to support the hypothesis of nonsignificant relationship between students' television viewing intention and their expectancy-value judgment of television viewing motives when attitude toward television viewing was held constant.

Hypothesis 5 predicted a positive relationship between television viewing intention and the exposure level. The hypothesis was supported when exposure level was regressed on students' viewing intention $R = .53$, *R-Square* = .28, $F(1, 93) = 35.27$, $p < .01$).

Hypothesis 6 predicted that the relationship between viewing intention and exposure level

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will be nonsignificant when students' attitude toward television viewing and perceived subjective norm are kept constant. The hypothesis was supported by a stepwise regression analyses that regressed students' exposure levels on viewing intention (Step 1) and attitudes toward television viewing and perceived subjective norms (Step 2). Over all, the effect of attitude and subjective norm was nonsignificant when viewing intention was held constant (see Table 5).

Discussion

This study is designed to extend the research evidence concerning the utility of the applications of expectancy-value theory to gratifications research by replicating, in the context of television viewing among foreign students, key findings and predictions regarding the use of television. The primary goal was to identify and determine dimensions of television viewing outcomes foreign students anticipate when they watch television. The exploratory factor analysis indicates that Korean students expect to experience four different dimensions of outcomes from television viewing: Escape-Companionship, Entertainment-Relaxation, Information, and Arousal. It was found that this topology of outcome expectations from television viewing predict students' generalized attitudes toward television viewing. This result parallels Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) and Babrow's (1989) findings on the effect of expectancy-value judgment on attitude, in that students' expectancy-value judgments explained a large amount of attitude variance.

However, further analysis demonstrated that only Information seeking is a statistically significant predictor of attitude. Students perceived Information as the primary outcome they would obtain from television viewing. The remaining three dimensions showed no significant effect on attitude. This may be due to the fact that Korean students make instrumental use of television which is anchored by intentional and selective use of television (Rubin, 1984). This pattern of television use can partly be explained by the fact that students anticipated the acquisition of information from television which could help them learn about and explore their new foreign environment. In fact, Rubin (1984) found that all viewing motives but escape predicted television exposure and attachment. That is, the more motivated students are to watch television, the more they watch and the more important they think television is. In turn, the more important television is to students, the more likely they are to attract positive or negative value judgement about the television viewing experiences. This notion is supported by the finding that the students' expectancy-value judgments were strongly related to their attitudes toward viewing experiences. Students' anticipation to acquire new information from television viewing reflects very motivated and goal-directed instrumental media use orientation (Rubin, 1984). This pattern of instrumental use of mass media is consistent with evidence that foreign students tend to use communications, mass media in particular, in the process of acculturation to the "exotic" cultures (Kim, 1982).

However, the other variables, Escape-Companionship, Entertainment-Relaxation, and Arousal, did not influence students' attitudes and viewing decisions. According to Rubin (1984), these are the variables which reflect very passive and ritualized media orientations. They are less goal-directed and less purposive motives, therefore not significantly related to attitudes and viewing experiences. In fact, Rubin (1985) and Carveth & Alexander (1985) found that escape (diversion, get away, avoidance) is often cited as a gratification sought from soap opera viewing, but it is nonsignificantly related to exposure levels. In a study of students' soap opera viewing, Babrow also found that two out of three dimensions of viewing outcomes, romantic fantasy and learning had little effects on students' attitudes and other viewing decisions. The author argues that variability of audience motives across populations can influence students' attitudes and viewing decisions. He also explained the result in such a way that some of the students' soap opera viewing motives-- romantic jealousy and learning outcome probability and values are not relevant to them. As for Korean students, an outcome expectation for entertainment and arousal may still be expressed as legitimate motives of television viewing, but may be perceived as not important or relevant motives to their attitudes.

Babrow (1988, 1988) also points out some degree of social undesirability college students attach to some television viewing motives for watching soap operas. Although the present study explored students' motives for television viewing in general not specific programs like soap operas or news, they might have felt some degree of social undesirability to admit that such outcome expectations as entertainment and arousal were important and relevant to them. This may explain why the perceived social pressure was a better predictor of Korean students' intention to watch television than their attitudes toward television viewing. In fact, this is not what was found in the previous expectancy-value studies and hence not expected in this study. Although the theory of reasoned action suggests that attitude and subjective norm will not always be weighted equally in forming behavioral intentions, students were found to apply more weights to his or her attitude than to perceived social pressure when they make viewing decisions (Babrow, 1989; Babrow & Swanson, 1988). For Korean students, the reverse was true in that they endorsed their perceived subjective norms more than their generalized attitudes toward television viewing. This emphasizes the notion that a media consumption should be understood in relation to the social contexts in which it occurs (Blumler, 1985). It also is consistent with the notion that different people may have characteristically different weights that they apply to each component, or different types of issues may lead them to differential weighing of the components. Certainly, Korean students appear to make a lot of references to others when they make television viewing decisions. This finding is contrary to what American students feel important when they make the same decisions. Although the issues discussed in this study (i.e., television viewing in general) and other studies (i.e., specific programs such as television news or soap operas) are different, this finding for the relative contributions for attitude and subjective norm provides an interesting venue for the future studies. Is the television viewing decision cultural specific or domain specific? Some evidence in the attitude literature indicates that television viewing decisions may be gender specific (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Answering these questions in the future studies allow for a broader structure of the determinants of the television viewing decision makings.

Overall, the present study offered directs tests of the predictions illustrated by the expectancy-value models, and the findings were consistent with the assumption that behavior is directly caused by behavioral intentions, which are based on attitudes, which in turn reflect beliefs about the consequences of behavior weighted by the subjective evaluation of the consequences. The proposed recursive-chain causal structure underlying the model is well supported by the fact that students' attitudes toward television viewing were predicted by the expectancy-value judgments students made for television viewing. In turn, attitudes combined with the perceived subjective norms determined students' television viewing intentions. However, the effects of attitudes and subjective norms on the actual exposure levels were nonsignificant indicating a indirect relationship between these components. This finding is in sharp contrast to the direct link between the expectancy-value judgments and exposure levels, which was found in the context of television viewing by Galloway and Meek (1981). In sum, the present study extended the research evidence concerning the relationships among belief, attitude, and behavior by replicating, in the context of television viewing, key findings and predictions regarding the motivational basis of television use (Babrow, 1989; Babrow & Swanson, 1988; Palmgreen & Rayburn, 1982; Rubin, 1985).

However, the present findings must be interpreted with some cautions. First, the sample in this study was very homogeneous group of students whose television viewing hours are very limited and irregular. The majority of them (70%) were graduate students, and may not be representative of the entire Korean student group in the university. A second problem is concerned more with the measurement of students' perceived subjective norms and viewing intentions. Both variables were measured through a single item. A multi-item index may benefit the reliability of the measure in the future (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980).

Future research could test the motives associated with other communication content and media. The study could be replicated with entertainment, news, and newly developing online computer-based media and the contents they deliver. Future research should also attempt to draw students from less homogeneous group and students with other cultural backgrounds. Replicating with other diverse group of people and other media and media contents will bolster the external validity of the model proposed in this study.

Future research could also examine the processes underlying any possible effects of mass media use on the foreign students' attitude formation and important decision makings. In fact, foreign students studying in the United State are known to make use of the "exotic" mass media for information to guide their attitudes toward the United States (Mowlana & McLaughlin, 1969).

An unanswered question is whether the use of these media impact their worldviews. The motivational base of television viewing established in this study is can be a step toward this end, since it is known to "exert constructive influence on audience experiences and thereby condition media effects such as cultivation" (Blumler, 1979; Rubin, 1985, 1986).

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South Asian Student Attitudes Toward and Beliefs About Advertising: Measuring Across Cultures

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South Asian Student Attitudes Toward and Beliefs About Advertising: Measuring Across Cultures

Abstract

Using a survey, this study applied to South Asia constructs developed in the United States--beliefs about advertising and attitude toward advertising in general (AG)--and their operationalizations with two goals in mind. First, to determine whether the factor structure of these beliefs is similar in the United States and South Asia. Second, to measure whether South Asian consumers' beliefs about advertising predict their AG. The five South Asian countries in the study were Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

While the factor analysis results from the South Asian data did not perfectly replicate the results from the United States study, the similarities were large enough to conclude that the belief structure underlying AG is similar in the two parts of the world. The South Asian data provided a clearer differentiation between belief dimensions.

For all five South Asian countries as a group, each of the eight South Asian belief factors contributed significantly to the prediction of AG. Analysis by country did not find this global result but found two consistent results: the belief factor "good for personal economics" was a predictor of AG in all five countries, and the belief factor "consumer manipulation" did not contribute to prediction in any of the countries.

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South Asian Student Attitudes Toward and Beliefs About Advertising:
Measuring Across Cultures

Introduction

Considerable research in advertising over the past two decades has focused on the construct of "attitude towards advertising," first proposed by Bauer and Greyser in 1968. Theirs and subsequent studies have focused on identifying those critical factors, i.e., beliefs about advertising, which contribute to the general public's attitudes towards advertising in general (AG), with additional studies attempting to measure the beliefs and attitudes of specific target populations. While early studies focused on the component factors explaining the attitudes of U.S. populations, recent studies have begun to shift their attention toward measuring the extent to which these belief factors and their ability to predict AG differ or replicate across various national and ethnic populations.

This study will apply to South Asia constructs developed in the United States--beliefs about advertising and AG--and their operationalizations with two goals in mind. First, the study will attempt to determine whether the factor structure of these beliefs is similar in the United States and South Asia. Second, the study will measure whether South Asian consumers' beliefs about advertising predict their AG. The five South Asian countries included in the study are Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

South Asia

South Asia represents one of the world's largest and fastest growing markets with a population in excess of 1.2 billion people and an overall literacy rate approaching 50 percent. Making this market even more attractive and now more accessible is a national trend to liberalize marketing regulations while developing an expanding mass communication system. The focal point of the region is India, representing the world's second largest market with a population of more than 930 million people, a third of whom are members of a growing middle and upper-middle class (Khan, 1995a). In fact, Malik (1995, p. 32) suggests that "India will be one of the major markets of the 21st century" with potential that "extends well into the future."

Since its independence in 1947, India has been democratic politically and socialist economically. A few years ago, however, the government instituted economic reform and opened up to outside investment. As a result, India's reserves from foreign investment were $20.5 billion in 1995, and the Reserve Bank of India predicted high economic growth (Khan, 1995a). Sales are rising rapidly showing such dramatic gains as a 40 percent annual growth rate in credit card sales and a 25 percent increase in television sales (Khan, 1995a). One study found that India's government owned television stations reached 83 percent of its population by 1989 with an estimated audience in excess of 100 million people (Khan, 1995b).

The growth in foreign investment has led to an exponential increase in advertising. In general, the advertising industry has been growing 30 percent each year in the 1990s and is expected to continue along similar lines for the next three to four years at least (Kemp, 1995).

In other countries of the region, comparable conditions for change are already in place to support dynamics and scenarios similar to those currently observed in India.

In Pakistan, the turn of the decade brought democracy and with it market reform, new confidence in trade and industry circles, foreign investment ($2 billion in 1990), foreign products, and collaboration with foreign advertising agencies (Pakistan Advertising Scene 92). Growth in media was also large and was spurred by economic liberalization and increasing press freedom.

A "big turnaround" is also happening in Bangladesh (Kamaluddin, 1996). Between July and November of 1995, foreign investors made proposals for $850 million in projects. For 1995, they had proposed a total investment of $750 million, a figure in sharp contrast to the $53 million registered in 1993. Also, Bangladesh unlike India does not submit these proposals to lengthy review and this results in only a brief time lag between proposed and actual investment. Bangladesh's economy grew 5.1 percent in 1995.

While there are those who oppose the changes, one marketing official in Bombay observed that the course has been set. Political, social and economic pressures may be able to alter the pace of change somewhat, but the direction cannot be altered (Khan, 1995a).

Recent reactions to routine marketing strategies, however, emphasize the uncharted waters facing domestic businesses as well as those multinational corporations scratching at the door. A recent advertising campaign introducing KamaSutra condoms, developed for an Indian corporation by an Indian advertising agency, was judged too risqué by Indian cultural standards and was banned from the government run television network though it was aired by commercial cable stations (Alexander, 1992). This controversy demonstrates the very powerful roles that religion and government play in this region. Similarly, regional conflicts and traditional rivalries have helped shape cultures and now impact on marketing strategies as recently discovered by the Coca-Cola Company. The corporation was recently threatened with expulsion from India by political party leaders if the Coca-Cola subsidiary in Pakistan went ahead with plans to sponsor the national Pakistani cricket team (Khan, 1995a). The weakening of media and market regulation has had its own impact on various aspects of culture and society such as the role of women, patterns of media use and consumer habits.

In spite of the obvious challenges, multinational corporations are unwilling to back away from this lucrative market while, at the same time, the region is developing its own generation of entrepreneurs who are entering the market prepared to compete on the strength of their own products and brand names.

A significant weakness in the advertising industry's ability to serve corporations and consumers is the lack of research directed specifically at the culture, attitudes and beliefs of

South Asian consumers. Because of its prominence in the region, India has been the focus of what little research is available in this regard but even this is insufficient and rapidly being made obsolete by rampant change. More than 20 years ago, Mehta listed a number of signs pointing to the increasing importance of marketing in India including the "phenomenal growth" of the advertising industry there. He concluded his introduction by stating that the extensive imitation of product concepts, use of non-Indian advertising and the failure of social programs to effectively diffuse innovations were all evidence of a lack of understanding of the behavior dynamics of Indian consumers (Mehta, 1973). Even today, while some marketing campaigns have succeeded, others have been launched with no understanding of local culture and have failed (Bhandarkar, 1995).

Beliefs and AG

A critical concept in the study of consumer behavior is research into consumer attitudes and the factors that contribute to the development of those attitudes. A recent definition of attitude which appears to be gaining in acceptance states that attitudes are "summary evaluations of objects" which emanate from beliefs (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1995). Attitudes are the result of "weighted evaluations of perceived attributes and consequences" or "an index of the degree to which a person likes or dislikes an object." The term "object" as used in these definitions is applied loosely to persons, material objects and issues, with advertising specifically included in that usage (Pollay & Mittal, 1993; Andrews, 1989; Muehling, 1987).

Beliefs are defined as "an individual's position based on information that person has about other people, objects or issues" (Andrews, 1989); the "likelihood that an 'object' (such as advertising) possesses or is associated with an 'attribute' " (Fishbein & Azjen, 1975).

The concentration of research on consumer attitudes and beliefs regarding various aspects of advertising has spawned its own vocabulary of related constructs and abbreviations. The pivotal construct is attitude-toward-the-ad (AAd), defined as "a predisposition to respond in a favorable or unfavorable manner to a particular advertising stimulus during a particular exposure occasion" (Lutz, 1985; MacKenzie & Lutz, 1985, p. 49). In developing a model of the structure of AAd, MacKenzie and Lutz identified five contributing factors: ad credibility, ad perceptions, preexisting attitudes toward the sponsor, mood, and attitude toward advertising (AG).

AG is defined as a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner toward advertising in general. Within their classic study, Bauer and Greyser (1968) developed a scale of consumer questions to measure AG. Factor analysis of the resulting data suggested a two-factor model based on social and economic considerations.

Muehling (1987) and Pollay and Mittal (1993) question whether the scales used by Bauer and Greyser and similar studies of the period really measured attitudes or actually measured beliefs. Using the description that beliefs are information a person has about an object, person or issue, beliefs must be combined with an evaluative factor in order to represent an attitude (Muehling, 1987). Based on these definitions, recent researchers have concluded the Bauer and Greyser's scales actually measure beliefs (Muehling, 1987; Andrews, 1989; Pollay & Mittal, 1993).

Several studies have found that AG is complex and consists of a number of belief dimensions, most of them related to social and economic factors (Sandage & Leckenby, 1980; Anderson, Engledow & Becker, 1978a &1978b). In an effort to expand on Bauer and Greyser's model, Pollay and Mittal proposed a more comprehensive model encompassing several other belief dimensions. The model was operationalized by an instrument which incorporated Bauer and Greyser's seven-item scale and 21 other items forming seven additional scales. Three scales measured personal uses of media (Product information, Social role and image, and Hedonic/pleasure), and four scales measured societal effects (Good for economy, Materialism, Value corruption, Falsity/no sense). The results of their study more or less supported the use of the seven factor model (Bauer and Greyser's items were part of these seven factors) and found that beliefs about advertising predicted AG.

Student Beliefs and AG

A number of attitude studies have focused on the AG of students (Larkin, 1977; Sandage & Leckenby, 1980; Dubinsky & Hensel, 1984; Andrews, Lysonski and Durvasula, 1991; Pollay & Mittal, 1993). Justification for use of this population focuses on two arguments. First, students represent a major market whose consumer attitudes and purchasing intentions have been difficult to measure. In addition, students represent the future professionals in the industry and a measure of AG provides a critical starting point and direction for their instruction (Andrews et al., 1991). The second argument focuses on the results of previous studies which have measured no substantial difference between student AG and other cross-sections of the general population. These studies have found no significant age, demographic, or geographic differences except measures between business executives and the general public (Pollay & Mittal, 1993).

Research Questions

While some have argued that today's world is becoming one "global village" with common needs and desires, others suggest that it is premature to assume that ethnic and cultural differences have eroded to the point that they are no longer a significant consideration in advertising (Andrews et al., 1991).

A variety of studies have begun to suggest substantial differences in beliefs and AG between U.S. populations and other cultures. With the exception of a single study, results have indicated a greater distrust and more negative view of advertising by non-U.S. populations (Andrews et al., 1991).

> Advertising is seen by many as a threat to the cultural identity and self-realization of many developing countries: it brings to many people alien ethical values; it may deviate consumer demands in developing countries to areas which can inhibit development priorities; it affects and can often deform ways of life and lifestyles.
>
> (MacBride, 1980, p. 111 as quoted in Pollay, 1986)

Srikandath (1991) suggested that advertising plays a critical role in promoting values and attitudes and found that India's television advertising promoted values labeled "high technology" and "modernity"

One recent study used the U.S. as a benchmark to measure whether Indian consumer values are similar to those in developed economies. The study analyzed and compared U.S. and Indian advertising content. The study found that materialism and hedonistic values have become more important in Indian culture but concluded that India is not yet a mature consumer society and has values still significantly different from those of the U.S (Sengupta, 1996).

While this study is not concerned with values transmitted by advertising or values held by people, it focuses on a related issue--beliefs about advertising and how they relate to attitude towards advertising in general. The study replicates the Pollay and Mittal study in a different setting: South Asia. The first research question it asks is:

> 1. Do the South Asian data support the belief factors about advertising theoretically proposed by the Pollay and Mittal model and empirically found by them in their study?

To answer this research question, analysis of data was conducted using factor analysis to determine whether the pattern of intercorrelation of variables obtained from South Asian subjects was similar to that proposed by or obtained by Pollay and Mittal in the United States. (1993)

The second research question this study asks is:

> 2. Do the belief factors supported by the South Asian data predict the AG of South Asian subjects? In each of the five countries?

To answer this research question, regression analysis was used with AG as the dependent variable and the belief scales as the independent variables. The analysis was run for all five countries together and for each country individually.

Method

The method for this study was survey research using a cross-sectional design. Data was collected using a self-administered paper questionnaire completed by college students in a five country region of South Asia in 1995.

A convenience sample of students at ten geographically dispersed institutions of higher education in five South Asian nations was used for this study. Total respondents (N) for the study were 852. The countries, institutions and student subjects from each were: 215 students from two universities and a mass communication institute in India, 259 students from three universities in Pakistan, 186 students from two universities in Bangladesh, 103 students from one university in Sri Lanka and 89 students from one university in Nepal.

The questionnaire was developed through a series of pretests and subsequent revisions. English was used in the preparation and administration of the survey instrument because English is used as the language of instruction in each of the institutions where the survey was conducted

The questionnaire replicated the belief and AG statements used by Pollay and Mittal (1993) with one exception (Appendix A). Pollay and Mittal postulated four "distal antecedents" related to but distinct from the factors themselves. This study did not include one of the antecedents which addressed "sex in advertising" because the statement was not applicable in South Asia. These statements were evaluated using a 5-point Likert scale consistent with previous studies applying these scales (Anderson, Engledow & Becker, 1978a; Pollay & Mittal, 1993). The questionnaire also measured demographic information including age, gender, education, and media use.

Finally, three statements measured attitude-toward-advertising-in-general (AG), i.e., the extent to which respondents perceive advertising to be acceptable or unacceptable without specifically addressing the belief dimensions contributing to that attitude.

Findings

The typical subject was between 22 and 24 years of age and a female. The average student was in their senior year of college though the largest percentage were graduate students working on their master's degree. Media use was limited, averaging a total of about six hours per day during the previous week. Television represented the highest percentage of use (2.48 hours), followed by newspapers (1.430 hours), radio (1.332 hours) and magazines (1.323 hours).

Principal components analysis was used with varimax rotation to answer the first research question. While the factor analysis results from the South Asian data did not perfectly replicate the theoretically proposed or empirically discovered results from the Pollay and Mittal study, there were similarities leading to the conclusion that the belief structure underlying AG is similar in the two parts of the world.

The belief factor structure obtained from the South Asian data is presented in Table 1. The South Asian data resulted in eight factors. The eight factors are: Hedonic/Pleasure, Product Information, Consumer Information and Benefit, Good for Personal Economics, Good for Economy, Social Consequence, Materialism, and Consumer Manipulation. The first four factors are personal use factors and the second set of four factors are societal effects factors. That is, the first four factors deal with items that are "specific, personal and self-reflective," while the next four deal with factors that are "more abstract, generalized, and projective to others" (Pollay and Mittal, 1993).

"Hedonic/pleasure" refers to the entertainment value of advertising, while "product information" and "consumer information and benefit" refer to the information value of advertising with the difference between the latter two being that "product information" refers to current sales, availability and brand features information while "consumer information" refers to providing personal feedback to the consumer. "Good for personal economics" addresses the economic effects of advertising for the public as opposed to "good for economy" which addresses the effects of advertising for the economy of the nation and is therefore considered a societal effects factor. The remaining societal effects factors "social consequence," "materialism," and "consumer manipulation" mainly deal with the values that advertising instills in people and the effects of advertising on society at large.

Pollay and Mittal had proposed seven and found six factors in their study. How do these eight factors stack up against the six factors Pollay and Mittal found empirically in their student sample? The "hedonic/pleasure" factor was identical between the two studies, providing strong support to the existence of hedonic beliefs as a common construct between the two regions. The "good for the economy" factor was similar for both countries with one exception; the Pollay and Mittal factor had an additional item "lowers costs of goods." The "product information" factor was also similar between the two studies with one exception: the Pollay and Mittal factor had an additional item "advertising is essential." (This accounts for three of the six empirical Pollay and Mittal factors and three factors for this study.) Where did these two items, "lowers costs of goods" and "advertising is essential" load in this study?

In this study, "lowers costs of goods" loaded on a new factor called "consumer information and benefit," and "advertising is essential" loaded on another new factor called "good for personal economy." Both our two "new" factors (accounting for the fourth and fifth South Asia factors) had other items load on them. These "other" items combined into a separate factor called "social role and image" in the Pollay and Mittal study accounting for the fourth Pollay and Mittal factor. This finding points to an underlying similarity in belief structure; similar items more or less loaded together with the difference being that they formed one factor in the Pollay and Mittal study and two factors in this study.

For the final set of factors, the same pattern was evident, similarity in structure but difference in number of factors. The large (fifth) factor that Pollay and Mittal's study found combined three of their theoretical factors of materialism, value corruption, and falsity. In this study, the large Pollay and Mittal factor split into three factors: materialism, value corruption and "consumer manipulation," accounting for our sixth, seventh and eighth factors. Our value corruption factor also included an item that loaded alone for Pollay and Mittal in their "promotes bad things" (sixth) factor.

To conclude, while the factor structure was not identical, it was similar enough that it provides a measure of confidence in the applicability to South Asia of these belief constructs developed in the United States. Pollay and Mittal themselves had not found the seven factor model they theorized perfectly replicated in the two samples (students and housewives) they used, but their results converged towards suggesting general support for their theoretical model. Our results suggest that the South Asian respondents made more specific and clearer distinctions in their beliefs about advertising.

To answer the second research question, multiple regression was used. The question "Do the belief factors supported by the South Asian data predict the AG of South Asian students?" was asked for South Asians as a group and individually for each of the five South Asian countries studied.

For all five South Asian countries as a group, each of the eight belief factors contributed significantly to the prediction of AG (Table 2). However, one predictor, "consumer information and benefit" had a negative sign. Hence, lower scores on this belief factor were related with more positive AG. For the other factors, higher positive belief scores predicted higher positive attitude towards advertising. The eight belief factors together explained 30 percent of the variance in AG.

For the country specific regression runs, the overall F value was significant (p<.01) for each of the five countries (Table 3). The eight belief factors explained 29 percent of the variance in AG in Bangladesh, 32 percent in India, 39 percent in Nepal, 30 percent in Pakistan, and 34 percent in Sri Lanka.

The country specific regression runs however gave somewhat different results from the global regression run with regard to the contribution of the eight belief factors to explaining AG. The belief factor "good for personal economics" was a significant predictor in all five countries. That is, in all five countries, those who had positive beliefs about the value of advertising to personal economics also had a positive attitude towards advertising and vice versa. One belief factor, "consumer manipulation" did not predict AG in any of the five countries. That is, whether the student respondents believed that advertising manipulated them or not had no relationship with their AG.

Both "value corruption" and "good for economy" predicted AG in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. "Product information" and "hedonic/pleasure" predicted AG in two countries each; the former in Nepal and Pakistan, and the latter in Nepal and India. Finally, "materialism" and "consumer information and benefit" predicted AG in one country each, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka respectively.

In Sri Lanka, as in the global South Asian run, "consumer information and benefit" had a negative sign as predictor indicating that Sri Lankan respondents with low belief scores on this factor had more positive AG. For all other independent variables making a significant contribution in all countries, more positive beliefs were related to a more positive attitude to advertising in general

Because no patterns are evident consistently across the nations, it is difficult to generalize. However, two consistent findings need to be noted; the importance of "good for personal economics" as a predictor and the lack of contribution to prediction made by "consumer manipulation." These findings provide a benchmark for further study of South Asia.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was twofold. First, Pollay and Mittal scales for measuring beliefs contributing to AG were replicated and applied in the context of a South Asian population. The study sought to explore the scales' validity in a cross-cultural setting. The results obtained from this portion of the study supported the validity of the scales for application in South Asia. This finding suggests that the beliefs measured by the scales are consistent across the cultures.

Second, belief scales were regressed on AG for all countries to explore their predictive power in a different setting. Additional validity for the application of the Pollay and Mittal model in South Asia is found in the results of the regression analysis wherein for all countries together and individually the belief factors did predict AG.

In terms of the theoretical model which posits beliefs as predictors of AG, this finding provides considerable support. The findings of this global regression run support the Lutz (1985) and the MacKenzie and Lutz (1989) theoretical model that beliefs are the building blocks of AG. More important, this study was conducted in a cultural setting quite different from those in which the model was originally formulated. That the findings are similar lends considerable validity to the underlying theory and to its applicability across cultures.

The contribution of this study lies in expanding the theoretical model to five other countries and thereby finding additional validity for the model. Future studies could study economic and social indicators of development in the five South Asian nations and explore whether the factor structure of beliefs and their ability to predict AG is similar to that in the United States based on each country's development indicator.

Additional understanding of the validity of applying western constructs to non-western cultures and, where necessary, the development of more suitable models is critical to effectively prepare students and the advertising industry to serve the needs of these markets which will be of critical importance in the future.

In the course of these studies, we may also gain additional insight into the impact of introducing western models and standards of advertising to foreign cultures. The potential impact of advertising on cultural values and traditions is a subject of concern for governments and individuals in these societies. Even as we search for more efficient ways to apply advertising techniques in new applications, we also have a responsibility to evaluate the societal consequences of those efforts.

Several aspects of this study must be considered in evaluating the results obtained. A convenience sample of college students was used in this study limiting generalizability on two counts. The use of a convenience sample lacks the property of randomness and so cannot be considered as a representative sample. The use of students also limits generalizability as they do not represent a cross-section of the population. Most researchers have used student samples and justified their use in AG research based on the findings of similar studies which show little difference between student beliefs and AG and those of other cross-sections of the general population (Andrews, 1989; Pollay & Mittal, 1993).

Despite these limitations, this study makes several contributions. First, study of international news is a lot more common than is study of international advertising and consumer behavior. Given the magnitude of the money involved in advertising and advertising's potential to influence values and attitudes, this research gap needs to be addressed. This study makes the contribution. Second, the study addresses theoretical issues and does not limit itself to empirical findings. Its goal was to explore the validity of theory, its constructs, their relationships, and their measurement in a cross cultural setting. Third, its empirical findings provide a benchmark for future studies in South Asia.

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Table 1
Factor Analysis of Beliefs About Advertising

	FACTOR LOADINGS							
Beliefs	**I**	**II**	**III**	**IV**	**V**	**VI**	**VII**	**VIII**
Hedonic/Pleasure								
Amusing/Entertaining			**.67142**					
Sometimes better than show			**.73136**					
Pleasure in recalling			**.65142**					
Product Information								
Valuable for local sales								**.56029**
Find brands with features								**.70059**
Up-to-date...what's available					.42612			**.44549**
Consumer Information/Benefit								
Lowers costs of goods		.30302		**.55646**			.32279	
What similar others buying				**.60193**				
What reflects me				**.65117**				
True picture of goods				**.41451**				
Good for Personal Economics								
Essential							**.58982**	
Raises standard of living							**.61463**	
Better products							**.59918**	
Good for Economy								
Helps nation's economy					**.71070**			
(Not) wasteful of resources	.37444				**.55804**			
Beneficial competition					**.55011**			
Social Consequence								
Promotes undesirable values	**.60324**	.41564						
Distorts values of youths	**.66628**							
Promotes bad things	**.67824**							
Misleading	**.57548**							
Materialism								
Materialistic Society		**.51295**						
Overspend. . . to show off		**.57420**						
Induces living. . . (in) fantasy		**.61060**						
Fashions. . . impress others		**-.55997**		.32111				
Consumer Manipulation								
Should not buy						**.71941**		
Insults intelligence						**.64643**		
Buy things not needed						**.45846**		

Table 2:
Global Regression of South Asian Factors

Multiple R:	.55189
R square:	.30458
Standard Error:	.62363
F value:	**45.65961 (1)**

	df	Sum of Squares	Mean Squares
Regression	8	142.05968	17.75746
Residual	834	324.35056	0.38891

South Asian Factors	b	SE b	Beta	F
Good for personal economy	.251892	.034351	.226498	53.771 (1)
Good for economy	.236146	.032669	.225888	52.251 (1)
Social consequence	.210612	.032007	.215516	43.298 (1)
Product information	.106914	.035835	.091742	8.901 (1)
Hedonic/Pleasure	.175049	.033230	.157063	27.750 (1)
Materialism	.096176	.039910	.077881	5.807 (2)
Consumer information/benefit	-.103761	.032905	-.094692	9.944 (1)
Consumer manipulation	.056942	.028596	.065214	3.965 (2)

Notes: **(1) $p < .01$**
(2) $p < .05$

Table 3:
Regression of Country AG on South Asian Factors

Country	Bangladesh	India	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
Multiple R	.54211	.56665	.62618	.54669	.58725
R Square	.29388	.32110	.39210	.29887	.34486
Factors					
Personal economics	**5.821 (2)**	**13.260 (1)**	**7.045 (1)**	**18.699 (1)**	**8.703 (1)**
Good for economy	**12.636 (1)**	**12.688 (1)**	2.423	**9.207 (1)**	**6.632 (2)**
Social consequence	**6.139 (2)**	**10.806 (1)**	3.632	**25.234 (1)**	3.702
Product information	0.033	00.591	**4.417 (2)**	**5.097 (2)**	1.691
Hedonic/Pleasure	3.474	**13.834 (1)**	**6.420 (2)**	3.166	3.460
Materialism	**7.514 (1)**	00.708	0.563	0.112	0.049
Consumer info./benefit	3.842	00.020	2.000	0.594	**4.095 (2)**
Consumer manipulation	0.091	01.749	0.611	0.131	1.700

Notes: **(1) p < .01**
(2) p < .05

Appendix A:
Belief Factors for South Asian Data

Good for Personal Economy:

Advertising is essential.

Advertising helps raise our standard of living.

Advertising results in better products for the public

Social Consequences:

Advertising promotes undesirable values in our society.

Most advertising distorts the values of our youth.

Some products/services promoted in advertising are bad for our society.

In general, advertising is misleading.

Good For Economy:

In general, advertising helps our nation's economy.

Mostly, advertising is wasteful of our natural resources.

In general, advertising promotes competition which benefits the consumer.

Consumer Information/Benefit:

In general, advertising results in lower prices.

Advertising tells me what people with lifestyles similar to mine are buying and using.

Advertising helps me know which products will or will not reflect the sort of person I am.

In general, advertising provides a true picture of the product advertised.

Product Information:

Advertising is a valuable source of information about local sales.

Advertising tells me which brands have the features I am looking for.

Advertising helps me keep up to date about products/services available in the marketplace.

Consumer Manipulation:

Advertising persuades people to buy things they should not buy.

Most advertising insults the intelligence of the average consumer.

Because of advertising, people buy a lot of things that they do not really need.

Materialism:

Advertising is making us a materialistic society--overly interested in buying and owning things.

Advertising makes people buy unaffordable products just to show off.

Advertising makes people live in a world of fantasy.

From advertising I learn about fashions and about what to buy to impress others.

Hedonic/Pleasure:

Quite often, advertising is amusing and entertaining.

Sometimes advertisements are even more enjoyable than other media contents.

Sometimes I take pleasure in thinking about what I saw or heard or read in advertisements.

Global Scale:

Overall I consider advertising a good thing.

Overall I dislike advertising.

My general opinion of advertising is unfavorable.

The Role of Culture in International Advertising

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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to contribute to the debate on standardized versus specialized approaches to international advertising. This cross-cultural content analysis compared print advertising from the United States and India and examined how cultural values are manifest in advertising. The results found that there were significant differences in the way these two countries produced advertising messages and that different cultural values were reflected in their advertising expressions. This cross-cultural study suggests that caution should be exercised when considering standardization in advertising between divergent cultures.

The Role of Culture in International Advertising

The influence of culture on communication is well documented by researchers in many disciplines. Previous research indicates that advertising, public relations and other forms of promotional communications are influenced by various elements of the originating culture (Frith & Wesson, 1991; Hong, Muderrrisoglu, & Zinkhan, 1987). In the recent years, cross-cultural advertising research has gained great momentum from the debate over standardization vs. specialization of international advertising in different countries around the world. Proponents of standardized advertising recommend that international advertisers view the world as if it were one homogeneous market (Fatt, 1967; Levitt, 1983). They argue that the needs and values of consumers around the world are becoming increasingly alike and therefore, international marketers should utilize standardized advertising approaches to international advertising. It is pointed out that standardized advertising campaigns offer the marketer greater control over content, reduced costs, unified brand image and simplified strategy planning. Critics of standardized advertising contend that differences among cultures hinder advertising uniformity and, therefore, advertising must be adapted to particular cultures (Mueller, 1987; Onkvisit & Shaw, 1987; Tansey, Hyman, and Zinkhan, 1990). The proponents of advertising specialization suggest that advertising that portrays the values of the indigenous culture is more effective than advertising that ignores these values. Some critics argue that international advertisers that practice standardized advertising are, in fact, imposing alien values on the indigenous cultures around the world (Schiller, 1989).

While a number of previous studies have examined this issue, many of them have produced contradictory results. Also, most of the previous studies analyzed advertising of the Western developed nations and focused on the verbal contents of advertisements. There is a need for comparative studies of advertising between the developing countries in the Eastern cultural environment and highly industrialized countries in the West. An equally important need is for a more comprehensive approach in analyzing the contents (both verbal and visual) of advertising.

This cross-cultural content analysis compared advertising from the United States and India and examined both the verbal and visual characteristics in advertising expressions. This study specifically examined how cultural values are manifest in the print advertising of these two countries. A number of previous studies indicated that important cultural values such as individualism, collectivism and cultural contexts are reflected in advertising (e.g., Cutler & Javalgi, 1992; Frith & Wesson, 1991). As noted by Cundiff and Hilger (1984) and Hall (1976), a high-context culture is one in which the context, suggestive or connotative meanings of the message, may be more important than the words themselves, and a low-context culture is one where explicit verbal messages are direct. Social scientists such as Bellah (1987) and Hofstede (1983) have noted that in individualistic cultures, individual interests and goals prevail over collective interest and goals and the emphasis is on the belief that the individual has control of, and is responsible for, his or her own life. How are these cultural values reflected in advertising of the developing countries in the Eastern cultural environment and how do they compare with the advertising in the highly industrialized countries of the West? To compare Western and Eastern cultural values as they are manifested in advertising, this study selected the United States and India for the following reasons. In the West, the United States has been cited to be a highly individualistic and a low-context culture (Bellah, 1987; Rokeach, 1973). It is also noted that the U.S. is the most active in international trade and has the largest and most influential advertising business in the world (Baudot, 1989). Researchers such as Hofstede (1983), Mehra (1989), and Mishra (1997) have noted that in the East, India represents a highly collectivist and a high-context culture. It is also noted that India is the fastest growing developing nation and has become a major center for Western marketers, advertising and public relations agencies operating in Asia.

This study is especially relevant and timely in light of the fact that in the 1990s, the Western and Eastern cultures have come into greater contact due to a significant increase in international trade. This increased contact between the West and the East has created a need for a better understanding of international promotional communication. Cross-cultural analysis of advertising can identify specific differences and similarities in promotional communication strategies, expressions, and manifest cultural values of the target audience and the larger culture. Such findings may be used to address the question of whether the same strategies and expressions can be used in international advertising and public relations, and whether the values, attitudes, desires and tastes of consumers around the world are converging as argued by the proponents of the standardized international advertising (e.g., Frith & Wesson, 1991; Hong, Muderrrisoglu, & Zinkhan, 1987). If specific cross-cultural differences or similarities in advertising expressions and manifest values can be identified, researchers and practitioners will better understand which aspects of promotional communication can be shared across several countries, and conversely, which aspects need to be adapted to local cultures.

Literature Review

The following sections provide definitions of key constructs as well as a discussion of the relevant past studies.

Cultural Contexts and the Use of Speech Acts in Advertising

According to linguistics, language can perform several functions or speech acts (Searle, 1971, 1969; Vestergaard & Schroder, 1985). In the *expressive function* or *expressive speech act*, language focuses on the addresser, his or her feelings, attitudes and wishes. In advertising, an expressive speech act occurs when the advertiser, for example, identifies and praises itself and recommends its product (e.g. "another fine product from Procter & Gamble"), condemns or criticizes its competitors, apologizes for inconvenience caused by faulty parts and the like. In the *directive function* or *directive speech act*, language relates to the addressee and tries to influence the addressee's beliefs, attitudes, emotions and actions. In advertising, a directive speech act is often used to call upon the audience to act (directly or indirectly). For example, the targeted consumers are asked to try the product, get the product, use the product, choose the brand and the like. The *poetic function* or *poetic speech act* takes place when the linguistic code is used in a special way to communicate a certain meaning, double meaning or ambiguity. Some poetic devices used in advertising include verbal metaphor, simile and rhyme. Advertising in diverse cultures may differ in terms of these speech acts. Cultural characteristics (such as low context vs. high context culture) may be reflected in the way different cultures emphasize different rhetorical devices.

As noted by Cundiff and Hilger (1984) and Hall (1976), a high-context culture is one in which the context, suggestive or connotative meanings of the message, may be more important than the words themselves. In a high-context culture, the audience is likely to derive meaning from the context, reducing the need for explicit verbal messages. A low-context culture is one where explicit verbal messages are direct. In order to communicate effectively, messages must be explicitly and directly stated through words containing most of the information to be sent. For example, according to Cateora (1987), France is a comparatively higher context culture than the United States. Cateora noted that Americans are more direct, but the French allow their imagination and intuition to make up for the implied meanings. The distinct differences between communication styles of the British and Americans have also been noted. Burli-Storz (1980) noted that while Americans are characterized by directness in speech, indirectness characterizes interpersonal as well as institutional communication in England, where a considerable emphasis is placed on double meanings, ambiguities and plays on words.

Within the Eastern cultural environment, Japan is known to be a high-context culture. Hong et al., (1987) indicate that the Japanese language is very sensitive and emotive and not very directed toward logical exactness; it places more emphasis on referring to emotional and aesthetic statuses of mind. According to Hong et al., indirectness, subtlety and symbolism are important characteristics of the Japanese culture. In the East, India has been cited to be a high-context culture (Hofstede, 1983: Mehra, 1989; Mishra, 1997). In the Indian culture, the contextual, suggestive or connotative meanings of the message are very important in communication.

Such cultural differences may be reflected in advertising strategies and expressions as suggested by several researchers. For example, compared to U.S. advertising, French and British advertisements were found to contain more emotional appeals and utilize more indirect and poetic rhetorical devices *(poetic speech act),* such as metaphors, similes, double meanings and philosophic and euphemistic expressions (Biswas, Olsen, & Carlet, 1992; Cutler & Javalgi, 1992; Hall & Hall, 1990). According to several other studies, U.S. advertising directly presents information, facts and evidence about product merits and purchase reasons and contains more informational cues than French and British advertising (Biswas et al., 1992; Hong et al., 1987; Weinberger & Spotts, 1989). Frith & Wesson (1991) found that U.S. advertisements were more likely to utilize direct rhetorical devices (such as an imperative) in their headlines than the British advertisements *(directive speech act).* Hong et al. (1987) and Mueller (1987) found that within the Eastern cultural context, Japanese advertising used emotional or "soft-sell" approaches more frequently than rational or "hard-sell" approaches as compared to U.S. advertising.

Individualism vs. Collectivism and the Use of Visual Stances

It is also well documented that cultures vary in terms of degree of individualism and collectivism. Western cultures have been cited to be more

individualistic, while Eastern cultures are believed to be more collectivist (Bellah, 1987; Hofstede, 1983; Hong et al., 1987). Social scientists such a Bellah (1987) and Hofstede (1983) have noted that in individualistic cultures, individual interests and goals prevail over collective interest and goals; ties between individuals are loose; and the emphasis is on the belief that the individual has control of, and is responsible for, his or her own life.
The cultural value of individualism and collectivism may be manifest in the image of characters in advertisements. As indicated by Alden et al.'s (1993) study, advertising in the highly collectivist cultures of Thailand and South Korea tends to portray characters in a "group stance" (more than two individuals featured), compared to an "individualistic stance" (one or two individuals featured) portrayed in advertising of highly individualistic cultures of Germany and the United States. Even within Western countries, the varying degrees of individualism may be manifest in differential images of characters. Frith and Wesson's (1991) study indicated that while individualism exists in England, it is not as highly developed a national "ethos" as it is in the United States, and this is reflected in British advertising which more frequently features people in a group stance.

The literature review indicates that cultural differences are reflected in advertising strategies and expressions of different countries. Cross-cultural differences in advertising strategies and expressions were found between Western and Eastern cultures, and even between Western countries that are believed to be not very different in terms of cultural traits and level of economic development. The literature review found very limited research on Indian advertising. Although several books and journal articles have dealt with the Indian media, the specific subject matters were not directly related to this present study. For example, Chakravarty (1993) examined the representation of national identity in Indian films. Unnikrishnan (1995) studied the impact of television advertising on children in India. Rao (1996) discussed the social effects of the mass media in India. Several studies focused on the portrayals of women on television, film and print advertising in India (e.g., Griffin, Viswanath, & Schwartz, 1994; Krishnan & Dighe, 1990; Rao, 1989). Since these studies did not examine how the cultural values of individualism vs. collectivism and low context vs. high context communication forms were manifest in advertising, they were not relevant to this present study and therefore were not reviewed in details. However, other researchers (e.g., Hofstede, 1983: Mehra, 1989; Mishra, 1997) have indicated that in terms of cultural traits, India can be classified as a highly collectivist and a high-context culture. In the research literature, the United States has been cited to be a highly individualistic and a low context culture (Bellah, 1987; Hofstede, 1983; Hong et al., 1987).

Based on the foregoing conceptual discussion of the relevant research literature, it is hypothesized that the cultural values of individualism vs. collectivism and low context vs. high context are likely to be reflected in advertising of the United States and India in the following ways:

Since the United States is cited as a low context culture in which explicit verbal messages are direct and the context, suggestive or connotative meanings of the message, are less important than the words themselves, it is hypothesized that:

H1: American advertisements will use expressive speech acts (direct rhetorical device) more frequently than the Indian ads.

H2: American advertisements will use directive speech acts (direct rhetorical device) more frequently than the Indian ads.

Since India is cited as a high context culture in which the context, suggestive or connotative meanings of the message may be more important than the words themselves and where the audience is likely to derive meaning from the context, reducing the need for explicit verbal messages, it is hypothesized that:

H3: Indian advertisements will contain poetic speech acts (e.g. rhyme, metaphor, simile, double meaning, philosophic or euphemistic expressions) more frequently than the U.S. ads.

As India is considered to be more collectivist than the U.S., and conversely as the U.S. is cited to be more individualist, it is hypothesized that:

H4: Indian advertisements will contain collectivist visual stances (three or more individuals featured in a group context) more frequently than the U.S. ads.

Method

A content analysis method was utilized to analyze and compare the verbal and visual contents of a sample of U.S. and Indian national advertising campaigns for consumer products carried out in the print media.

Sampling and Data Collection

The population for this study was advertisements in nationally circulated news magazines and specialized business magazines of the United States and India, between January 1993 and December 1994. A random sample of advertisements were selected from nationally circulated news magazines and business magazines of each country. *India Today* and *Business India* were selected from India (English language national magazines in India). The publications selected lean toward the upscale audiences because previous researchers have indicated that the greatest homogeneity exists among upscale and urbanized audiences of many nations (Frith & Wesson, 1991). Therefore, if significant differences are found in the advertising expressions geared toward those comparable audiences of the two cultures, then these results may contribute to the standardization and specialization debate by suggesting that the world may not be viewed as one homogeneous market as argued by the proponents of standardization of international advertising (e.g., Fatt, 1967; Levitt, 1983).

In the United States, *Time* and *Business Week* were selected for comparison with the Indian magazine advertising. In order to maintain comparability, the magazines were matched by format, audience demographics and circulation. One issue per month was selected randomly from each magazine of each country between the years 1993 and 1994. Only full-page (single-page) advertisements were considered for this study because of their dominant use in magazines and also because this procedure controls for advertisement size. This is also a well-established standard procedure for the analysis of magazine advertising (e.g., Biswas et al., 1992; Harmon, Razzouk, & Stern, 1983). A total of 150 ads were randomly selected from the two magazines of each country resulting in a total of 300 ads from the two countries. Previous research indicates that for a content analysis of one or two types of magazines, such sample size is adequate (e.g., Gilly, 1988; Frith &

Wesson, 1991; Graham, Kamins, & Oetomo, 1993; Mueller, 1987).

Unit of Analysis and Category System

The unit of analysis was full-page display advertisement. Based on Vestergaard and Schroder's (1985) linguistic classification of speech acts in advertising, three categories of speech acts were operationally defined as follows:

Poetic speech act. Does the advertisement utilize poetic devices or indirect rhetorical devices such as rhyme, metaphor, simile, double meaning, philosophic or euphemistic expressions?

Expressive speech act. Does the advertisement talk about the company? For example, does the ad identify and praise the company and recommend its product (e.g. "another fine product from Proctor & Gamble")? Does the ad condemn or criticize its competitors? Does it apologize for inconvenience caused by a faulty part or other problems?

Directive speech act. Are the potential consumers directly asked to do something or think about something (for example, "try X"; "get X"; "use X"; "ask/call for details"; "give her an X"; "introduce your family to X"; "look for X at your department store"; "contact your dealer"; "come to our showroom")?

The variable "visual stance of human characters" was operationally defined using Alden et al.'s (1993) category scheme.

Individualistic stance. Does the advertisement feature just one or two individuals?

Collective stance. Does the advertisement feature three or more people in a group context?

Coding Procedures and Reliability Tests

Two coders were employed to evaluate the sample of ads. The two coders were trained and familiarized with the precise definitions of categories and coding instruments. Detailed instruction sheets were made available that clearly explained categorization and quantification systems and provided examples for coding. Intercoder reliability was tested using the Holsti's reliability formula (Holsti, 1969). The reliability test results were within the acceptable levels (reliability coefficients ranging from .92 for speech acts to .95 for visual stances).

Results

All four hypotheses were supported by the data. The data analysis revealed that cultural values were reflected in the use of differential rhetorical styles and visual stances in advertising.

Low Context vs. High Context Culture

Hypothesis 1 and 2 - expressive and directive speech acts. The author hypothesized that the American advertisements would use expressive and directive speech acts more frequently (direct rhetorical devices) than would the Indian ads. Both hypotheses were supported by the data as shown in Table 1.

Hypothesis 3 - poetic speech acts. The author hypothesized that the Indian advertisements would use poetic speech acts more frequently than would the American ads. The data provide support for this hypothesis as well as shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Use of Speech Acts

Speech act	U.S. ad	Indian ad	X^2
Expressive	98 (65%, n=150)	68 (45%, n=150)	$X^2=12.13$; d.f.=1; $p<.001$
Directive	91 (61%, n=150)	71 (47%, n=150)	$X^2=5.36$; d.f.=1; $p<.05$
Poetic	14 (9%, n=150)	49 (33%, n=150)	$X^2=24.61$; d.f.=1; $p<.001$

Note. Percentage total does not add up to 100% because there were opportunities for multiple speech acts within each ad.

Individualism vs. Collectivism

Hypothesis 4 - individualist and collectivist visual stances. The author hypothesized that the Indian advertisements would contain collectivist visual stances more frequently (three or more individuals featured) than would the U.S. ads. The data supported this hypothesis as shown in Table 2.

An analysis of each variable by type of magazine within each individual country did not show significant differences for any variable, and therefore, no comparisons were made between countries by type of magazine.

Table 2

Visual Stance of Human Characters

Visual stance	U.S. ad	Indian ad
Individualist stance	117 (86%, n=136)	68 (53%, n=128)
Collectivist stance	19 (14%, n=136)	60 (47%, n=128)

Note. Chi-square=34.04; d.f.=1; p<.001

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to contribute to the debate on standardized versus specialized approaches to international advertising. This study generated new insights and also filled a gap in the research literature. Since most of the previous studies focused on the advertising of the western developed countries, this study attempted to fill a need for comparative studies of advertising between the developing countries in the Eastern cultural environment and highly industrialized countries in the West. Also, since most of the past studies concentrated on the verbal contents of advertising, this study wished to fill a need for a more comprehensive approach in analyzing the contents (both verbal and visual) of advertising. This present cross-cultural content analysis compared advertising from the United States and India and examined both the verbal and visual characteristics in advertising expressions. This study specifically examined how cultural values are manifest in print advertising of these two countries.

The results found that there were significant differences in the way the United States and India produced advertising messages and that different cultural values were reflected in their advertising expressions. The findings revealed that the U.S. advertisements utilized direct rhetorical styles and individualistic visual stances more often than their Indian counterparts. The Indian ads utilized indirect rhetorical styles and collective visual stances more frequently than did the U.S. ads.

The evidence of specific cross-cultural differences suggests that perhaps the proponents of "standardization of international advertising" have promoted an oversimplification. This cross-cultural study suggests that caution should be exercised when considering standardization in advertising and other forms of promotional communication between divergent cultures.

The findings of this study are especially relevant and timely in light of the fact that in the 1990s, the Western and Eastern cultures have come into greater contact due to a significant increase in international trade. This increased contact between the West and the East has created a need for a better understanding of international promotional communication. From a pragmatic standpoint, the findings of this study provide useful insights into the nature of advertising in India and the United States in the 1990s. The results show what elements and aspects of advertising are different between the two cultures. Such cross-cultural understanding is imperative in order to be able to formulate effective localized advertising or public relations messages that would appeal to or reflect the cultural values and norms of its intended audience.

Although this study contributes to the debate on standardized vs. specialized approaches to international advertising, the author recognizes its limitations. This study focused on only two magazine categories and two cultural variables. There is certainly a need to widen the research ground covered in this study. Future studies may focus on promotional communications in other types of publications and the electronic media and across different product categories. In addition to the dimensions examined in this study, there are other variables that should be investigated (e.g., appeal methods). Future researchers may also explore other developing and newly industrialized countries and examine the manifestation of other cultural values (such as egalitarianism vs. class consciousness, tradition vs. modernity, respect for elderly, respect for authority, nurturance, etc.) in advertising. Additional research would be of great value to the international advertising and public relations practitioners who are searching for guidelines for the development of effective promotional communication for the international audience.

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Reporting under Civilian and Military Rulers in Africa: Journalists' Perceptions of Press Freedom and Media Exposure in Cameroon and Nigeria

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Abstract

This study is a comparative analysis of journalists' perceptions of press freedom in Cameroon and Nigeria. The former has a democratically elected government while the latter has a military oligarchy. The conventional wisdom or hypothesis that a democratically elected government may tolerate press freedom while a military regime will censor the press was not fully supported by the empirical evidence in this study. Cameroonian journalists in this study do not believe that the press is free. As expected, Nigerian journalists confirmed the hypothesis that the press under a military regime cannot be free.

Reporting under Civilian and Military Rulers in Africa: Journalists' Perceptions of Press Freedom and Media Exposure in Cameroon and Nigeria

Introduction

This study is a comparative analysis of journalists' perceptions of press freedom in two countries, Cameroon and Nigeria. The former has a democratically elected government while the latter has a military oligarchy. The study is based on the survey of journalists in Cameroon and Nigeria, two neighboring countries with distinctively different but comparative colonial and post-colonial histories and media developments. Although conventional wisdom dictates that a democratically elected government may tolerate press freedom while a military regime will censor the press, there is no empirical research on this assumption in and outside Africa. Subsequently, the conventional wisdom is untested, right or wrong.

The objective of this study is to test the hypothesis that the mass media in democratically elected African countries may be freer than those in rogue states controlled by military dictators without political legitimacy. The study is significant because (1) it is a seminal examination of African journalists under civilian administration and military rule, (2) it is a comparative analysis of press freedom under different administrative types, (3) it is a comparative study of the media exposure of journalists in Anglophone and Francophone Africa, and (4) it will contribute to the literature on press freedom and democratization.

Press Freedom and Political Systems

Press freedom is a fundamental right of the people to transmit and receive information in a free marketplace of ideas. Eribo, in his study of internal and external factors affecting press freedom in Nigeria, pointed out that the "concept of press freedom abhors government control, censorship, interference, and undemocratic regulations aimed at abridging the freedom of opinion, expression, and transmission of information or ideas through the mass media and other channels of communication." He noted that press freedom does not exist in a vacuum because it is the cumulative result of a number of societal, economic, and political values (Eribo, 1997). The prevailing degree of democratism and level of development may determine the degree of press freedom in a country whether in Africa or elsewhere.

The opinion and characteristics of journalists, government policies, media ownership and other factors are relevant to our understanding of press freedom in a country. Edeani reported in 1993 that the factors contributing to the nurturing of journalists' "professional orientations and degrees of commitment can vary greatly, but education, professional training, personality characteristics, media ownership patterns; and the prevailing economic, political, and socio-cultural contexts are likely to predominate" in the study of journalists (Edeani, 1993, p. 134). Pratt noted in 1990 that it is "possible that journalists' characteristics (e.g., their professionalism) and governments' media policies (e.g., "coopting" influential journalists into the government as a systematic way of softening the press's criticism of government) are salient variables in Nigeria's media behavior" (Pratt, 1990, pp. 17-40). In Cameroon, Kale noted that journalistic "restraint for the sake of social tranquillity is a doctrine that has found adherents besides government policy-maker" because Cameroonian journalists also justify the limitations placed on the press (Kale, 1997, pp. 279-280).

Outside Africa, American journalism is largely hedged on the First Amendment of the Constitution -- "Congress Shall make no law abridging freedom ...of the press." Although freedom of the press in the Unites States of America is not absolute, the media enjoy a sophisticated and healthy economic independence and enviable constitutional protection. Journalists, "as social reformers, are likely to be more left than right on the political scale" (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1991, pp. 25, 88 and 105). To carry out the "watch-dog" role of the press, it is incumbent on journalists to investigate government and business activities in a democratic and accountable political system. In a survey designed to examine the characteristics of journalists who live and work in Hawaii, Henningham (1993) found this to be true -- a greater percentage (66 percent to 72 percent) of the respondents considered it extremely important to investigate government claims, to provide analysis of complex problems (49 percent to 63 percent), and to serve as an adversary of both government and business (Henningham, 1993, p. 554). Weaver and Wilhoit found that American journalists "leaned toward altruism, at least in ranking economic rewards as less important than public service." And as Stamm noted in 1993 that "journalists are happier when they are about the business of journalism - rather than the business of business" (Stamm , 1993, pp. 528-541).

The right to communicate freely without fear, coercion and reprisal is a natural right of the people and the press. This right is violated in many countries trapped in the vicious circle of a gagged press and underdevelopment. The potentials of a free press and society are often stifled by censorship imposed by elected and unelected dictators manning the ship of state in Africa and other continents. The magnitude of the adverse effects of censorship on the development of nations is largely not addressed by communication scholars. However, several professional and non-profit organizations committed to the protection of journalists and press freedom are engaged in the global monitoring of press freedom or the lack of it.

The efforts to protect journalists do not necessarily translate to better conditions and exposure for reporters and editors. Although it is debatable, media exposure and press freedom may be related "to the level of a country's development," the political and cultural structures, the education and training of journalists and other factors (Eribo, 1997, and Marron, 1995). Logically, the socio-economic and political super-structure cannot be disregarded in most discourse of press freedom, media exposure, and mass communication in general.

Journalists' Media Exposure

The exposure of journalists to the local press and international media is significant to their participation in the agenda set by the media. This variable which is very often measured in the examination of media effects on audiences is seldom limited to journalists as the primary audience. Media exposure by journalists are mostly likely influenced by the journalists' level of education, the quality of the media organization, the availability of new technologies and the level of national development which invariably affects the volume of news flow.

In their 1987 study of social information processing model of media use in organizations, Fulk et al. pointed out that media-use patterns are the outcomes of objective and rational choices involving the evaluation of communication options and selection of an appropriate medium to match the communication requirement of the task. Fulk et al. argued that the attitudes and behaviors of media users are "partially determined by information embedded in the social context" (Fulk et al., 1987.) Fulk et al.'s findings on how social influence processes affect individuals' attitude toward communication media and media use behavior may be relevant to the senders and receivers of mass media messages. Similarly, Gantz, Fitzmaurice and Fink's study of the active component of information-seeking found that information-seeking occurred primarily within the confines of the media that people normally use as they watch the local, national and global environment (Gantz, Fitzmaurice and Fink, 1991.) Arguably, the characteristics and attitudes of media users may be socially constructed.

In Nigeria, the people and the press have shared the burden of military regimes and dozens of censorship decrees for more than a quarter of a century (Agbaje, 1992.) The protracted reign of the military and the abortion of democracy may have significant impact on the social forces driving not only the use of the mass media but also the effects and practice of journalism in Nigeria. The sheer number of media users in the country calls for a closer examination of the agenda setters or the senders of media messages.

Tanjong's study of international media use and effects in 1986 is relevant to this study since his findings may serve as a basis for comparison between the media use by receivers and the media use by senders of media messages. For example, Tanjong found that urban Nigerians use the radio more than television and newspapers and that the majority of the survey respondents listened to BBC followed by the Voice of America and Radio Moscow. Tanjong based his analysis on secondary data collected nationally under the auspices of the United States Information Agency (USIA); it did not address the media use by journalists (Tanjong, 1986.) Since journalists are a part of the society, the information-seeking characteristics of the respondents in this study may be analogous to the findings by Tanjong.

Weaver and Wilhoit (1991) addressed the issue of media use by journalists in the United States in their study of American journalists. The authors corroborated an earlier finding by the Burgoons and Atkin that "information suppliers are information addicts" and that U.S. journalists rely primarily on few East Coast newspapers and magazines for national and international news (Burgoon, Burgoon and Atkin, 1982; Weaver and Wilhoit, 1991.) The differences in the political and economic development between the United States and the two African countries examined in this study should be taken into consideration in the interpretations of this analysis.

Press Constraints in Cameroon and Nigeria

The media in Cameroon and Nigeria are the products of the colonial legacies of the British in the case of Nigeria and the British, French and Germans in the case of Cameroon. In Cameroon, British, French and German legacies are evident because of the historical connections to the three colonial powers. In fact, Cameroon, with about 14 million people, is one of the unique African countries colonized by three European powers. Cameroon is bilingual. In addition to the local languages, French and English are the major foreign languages inherited from the colonialists. The mass communication system is in the major Cameroonian languages in addition to English and French with the concomitant economic and cultural demands of the linguistic diversity. Although Cameroon and Nigeria have historical and cultural connections, both countries have had border clashes over the mineral-rich Bakassi region in recent years.

The first newspaper in Cameroon, *Das Evangelische Monablass*, was published in 1903 as a religious newsletter aimed at converting Cameroonians to Christianity. Other early newspapers such as *The Cameroon Chronicle* and *Nieb be Krissten*, were missionary newspapers established by the British and French missionaries respectively. The media in Cameroon are polarized by the differences between Anglophone and Francophone media, ethnic differences, and geographic location. Furthermore, the post-colonial media are at the mercy of the indigenous political leaders. For example, between 1991 and 1993, the government of Cameroon seized 146 issues of 16 different newspapers in the country.

In Nigeria (with about 115 million people), the French and German influence does not exist but the British colonial influence persists while English is the dominant language of nationwide mass communication. The first Nigerian newspaper, *Iwe Ironhin*, established in 1859 was, like the Cameroonian papers, a religious paper. The media in Nigeria and Cameroon can be contrasted in several ways beyond the colonial legacies. For example, the post-colonial media in Cameroon have never operated under a national military dictatorship since the country became independent in January 1960. However, there is overt and covert censorship in various forms. On the other hand, the media in Nigeria have been less fortunate because of the catalogue of military regimes and political instability in post-colonial Nigeria. In Nigeria, arrests, imprisonment and killings of journalists and writers are the dominant features of recent reports on this oil rich nation caught in a paradoxical economic decline under a chain of kleptocractic and dictatorial military regimes in the last three decades. Subsequently, the repression of Nigerian journalists has become a traditional rite of passage among the military rulers who do not want their ill gotten wealth exposed.

Stevenson's study of global communication articulated the travails of the journalists under the military as follows: "Nigerian journalists face a daily struggle beyond the imagination of most Western journalists. Not the least of their problems is the government, which is a military regime" (Stevenson, 1994, p. 249). However, Nigerian journalists appear to be undaunted by the deliberate repressive measures such as the closure of private and sometimes government news media and the promulgation of censorship decrees by the regimes in order to silence the press and suppress criticisms of the military rulers. Agbaje's essay on civil society and the Nigerian press under military rule pointed out "the traditional bellicosity of the Nigerian press" right from its inception, noting that it "has always been one with a cause - committed, agitational and, often, political" (Agbaje, 1993). Despite all efforts by the military rulers to silence the press in Nigeria, the regime has been confronted with a new challenge since 1996 -- the broadcast of uncensored news, interviews and commentaries by an intractable, invisible, and invincible underground radio station run by pro-democracy journalists and anti-military groups in and outside Nigeria. One may argue that the cumulative results of the various political, economic, and cultural constraints in a given country would have an impact on what journalists think of the prevailing working conditions or media ecology in Africa.

Dearth of Literature

The dearth of literature on African journalists and, in deed, other journalists from The Netherlands to New Zealand and from Canada to Chile has been acknowledged in recent studies calling for more analyses of socio-political, economic, and professional characteristics of journalists. However, the limited study of journalists appears to be a worldwide phenomenon (Starck, 1990, p. 89). Pollard noted in 1995 that "the least studied aspect of the social communication process is the communicator, the who in the classic Lasswellian (1960) paradigm" (Pollard, 1995). In his study of Nigerian journalists, Eribo (1996) pointed out that the dearth of literature on the use of the media by Nigerian journalists and the heightened censorship of the press in the country are significant catalysts for the study of media exposure of journalists. He noted that empirical studies of journalists in Nigeria were particularly rare since the economic and political crises of the 1980s and 1990s and their impacts on research and development (Eribo, 1996).

In Cameroon, mass communication research is largely at its infancy. Perhaps this point is better illustrated by the fact that the streets in Cameroon do not have street signs and the houses are have no numbers. Subsequently, a visitor to Yaounde or Douala who is not met by a host at the port of arrival may be advised to report at the local radio station where his or her arrival may be broadcast so that the host could report at the radio station to pick up the visitor. It is, therefore, a Herculean task to conduct meaningful surveys and communication research under the prevailing conditions. Local university students trained by American educated professors in communication research methods are now beginning to walk the streets and media houses administering survey questions.

In Cameroon and Nigeria, the qualitative studies of the press outnumber empirical examinations of the journalists. The studies carried out during post-colonial rule, that is, from the 1960s to 1980s, focused largely on the epistemological analysis of the institutional characteristics of the media, their historical role in the struggle for independence, and their developmental patterns since the attainment of independence. These studies characterized Cameroonian and Nigerian journalists and their media as resilient in the hostile environment of 20th century journalism in Africa (Omu, 1978; Oyediran, 1979, Ugboajah, 1985, Eribo, 1997, and Tanjong, 1997). Such characterizations without empirical examinations may be inadequate in a holistic understanding of Cameroonian and Nigerian journalists and the mass media in the different post-colonial administrative types in the two countries.

It should be pointed out that earlier studies were conducted at a time when African countries were deluged with hopes of economic prosperity and an unbridled developmental aspiration based on foreign patronage and the Eurocentric dominant paradigm. Additionally, the literature on African communication within the continent and the rest of the world was inevitably tagged to the socio-economic and political machinery. Thus, the failure of the dominant paradigm and the concomitant economic crisis since the 1980s precipitated the decline of research and development as well as the literature on African media. The subsequent impact of the economic problems on the institutions of higher education, research centers, mass media and society has, in a peculiar way, exacerbated the problems facing communication scholars and research in Africa in general. The journalists, in their watchdog role, have also been under tremendous economic hardship. The economy is so bad that most of the people, including the journalists and intellectuals, are preoccupied with the daily search for economic survival in virtually all the African countries with either democratic or dictatorial governments.

Method

The data for this study were collected in Cameroon and Nigeria. The Nigerian survey was conducted first and the same questions were used later in the survey conducted in Cameroon. The Nigerian data were collected from a drop-off questionnaire in December 1994 and January 1995 while the Cameroonian data were collected in March and April

1997. The questionnaires were distributed among working journalists in both countries. The sampling methods in Cameroon and Nigeria were adapted to suit the cultural peculiarities and levels of development in both countries. For example, the questionnaires were administered in French and English among the Francophone and Anglophone journalists in Cameroon while the English version only was used in Nigeria. The Nigerian sample was drawn from a register of 217 journalists in the Edo State branch of the Nigerian Union of Journalists representing various national and regional media (newspapers, radio, television, and news agencies) in Benin City. The city is a media-rich town and the mix of journalists in the city is diverse. Benin City is home to two television stations: Edo Broadcasting Service Television and the National Television Authority, an independent satellite-cable television company; a radio station; and one national newspaper, *The Observer*. In addition to the number of journalists hired by the local newspaper, radio and television stations, and the state department of information, there is a high presence of correspondents from more than 20 national and regional newspapers and magazines as well as the News Agency of Nigeria. The mix of journalists in Benin City is common in major Nigerian cities such as Abuja, Lagos, Ibadan, Ilorin, Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Enugu and Port Harcourt. In Cameroon, some of the comparative cities in terms of media mix are Yaounde, Douala and Buea.

The Cameroonian sample was drawn from a probability random sample from a list of journalists in all media organizations supplied by the Association of Cameroon Journalists. Five hundred questionnaires were distributed nationwide. The response rate of the survey in Cameroon was 70 percent. However, 200 of the 350 completed questionnaires were usable, thereby deflating the rate of actual response used in the analysis of the Cameroonian survey to 40 percent. According to the second author, this response rate is "unexpectedly high" and, in deed, surprising for Cameroon because of the apprehension toward surveys of local journalists. In fact, most of the journalists refused outright to participate in the survey. Although no reasons were given for the refusal, it is likely that the journalists were concerned about unspecified reprisal for expressing their views.

The sampling method for the survey was also affected by the level of the infrastructure in Cameroon and Nigeria. The inadequacies of postal, fax, and telephone facilities made a simple random sampling practically impossible in both countries. For example, Benin City has no telephone directory and at the time of the survey, the local subscribers had paid for a telephone directory which the phone company did not publish or circulate. Subsequently, the authors used a purposive categorical sample by randomly distributing questionnaires to 125 out of the 217 journalists registered. Ninety questionnaires were completed, for a response rate of 72 percent in Nigeria. Bainbridge notes that a categorical sample "combines the best features of quota sampling and simple random sampling" (Bainbridge, 1992, p. 223). Additionally, Stempel and Westley pointed out that a variety of techniques may be used in survey research but, like Bainbridge, did not address the difficulties of survey research in Third World countries (Stempel and Westley, 1989, pp. 150-172).

It should be noted that survey research is not risk free for communication scholars in Africa. The possibility of an arrest and imprisonment or execution of a researcher or writer are high, particularly in Nigeria under the military dictators. For example, the late Dele Giwa, publisher and editor in chief of *Newswatch* magazine, was murdered by a parcel bomb delivered to him in his residence in 1986 and a leading Nigerian playwright, Ken Saro Wiwa, was hanged in November 1995 for trumped-up charges by the military government headed by General Sani Abacha. Some questions in the survey were modified in Nigeria and Cameroon in recognition of the political sensitivity and potential danger to everyone involved in the study.

On a Likert scale of one to five, the respondents in Cameroon and Nigeria were asked to relate to statements or answer questions in the questionnaire (See Tables for a list of some statements in the survey). In reporting some of the findings, the authors collapsed the categories of strongly agree and agree on the one hand and strongly disagree and disagree on the other. The results of the survey were tested statistically for significance.

Results

(a) Sample

The demographic data from the survey are relevant to our understanding of the composition of the respondents. In the Cameroonian sample, 74 percent of the respondents are male while 26 percent are female. Sixty-eight percent of the respondents in the Nigerian sample are male while female represented 32 percent of the sample. Although the number of men is more than twice that of women in both samples, it is significant to point out that in a traditional African setting, journalism is still largely dominated by men. In a crosstab of male and female responses, this study found no statistical significance, indicating that the chances of finding similar responses among the male and female respondents are high and that gender may not play a role in the majority of the responses in this survey (Cramer V = .851, Contingency coefficient = .851). One of the findings in the demographics of the journalists in this survey is that no respondent in the Nigerian sample was divorced or widowed while only two percent of the respondents in the Cameroonian sample were divorced or widowed. These findings are indicative of the stability of family life in many African countries. In the Nigerian sample, 65 percent of the respondents are married and the remaining 35 percent are unmarried while the Cameroonian sample revealed that 62 of the respondents are unmarried and 36 percent are married.

The Nigerian sample revealed that 43 percent of the respondents have university education, while 51 percent have associate degree or post secondary education and only seven percent have secondary education or the equivalent of High School education in the United States. In the Cameroonian sample, 87 percent have university education, 10 percent have post-secondary education and only three percent have secondary education. It should be noted that the percentage of university trained journalists in the Cameroonian sample is much higher than that of Nigerian journalists in this study. The educational attainment of the respondents in both countries is impressive and, in deed, significant to the evaluation of the findings of this study. Marron's (1995) findings cited elsewhere in this paper that journalistic professionalism can be related to the education and training of journalists is a case in point.

In the samples from the two countries, the majority of the respondents was between 20 and 39 years old. In the Nigerian sample, thirty-nine percent of the respondents were between 20 to 29 years old while 44 percent were between 30 and 39 years old. Sixteen percent of the respondents were between 40 and 49 years old and one percent were older than 50 years. In the Cameroonian sample, one percent were between 15 and 19 years of age, 45 percent of the respondents were between 20 to 29 years old while 35 percent were between 30 and 39 years old. Seventeen percent of the respondents were between 40 and 49 years old and one percent were older than 50 years.

The results of the survey in Nigeria are more likely to represent the views of journalists in the Christian South than those in the Moslem north of Nigeria. Nigerian media and journalists are concentrated in the Christian South. In our sample, Christians accounted for 74 percent of the respondents while Moslems accounted for 18 percent and believers in African traditional religion made up seven percent of the respondents. In the Cameroonian survey, 89 percent of the respondents are Christians while only two percent are Moslems. The remaining nine percent are either believers in African traditional religion, atheists or others.

(b) Journalists' perceptions of press freedom

When asked to respond to the statement that "the media, both government and privately owned, are free in Cameroon," only 18 percent of the respondents in Cameroon agreed that the media are free while 56 percent disagreed and 25 percent were not sure. The respondents in Nigeria did not believe that "The media, both government and privately owned, are free in Nigeria." Sixty-six percent of the respondents agreed that the media, irrespective of the ownership, are not free in Nigeria. Only nine percent of the respondents agreed with the statement while twenty-five percent were not sure if the media are free or not. Clearly, the conventional wisdom about tolerance of press freedom by civilian administration and suppression of press freedom by military dictators needs some modification since the majority of the journalists in the Cameroonian sample do not agree that there is a free press in the country. The response from the Nigerian survey seem to support the convention thinking that the press cannot be free under a military dictatorship (See Table 1).

In response to the statement "I do not think this country is free enough today for me to answer comfortably some of the questions in this survey," the majority of the respondents in Cameroon (56 percent) did not indicate discomfort in participating in the survey. Thirty percent agreed with the statement that the country is not free enough for them to participate comfortably in the survey while 14 percent were not sure. Similarly, the majority of the journalists in the Nigerian study (51 percent) did not indicate discomfort in participating in this survey in spite of previous arrests and imprisonment of journalists by the past and present military regimes. But 42 percent agreed with the statement that the country is not free enough for them to participate comfortably in the survey and seven percent were not sure (See Table 1). The percentage of respondents (30 percent in Cameroon and 42% in Nigeria) who were uncomfortable completing a survey questionnaire was higher than expected for any country that is not at war or totalitarian in ideology. This survey results may be attributed to the chilling effects of arrests, detentions and killings of journalists, writers and publishers by the military regime in Nigeria and the seizure of newspapers in Cameroon. If 30 percent of Cameroonian journalists and 42 percent of Nigerian journalists in this survey were not comfortable with completing a confidential questionnaire, the number of journalists and editors afraid to criticize the governments publicly may be astronomical. The probability of self-censorship in the given scenario may be equally high. The result is the erosion of press freedom by forces within and outside the media.

In the Cameroonian sample, 52 percent of the respondents believed that "privately owned media were freer than government owned media" while 32 percent did not agree with the statement and 16 percent were not sure. In Nigeria, 44 percent of the respondents believed that "privately owned media were freer than government owned media" while 29 percent did not agree with the statement and 27 percent were not sure. The majority of the respondents in both countries appear to have confidence in the ability of private media to exhibit more independence (See Table 1).

In Cameroon, 93 percent of the respondents prefer the continuation of a democratic system of government in order to guarantee press freedom, four percent disagreed with the statement and three percent were not sure. In Nigeria, 99 percent of the respondents indicated that Nigeria should pursue a democratic type of government and one percent disagreed (See Table 1). The overwhelming support for democracy by Cameroonian and Nigerian journalists was not surprising, given their levels of education and the daily experience in the press. The support for democratic rule was a strong signal that the survey respondents do not want a military dictatorship. But military dictators don't read survey results or govern by public opinion polls. Given that none of the Nigerian military heads of state and commanders in chief of the armed forces from 1966 to 1996 had university education, their propensity to ignore internationally acceptable norms is high in deed.

Table 1 About Here

In response to statements used in the Nigerian questionnaire only because the country is controlled by the military, fifty-five percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that "government owned media in Nigeria are freer under civilian government than under military government." Twenty-five percent disagreed with the statement while 20 percent were not sure. When asked to respond to the statement that "the media in Nigeria are not free under civilian government," 21 percent of the respondents agreed while 65 percent disagreed and 14 percent were not sure. This indicates that not all journalists think that the media were free under civilian government. It should be noted that only 21 percent of the respondents agreed that the media in Nigeria were not free under civilian government, whereas by contrast, the overwhelming majority (88 percent) thought that the media were not free under military regimes, three percent disagreed and nine percent were not sure. Interestingly, 97 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that "freedom of the press should be entrenched in the Nigerian constitution." Two percent disagreed and one percent were not sure. In a specific statement relevant to Cameroon, the majority of the respondents (45 percent) stated that the constitution promotes press freedom, 24 percent noted that the constitution does not promote press freedom and 31 percent were unsure.

(c) Journalists' media exposure

The findings on the regularity of media use or exposure by the respondents indicate that Weaver and Wilhoit's statement that "information suppliers are information addicts" may not be limited to American journalists. Ninety-two percent of the respondents in

Nigeria read newspapers everyday and the remaining eight percent read newspapers a few times a week. But in Cameroon, 47 percent of the respondents read newspapers everyday, 37 percent read newspapers a few times a week , and the remaining 16 percent read newspapers a few times a month (See Table 2). This low frequency in newspaper readership in Cameroon is difficult to explain but it is related to the frequency of newspaper editions -- not all newspapers are published daily in this country.

Interestingly, this study revealed the all powerful role of the radio in Cameroon and Nigeria. In Cameroon, 80 percent use radio daily, 14 percent use radio a few times a week and six percent use radio a few times a month. A whopping 98 percent of the Nigerian journalists in the survey use radio as a part of their daily information sources. Only one percent of the respondents use radio a few times a week and another one percent a few times a month. (See Table 2). It is significant to note that more respondents use radio than newspapers and television on a daily basis in Cameroon and Nigeria. This finding corroborates Tanjong's report in 1986 about the dominant use of radio by the urban population in Nigeria. Subsequently, one may conclude that both the senders and receivers of media messages are heavy users of radio for news and information.

The respondents in both countries are less exposed to television (which is in the third place) than radio and newspapers. Forty percent of the respondents in Cameroon watch television daily, 43 percent watch television a few times a week and 18 percent watch television a few times a month. Ninety-one percent of the respondents in Nigeria watch television daily, four percent watch television a few times a week and another four percent watch television a few times a month. Television is very popular in the major cities with electricity in Cameroon and Nigeria. What militates against television viewing in Africa is the incessant failure of electrical power supply and, of course, the absence of electricity in much of the rural areas.

The reading of magazines is in the last place in the daily menu of media use and exposure. The exposure of respondents to magazines may actually be higher than it seems at first glance. For example, 49 percent of the respondents in Nigeria read a magazine daily, another 42 percent read a magazine a few times a week. Since the majority of Nigerian or foreign magazines is published weekly, it may be reasonable to say that at least 91 percent of the respondents read a magazine weekly. Only nine percent of the respondents in Nigeria read a magazine a few times a month. In Cameroon, eight percent of the respondents read a magazine daily, another 43 percent read a magazine a few times a week and 49 percent read a magazine a few times a month. All respondents are users of the mass media (See Table 2).

Table 2 About Here

The survey results on the countries the respondents would like to seek information from reveal that the United States is the most popular country among the journalists in Cameroon and Nigeria. Forty-one percent of the respondents in Cameroon would like to read about the United States in the print media, 23 percent would like to read about Britain and 18 percent would like to read about France. A mere one percent would like to read about Russia and 17 percent would like to read about other countries. In Nigeria, fifty-eight percent of the respondents would like to read about the United States in the print media, 36 percent would like to read about Britain, a mere one percent would like to read about France and five percent would like to read about Russia (See Table 3). What is astonishing here is the fact that more journalists would like to seek information about the United States than Britain or France which were the colonial masters in these countries. The focus on the United States may be attributed to its leadership position in the world after the fall of the Soviet Union.

On television viewership, again the majority of the respondents in Cameroon (41 percent) and Nigeria (61 percent) would like to watch programs about the United States. The U.S. is followed by Britain with 20 percent of the respondents in Cameroon and 36 percent of the respondents in Nigeria. France, with 11 percent, was in the third place in Cameroon while Russia with two percent was in the fourth place. In Nigeria, Russia was in the third place with two percent while France, with one percent, was in the fourth place (See Table 3). It should be pointed out that the authors have no explanation for the poor performance of France as a popular country among the journalists in this survey even when Francophone journalists were in the survey sample in Cameroon.

On radio listenership, the majority of the respondents in Nigeria (54 percent) would like to listen to information about the United States. This is followed by Britain with 44 percent and France with two percent. No respondent expresses the wish to listen to information about Russia on radio. This variable was not measured in Cameroon because it was missing from the questionnaire used in that country (See Table 3).

Table 3 About Here

The majority of the respondents in Cameroon and Nigeria prefer the BBC and Voice of America respectively to other leading international radio stations when they were asked: which of the following foreign radio stations do you like the most? In their response to the question, 50 percent of the respondents in Cameroon indicated that they like BBC the most. Radio France International was in the second place with 23 percent while VOA was third with 22 percent. This result may be related to Cameroon's colonial connection with Britain and France. One percent of the respondents liked Radio Moscow and four percent liked other international radio stations. In Nigeria, 52 percent of the respondents indicated that they like the Voice of America the most while the remaining 48 percent like BBC the most. No single respondent in Nigeria preferred Radio Moscow or Radio France International to VOA or BBC although the Russian and French stations have English language broadcasts to Nigeria or Africa in general.

It is important to point out that the respondents in Cameroon and Nigeria prefer local television programming to foreign television broadcasts. Twenty-eight percent of the respondents in Cameroon and 36 percent of the respondents in Nigeria indicated preference for National television programming when asked "which of the following TV programmings do you prefer?" In Cameroon the preference for foreign television programming was in the second place with 27 percent, while regional television programming within the country received nine percent. Twenty-six percent of the respondents in Cameroon prefer a combination of all three programmings, that is, national, regional, and international television programming. In Nigeria, the local regional TV programming was in the second place with three percent while international television programming received two percent. The majority of the Nigerian respondents (57 percent) prefers a combination of national, regional, and international television programmings.

Conclusions

This study compared the perceptions of journalists on press freedom and mass media exposure in Cameroon, a country with democratically elected government, and Nigeria, a country with military dictatorship. Additionally, the study examined how often Cameroonian and Nigerian journalists use the media and which media they like the most in their daily search for information? The study provides a clear perception of Cameroonian and Nigerian journalists on press freedom and the media. The conventional wisdom or hypothesis that a democratically elected government may tolerate press freedom while a military regime will censor the press was not fully supported by the empirical evidence in this study. Although Cameroon has a civilian government, the journalists in this study do not believe that the press is free. As expected, Nigerian journalists confirmed the hypothesis that the press under an authoritarian military regime cannot be free.

The study brings to focus the most popular international radio stations and countries among Cameroonian and Nigerian journalists. The study found that Cameroonian and Nigerian journalists do not believe that there is press freedom in their countries. The study found that Cameroonian and Nigerian journalists are avid users of both print and electronic media and that the Voice of America, the BBC and Radio France International are the international radio broadcasts preferred by the majority of the respondents in the study. The examination of the international media use by Cameroonian and Nigerian journalists and their perceptions of press freedom highlights the necessity for research on senders of media messages.

This paper, is limited by the focus on its primary objectives which does not include the processing and use of information by journalists. Nevertheless, the authors believe that it is an important research topic that could contribute to our understanding of journalists and the media. Although this analysis attempts to contribute to the scholarship on media use and exposure, the authors recommend more studies of media use by journalists in Cameroon and Nigeria and other countries in order to complement the existing literature on media use by audiences. For example, it may be interesting to find out if journalists from the Francophone African countries share a common lust for international media as do the Cameroonian and Nigerian journalists in this study. The authors hope that future research will address these and other issues not treated in this study.

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Table 1

Perceptions of press freedom

Items		Response in percentage			P[a]
	Country	Agree %	Disagree %	Not Sure %	
The media (both government and privately owned) are free in Cameroon/Nigeria	Cameroon	18	56	25	<.001
	Nigeria	9	66	25	<.001
I do not think this country is free enough today for me to answer comfortably some of the questions in this survey	Cameroon	30	56	14	<.001
	Nigeria	42	51	7	<.001
Privately owned media are freer than government owned media	Cameroon	52	32	16	<.001
	Nigeria	44	29	27	<.001
Cameroon/Nigeria should pursue a democratic type of government	Cameroon	93	4	3	<.001
	Nigeria	99	1	0	<.001

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[a] df=2byX2 test

Table 2

Regularity of media use by journalists

Item	Country	Daily %	A few times a week %	A few times a month %	Never %	P[a]
How often do you read a newspaper?	Cameroon	47	37	16	0	<.001
	Nigeria	92	8	0	0	<.001
How often do you listen to the radio?	Cameroon	80	14	6	0	<.001
	Nigeria	98	1	1	0	<.001
How often do you watch television?	Cameroon	40	43	18	0	<.001
	Nigeria	91	4	4	0	<.001
How often do you read a magazine?	Cameroon	8	43	49	0	<.001
	Nigeria	49	42	9	0	<.001

---

[a], df=2by X2 test

Table 3

Popularity of countries among journalists

	Country	USA	Russia	Britain	France	Other	P[a]
		%	%	%	%	%	
Which of the following countries do you like to read about in print media?	Cameroon	41	1	23	18	17	<.001
	Nigeria	58	5	36	1	0	<.001
Which of the following countries do you like to watch on TV?	Cameroon	41	2	20	11	26	<.001
	Nigeria	61	2	36	1	0	<.001
Which of the following countries do you like to listen to on radio?	Cameroon	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Nigeria	54	0	44	2	0	<.001

---

[a] df=2by X2 test

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	Nigeria	91	4	4	0	<.001
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	Nigeria	61	2	36	1	0	<.001
Which of the following countries do you like to listen to on radio?	Cameroon	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Nigeria	54	0	44	2	0	<.001

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[a]. df=2byX2 test

Saudi Arabia's International Media Strategy:

Influence through Multinational Ownership

by

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Abstract

This study reviews and analyzes Saudi information policy that has attempted to keep some Western-oriented entertainment and information programming from reaching that country's citizens. The focus of the research is the kingdom's special concern about Direct Satellite Broadcasting (DBS) and how members of the royal family have become involved in the most important commercial Arabic-language satellite services in the Arab world.

Saudi Arabia's International Media Strategy: Influence through Multinational Ownership

Until the early 1960s the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was seemingly unaware of the importance of domestic or international mass communication. This was before oil sales made this conservative Islamic nation both extremely wealthy and an international economic and political power. During the early 1960s the Saudi government showed initial concern about what it believed to be a radio propaganda threat from other states, primarily Egypt, and started building a domestic electronic media system. Starting in the late 1970s and continuing throughout the 1980s, the kingdom became aware that it had to be proactive in media affairs if it was to foster its emerging regional and world-wide leadership role. During the 1990s the government and some of its citizens decided to be major actors in what was believed to be a powerful new international communication medium: direct satellite television broadcasting.

This study details the history of Saudi media developments, concentrating on events in the past decade that have made Saudi Arabia a major owner of Arabic-language print and electronic media both in and outside the Arab world. This research is important because through ownership patterns one can better understand the tactics and motivations of Saudi leaders who are the media owners, especially those who are members of or related to the royal family.

Historically, many nations, even those embracing democracy, have tried in some way to limit access of citizens to some information. Pool (1983) in *Technologies of Freedom* notes:

> While the printing press was without doubt the foundation of modern democracy, the response to the flood of publishing that it brought forth has been censorship as often as press freedom. In some times and places the even more capacious new media will open

> wider the floodgates for discourse, but in other times and places, in fear of that flood, attempts will be made to shut the gates. (p. 251)

Approximately a decade later, Stevenson (1992) similarly said:

> Even the most optimistic assessments of the future would not exclude government efforts to influence the media in the West or government control of the media in other parts of the world, but the legitimacy of government control is gone. The proliferation of faxes, e-mail, DBS TV, desktop publishing and VCRs means that a government monopoly on information -- never successful anyway -- is no longer a realistic policy. (p. 546)

This study also concerns communication technology and a particular country's desire to, on the one hand, embrace new electronic media as part of the modernization process, and on the other, limit citizen access to it, even though non-indigenous news and entertainment programming can no longer be effectively stopped from crossing borders. Should they wish to do so, Saudi citizens can see and hear material that, for whatever reasons, the government believes threatens its very existence or what it believes to be its Islamic cultural values.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The country's modern history began when Abdul Aziz ibn Saud captured the old walled city of Riyadh from the Rashid family in 1902; over the next thirty years, he, his sons, and his followers conquered vast sections of the Arabian Peninsula. In 1932 that land (bordering on Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Yemen) was proclaimed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the only country in the world named after a family.

The two factors that have most influenced Saudi Arabian society are religion and oil. The kingdom is the most conservative of the Gulf countries, adhering to the basic beliefs of a Sunni Islamic sect that follows the teachings of Mohammed Abd-al-Wahhab. The consumption of alcoholic drinks is illegal; public cinemas are not permitted; censorship is widely practiced; women--who veil from head to foot in public--are not permitted to drive; and the country's legal system is based on the *Koran*, Islam's holy book. In the 1930s, oil was discovered in the Eastern

Province.[1] Petroleum revenue increased steadily during the 1950s and 1960s, but not until the rapid increases in OPEC-inspired oil prices after the 1973 Middle East War did the country accumulate enormous wealth and put into effect its remarkably energetic development plan. An important supplier of oil to the United States, Europe, and Japan, Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter of the Arab countries and has the largest oil reserves--261.2 billion barrels--of any country (Amirahmade, 1995). Estimates of the kingdom's population vary because the government is sensitive about the large non-Saudi work force living there, but as of 1992 the total population was estimated to be 16.9 million; about 4.6 million are foreign nationals (*Europa world yearbook*, 1995; *Background notes: Saudi Arabia* 1994).

Radio Broadcasting to and in the Kingdom

By the early 1960s two developments occurred that pointed the way to future Saudi media developments. First, although the country was not yet as wealthy as it would become in the 1970s, Saudi citizens started to experience the emergence of a Western-style consumer economy. Second, inexpensive transistor radios became easily obtainable. It was not until the mid-1960s that Saudi Arabia had a viable national domestic radio service over which programming, adhering to conservative Islamic codes, could be heard. A major reason for the establishment of a national Saudi radio service was the attractiveness to Saudi listeners of neighboring radio stations. When Egypt's *Voice of the Arabs* started, and continuing through the 1967 Six Day War, the Saudi government had almost no radio defense. It had not planned a viable domestic alternative.[2]

Those living in the kingdom during the 1960s can testify that one did not need a survey to document the popularity of Egyptian radio. *The Voice of the Arabs* and *Radio Cairo* could be heard in shops and residences through open windows, during the days before air conditioning became widespread. One clearly defined result of such hostile broadcasts was the realization that the kingdom could no longer ignore the need to create a viable domestic media system, one that would become one of the best financed and most powerful (at least in terms of transmitter strength) electronic media systems in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabian Television

Clearly, one of the motivations for the 1963 announcement by then-King Faisal that the kingdom would start a television system was the realization that there needed to be some type of home visual entertainment and information that the government could control. Such an announcement was great "symbolic modernization" and practical too because many residents had seen television in Egypt, Lebanon, or Europe, and the prospect of having a medium that at the time some neighboring states did not was generally well received. Starting in July 1965, television spread from Jidda and Riyadh, the first cities with services, to other major populated areas of the kingdom. In August 1993 the second channel started (Al-Najai, Ali, General Supervisor, Second Television Channel, personal communication. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 12, 1983). Both locally made and imported programming on this channel is only in English, and like the First Channel, it is available nation-wide. Television very quickly became popular in the kingdom with data showing television set ownership to be near saturation. A 1997 study done for the United States Information Agency by the Pan Arab Research Center, concluded that 91% of Saudi citizens questioned about "yesterday" media habits said they had watched television the previous day (United States Information Agency, 1997).

The Loss of Saudi Government Information Control

Two incidents occurred that had a dramatic impact on the Saudi government's media policy. First, in November 1979 a group of 225 well armed Saudi religious zealots who opposed the royal family took over Islam's most holy place, the Grand Mosque in Mecca Quandt, 1981). It took several weeks to dislodge the Mosque occupants, but by then the information damage was done. As the Saudi Ministry of Information had done in the past (and would do during the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) it at first said nothing, leaving popular Arabic-language international radio stations such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Radio Monte Carlo Middle East (RMCME), and the Voice of America (VOA), and regional Arabic services to report on what they believed to be happening. Radio Monte Carlo Middle East was especially well listened to at the time and the Saudi government was so concerned about the impact of its reports that they jammed the station (J. Regnier, personal communication, Commercial and Marketing Manager, Radio Monte Carlo Middle East, February 1, 1980, Paris, France). After the incident was over, the Ministry of Information rather skillfully used its domestic television service to examine the incident and the leader of the takeover in an attempt to minimize damage. The government's inability to control information from outside the country became a major source of concern.

Another event made it quite clear that in the increasingly modern electronic world, the Saudi government could no longer manage how citizens got information. Videocassette recorders (VCRs) were an almost immediate success in the Arab world when they arrived in the late 1970s, especially in the Gulf states where there is a great deal of disposable income and at the time few alternatives to government-run television. In Saudi Arabia most cassettes of Arabic-language and Western television and feature films are pirated. The efficiency of the cassette pirates is evident from the speed with which the controversial British/U.S. April 1980 made-for-television film *Death of a Princess* reached the kingdom. Purporting to detail the death of a Saudi Arabian princess and her lover for adultery, the film was flown to the Eastern Province the morning after its showing on British commercial television; copies were duplicated and made available in the Dammam area for sale the same day. Though luggage is thoroughly searched by Saudi customs authorities, it is possible for a VHS cassette to be carried through customs in a coat pocket.

The Higher Media Council

By royal decree in July 1981 the government reorganized a commission established in the late 1970s to study and make recommendations about the kingdom's information problems. Known as the Higher Media Council, it is headed by the Minister of Interior (who directs internal security), rather than the Minister of Information (in charge of the previous body), in part because of the then wide-spread belief at the time that it was Ministry of Information officials who were unable to control information and were thus the cause of unfavorable international press. The Council had the responsibility to:

> lay out a clear and well-defined information policy for both internal and external matters;
>
> help in the development of radio and television programming by all available measures; and
>
> help the Ministry of Information solve the problems hindering the higher information policy from reaching its objectives. (Najai, 1982, 58-59)

The government realized, at least temporarily, that it must be more prompt in providing information about internal matters. An example of such a possible change had occurred earlier in the handling an August 1980 Saudi Arabian Airlines accident at Riyadh airport. Almost immediately after the catastrophe, the state radio and news service released information about the aircraft fire, which killed over 300 people. Film of the plane taken by Saudi Arabian television was fed by satellite to all interested television organizations and quickly appeared on European and American network television news. Subsequently, problems during the annual Hajj ceremony in Mecca, such as the summer 1990 death of 1400 pilgrims in a tunnel accident, and the April 1997 fire at a Mecca tent city for pilgrims that killed or injured hundreds, have been handled in a manner that gave Western journalists access to information they requested.

Many members of the royal family and ranking government leaders knew they could no longer control incoming information. Western shortwave and mediumwave international radio has been popular since the 1950s; the videocassette revolution was unstoppable (despite strict government laws to control video rental stores); those living in the Jidda area could see Egyptian television from transmitters from across the Red Sea and many in the Eastern Province could view as many as 12 television channels from neighboring Gulf states; and travel to other Middle Eastern and Western countries exposed a large number of Saudi citizens to Western visual material and information--the very "un-Islamic material" against which many in the government and religious community wanted to protect citizens. The increase in conservative Islamic activists in Saudi Arabia is of concern to the government. Their concern with indigenous media is reflected in this paragraph of a May 1991 letter submitted to the King:

> Reformation of the mass media in accordance with the kingdom's policy to serve Islam and to reflect the ethics of society, elevating its culture, and purging the media of everything not conforming to these objectives, with a guarantee of its freedom to spread awareness through accurate news and constructive criticism within the limits of the sharia. (Dekmejian, 1994, 631)

Fifteen months later, the same Islamic group sent a "Memorandum of Advice" to Saudi religious leader Baz that included this media-related concern. They wanted the government: "to censor foreign materials, magazines, and television programs to prevent the dissemination of infidel and secular ideas and nude pictures" (Dekemejian, 1994, 634).

At no time has the government attempted to keep communication equipment from Saudi homes. There are 6.5 million radio receivers, 5 million television sets, and 3 million videocassette recorders (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1996), in 2.9 million television Saudi households (Saudi Arabia, 1995). Baskerville Communications Corporation and the BBC World Service International Broadcasting and Audience Research office estimates that between 500,000 and 700,000 Saudi homes could receive satellite television (Saudi Arabia, 1995).

Each new communication-related technology brought a new challenge to the government, but none was greater than home television reception directly from satellites. Direct Satellite Broadcasting (DBS)[3] came to Saudi Arabia, but as it turned out those providing the most desirable services were Saudi-owned companies.

DBS in the Kingdom and the Gulf

Saudi Arabia, with a land area the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi River, understood very early the value of satellites for communication. The kingdom was an early member of INTELSAT and used leased satellite time in the early 1970s to connect its television transmitters. As noted in more detail later, both the inspiration and most of the money for ARABSAT came from Saudi Arabia (Abu-Argoub, 1988).

The adoption patterns for television reception from satellites in the Gulf states are almost identical the purchase of home videocassette recorders as soon as they became available (Boyd, Straubhaar, & Lent, 1989): royal family members and the wealthy. Although Saudis had to get permission from the Ministry of Communication to own a dish, those with money and influence either did so or ignored the regulation. These home dishes were not DBS in the sense that we have come to know them: small 18-inch dishes that receive digital signals. Then, and to some extent now, these were relatively large roof-top mounted dishes that could receive Western programming such as CNN International (CNNI) and U.S. Armed Forces Television. Initially, there were few of these, and thus the government paid little attention until August 2, 1990, the day Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Although official Saudi electronic media did not acknowledge the Iraqi invasion for four days, 54% of those in the Saudi capital Riyadh who were interviewed by a research firm hired by the BBC said they knew about the invasion the day it happened (Mytton & Eggerman, 1993). Those with access to CNNI from home dishes, or from Ministry of Information offices, could see unfolding the events leading to Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Egypt's SpaceNet--that country's early satellite television service--played a role in the Gulf Crisis by delivering information to Egyptian and other Arab military forces stationed in Hafre El-Baten, Saudi Arabia, and Shargha in the United Arab Emirates. The first TVRO (television receive-only down-link dish) was installed in military headquarters, where programs were received and disseminated by cable to several locations. Additional TVROs were placed near where Egyptian forces were stationed in Saudi Arabia; television programs were retransmitted via a low-power VHF transmitter that enabled soldiers to watch television programs on ordinary television receivers (Amin & Boyd, 1994).

ARA Group/Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC)

London-based MBC is the creation of several wealthy, influential Saudi businessmen. Sheikh Saleh Kamel--later to start satellite-delivered Arab Radio & Television (ART), an MBC competitor--owns many businesses in the kingdom, including a Jidda-based media production and advertising company. From the beginning, MBC's principal owner and Chief Operating Officer has been Walid bin Ibrahim al-Ibrahim, not yet 30 years old when MBC started in September 1991; his connection with the Saudi royal family is his sister, Saudi King Fahd's wife.

Although Egypt was the first country to utilize satellite distribution in the Arab world with the hope that those with home satellite dishes would pick up the signal, MBC pioneered not only a service designed to be seen free-to-air directly by home viewers; it was also the first to do so on an advertising-supported basis. While the Gulf War had motivated many to purchase home satellite receivers with the hope of receiving more extensive news coverage than was provided locally, MBC's launch date was before Arab world dish sales increased dramatically. One relatively early success for MBC came with agreements with the governments of both Morocco and Bahrain to rebroadcast MBC's signal terrestrially; this was especially important in the case of Bahrain because of the large, affluent audience in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province just a few miles from this Gulf island nation. The interest of the Saudi government in having MBC available to home viewers can be seen by the negotiations that took place for the service's terrestrial broadcast from Bahrain. Rather than having MBC work directly with Bahrain's Ministry of Information, the retransmission agreement resulted from discussions between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hala Al Umran, Assistant Under Secretary for Radio and Television, personal communication, Manama, Bahrain, June 4, 1993).

At first MBC operated an evening schedule from a converted pasta factory in south London. These modest beginnings changed when British Prime Minister John Major presided over the opening of a purpose-built, state-of-the-art broadcasting facility in London's Battersea area on March 10, 1995, during which he welcomed MBC as a "very distinguished member of the international press" ("John Major inaugurates MBC's," 1995, 1, 2). Programming starts at mid-morning in the Middle East and continues until after midnight. There is a teletext service until the start of programming, which then continues with programs for women, children, and the evening offering of news and entertainment. The tendency in the Arab world is for state-run television to be unexciting, but MBC programming uses Western television production values--one of the advantages of being located in London.

Although MBC may be the best known entity of the al-Ibrahim ARA Group International Holding Company, it is not the only one. Over the years, MBC owners have acquired or started various media-oriented ventures that now span four continents. ARA owns United Press International (UPI); ARA International Production Company; ANA Radio and Television, which distributes Arabic-language news and information from Washington, D.C.; Spectrum 558 AM, which transmits Arabic programming in London and South East England; MBC FM, which operates a 24-hour per day radio service delivered from the MBC London headquarters via satellite to Saudi Arabia where it is rebroadcast nationally; ARA Media Services (AMS), a Jidda-based advertising sales and media representation agency; and SARA Vision, formed to operate the Multi-Channel Multi-Point Distribution Service (wireless cable) (MMDS) system in Saudi Arabia (*ARA Group International,* n.d.). The proposed service--featuring a tape-delay system permitting censorship of objectionable material) could offer up to 60channels when it is scheduled to become operational in 1998 (Attia, Samir, Business Director, International Operations, ARA Group International, personal communication, London, July 25, 1997).

The MBC FM service is unique to the kingdom because, with the exception of American Armed Services Radio English broadcasts in the 1950s and 1960s and during the Gulf War, MBC is the first non-government radio service to be relayed from Saudi soil. According to a survey done in Saudi Arabia by Pan-Arab Research Company in 1995, MBC Radio was the kingdom's most popular foreign radio station with 35% of the audience listening ("MBC Top in Saudi Arabia," 1995). The station's popularity increased in 1997 with 49% of respondents to a survey saying that they listened weekly; the other major international broadcasters to the kingdom--Voice of America, BBC, and Radio Monte Carlo Middle East--attracted only 5%, 11%, and 11%, respectively (United States Information Agency, 1997)

Orbit Television and Radio Network

The short history of DBS television worldwide shows that such ventures are risky--startup costs are high and return on investment can be slow at best. Rome-based Orbit may well be the most costly DBS effort in the world, especially since it is unlikely that Orbit will ever realize a financial return large enough to recoup its initial investment of at least 1 billion dollars.

Orbit had its origins in Hong Kong-based Star TV. Started by Richard Li, son of wealthy and influential Hong Kong businessman Li Ka-Shing, Star TV quickly became a major innovator of television throughout Asia. In 1994, Li sold part, and later all, of Star TV to Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation and it remains an important part of Murdoch's world-wide print and electronic media empire (Gershon, 1997; Cox, 1994). When Li first was looking for a buyer, one interested party was Saudi Arabia's Mawarid Investment Group that is headed by Prince Khalid bin Abdullah al-Saud, cousin and brother-in-law of Saudi King Fahd ("Partner quit BBC," 1996; "Dispute ends BBC's," 1996). The kingdom's largest private-sector employers, Mawarid is privately held by members of the Saudi royal family. When they were unsuccessful in investing in Star, Mawarid's principals approached Alexander B. Zilo, an American Star executive who had worked in U.S. television before moving to Asia. Zilo said that he knew Mawarid's owners were serious when they called him and said that they were sending a plane for him to come to Riyadh for talks (A. Zilo, CEO Orbit Television and Radio Network, personal communication, January 3, 1995, Rome, Italy). The decision to start Orbit occurred during a time when there was great interest in DBS in the Arab world and only MBC as a major DBS competitor.

Zilo's background at Star proved of great value to the planning of the world's first all-digital DBS service. Drawing on Star's experience of planning a digital subscription service, many of the executives and the senior technical staff moved from Hong Kong to Rome to be part of a crash program of guiding many former Star contractors to get the service on the air. Planning started in September 1993 and the service was officially launched in May 1994 (Parker, 1994).

Although Orbit at first provided a free-to-air preview channel, the service is subscription-based because there were those in the Arab world, especially in the Gulf, with incomes sufficient to purchase the sophisticated Scientific Atlanta receiver, initially priced at $10,000, but later drastically reduced because of a lack of purchasers. This charge is in addition to monthly fees for a variety of program packages (A. Zilo, CEO Orbit Television and Radio Network, personal communication, January 3, 1995, Rome, Italy). The service was originally planned to have up to 24 separate programs, transmission of which was made possible by 7 to 1 digital compression, but that number has not been reached. At one time as many as 19 were being offered, including rebroadcasts of two Egyptian domestic channels, *ESPN*, *The Music Channel*, *The Hollywood Channel*, *CNN International*, *C-SPAN*, and *BBC World Service Arabic Television News*. Why the emphasis on Western entertainment programming in an area of the world that is perhaps most sensitive to such visual entertainment? The European edition of *Newsweek* quoted Zilo on this question: "We're going after a niche market with the most potent, affluent demographics in the world . . . These people travel a lot and watch Western television when they're away. When they come home, there's nothing" ("20 more channels, Inshallah," 1994). Although Orbit had what seemed to be unlimited financial resources, both Western management and Saudi owners initially misjudged the service's customer base; they made a major error in contracting with the British Broadcasting Corporation to operate an Arabic television news service.

The BBC's Arabic radio service was the corporation's first foreign language service and has been a popular one in the Arab world since it started in 1938. In a region where virtually all electronic media are government owned, interest in news from a credible organization such as the BBC is especially valued (Boyd, 1993). Zilo had a relationship with the BBC because when he lived in Asia, Star TV featured the BBC's English-language World Service Television on one if its channels. Outwardly, the 10-year 150 million-dollar-contract with the BBC was a good decision because it provided the BBC with income for its commercial venture and gave Orbit something MBC and ART did not have: an independent news source from a service that in the Arab world was a credible household news name. Orbit did not foresee two important developments--a Saudi government ban on satellite dishes, and the move to London of Mohammed Al-Masari, an outspoken fax-sending, electronic mail-using Saudi Arabian dissident. On March 10, 1994, just as the holy month of Ramadan was ending, the Saudi Arabian government issued decree No. 128 officially banning private satellite dish ownership ("Saudi Ministers," 1994). Reasons for banning dishes include wishing to keep out Western news and entertainment, un-Islamic program material, and anything anti-Saudi. However, aside from isolated instances of the religious police having dismantled a few dishes, the ban has not been enforced and dishes as well as satellite reception equipment are readily available in the kingdom.

The Saudi government, Orbit soon learned, had no interest in a kingdom-based company that provided an independent news service. Alexander Zilo said that the 8-hour service became a problem when it started devoting time to Al-Masari's specific objections to the way the Saudi royal family was running the country and that he had talked to the BBC about the coverage (A. Zilo, CEO Orbit Television and Radio Network, personal communication, January 3, 1995, Rome, Italy). Coverage of Al-Masari's activities peaked in late 1995 and early 1996 when he fought a successful court battle in Britain to stay there as a political refugee. However, the event that caused Orbit unilaterally to break its BBC contract was a *Panorama* program on the BBC

Arabic Television News showing "secretly shot [in Saudi Arabia] film of the preparations for a double execution by beheading" (Snoddy & Gardner, 1996, p. 3). The demise of the Orbit-sponsored BBC Arabic television news service on April 20, 1996 embarrassed the BBC, especially after it was revealed that no other company could take over the service. In the process of concluding a contract in 1994, Orbit had persuaded the BBC to permit it to own, for "tax efficient" reasons, all of the studio and editing equipment used for BBC Arabic news; Orbit would not permit anyone else to lease or purchase it (Richardson, 1997).

Orbit was the first Saudi-owned DBS service to take advantage of excess transponder capacity to cooperate with another DBS provider. In 1996 Orbit started featuring some of the Star TV channels, and in January 1997 for $20.00 per month Orbit offered a package of Star Select channels customized for the Middle East: Star Select International, Star Movies, Star Sports, NBC/CNBC, and the Fox Kids Network ("Star TV Launches," 1997).

Arab Radio and Television (ART)

Of the three Saudi-owned DBS services, ART is the only one to be operated primarily from the Middle East; this is, in part, why relatively little information is available in the West about the multi-channel satellite service. ART is part of Sheikh Saleh Kamel's Jidda-based Dallah Al-Barakah holding company. As noted earlier, Kamel was a principal founder of MBC. Like the Saudi-headquartered Mawarid Group of companies (Orbit's owners), ART's electronic media interests are relatively recent.

Although uplinked to satellites serving the Arab world and Europe from Italy (where it is establishing a new studio and distribution facility), most ART post-production is done in Cairo because of this city's vast store of film and television talent and available production facilities. In 1994, ART started 4 free-to-air channels serving the Arabic-speaking world. ART's first four

DBS channels were: ART I, a general channel showing films and television programs that appeal to a wide variety of ages and tastes; ART II, all sports; ART III, the children's channel; and ART IV, the film channel, featuring both Arab world and Western films that have been dubbed or subtitled. By mid-1995, ART had added another service, with plans for more programs as well as a subscription service ("ART Arab network," 1995). By mid-1997, ART offered 6 satellite program services: Variety Channel, Sports, Children's Channel, Movie Channel, Music Channel, and ART Shopping (ART, Arab Radio & Television, 1997).

ART has decided not to telecast any non-sports news, thus avoiding the type of problems with the Saudi government that Orbit had as a result of its former BBC Arabic Television News, or criticism that MBC's news is "Saudized."

ART decided to partner with the London-based outlet for Viacom's Showtime services. For part of 1996 and 1997, Via PAS-4, Showtime provided a multi-channel service to the Middle East: *Bloomburg Information TV*, *Nickelodeon*, *Paramount TV Channel*, *MTV Europe*, *VH-1*, *The Movie Channel*, and *TV Land* ("The time of your life," 1996). However, Showtime and ART decided not to use the same home delivery technology, reflecting the changing nature of technical and programming partnerships among Middle East satellite delivery services.

Although not directly involved in his own DBS business at this time, Saudi royal family member Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, a wealthy international investor, is involved in several media-related businesses, including Euro Disney and the television interests of former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (Rossant, 1995). He is additionally involved in music-oriented business ventures with Michael Jackson (Carey, 1997) and reportedly is the primary financial backer ART's Music Channel that he had downlinked to his yacht (formerly owned by Donald Trump) while on vacation in the Mediterranean. In November 1997 he successfully acquired 1 per cent of Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, reportedly making him the single largest News Corporation stock holder after Murdoch and his family ("Arabian news Corp. buy-in, 1997).

Satellite Technology

Perhaps nowhere else in the world does satellite ownership, technology, and transponder availability play such a key role in the success of DBS services. The primary satellite carrier in the Arab world is ARABSAT, an Arab League-sponsored consortium of Arab states (with Saudi Arabia as the majority shareholder) that owns and operates communication satellites. Most of the first ARABSAT generation, known as the I-Series, had technical problems and a limited number of transponders. The new II-Series generation, starting with II-A, has 22 medium- and high-power C-band and 12 Ku-band transponders ("ARABSAT II-A transponder list," 1996.)

ARABSAT continues to face competition from other satellite organizations, especially from INTELSAT, who in January 1995 launched the 704 satellite used by Orbit and PANAMSAT's Indian Ocean PAS 4 that has a Ku-band spot beam centered on Saudi Arabia ("INTELSAT 704 launched successfully," 1995; "PAS-4 due for August launch," 1995). The next major competitor will be NILESAT, an Egyptian-owned communications satellite company that will be operational in 1998. Just after that, ARABSAT expects to have its new generation of higher-power, French-built satellites positioned to serve the Middle East (Said, A. Al-Qahtani, Assistant Director General for Finance and Administration, ARABSAT, Personal interview, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, January 14, 1998.)

Impact of DBS

DBS is too new to assess adequately its impact on viewers. However, a few studies have been completed and thus offer a preliminary assessment. Al-Makaty, Boyd, & Van Tubergen

(1996) found 3 types of Saudi male viewers: those wishing for a government satellite dish ban; those opposing DBS because they saw programming as a cultural threat that would have a negative impact on society; and those that believed that the Saudi government itself should use DBS to advance Islam worldwide. Marghalani, Palmgreen, & Boyd (1996) examined gratifications sought from DBS channels, concluding that seeing news from different perspectives was an important motivation for viewing DBS. On the other hand, the most potent disincentive for viewing DBS was the fact that most DBS channels available to Saudis have a Western flavor that clash with the tenets of Islam.

In 1997 the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research released preliminary data from their 1996 media usage study of high school and college students. One finding from the United Arab Emirates is that younger people, especially when there are "incidents" in the Middle East, prefer foreign media such as CNNI, NBC, or BBC, over local outlets. In fact 75% said that foreign news services were more credible than local news ("Local media urged," 1997; Jamal Al-Suwaidi, Director, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, personal communication, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, January 5, 1997). The United States Information Agency 1997 study of media habits in Saudi Arabia concluded that 51% of citizens have access to satellite television; among those DBS services reaching the kingdom from abroad, 55% watched MBC, 51% viewed the Egyptian Space Channel, and 35% saw ART weekly (United States Information Agency, 1997).

WorldSpace

It is not only television via satellite that is of interest to those in the kingdom. Washington, D.C.-based WorldSpace is the inspiration of Noah Samara, a Ethiopian-born U.S.-based lawyer whose company's mission is to make digital radio signals available to most of the developing world. Even with American and other venture capital banking, the high start-up costs of the organization, especially technical development and satellite construction and launch, have fueled speculation in Europe and North America that a wealthy Gulf state such as Saudi Arabia had a significant financial interest in the venture; WorldSpace's first satellite scheduled for launch in June 1998 is to cover the Middle East and Africa ("Digital Direct delivery," n.d.). During a spring 1997 meeting in Toulouse, France (where the satellite is being built by Alcatel Alsthom) organizers would not deny that Saudi financing was involved. *News Week* confirm that, '. . . the Bin Mahfouz family, which handles the Saudi royal family's finances, has invested in WorldSpace (Yang & Johnston, 1997).

Discussion

It is clear that satellite delivery of television programming to the Arabic-speaking world is a major development in the relatively short history of Middle Eastern electronic media. There is a tradition of Arab ministries of information wishing to control--or at best influence--information their citizens receive, and governmental ownership of electronic media. The ability of Arabs to receive a variety of television entertainment and news offerings directly from both within the Arab world as well as the West has the potential to eliminate government broadcasters as a major source of visual home entertainment.

It is primarily because of the above-noted conditions that Arabs are the world's most enthusiastic international radio listeners (Boyd, 1993). Television is accepted by media researchers as a medium that is more powerful than radio. Pictures, after all, are captivating, and programming that meets viewers' needs will find a willing audience.

There is a long tradition of Arab states such as Saudi Arabia attempting to influence what is written about them in the Arab world press. Especially during the years before the Lebanese

Civil War that started in the mid-1970s, the Lebanese press was known for allegedly accepting money from those states that wanted favorable newspaper coverage. Former Lebanese President Charles Helou is said to have remarked upon receiving a group of Lebanese journalists, "Now that I have met you in your official capacity, may I learn what foreign countries your papers unofficially represent . . . Welcome to your second country, Lebanon" (Dajani, 1974).

Two recent examples of the kingdom's internationally distributed off-shore newspaper publishing are London-based, Lebanese-owned *Al Hayat* (leased to a member of the royal family for 20 years), and *Asharq Al-Awsat*, owned outright by another Saudi royal family member. The fact that London-based MBC, Rome-headquartered Orbit, and Jidda-located ART are owned by members of or those close to the Saudi royal family is not accidental. Nor is it accidental that these businesses are, for the most part, located outside of the Arab world. They, like most contemporary Arab novelists (the most notable exception being Egypt's Nobel winner Naguib Mahfouz), write from outside the Middle East because that ensures them freedom of expression ("Writing from the Arab world," 1997)

Visitors to the Arab world have noticed that the rooftops are becoming crowded with satellite television selections. The Saudi-owned DBS services are no longer unique and now compete with Western programming (via some of the Saudi-sponsored services) and DBS services from other Middle Eastern countries. Iraq is unique among Arab states in not having a satellite television channel because no company will provide it with transponder time. Even Libya has leased a satellite transponder for daily broadcasts (Warg, 1997).

There is no doubt that all DBS services hope for a return on their financial investment. The question that continues to be asked is to what extent the Saudi government itself, possibly through the Higher Media Council, is involved with start-up costs for the services, and if this is the case, why a government concerned about outside media influence would position itself as defacto owners of foreign-based media outlets? The answer is, at least in part, to continue influencing Arab world information that is at least somewhat influential in promoting a positive image of the kingdom. ART has decided to avoid non-sports news altogether and concentrate on multi-channel family programming; MBC's news, while generally thought to be credible, is Saudized in the sense that the kingdom is presented only positively--mentions of foreign-based dissidents such as Dr. Al-Masari or alleged human rights violations in the kingdom are avoided altogether. As documented earlier, Orbit's short-lived contract for an Arabic television news service was terminated because the BBC did include issues that were sensitive to the kingdom as it has always done on its short- and medium-wave Arabic radio service to the area. As we approach the last few years of the 20th century, Saudi Arabia has decided that it can most effectively influence television programming through either direct or indirect media ownership.

Notes

[1] There many sources of information about the early history of the kingdom. See, for example, Williams (1933), Philby (1952), Philby (1955), Benoist-Mechin (1958), Rugh (1969) and Lacey (1981).

[2] For a detailed account of this Egyptian radio service, see Boyd, 1975. For a comprehensive discussion of the electronic media in the Arab world, see Boyd, 1982 and 1993.

[3] Throughout this discussion, the term Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS), rather than Direct-to-Home (DTH), reception is used.

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Factors Influencing Repatriation Intention, an aspect of the Brain Drain Phenomenon

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ABSTRACT

Factors Influencing Repatriation Intention, an aspect of the Brain Drain Phenomenon

Based on Grunig's situational theory, this study proposed and tested a systemic relationship represented by a causal model composed of attitudinal, communicative, and motivational variables. The systemic relationship so formed explained the intention of Third World students to or not to return home after their assignment in USA.

Study used stratified random sample of 400 Third World students attending university. Phone interview refusal rate was 23 %. Data analysis involved regression and path analytical models.

Factors Influencing Repatriation Intention, an aspect of the Brain Drain Phenomenon

> The progress of a nation depends first and foremost on
> the progress of its people. Unless it develops their spirit
> and human potentialities, it cannot develop much
> else--materially, economically, politically, or culturally.
>
> Harbison, (1963, p.140)

Among the many conditions that stigmatize countries of the southern hemisphere with the label of underdevelopment are, mass poverty, high rates of infant mortality, high rates of disease, high rates of illiteracy, overpopulation, malnutrition, short life span, high level of corruption (Bradshaw & Tshandu, 1990, p. 236; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982), "brain drain," and others. This study groups these conditions under two phases of development: structural (dealing with technology and economics) and human (dealing with human resources) phases. While all other conditions come under the structural phase, brain drain is considered under the human phase of development which is the focus of this study.

This study is directed at those people in whose domain, inevitably, the mantle of future Third World leadership rests--today's university students from the developing World. The purpose of the study is to investigate: (1) the attitudes of Third World students, the potential leaders of the Third World, toward national development,
(2) the relationship of such attitudes to their communication behavior toward national development issues, (3) the effect of their communication behavior on their level of knowledge of national development issues, and (4) how all the aforementioned factors are related to the students' intention to return home on completion of their assignments in the United States (repatriation intention), an aspect of brain drain. Grunig and Childers (1988) in their revised situational communication theory provide a framework for assessing the aforementioned relationships. The need for such a study was succinctly

expressed by Schramm (1964): "the mobilizing of human resources requires a great deal of attention to what the population knows and thinks of national development" (p. 31).

Efforts, both theoretical and pragmatic, aimed at eradicating underdevelopment in the new nation states (Lerner, 1958; Schramm, 1968; Rogers, 1976) were far too inconsequential to the unique lifestyles and cultures of the developing nations to be effective. Those efforts fell short of their mandate by principally addressing the structural phase of development while dealing with a limited scope of the human phase such as investing in people through formal education and training, employing communication channels to educate rural farmers on farm development techniques, popular participation in development programs, introducing family planning programs to control population explotion, and similar projects. Conspicuously absent from development research, have been attempts to assess Third World people's orientation toward national development. For instance, what and how much do they know about development and underdevelopment issues? Do they really recognize underdevelopment as a problem? If so, do they care? If they do, how involved are they in those problems--are they willing to participate and, if necessary to make sacrifices in order to solve the problem? Or are they fatalistic toward the solution of underdevelopment problems--feeling, for instance, that the west controls everything to the extent that they (the Third World people) are unable to change the situation? One who does not recognize a situation as problematic, and does not feel involved in such a situation, will be unlikely to think seriously about it, and even less likely to actively participate in the search for its solution (Grunig, 1983). Thus, if Third World citizens do not see underdevelopment as a problem, feel helpless about it, and/or feel uninvolved in it, it seems unlikely that efforts at national development will succeed without first eliminating such obstacles. To this end, a first step seems to be to investigate Third World citizens' orientations toward national development. Until that is done, one is unlikely to determine that an obstacle exists which needs removal.

The importance of studies such as this to national development rests on the indispensable role of people in the development process. Technologies, including robots, are managed by people. Regardless of how buoyant an economy may be, it must be managed by humans for it to yield effective development implementations (such as educational improvement, creation of jobs, agricultural enhancement, rural electrification etc.).

Repatriation Intention And Brain Drain

The phenomenon described as "brain drain" has received considerable, albeit infrequent, attention in national development discourse. Brain drain refers to the migration of trained personnel from one nation to another. It is from the perspective of the losing country that the concept is labelled "brain drain" as this practice tends to deplete the loser's knowledge resource.

Although an old idea, the term (brain drain) was first used in a 1962 report by the British Royal Society inquiring into the immigration of engineers, scientists and technicians from Great Britain to North America (Okigbo, 1981). This term which the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has defined to include professionals, technical, and kindred workers (PTKW) now also includes various categories of foreign students who permanently reside abroad after graduation from college. It is this latter category (foreign students) that is of interest to this study. Hence, the concept of "repatriation intention," or the intention (of developing world students) to return home after graduation.

In the 1960's and 1970's, when complaints about imbalance between northern and southern hemispheres had reached their highpoints, statistics of drainees from developing to developed world were staggering, and such data seemed to buttress the claims of imbalance and dysfunctional relationship (in the view of the developing nations) between developing and developed nations. In 1968 for instance, Adams (1968) recorded that there were more commonwealth specialists working in Britain than there were British specialists working in the commonwealth. In the same passage, he (Adams) also pointed out that there were more American-trained Iranian doctors working in New York alone than in the whole of Iran. In regard to foreign graduates who do not return home after graduation, the picture is not much different. Concerning these non-returning graduates, Okigbo (1981, p. 22) noted:

> A national Science Foundation study reported that 60% of foreign scientists and engineers lived in the U.S as temporary residents before they became immigrants. Of these immigrants, 45% came originally as non-exchange visa students. For some countries (e.g., Taiwan, India, Korea and Iran) between 70% and 90% of their immigrant professionals were previously students in the U.S.

The irony of this situation is that in spite of the poor repatriation record of developing world students, research reveals that the number of international students entering the United States is on the rise (Institute of International Education, 1988), and that of these foreigners, developing world students constitute well over 75%. If the migrant population increases as repatriation intention remains low, then the impact of this brain drain on the development of the Third World can be catastrophic.

Concern about brain drain prompted the United States, one of the countries accused of benefitting from brain drain, to commission both congressional hearings and large scale studies to examine the problem and make recommendations (Okigbo,1981).

Okigbo's (1981) study, one of the few that have looked at Third World students expatriation habit, dealt with Nigerian students in the United States, looking at 18 different characteristics relating to gender, length of stay, religion, U.S. media, communication habit, among others, of returnees and non-returnees. The study conducted here adds to previous work on brain drain by investigating the relationship between orientation toward national development and repatriation intention (their intention to return home on completion of their studies) employing a path analytical model.

Theoretical framework

The theoretical base of this study is Grunig's (1983) and Grunig and Childer's (1988) situational communication theory. In its original form, the theory holds that "how a person perceives a situation explains whether he [sic] will communicate about the situation, how he [sic] will communicate, and whether he [sic] will have an attitude relevant to the situation" (p. 9). The theory also distinguishes between active and passive publics--respectively those who not only recognize a problem, but will also organize to seek its solution, and others who recognize but will not do anything about it. But in its revised form (Grunig & Childers, 1988), situational theory was reconceptualized as a causal model eliminating the fourth variable, referent criterion, and separating each of the three independent variables--problem recognition, level of involvement, and constraint recognition--into internal and external dimensions. Thus the reconceptualized model consisted of six exogenous and four endogenous variables (in the language of path analysis) explaining the relationship between problem recognition, constraint recognition, level of involvement and information seeking and processing as well as breadth of cognition and depth of cognition (all defined later in this paper).

Research conceptualization and proposed model

The model describing the hypothetical system of relationships to be tested in this research is presented in Figure 1. Principally, this model comprises the revised situational communication theory (Grunig and Childers, 1988, their AIDS study) and two additional variables introduced by this author--political ambition and repatriation intention--which will be discussed subsequently.

Figure 1 is a path model. A path model consists of exogenous (a variable whose "variability is assumed to be determined by causes outside the causal model") and endogenous (whose variation "is explained by exogenous or endogenous variables in the system") variables (Pedhazur, 1982 p. 581). Consequently, in a causal model, while efforts are centered on explaining the variability of endogenous variables, explanations for the variability of the exogenous variables or their relationship with other exogenous variables are not considered. Such relationships remain unanalyzed.

The theoretical model here comprises five exogenous variables--political ambition, external problem recognition, level of involvement, internal constraint recognition, and external constraint recognition--and six endogenous variables--information processing, internal problem recognition, information seeking, breadth of cognition, depth of cognition, and repatriation intention, (see Figure 1).

Definition of variables

POLITICAL AMBITION is defined here as "the desire to influence public policy through (holding) public office as one returns home."

REPATRIATION INTENTION is a variable derived from Okigbo's (1981) work on brain drain. Although the two items are closely similar, their conceptualization takes opposite meanings. While Okigbo studied expatriation intention or the intention to reside permanently outside one's home after graduation from college, this study is concerned with repatriation intention or the "intention to return home to reside permanently after completing one's education whether or not things work out here in the U.S.A." The remaining variables derive from Grunig and Childers (1988) original definitions.

INTERNAL PROBLEM RECOGNITION is defined here as "the extent to which an individual perceives him/herself as intellectually curious or interested in development issues."

EXTERNAL PROBLEM RECOGNITION. Adapted from both Grunig and Childers (1988) external problem recognition; and Elliott, Mamoud, Sothirajah, and Camphor's (1991) "AIDS problem recognition," external problem recognition is defined here as "the perceived seriousness of underdevelopment for citizens in one's country."

LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT. While Grunig and Childers (1988) used internal and external dimensions of "level of involvement," their definition of internal level of involvement as 'ego-involvement,' seems unsuitable for repatriation intention. It is doubtful that many, if any, would possess the level of emotionality about repatriation intention that "ego-involvement" suggests. The model here, therefore, employs only "level of involvement" defined as "the extent to which one perceives underdevelopment as having a significant consequence on one's life." This derives from Petty and Cacioppo's (1986) concept of "personal relevance or issue involvement."

INTERNAL CONSTRAINT RECOGNITION is "the inability to comprehend the dynamics of underdevelopment" (Grunig and Childers, 1988).

EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT RECOGNITION is defined here in terms of political efficacy (adapted from Acock et al., 1985; Craig and Maggioto, 1981) as "the perception that one can influence policy decisions in one's country that will affect one's country's development."

INFORMATION PROCESSING is "passive media behavior or media use" (Grunig 1983).

INFORMATION SEEKING is "the purposive search for information that has utility for deciding what to do about national development problems in one's country."

BREADTH OF COGNITION is defined as, "knowledge of development issues pertaining to the developing world in general."

DEPTH OF COGNITION refers to "knowledge of development issues pertaining specifically to one's country."

Hypotheses

As is usual with causal models, the variables in Figure 1 are arranged in blocks in their order of hypothesized relationships. Specifically, external problem recognition, internal constraint recognition, and external constraint recognition, as predicted by Grunig and Childers (1988), will lead to information processing, and to information seeking.

information processing, through internal problem recognition, will lead also to information seeking. The communication variables--information processing and seeking--in turn will lead to the cognitive variables (breadth and depth of cognition) which then lead to repatriation intention, the ultimate dependent variable (see Figure 1). Political ambition is expected to lead to both the communication variables--information seeking and processing--and repatriation intention, while level of involvement leads to information seeking and repatriation intention.

Political ambition (or "the desire to influence public policy through (holding) public office as one returns home") is seen here as a motivational factor for communicative behavior. If one intends to take up a job in one's country that will entail becoming a leader of a segment of the society (say, a political institution or organization, or even the country as a whole), it seems almost compelling that information about one's country and especially about political and/or leadership issues in one's country will be of vital interest to that individual so much that the individual will purposively seek out such information.

Expatriation intention (or "the intention not to return home to reside permanently after completing one's education") has been found to have a positive association with information seeking (Okigbo, 1981). It is predicted here that a similar association will exist between information seeking and repatriation intention. Hence, information seeking is expected to lead to repatriation intention. In the same study of Nigerian students and their migration intention, Okigbo found that those "students who patronize Nigerian media and discuss Nigerian affairs are more willing to return" (p. 134) home on completion of their studies than did others who did not. Information processing--defined here as media use (Grunig, 1983)--is expected to lead to repatriation intention.

A path is specified from political ambition to repatriation intention. This path is logical since political ambition presupposes that the ambitious will obtain the political appointment in his/her own country. Thus political ambition would be meaningless without the intention to return home where one, as a citizen, can fulfill that ambition . It is expected therefore, that political ambition would increase the chance of returning home.

Situational theory (Grunig and Childers, 1988) predicts causal paths from each of the revised exogenous (independent) situational variables to either or both information processing and information seeking. Although situational theory specifies a nonrecursive path from information processing to internal problem recognition, the return path (from internal problem recognition to information processing) is not predicted here because: (1) intellectual interest (internal problem recognition) is believed to be more closely associated with active (information seeking) than with passive (information processing) communication behavior. This assessment is buttressed by Grunig and Childer's (1988) finding that "people who are curious about an issue seek out information and, as a result, are less likely to pay attention to information that comes to them without a search . . ." (p. 30)); and (2) the model proposed here is recursive rather than nonrecursive. An investigator may not be able to exhaust all the universe of expectations there is in a causal model, and therefore must contain predictions to a limit considered sufficient by the investigator for the purpose of a particular research (Tsui, 1980).

Grunig and Childers (1988) in their study of an AIDS issue, found, contrary to the prediction of situational theory, that problem recognition, not level of involvement, had the strongest effect on the communication variables--information seeking and processing. Neither of those two variables is predicted here to have the strongest effect on communication behavior. Instead, it is expected that political ambition will have the strongest effect on communication behavior.

The involvement variables showed a nonsignificant and negative association with information seeking, an outcome described by Grunig and Childers (1988, p. 30) as "unexpected." With internal level of involvement defined as "ego-involvement," it is indeed surprising that a negative relationship should exist between it and information seeking. However, for external level of involvement defined by Grunig as "issue involvement" or the consequences of an issue "for . . . the population" (p. 31), it is not such a surprise that there is no strong relationship between it and information seeking. If a problem has consequences for a population but not particularly for an individual, such a problem may not arouse so much concern for an individual to start seeking information about it as would be the case if the problem were perceived by the individual as personally important (level of involvement as defined by this study). Grunig and Childers' (1988) finding notwithstanding, a strong positive relationship is predicted here between level of involvement and information seeking. As Grunig and Childers (1988) speculated, the nonsignificant negative path from the two involvement variables to information seeking may be an artifact of the AIDS issue which is involving only to the homosexuals and fundamentalists. Hence, Grunig and Childers' (1988) original prediction of a strong relationship is retained here.

Finally it is expected, as situational theory predicts, that information processing will lead to breadth of cognition while information seeking leads to both breadth and depth of cognition. As also suggested by the revised situational theory, internal constraint recognition will lead to depth of cognition. That is, a feeling of lack of efficacy about influencing the development of one's country may lead to one getting to learn more detailed information about national development perhaps as a means of overcoming one's constraint. But one nonrecursive path between breadth and depth predicted by situational theory was collapsed in this study into a recursive path following Grunig and Childers' (1988) finding that the path from depth to breadth was negative and nonsignificant.

Methodology

It is important to note that the model proposed here is recursive--one in which relationship between variables is unidirectional rather than reciprocal. A nonrecursive model, on the other hand, takes into account bidirectional relationships or reciprocity.

The model proposed here has met the requirements for a recursive model (see Pedhazur, 1982, p. 582).

Measures

Political ambition. The political ambition scale used here had 8 items. Respondents were asked to rate the 8 items using a Likert scale: Whenever I return home: (a) I have a personal obligation to work in government; (b) I will be a political observer rather than player; (c) I would like to make some changes at home, and will try public office as a way to make the changes; (d) Politics does not agree with my life style; (e) Rather than make policy decisions in my country, I will be satisfied to see others make them; (f) I will be a political observer, not a player in my country; (g) I will not forget that working in a public office is the dream of everyone including me; (h) I must do what is necessary and fair to acquire the power to influence the masses. Items b, d, e, and f were reverse coded and these measures were combined to create an index of political ambition (Cronbach's ∂ = 0.72).

External problem recognition was measured using a 5-point scale ranging from "extremely serious" to "not at all a serious." The scale had 4 items of problems facing the Third World such as (a) food shortages, (b) corruption (c) civil crisis/disorder, and (d) political instability (Cronbach's ∂ = 0.80).

Level of involvement. A measure of Level of involvement again used a 5-point scale ranging from "extremely influential" to "not at all influential on your life" to assess subjects' involvement in underdevelopment problems such as: (a) food shortages, (b) poor health service (c) corruption, and (d) civil crisis/disorder (Cronbach's ∂ = .84).

Internal constraint recognition. Using a Likert scale, respondents were asked to rate their inability to understand the dynamics of underdevelopment such as : (a) The way corruption operates in many developing nations; (b) what causes the unequal distribution of resources in the developing world; (c) Health problems in many nations;(d) how to improve food production in many developing nations. Items b and d were reverse-coded (Cronbach's $\partial = .62$).

External constraint recognition. Respondents were asked to rate, using a Likert scale, their perception of how much they can influence public policy toward national development in their countries. The items were: (a) People like me can't influence policy decisions in my country; (b) For the most part, the government serves the interests of just a few groups such as bureaucrats and big businesses; (c) Even if I vote in my country, my vote makes no difference;

(d) Underdevelopment is a problem that I can do little about even if I know what to do (Cronbach's $\partial = .66$).

Information processing. A measure of information processing had two parts--for both print and broadcast media. Print media use was measured by asking the respondents how much time over the past week they spent reading newspapers and magazines from their home countries; from other developing countries; and from America. Broadcast media use was measured by asking the respondents how much time each day, over the past two or three days, they spent listening to both international and American radio and TV programs. The response choices for both media types ranged from "No Time" to "5 or more hours." (Cronbach's $\partial = .61$). This low alpha suggests a reevaluation of the measure of information processing in the future.

Internal problem recognition. With response choices ranging from "extremely interested" to "not at all interested," on a 5-point scale, respondents were asked how interested they were in: "the methods of population control," "the impact of corruption on national development," "the impact of civil crises/wars on national development," and "how political stability enhances national development" (Cronbach's $\partial = .73$).

Information seeking. Information seeking was measured by the sum of all positive responses to some 10 questions with 'Yes' or 'No' answers. The questions were: Within the past year, did you: (1) take any course because it would help you learn about national development? (2) check out a library book because it would teach you things about national development? Within the past one month, have you (3) attended a public presentation or seminar on politics? (4) been to the library mainly to read articles about politics in your country? (5) checked out a library book on the subject of population ? (6) checked out or sent for any publication dealing with national development? (7) sought any U.N. publication dealing with development issues? (8) discussed your country's development problems with other people from your country? (9) discussed development problems with someone from another country? (10) taken any other action not listed here to get information on national development? (Cronbach's ∂ = .66).

Breadth of cognition. Unlike the previous variables, this was measured by a direct summation of the number of correct answers out of seven questions which asked for (a) what the following acronyms related to world organizations concerned with national development stand for: WHO, IMF, UNDP, IBRD, IFAD; and (b) the correct answers to these two questions: "Is it correct to say that most developing nations are located in the northern hemisphere?" and "What world body is associated with the educational and cultural development of the different peoples of the world?"

Depth of cognition is also a direct summation of the number of correct answers out of six questions about respondents' countries--(1) Date of independence, (2) major export, (3) population, (4) illiteracy rate, (5) GNP (Gross National Product), (6) per capita income." A key (answer to each of the above questions for every country that was present in the study) was prepared from World Bank's *World Development Report* and each questionnaire was graded using this key. There was a plus or minus 5% tolerance for each answer. This means, for instance, that a question whose answer is 100 will accept as correct a range of answers from 95 to 105.

Repatriation Intention. Employing the Likert scale, this variable was measured by the statement: "Whether or not things work out here in the USA, on completing my education and other plans: I will return to live permanently in my home country; I will probably remain in the United States; I shall put what I have learned here to work in my country; I will live in the USA but visit my country often." Items 2 and 4 were reverse-coded for scale consistency (Cronbach's ∂ = .91).

Pretesting

The initial questionnaire for this study was pretested using 30 international students from the developing world. Their verbal as well as questionnaire responses from the pretest were utilized in modifying the final version that was administered to the study sample. Interviewers (many were graduate students) were trained on telephone interviewing.

Subjects and Procedures

The sample for this study comprised 400 students from the Developing World (Africa, Asia, Latin America, and The Middle East) schooling at a midwestern university in the US. A sampling frame of all Developing World students registered at the university in the Fall of 1991 was obtained from the office of registration and records, and stratified sampling method was chosen for its greater sample representativeness. Stratification was done by region--Africa, Asia, Latin America, and The Middle East. From a sampling frame of 779 students, 600 were accessible by telephone, and hence a stratified sample with the respective regional proportions in the original population was drawn from 600 subjects. Of the 600 contacted, 460 completed the interview, yielding a completion rate of 77 percent. Of the 460 returns, only 400 questionnaires were usable.

Data Analysis

Data was analyzed using SPSSx. The structural equations for the proposed path model were analyzed by regressing each endogenous variable on the corresponding independent variable(s). Then the path coefficients resulting from the regression analysis (Figure 2) were used to revise the model by deleting the nonsignificant paths. See the revised model (Figure 3). The criterion for deletion was statistical significance at the 0.05 level. Any paths within the 0.05 level of significance was retained. It should be noted that a direct path coefficient in causal modeling is the same as the standardized regression coefficient or Beta in regression analysis. Each coefficient represents the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable.

The revised model (Figure 3) was used for the decomposition of the correlations of the system of relationships in the model. Decomposition is the breaking down of a correlation coefficient into its composite parts, which is one of the advantages of path analysis (Asher, 1988).

In causal modeling (Pedhazur, 1982; Asher, 1988),

$$r = DE + IE + S + U$$

where r = correlation coefficient
DE = Direct Effect S = Spurious Effect
IE = Indirect Effect U = Unanalyzed Effect

The correlation between any two variables could be a combination of all or part of the above, but the components of interest are usually the direct and indirect effects, the sum of which provides the total effect (also called the effect coefficient) of an independent variable on a dependent variable.

Finally, the numerical solution of the revised model (Figure 3) was used to calculate the individual and total effects of independent variables on the dependent variables. The revised model was also used in calculating the goodness-of-fit (Q) of the model to the data as well as the statistical significance of the Q.

Results

Descriptive Analysis

Sample Characteristics

In a sample of 400 international students, 8% came from Africa; 8.2% from Latin America; 10% from the Middle East; and 73.7% from Asia (excluding Japan, Hong-Kong, Taiwan, Israel, and South Africa which are no longer classified as developing). There were 70.2% males, and 29%. 69.7% were single and 28.7% married; 0.2% person was divorced and 1% separated. Ages ranged from 18 to over 50, with the predominant age group being 19 to 25 years (49%) followed by 26 to 30 years (28%). The group between 46 and over 50 was the smallest (4%).

Of these students, 28% were in engineering; 19% in humanities; 10% in social sciences; 8.7% in computer information systems, and the rest classified as "other." Nearly half (49.2%) were in Graduate School with 31.7% in the master's, and 17.5% in the doctoral programs. 0.2% was in Law School, and 0.7% in Medical School.

Their religions were Christianity (27.2%), Muslims (22.7%), Hindus (15.2%) and Budhists (13.7%). Apart from the unclassifides (9.0%), the smallest group (10.5%) consisted of Atheists.

Attitude Toward National Development

The means and standard deviations for these situational (attitudinal) variables are presented in Table 1.

Internal problem recognition (interest in development issues), with the highest mean of14.21 (N = 400) suggests a high interest in development issues such as those used in this research.

External constraint recognition (the perception that one cannot influence development policies in one's country) with a mean of 12.21 (N= 400) suggests a feeling of high constraint, and thus inability to influence development policies in their countries.

The relatively low reliability coefficient for this measure suggest a future reexamination of the scale for this variable.

Level of involvement (the perception that underdevelopment has a significant impact on one's life) has the lowest mean (9.13; n = 400) suggesting that on the average, international students consider development problems ("food shortages, poor health services, corruption, and civil crises") as not having a significant impact on their lives.

For internal constraint recognition (inability to understand the dynamics of underdevelopment) and external problem recognition (the perception that underdevelopment is a problem for one's nation), their means respectively were 11.25 and 11.40 suggesting that on the average they do not perceive themselves as able to understand the dynamics of underdevelopment; nor do they perceive underdevelopment to be much of a problem for their nations. Similar to external constraint recognition, internal constraint recognition should also be reexamined in the future for possible scale adjustment because of its relatively low alpha here.

Communication Behavior.

Results of the students' media use are found in Table 2. **Information processing** (media use--a passive activity). In a period of one week, 36.2% reported reading American (USA) newspapers for one to three hours while 15.2% reported reading foreign papers for the same period. 34.5% read American magazines for 1 to 3 hours while 17% read foreign magazines in the same period. 26% listened to American radio for 1 to 3 hours in a two day period while in the same period, 27.7% watched television. Whereas in a period of one week, 10.2% reported read American newspapers for five or more hours, only 2% reported reading foreign newspapers for that long in a week. The situation is similar for magazines, radio, and television. Among the media types--print and broadcast--broadcast media were used more by developing world students than were the print media both foreign and American. This variable is another that may need future reconstruction because of low alpha.

Information seeking. Results on information seeking are found in Table 3. These results suggest that a majority of these students seek information through interpersonal communication rather than the media. Nearly 80 % reported discussing their nation's development problems with other people from their own countries, and 68.5 percent reported discussing development problems with someone from another country.

Political ambition. The mean political ambition for these students is 23.24 (N= 400; SD = 5.21) suggesting that on the average, students from the developing world tend not to have high ambition to get involved in their national politics.

Repatriation intention. This is the major dependent variable. The mean repatriation intention for these students is 15.2 out of 20 (N=400; SD=4.1) suggesting that they, on the average, have a high intention of returning home.

The Explanatory Model

The fourth purpose of this study is to determine how the variables of the proposed model (Fig. 1) affect one another and the major dependent variable--repatriation intention. To analyze a causal model, its "**Goodness of fit**"--an estimate of how well the model fits the data for the research--must first be ascertained. Q is an index that provides a measure of the validity of a causal model (its Goodness of fit). Chi-square (X^2) is another, although not as powerful as Q (Pedhazur, 1982). Table 4 shows the overall Goodness of Fit estimate (Q = .92) and Chi square (X^2 =31.2). Both indices show a good fit of the model to the data, thus warranting interpretation of the data.

Outcome of the hypotheses

Figure 2 shows the hypotheses with the numerical values of the different path coefficients (significant and non significant). Table 5 shows the outcome and interpretations of the hypotheses tested in the causal model. There were 17 hypotheses tested: 8 were supported, and 9 rejected.

Effects on communication behavior

Political ambition is the only variable that influences both communication variables--information processing and seeking. Only political ambition led to media use (information processing) in this research. Of the three variables--political ambition, level of involvement, and internal problem recognition--leading to information seeking, political ambition has the greatest influence on information seeking (see Table 5). The second most important variable leading to information seeking is level of involvement, and the least influencial is internal problem recognition.

Effects on the Cognitive Variables

Only one variable--information seeking--has a significant effect on the breadth of cognition (PC = .12; $p < .05$). Two variables--internal constraint recognition and breadth of cognition--affect the depth of cognition. While the former reduces the depth of cognition (PC = -.11; $p < .01$), the latter increases it (PC = .28; $p < .01$).

Effects on repatriation intention

Based on data from this study, three variables meaningfully affect international students' intention to return home eventually. Those variables are political ambition, information processing, and external constraint recognition. Of all the variables in consideration here, path analysis clearly suggests that political ambition is the one that influences the intention to return home the most (Effect Coefficient or total effect = 0.14; see polamb to repatria; Table 5).

Two variables are shown here to influence these students' intention not to return home eventually. They are information processing--media use (Effect coefficient, EC = -.12) and external constraint recognition (EC = -.16; Table 5) with the latter having the greatest impact on the intention not to return home (Excons-Repatria: EC = -0.16; Table 5).

Discussion

Results here suggest that, for Third World students in this university, the intent to influence public policy through (holding) public office in one's country (political ambition) leads to the desire to return home after one's studies in the United States. That is as it should be since political ambition will be meaningless without one returning home where one can actualize that intent. Further, political ambition also leads to active search for information that has utility for national development, as well as to the use of mass media. Again, this outcome presents no surprise given that knowledge is a vital quality for leadership, and can mostly be obtained through an active search for information. It also makes sense that an active searcher for information will use the mass media given media's "surveillance function" (Lasswell, 1969, p. 103).

Media use and the perception that one cannot influence development policies in one's country are both negatively related to the intention to return home (Table 5). That is, use of the mass media (American media) leads to the intention not to return home eventually as does the perception that one cannot influence development policies in one's country. It is understandable that fatalistic people will give up on solving that problem about which they feel helpless (Grunig, 1983), but it is not clear why the use of American media inhibits the desire to return to one's country as has also been documented in previous research (Okigbo, 1985). Okigbo in his study of Nigerian students in the USA, found that those Nigerian students who patronized U. S. media were more likely not to return home on completion of their studies in the USA. The persistent negative relationship between media use and the returning home of international students raises questions about the role of the media in the brain-drain issue. That question traces back to media content, and inevitably reawakens the issue at the core of the New World Information and Communication Order debate (for information on NWICO, see Masmoudi, 1979; Richstad & Anderson, 1981). What kinds of content do the American media disseminate about the developing world that has the impact of turning its citizens away from home? Is it their use of American media that affects their desire to go home, or are they interested in American media because of their lack of desire to go home? Further research is needed to provide answer(s) to these questions.

For the non-significant relationships, inability to understand the dynamics of underdevelopment did not lead to either media use or active search for information on national development. Similarly, the perception that one cannot influence national development policies did not lead to either of the communication variables. This seems to suggest that constraints do not motivate communication behavior contrary to conventional wisdom that the presence of a difficult situation encourages people to talk, read, write, telephone, (etc.) in order to find a solution to the problem. It is noteworthy, however, that this research found that these students do not perceive underdevelopment as being a problem for their nations. Perhaps this explains why they do not communicate about it.

Media use did not lead to knowledge of development issues, nor did it lead to interest in development issues. Although it is generally believed that mediated information affects its audience which is the basis for the expectation that learning should occur from media use, research on the effect of mediated content remains inconclusive (Wurtzel and Lometti, 1987). Graber (1984) notes that viewers recognize details if such details are recalled to them, but they "do not seem to gain much specific knowledge from the media" (p. 157). This perhaps explains the lack of significant relationship in this study between media use and knowledge acquisition. Perhaps, a more plausible explanation is the fact that American media, especially television (which was reported here as the predominant medium used by these students, Figure 2), usually carries little or no information relevant to Third World development (Mitra, 1975; Masmoudi, 1979; Weaver and Wilhoit, 1981; Riffe and Shaw 1984). Thus, even a heavy user of American media may not become knowledgeable of Third World development issues as a result of such media use.

Significance of study

This study conforms to what Grunig refers to as an applied research--research which applies a basic theory of communication to a practical problem of concern to the developing world--repatriation intention. It provides data on the psychological (attitude, motivation, communication behavior, cognition, and intention) frame of mind of citizens of the developing world regarding the development of their nations, an area that continues to require attention in national development. Data produced in this study provide development experts--theorists and practitioners--with a diagnosis of some of the serious problems plaguing the development of the new nation states. For instance, although these students perceive themselves as having an interest in national development, having the ability to influence development policies in their countries, and having the ability to understand the dynamics of underdevelopment, they do not recognize underdevelopment as a problem either for their countries or for themselves as individuals. Nor do they have much knowledge of national development issues (as found in this study).

It is not clear why they do not recognize underdevelopment as a problem. One reason could be definitional--what is development and underdevelopment? As it has been documented, there is no agreement on what constitutes development (Ogan, 1987). Whatever the reason however, this result is not good for Third World development. It has long been recognized by Dewey (1938) that one cannot communicate about a situation unless one recognizes such a situation as problematic. Grunig (1983) further noted that problem recognition or awareness is fundamentally important if any group of people will organize to seek a solution to an indeterminate situation. It seems almost impossible therefore, that people who do not recognize underdevelopment as a problem would even bother to seek a solution to it. The people must first recognize underdevelopment as a problem before the phase of development can be successfully implemented.

The data here also deals with one of the troubling issues in international relations--brain drain which is almost always from the developing to the developed countries of the world. Results here suggest that political ambition is the most important factor leading to the intention to return home, while the perception that one cannot influence policy decisions at home is the most serious factor inhibiting the intention to return home. What the developing world governments do to increase political ambition and political efficacy in these potential leaders is up to them. The good news in this respect is the advent of democracy to the developing world. If and when democracy (in the sense of respect for human rights) takes a strong hold in the developing world, citizens will acquire more freedom and wield more political clout. With this, hopefully, shall come an increase in political efficacy and ambition. What this means is that developmentalists will need to support and possibly work to ensure the survival of democracy in the developing world.

Limitations

A representative sample of all the Developing World students in the USA would be ideal for this kind of study, but time and financial constraints obviously make such an effort infeasible for this author. Hence, findings from this study can only be generalized to all Developing World students studying at the particular university at the time of study.

A study such as this that spans the entirety of the Developing World inevitably is likely to have a broader focus at the expense of analytical depth such as country by country analysis. For the purpose of this study, however, the variance introduced by breadth is as important as the depth there would otherwise have been. Perhaps of a smaller magnitude, but differences still exist even in a single country that may preclude indepth analysis of some variables that an investigator may need to include. Thus there will always be unanalyzed important variables in a study.

Delimitations

It must be noted that in as much as the issue of national development is a major concern of this study, this is not a study of the process of national development or an attempt to propound a theory of national development. This study looks at and calls for continued attention to what the author thinks is an indispensable element in the process of national development--the human phase of development. It is not an effort to study the role of mass media in national development. But its main importance to communication is that a better understanding of the human phase of development will facilitate and enhance the application of communication in national development.

Secondly, this research is not aimed at studying a Developing World population that is representative of the Developing World citizens living in their various countries. Although it is almost impossible, within the time frame it takes them to graduate from college here, to have lost all indigenous culture, most of these students may have undergone some acculturation as a result of having lived here for sometime. As such, they will seem unsuitable, as a sample representing the Developing World citizens living in their countries. Rather, this study is aimed at the developing world citizens who by virtue of their education and exposure to the outside world have become potential candidates for leadership roles in their various countries. For this kind of study, this population is among the most suitable.


POLITICAL AMBITION
EXTERNAL PROBLEM RECOGNITION
LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT
INTERNAL CONSTRAINT RECOGNITION
EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT RECOGNITION
INFORMATION PROCESSING
INTERNAL PROBLEM RECOGNITION
INFORMATION SEEKING
BREADTH OF COGNITION
DEPTH OF COGNITION
REPATRIATION INTENTION

FIGURE 1 THE THEORETICAL MODEL



* = p < .05
** = p < .01
POLITICAL AMBITION
EXTERNAL PROBLEM RECOGNITION
LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT
INTERNAL CONSTRAINT RECOGNITION
EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT RECOGNITION
INFORMATION PROCESSING
INTERNAL PROBLEM RECOGNITION
INFORMATION SEEKING
BREADTH OF COGNITION
DEPTH OF COGNITION
REPATRIATION INTENTION
.15**
.23**
.10*
- .00
- .02
- .03
- .12*
.08
.08
. 28**
-.01
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FIGURE 2. NUMERICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROPOSED MODEL


* = P < 0.5
** = P< .01
POLITICAL AMBITION
LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT
INTERNAL CONSTRAINT RECOGNITION
INTERNAL PROBLEM RECOGNITION
EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT RECOGNITION
INFORMATION PROCESSING
INFORMATION SEEKING
BREADTH OF COGNITION
DEPTH OF COGNITION
REPATRIAT INTENTION
.23**
.10*
.15**
.22**
-.12*
.13**
.12*
.28**
.11**
-.16**

FIGURE 3 THE REVISED MODEL

TABLE 1

Attitudinal/Situational Variables

Variable and items	Mean	SD	(N)
INTERNAL PROBLEM RECOGNITION	14.21	3.13	400
--defined as "interest in:"			
(a) methods of population control			
(b) corruption and national dev.			
(c) effect of civil crises and war on national development			
(d) effect of political stability and national development			
Cronbach's alpha = 0.73			
EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT RECOGNITION	12.21	3.13	400
(a) Can't influence policy decisions			
(b) Government serves a few groups			
(c) My votes makes no difference			
(d) Can't do much about underdev.			
Cronbach's alpha = 0.66			
LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT	9.13	4.29	400
Perceive a connection between one and the following:			
(a) food shortages			
(b) corruption			
(c) civil crises/disorder			
(d) political instability			
Cronbach's alpha = 0.84			
INTERNAL CONSTRAINT RECOGNITION	11.25	2.56	400
(a) Can't understand corruption			
(b) Understands unequal distribution of resources			
(c) Can't understand health problems			
(d) Can improve food production given the support.			
Cronbach's alpha = 0.62			

TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)

Variable and items	Mean	SD	(N)
EXTERNAL PROBLEM RECOGNITION	11.40	3.98	400
Perceive the following as problematic:			
(a) food shortages			
(b) corruption			
(c) civil crisis/disorder			
(d) political instability			
Cronbach's alpha = 0.80			

Internal Problem Recognition = interest in development issues.
External Constraint Recognition = the perception that one cannot influence development policies in one's country.
Level of Involvement = the perception that a situation has a significant consequence on one's life.
Internal Constraint Recognition = inability to understand the dynamics of underdevelopment.
External Problem Recognition = the perception that underdevelopment is a problem for one's nation.

TABLE 2

Passive Communication Behavior (Media Use) of International Students

	Those Reading NEWSPAPER (In a Week) %		Those Reading MAGAZINES (In a Week) %		Those Using RADIO (In 2-3 days) %		Those Using TV (3days) %
PERIOD	USA	INT'L	USA	INT'L	USA	INT'L	USA
No Time	15.5	61.0	22.5	63.7	24.5	80.2	9
< 1 hr.	28.5	20.7	23.7	15.7	16.0	11.0	0.5
1 - 3 hr.	36.2	15.2	34.5	17.0	26.2	5.5	28
>3<5 hr.	9.5	1.0	10.0	1.5	10.2	0.5	3.7
5 + hours.	10.2	2.0	9.2	2.0	23.0	2.7	41

USA = American (USA) media;
INT'L = Foreign/International media
Period = the length of time a student uses a particular medium in a specified time.

TABLE 3

Active Communication Behavior (Information Seeking) of International Students Concerning National Development

ACTIVITY	FREQUENCY n	%
Taking a course	113	28.2
Reading library book	135	33.7
Seminar	70	17.5
Reading politics	155	38.7
Population issue	54	13.5
Development publication	71	17.7
U. Nations publication	62	15.5
Talk with own people	319	79.7
Talk with others	274	68.5
Other action	108	27.0

n = number of people who reported seeking information on national development through each of the respective means listed above.

Table 4

Overall Goodness of Fit Estimate

Summary of Measures	Values
Degrees of freedom	26
χ^2 (Chi square)	31.2
Probability (p)	$<.30$
Goodness of Fit Index (Q)	.92

Q and the Chi square statistics are proposed as indices of goodness of fit (Pedhazur, 1982; Carmines and McIver 1981; Hayduk 1987; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1989).

TABLE 5

Outcome of proposed Hypotheses

	Hypotheses	Results	Conclusion
1.	Polamb -> Repatria	S	Those with political ambition intend to return home eventually.
2.	Polamb -> Infoproc	S	Political ambition leads to the use of mass media.
3.	Polamb -> Infoseek	S	Political ambition leads to purposive search for information that has utility for national development.
4.	Involvement ->Infoseek	S	The perception that underdevelop--ment has a significant impact on one's life leads to purposive search for development information.
5.	Intprob -> Infoseek	S	Interest in development issues leads to active search for information on national dev.
6.	Infoproc -> Repatria	S (-)	Use of the mass media (American) leads to the intention not to return home eventually.

TABLE 5 (CONTINUED)

	Hypotheses	Results	Conclusion
7.	Breadth -> Depth	S	knowledge of issues pertaining to the developing world in general leads to knowledge of development issues pertaining to one's own country of origin.
8.	Extcons -> Repatria	S (-)	The perception that one cannot influence development policies in one's country leads to the intention not to return home eventually.
9.	Intcons -> Infoproc	NS	Inability to understand the dynamics of underdevelopment does not lead to media use.
10.	Intcons -> Infoseek	NS	Inability to understand the dynamics of underdevelopment does not lead to active search for information on national development.
11.	Extcons -> Infoproc Extcons -> Infoseek	NS	The perception of inability to influence development policies does not lead to either media use or active search for dev. information.

TABLE 5 (CONTINUED)

	Hypotheses	Results	Conclusion
12.	Infoproc -> Intprob Infoproc -> Breadth	NS NS	Media use does not lead to interest in dev. issues or to knowledge of dev. issues pertaining to the dev. world in general.
13.	Intprob -> Repatria Involvement-> Repatria	NS NS	Neither interest in dev. issues nor the perception that underdevelop-ment impacts one's life significantly leads to the intention to return home eventually.
14.	Infoseek -> Repatria	NS	Active search for information does not lead to the intention to returnhome eventually.
15.	Infoseek -> Depth	NS	Active search for information does not lead to knowledge of development issues pertaining only to one's own country.

S = Significant relationship
NS = Non significant relationship
(-) = negative association

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American Imperialist Zeal in the Periphery: The Rural Press Covers the Spanish-American War and the Annexation of the Philippines

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Introduction and Background to U.S. Colonial Expansion into Asia

When war against Spain was declared by Congress on April 25th, 1898, the majority of American citizens were rural, and most of the media from which they received their information about U.S. foreign policy and the course of the war were local newspapers and agricultural publications. Of course, many of the editors of these publications were influenced by urban newspapers, particularly the New York-centered "Yellow Press," lead by papers like the *World, Journal, Sun, and Herald.*[1] The often manufactured stories from such papers about the dastardly deeds of the Spanish and their colonial enslavement of the Cuban people were sent westward to stir the righteous indignation and patriotic sentiments of America's heartland, while likely titillating them after a hard day of labor on the farm or in the small town.

This Yellow Press influence, however, was fleeting and composed only one factor in forming public opinion in the American heartland about the Spanish American War, the ensuing colonial expansion into Asia with the capture of Guam, and defeat of the Spanish naval forces in the Philippines in the war's first month. Farmers had access to much information in the already complex international market for agricultural commodities, although whether they could and did use this information is much less certain. William Jennings Bryan had appealed to such strong political elements as the radicalized farmers of the Midwest, miners and ranchers of the West, and loggers in the Northwest, as a base to nearly defeat the urban business class candidate, William McKinley, in the turbulent election of 1896. The rural versus urban conflict with the on-going demographic shift was very much reflected in the rural media, including its coverage of the war and issues related to the annexation of the Philippines. This paper is unique, we believe, in focusing on the agricultural press' coverage of issues related to American colonial expansion into Asia, and in reflecting upon what influence that coverage might have had on the larger debate on America's direction as an emerging power in the struggle for colonial and international market influence.

Taking the War to Asia

By the time the United States Congress declared on April 25th, 1898, that war existed with

Spain, much of the nation was in a jingoistic fury over "yellow press" reports of alleged dastardly acts of repression by the Spanish in Cuba, and particularly over the sinking of the US battleship Maine on Feb. 15th, with the loss of 266 of its crew. This extension of the Spanish-American War to Asia was the result of the success of Commodore George Dewey and his Asiatic Fleet's defeat of a decrepit Spanish naval forces in Manila Bay on the morning of May 1, 1898. That American expansion into Asia with Dewey's victory came as a surprise to most Americans is evidenced by then President William McKinley's reaction to news of this naval victory, when he is reported to have asked, "where are the Philippines?"

Harry Hawes wrote that McKinley was originally anti-expansionist, saying that before the war he had entertained vigorously anti-expansionist ideas. He quotes McKinley: "Forcible annexation, according to our American morals, would be criminal aggression."[iii] Hawes says part of McKinley's change in attitude toward annexation was due to his railroad tour of the far West in 1898, where he sensed a collective support for permanent domination over the Philippines to be strong among the crowds he addressed from the platform. Hawes says what was lacking was the sober conservative feeling which seldom finds utterances in such assemblies. He also notes the revulsion against imperialism which was to grow in the rural sector as such jingoistic fervor abated

That even in the far West of the United States, much of which had only been taken from Native Americans in the previous two decades, news and information about the war was of significant quantity to stir this jingoistic and imperialistic fervor, is evidence of the great strides that had been made in communication technology, particularly the telegraph and the trans-oceanic cables.

Although the communication technologies had grown more sophisticated, the level of reporting on the expansion of the war to the Philippines was in many ways unsophisticated, racist, and geographically and culturally inaccurate. Christopher Vaughan writes that even as it launched Asia's first anti-colonial revolution in 1896, the Philippines remained far outside American consciousness, and virtually absent from press accounts and public discourse alike. Vaughan adds that, "Geographical and cultural ignorance formed a basis for the international knowledge deficit that hindered American efforts at peaceful domination of the strategic soil and water contested for most of the first decade of the encounter." He adds that in 1897, the Philippine archipelago and its nearly eight million inhabitants lay so far beyond the horizon of American popular awareness, that it had to be explained in the most elementary of terms.[iv]

When the US press had virtually exhausted glorification of Dewey and his relatively easy victory at Manila, it began to deal with the issue of whether to continue with military operations against the Spanish garrison at Manila. It also began to cover issues of annexation and colonial policies effecting the islands and their inhabitants. The momentum of the naval victory at Manila and war hysteria in much of the United States helped to speed the McKinley administration's decision to continue with operations against Spanish land forces in the Philippines, which would lead to fighting a tragic three year guerrilla war against the Philippine "insurrectionists."

On May 7th Dewey telegraphed from Manila Bay to Washington that, "I control bay completely, and can take the city at any time, but I have not sufficient men to hold." [v] By the end of July 1898 over 11,000 American troops had arrived in Manila Bay , with 5,000 more on the way. This force was under the command of Gen. Wesley Merritt, who was appointed governor-general of the Philippines. These first land forces disembarked at the town of Cavite on the Bay. Because the bulk of the American regular army was engaged in fighting the Spanish in Cuba, much of the Philippine expeditionary force was comprised of 19 voluntary units, all but two (Tennessee and Pennsylvania) units were from west of the Mississippi River. The majority were probably farmers or sons of farmers.

When the American people began to embrace imperialism in the late 1800s, the United States was still predominately an agricultural nation. In 1900, it was 45.8 million rural and 30.2 million urban. This rural majority existed in an internal colonial relationship with the industrialized and metropolitan sector of the nation, and the larger Western European metropolis of which some consider New York City to be a part. In fact, at the end of the nineteenth century, "colonials" in rural America exerted a great influence on American views of foreign policy, opposing European market restrictions and pushing the metropolitans for overseas economic expansion, according to Williams.[vi]

Metropolitan businessmen and intellectuals were forced by the colonials in the agricultural sector to devote more attention to the fortunes of commodity and food exports, and politicians began to advocate for market expansion. This translated into concern in Washington for expanded market opportunities and the need to satisfy both the needs of the larger system dominated by the metropolis and the political needs of the producers of the raw materials - the colonials in new agricultural states and territories in the West. Williams says, "The colonials, not the metropolitan manufacturers or bankers, alerted the rest of the world to the challenge and the dangers of the rising power of the American economy," [vii] adding that:

> Hence the problem is devined as delineating the way the internal colonial majority came either to accept or acquiesce in imperialism. And the answer lies in understanding that the domestic colonial majority embraced overseas domestic expansion as the best way of improving its relative and absolute position within the system. The reason for this is that the domestic colonials were commercial farmers. They did not go to the land to escape the marketplace and live a life of quiet contemplation. They turned the sod and chopped the cotton to win a healthy share of marketplace rewards. They intended to be, and they were, men of the marketplace. And they knew that, in order to improve their position, they had to have either: (1) a domestic market capable of absorbing their vast production, (2) a foreign market sufficient unto their surpluses, or (3) a willingness to change their existing outlook and embrace some form of socialism.[viii]

In much of the Midwest, farmers embraced the promise of expanded markets for their spring wheat. So when this expansion into the Caribbean and Asia failed to improve the export market for their products, and failed to relieve their level of dependency on the railroads, flour mills and banks centered in cities such as Minneapolis and St. Paul, they then turned to the socialist experiments led by the Non-Partisan League, and eventually to a hard isolationist stance that included opposition to entering the First World War. Certainly in Midwestern and Western states farmers showed their adaptability both politically and economically, on both the domestic and international fronts. Farmers were generally bitterly dissatisfied with government economic policies, particularly following the Panic of 1893 and the agricultural depression that followed.

These dissatisfied farmers were often reluctant to accept the dominant explanation of overproduction for their economic woes. The depressed condition of agriculture was often attributed to other factors such as high freight rates, usury by bankers, price gouging by "middle men," and a contraction of currency. It was argued that underfed people could not afford agricultural products because of the withdrawal of money from circulation. Trusts were also blamed for inflated prices for agricultural inputs such as coal, lumber, twine and machinery. These were among the factors that tended to make Western and Midwestern farmers reject the projectionist and tariff policies proposed by the Democrats and to embrace the imperialist rhetoric put forth by leaders like Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and their own adopted son of the Wild West, Theodore Roosevelt. To these farmers territories like Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines looked like home to potentially millions of new customers for their superior grain, meat and other agricultural commodities. Thus they were willing to go overseas and fight for these new markets, or at least support their countrymen in the effort..

The Press Debates Annexation of the Philippines

The colonial relationship between the United States and the Philippines rapidly deteriorated with the first news reports of attacks by Filipino "insurgents" upon American occupation troops in February 1899. These large-scale attacks followed a relatively peaceful period after the quick and glorious victory over Spanish forces in Manila the year before. The attacks by the Filipino "insurgents" did a lot to damage public opinion initially favoring Philippine independence.

Without this change in American public opinion, it is unlikely the U.S. Congress would have ratified the Philippine annexation treaty with Spain negotiated in Paris. This treaty not only delayed Philippine independence for almost half a century, it handicapped Filipinos in establishing a national identity and political integration that facilitate the national development process. Strong objections to colonization of the Philippines were carried out both in the U.S. Congress and in the press. The farm press fully participated in the debate, although it never provided adequate information with regard to the effects of the war on the agricultural economy..

The debate quickly degenerated into a caustic and partisan one. On Jan. 7, 1899, Illinois Senator William Mason introduced a Senate resolution holding that the principle of self-determination ruled out annexation, stating that: "The government of the United States of America will not attempt to govern the people of any other country in the world without the consent of the people themselves, or subject them by force to our domination against their will."[ix] And on December 10, 1899, Missouri Senator George Vest introduced a resolution outlining constitutional impediments to Philippine annexation, stating: "Nowhere in the Constitution is there a grant of power authorizing the President to acquire territory to be held permanently as a colony. All land held by the United States must be prepared for eventual statehood."

In the U.S. press, Harvard professor William James, writing in 1900 for several influential newspapers, called the annexation "the most incredible, unbelievable piece of sneak-thief turpitude that any nation has practiced." James further attacked the proposed policy of "benevolent assimilation" as being criminal and contributing to the murder of another culture, adding: "God damn the U.S. for its vile conduct in the Philippines."[x]

Despite American news reports of such atrocities by American troops, mostly from farm states in the Midwest and West, such as extensive use of torture, the burning of villages and the internment of Filipino civilians in camps, by October 1899 popular support for annexation of the Philippines had gained such momentum in the United States that President William McKinley, initially opposed to it, finally lent his full support. Speaking in Springfield, Illinois in a classic defense of the concept of Manifest Destiny, McKinley said: "My countrymen, the currents of destiny flow through the hearts of the people. Who will check them? Who will divert them?...And the movements of men, planned and designed by the master of men, will never be interrupted by the American people."

Later McKinley justified his decision to annex the Philippines by saying that, "No imperial designs lurk in the American mind. They are alien to the American sentiment, thought and purpose. Our priceless principles undergo no change under a tropical sun, they go with the flag."[xi]

As the Philippines insurgency dragged on through 1902, and as newspapers reported mounting casualties, the American public began to lose heart for the campaign. Still support remained strong enough to bring the guerrilla war to a successful conclusion for the Americans. The effort required 126,500 American troops, of which 4,200 were killed and 2,800 were wounded. On the Philippine side, there were 18,000 partisans killed in battle, and an estimated 100,000 Filipino civilians who died as a result of the fighting and of related hunger and disease. It was a Vietnam-like conflict that grew increasingly unpopular in the United States and resulted in strong sentiments among Americans for granting Filipinos their independence.

As it did later during the Vietnam War seven decades later, the American press beginning in 1898 became a forum for a national debate with regard to the moral and practical value of the war being carried out against Filipinos. Anti-imperialist leader Mark Twain said that after the occupation of Manila, the stars and bars of the American flag should be replaced by the skull and crossbones. Twain added that, "We cannot maintain an empire in the orient and maintain a republic in America." In a reply that would especially appeal to Westerners, Roosevelt replied:

> Every argument that can be made for Filipinos could be made for the Apaches, and every word that can be said for Aguinaldo could be said for Sitting Bull. As peace, order and prosperity followed our expansion over the land of the Indians, so they'll follow us in the Philippines.[xii]

The Agricultural Press and Philippine Annexation Issues

The agricultural press joined the mainstream press in first reporting the beginning of the Spanish American War, and then the consequences as the Spanish were defeated and the military turned to putting down the Philippine insurgency. Within the agricultural press there was great diversity in support for the war and annexation, as well as a diversity of views on the potential economic effects of expansion and colonization. Many farm papers ran ads for discount subscriptions to the major New York dailies, wherein for one price a subscriber could get a Hearst or Pulitzer paper, along with their local daily or weekly. This indicates that even the most rural citizen could have relatively inexpensive access to the major foreign news and foreign policy debates. It also meant that they were susceptible to the Yellow Press' pro-war hysteria that raged in 1898. We must not assume, however, that only one or two factors influenced the position farmers took related to the war and to annexation of the Philippines.

The effects of the "Panic of 1893", a depression that especially hit the agricultural sector were still being felt at the beginning of the Spanish American War. These effects had added a very radical element to American agriculture, which especially rallied around the free silver issue that almost won William Jennings Bryan the presidency in 1896. Richard Hofstadter says of the period:

> To middle class citizens who had been brought up to think in terms of the nineteenth century order, things looked bad. Farmers in the staple-growing area seemed to have gone mad over silver and Bryan; workers were stirring bloody struggles like Homestead and Pullman strikes; the supply of new land seemed at an end; the trust threatened the spirit of business enterprise; civic corruption was at a high point in the large cities; great waves of seemingly unassimiliable immigrants arrived yearly and settled in hideous slums.[xiii]

Polls showed that leading Republican newspapers were pro-expansion as the war was starting in 1898. A sample of 65 newspapers taken by *Literary Digest* in August 1898 showed that 43 percent were for permanent retention of the Philippines, 24.6 percent were opposed, and 32.4 percent were wavering. Wavering was said to mean they had previously opposed expansion. A *New York Herald* poll of 498 newspapers the same year found that 61.3 percent were in favor of annexation, with the New England and Middle States showing clear margins in favor. The West was reported to be strongly opposed to annexation, and the South was in favor by a thin margin. In a 1900 poll the *New York Herald* found that of 241 Republican papers, 84.2 percent favored expansion, and for Democratic papers, 71.3 percent were opposed.[xiv]

A review of major agricultural publications indicates that farmers, who tended to be Democrats, were generally opposed to United States foreign policies related to "expansion," "imperialism" or "manifest destiny." It is apparent that many in the agricultural sector were conflicted with regard to this opposition, which was often tempered by strong feelings of patriotism. Early in the war it was difficult to resist the robust jingoism of the era, and the propaganda the New York-based Yellow Press was able to disseminate across the nation.

It appears that patriotism was the strongest motivation for farmers supporting expansionist policies, or who were hesitant to openly criticize them. In the Northeast, Midwest and West, this patriotism was very much a remnant of the Civil War, which had ended only 33 years before. Many Union veterans were Midwesterners or Westerners and many of these were farmers. It was easy for the Republican party of President McKinley to "wave the bloody shirt" of the Civil War to gain support for the Spanish American War. The Philippine "insurrectionists" were even accused of the same disloyalty to the Union that Confederates and their sympathizers had once exhibited, despite the fact they had never been American citizens or professed any semblance of loyalty.

At the same time U.S. farmers tended to be very suspicious of the motives of politicians, business executives, military leaders and expansionist newspaper editors. If farmers supported the war, they tended to express the feeling that it should be brought to a swift conclusion. Even Democratic leader William Jennings Bryan, who would soon become the most vocal and effective critic of annexation, would seek a commission as an officer of Nebraska volunteers in the Spanish American War, fearing that any appearance of disloyalty would tarnish his image.

Anti-imperialism was initially an unpopular stance to take and it was often the radicals who led the way, particularly farmers, miners and loggers in the West and Northwest, who had been hurt hardest by the Panic of 1893 and the resulting depression. The rationality of the market seemed to win the debate, although all sectors of the economy seemed to influence the debate over expansion and annexation. Williams says[xv]:

> Watching the statistics, and evaluating the evidence, metropolitan businessmen and intellectuals increasingly devoted more attention to the fortunes of commodity and food exports, and to the relevance of that pattern for their own operations. Politicians began to act within the framework of that new metropolitan concern for market expansion as well as respond to colonial agitation and pressure for the same objective.

Method

In order to analyze coverage of the Spanish-American War and Philippine-American War in U.S. agricultural publications, nine such publications were examined for the period between mid-1898 as the war was beginning, to July 1902 when the Philippine theater of that war was winding down. Exact beginning and ending dates for examination could not be adhered to, because of the variation in publishing schedules. Content specifically related to the war and its effect on agriculture as well as political opinions expressed about the war were. Accounts of battles and strategy were primarily from wire and other news services or lifted from urban newspapers. These often lengthy and detailed accounts were for the most part ignored for the purposes of this study. The analysis is qualitative for the reason that it was relatively easy to isolate stories or content directly related to agricultural economics and the war. As we will report later, there wasn't much of it. For that reason a systematized and quantitative content analysis generally did not appear to be the most effective method for utilizing the data and carrying out a productive and comprehensible analysis. Publications examined are: The Farm Journal, a monthly newspaper published in Philadelphia (additional information is available in Quebral, 1970); The Maine Farmer, a weekly newspaper published in Augusta; The Massachusetts Ploughman, a weekly newspaper published in Boston. The Michigan Farmer and State Journal of Agriculture, a weekly newspaper published in Detroit; The Progressive Farmer, a weekly newspaper published in Raleigh, North Carolina; The Southern Cultivator, a semi-monthly published in Atlanta, Georgia; The Southern Planter, a monthly published in Richmond, Virginia; Wallace's Farmer, a weekly published in Des Moines, Iowa (additional information is available in Schapsmeier & Schapsmeier, 1967); and The Dakota Ruralist (later named The Dakota Farmer), a weekly published in Aberdeen, South Dakota (avowedly socialist). These nine publications were not randomly selected, but are thought to be generally representative of agricultural publications of the period. Hundreds of farming periodicals--weeklies, biweeklies, and monthlies; local, statewide, regional and national; specialized and general--were being published at the turn-of-the-century in the United States.[16]

The Farm Journal and Wallace's Farmer were two of the largest farming publications of the period; the other six s were included because they were high quality, and/or distinctive publications representative of variations in geographical regions, in dominant crops and in production methods. Of course, another reason for their selection was availability on microfilm to the researchers. Microfilmed volumes of alternative agricultural publications were often unavailable for the 1898-1902 period, or there were too many missing volumes for those years.

Early Indications of Optimism for the War Boosting Agricultural Prices

The March 26, 1898, issue of The Michigan Farmer was a very early instance of a newspaper speculating about what a war with Spain would do to the prices of farmers' products. The article did not specifically advise farmers to attempt to sell goods to the U.S. military, but instead implied that a farmer could increase profits when a war is on regardless of whether he or she is a military supplier or not. The predicted impact was significant for virtually all agricultural products, including for horses, mules and cowhide. With regard to demands for food, the paper reported:

> In articles of food, the government supplies its army with hard bread, barreled pork and beef, bacon, coffee, sugar, and fresh beef and salt. These are called marching rations, and in camp are reinforced with various vegetables, soft bread, vinegar, etc. All these articles are of good quality, free from adulteration, and provided in quantity ample for even the ravenous appetite of a soldier during a campaign. The sudden and large demand that would at once be made for the articles enumerated above would be sure to advance values, and this would be reflected in higher prices for cattle, hogs, wool, hides, wheat, oats, corn, hay, and sugar..... The highest range of values would probably materialize soon after war was declared, and future values would be gradually reduced when once the enormous productive capacity of the country was directed into the special lines which would be required for the use of army and navy when engaged in active hostilities. That is what we think would be the effect of a foreign war upon the value of farm products.

There seemed to be no follow up on any such predictions made early in the war. Readers of The Michigan Farmer never were very informed by the paper whether such speculation was accurate. Little evidence was found in the content analysis that readers were informed effectively of the war's actual impact on the agricultural economy. Readers were warned that there might be a temporary shortage of imported goods such as sugar and coffee, as the war progressed. The Michigan Farmer and other papers continued to explicitly and indirectly speculate on what effects the war was having on its readers, with little effort to provide a reliable analysis. The May 7, 1898, Michigan Farmer pointed out:

> If, as some predict, the war comes to an end within a few weeks (which we do not believe), another strong prop would be knocked from under the [wheat] market. If, on the other hand, it should be extended indefinitely, the result would be a strengthening in values of breadstuffs. It is likely to last until the fall months at least, and it must be a strong support to the market until it ceases.

Perhaps because of market complexities and apparent lack of data, farmers' opportunities to benefit from the war were never adequately reported, alternative market factors related to the war were routinely discussed but never resolved with hard evidence in the papers. A May 28, 1898, Michigan Farmer article speculated on whether wheat prices had increased because of the war or because lower yields in other wheat producing nations were increasing U.S. prices. The Dakota Farmer identified factors of the war that echoed the major campaign issues of the agitated 1896 presidential election, particularly the issue of the money supply, when it provided this somewhat indecisive and questionably reliable report on May 15, 1898:

> If war continues for any length of time it will result in much good to the producer, said a member of one of the leading commission firms in Chicago and one of the largest individual feeders in the state, who was at the yard looking after some business interests. A two months or a six months war, on the other hand, will operate just the other way....Dealers in Chicago have already begun to feel the hardening effect on the money market. The large money lenders of the east are drawing in their money as fast as possible, no doubt to be prepared to take up any interest bearing bonds the government may be compelled to issue, and this has tightened money correspondingly with us.

The Dakota Farmer from the beginning of the war avoided the kind of jingoistic optimism about the war that many papers borrowed from the New York-based Yellow Press, although the Dakota Farmer did early in the war publish its share of maudlin and sentimental tributes to the soldiers who were fighting and dying in Cuba and the Philippines. For instance, on June 1, 1898, a page one article beginning, "Where Sleep the Brave," begins:

> In these closing hours of springtime, while we anxiously await the latest news from the battlewaves, listening to hear above the scream of shot and torpedo the cry of victory, and to see above the smoke and din the star and stripes streaming heavenward, we turn reverently and with love-laden hearts and flower-laden arms to the graves of those who fell fighting for an immortal principle.

The June 1, 1898 Dakota Farmer reported a large increase in foreign trade, especially for wheat for the ten months ending April 30 (five days after the declaration of war), indicating that the export economy was already strong as the war was beginning. As in all articles about the war between 1898-1902, it fails to mention the war as a factor at all in the agricultural economy, at least as that economy impacted its readers. The article titled, "Our Enormous Foreign Trade," never speculates on the acquisition of Cuba or the Philippines as factors in increasing export market opportunities, stating:

> Our trade in merchandise, corrected for May 14th, shows a very large increase of exports over imports. During the ten months ended April 30, 1898, the exports of merchandise exceeded by $127,497,435 the exports during the corresponding period of 1897...The cause of this most gratifying condition of our foreign trade, for almost the whole of it is due to the phenomenally large foreign demand for American agricultural products.

Those few publications that did engage in speculation about the effect of the war on agricultural commodity markets, agricultural newspapers also tended to engage in attempts to persuade the military to consume more of the agricultural products their state or region produced in quantity. On June 4, 1898, for example, the Michigan Farmer claimed that soldiers at the front should be eating pork and bacon, not beef, due to alleged logistical problems of providing fresh beef while the army was in the move. On July 2, 1898, the Michigan Farmer also endorsed cheese in soldiers' diets, and on July 9, explicitly said they should eat cheese rather than beef.

Farm editors seemed to understand that provisioning the military during the war was unlikely to provide significant economic benefits to their farmer subscribers. Rather, there was speculation and guarded optimism expressed that the results of the war, particularly annexation and colonization, would eventually produce a positive increase in consumption and exports. The July 30, 1898, Michigan Farmer (in addition to information about trade with Cuba and Puerto Rico), noted that trade with the Philippines had actually declined since the war began. The paper went on to suggest that annexation of the Philippines would result in a reverse in this trend..

The Dec. 24, 1898, Massachusetts Ploughman professed to answer the "ultra conservative" question, "What kind of market can eight to ten million naked savages make for American manufactures?" It assured its readers that, "Contact with American civilization will change them and make them want more and more of American goods, and will also train their people to work so as to supply their increased needs."

The Southern Cultivator raised the question: if the United States had a larger market, would farmers be smart enough to take advantage of it? The Sept. 1, 1898, Southern Cultivator explained that, "We have so few large cities that our home markets are easily supplied. We must depend largely upon foreign markets." The editorial urged farmers to study the existing markets and to develop strategies to succeed in them, rather than relying on the vagaries of new foreign markets. As in other commentary and coverage in our sample publications, there was little concrete information provided that might assist a farmer in taking advantage of expanding foreign markets created by the war. And Southern Cultivator expressed little confidence that farmers would or even could take its advice, as it said on March 1, 1899:

> It is time for Southern farmers to wake up and keep well to the front. Everybody else is alive and looking for opportunity, but the Southern farmers are many of them still asleep or rubbing their eyes to see if day is breaking.

The Dec. 24, 1898, Massachusetts Ploughman minimized the importance of the Philippines as an export market but detailed the benefits and advantages of trade with China[xvi], citing annexation of the Philippines as a means of expanding and securing the vast China market. It said:

> Providential interposition that the Philippine Islands have come to us without our seeking, at just the time when we are feeling the need of wider markets, and when we have shown in nearly every kind of production that we can produce nearly everything more cheaply than can anybody else. The fact that the Philippines are under our control gives us a right to interfere in this defense of our own commerce as we could not do without it. We are on the great highway to Asia, and can reach it from our Western coast States more easily than European nations can by the round-about way through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean...."All the indications now favor an enormous traffic in American manufactures across the Pacific Ocean within the next few years.

The Jan. 13, 1899, Wallace's Farmer also suggested that annexation of the Philippines was primarily an advantage with regard to securing favorable trade with China. It suggested that if the U.S. followed an "Open Door" policy on free trade with the Philippines, it would have a greater moral influence on negotiating for an open door policy with "all parts of the Chinese empire, whether under Russian, German or English influence."

Reporting Actual Market Advantages Created by the Acquisition of the Philippines

A year after the beginning of the war, there was a significant unfavorable trade imbalance with the Philippines, although this could be blamed on Dewey's extended naval blockade and on continued fighting between American troops and Filipino insurgents. The April 1, 1899 Michigan Farmer quoted the U.S. Bureau of Statistics figures to the effect that the U.S. was importing $250 million in goods from its new possessions and exporting only $100 million to them, including $22 million to the Philippines. Confidence was expressed that development of the islands would reduce the imbalance. The Jan. 5, 1899 Maine Farmer simply claimed that "Power in the world's markets comes with a demand for breadstuffs and other necessities never before equaled," and told its readers on Feb. 21, 1899, that with regard to the Philippines, "a richer land or group of islands, as regards area and population, variety of agricultural, mineral, and forest resources undeveloped, cannot be pointed out on the map of the world." Combined import and export trade with the Philippines was only $30 million in 1894, but would surpass the $200 million mark, the newspaper asserted. The April 13, 1899 Maine Farmer, drawing from the U.S. Bureau of Statistics report, went into extensive detail about Philippine products and exports, teasing that only one-ninth of the islands' "very fertile" land was under cultivation.

By Aug. 17, 1901, the Massachusetts Ploughman was reporting that farmers were becoming nervous about potential competition from all of the new possessions, but asserted that there was little need to worry. A year later it was able to report that trade with the Philippines doubled between 1899 and 1901, although it hadn't doubled from much and anti-imperialists cited the enormous cost of the war in lives and property to belittle the improved trade figures. They were easily able to produce convincing statistics indicating that trade with the Philippines could not rectify the tremendous military expenditures for the war for many decades, nor could it atone for the loss of over 7,000 American lives.

There were other negative impacts of the war cited by farm publications. For example, the July 21, 1898 Maine Farmer complained that farmers were having to pay more for Philippine twine due to Dewey's blockade. The Dakota Farmer on July 15, 1898 published two large ads, headlined: "The Binding Twin Famine" and "Cordage Famine!: One of the Unfortunate Results of Admiral Dewey's Blockade at Manila Harbor." Portions of the text of the second ad suggest that the blockade would create a cordage dearth throughout the "civilized world," adding that the blockade has, "doubled the price of manila rope and twine in this country, and by doubling the price of manila hemp has made fortunes for manufacturers who had large stocks in reserve." Both ads suggest that a bumper wheat crop would result in farmers having to regress to the "old fashioned method" of binding their sheaves with straw.

Anti-Imperialist Sentiments Reflected in the Rural Press

Although the Spanish American War was ostensibly fought to free the Cubans from the Spanish, there is little to indicate that American troops fighting in the Philippines, who were mostly from agricultural states in the West, had such high aspirations with regard to freeing Filipinos. With the defeat of the Spanish in Manila, a hatred for the Philippine insurgents developed among the occupation troops. This animosity soon turned against the Filipino people as a whole, who were often referred to as "niggers" by the American troops and in agricultural press accounts. According to Cooper and Smith, conditions for the troops had rapidly declined by mid-August 1898. All Midwestern and Western governors who had mobilized their National Guard units for the fight against the Spanish were under tremendous pressure to bring their troops home after the Spanish forces quickly surrendered in the Philippines. Cooper and Smith state that:

> Most American troops lacked sleep when logistics broke down completely in the confusing days after the battle (for Manila). While many went hungry, others became sick from eating the native food. Tired, hungry, confused, they took their anger and frustration out on the jostling Filipinos. The majority probably did not yet hate the Insurgents, but they did not trust them either.[xvii]

Many of these farm boys began to fill their letters home with descriptions of their plight and of the folly of the polices and planning that were causing their suffering. These letters found their way into the rural newspapers, swaying opinion away from support for the war. The soldiers themselves provided strong arguments against annexation of the Philippines, and further colonial expansion. Volunteers, their families and officials of the states that had sent volunteer regiments began to press the War Department, which was not prepared to release any such volunteer units, since it was only beginning to execute a long and drawn out war to exterminate or to force the capitulation of Gen. Aguinaldo and his well organized Filipino insurgents. Both morale and condition of the U.S. troops declined as they were informed that they would not be returning home as expected. Their despondency and anger were further aggravated by the policy quarrels that were beginning at home, including the rise of strong anti-imperialist sentiments.

Occupation duty tended to be monotonous and hard on military discipline. Among the troops prostitution and related diseases flourished. There were many incidents of drunk and disorderly behavior, insubordination, sleeping or drinking on guard duty, and harassment and striking of Filipino natives. There were also epidemics of dysentery, malaria and other tropical diseases. By October 1898, the sick rate for units like the First North Dakota Volunteer Regiment were as high as 21 percent.[xviii] The Dakota Ruralist was scathing in its attacks on what it called "Our Imperial Army." On March 2, 1901, it reported the "Infamous Disease Record of the Philippine Army," with an accompanying chart showing an increase from 210 in 1898 to 3,678 1900 in soldiers on the "sick list" for venereal disease. This could hardly have had a positive effect on the wives, girlfriends, and relatives of the men serving in the Philippines.

The volunteer units, like the regular Army units, engaged in torturing of prisoners, the looting and burning of villages, and increased harassment of civilians. One officer, Lt. Charles Gentile, described a Feb. 5, 1899 advance on Pasay, "as an opportunity to go looking for niggers." Sergeant William H. Lock wrote to a friend at home, "I tell you the way the insurgents were killed was something awful. There was such a feeling among the boys towards them that they shoot them down like they were hunting jackrabbits." Later he wrote that: "most of the boys say, as the cowboys did of our North American Indian: A dead Philipino is a good Philipino." John Kline described an incident where a volunteer accidentally shot a woman through the chest as she held a baby, while his unit attacked suspected insurgents in a village.

Volunteer John Russater noted in his diary on Feb. 7, 1899, that his unit had orders to burn every house where there was evidence of occupation by insurgents, as well as permission to shoot any insurgent who resisted being searched.[xix] They also began to plunder food from the villages, even when they had plenty of their own. Looting, burning and intimidation of Filipinos was said to mark American behavior throughout the insurrection, although there were orders by commanders to control their men in the field. Such restraint became more important as a policy to pacify the Filipinos developed, partly due to the increasing cost of the war and a growing American public aversion to military actions and atrocities reported from the Philippines.

Reports of atrocities and public sentiment against annexation began to be reflected in agricultural publications such as the *Dakota Ruralist*, which under a February 21, 1901 headline, "Our Duties to the Heathen," the writer vividly expresses the disgust many Americans were feeling about the war in the Philippines, which had been going on for three years:

> From Greenland's icy mountains and Manila's coral strand, the poor benighted heathen call away to beat the band. They're achin' ter be civilized, in every heathern land, an' we've gotter have an army fer the job. The heathern are a-callin to our noble Christian race. America with all the rest has got to set the pace, and for our surplus produc's we must have a market place -- and we've gotter have an army for the job.

The Press Debates Annexation of the Philippines

Strong objections to colonization of the Philippines were echoed in both the U.S. Congress and in the press. The rural media fully participated in the debate, such as covering the Senator Mason introducing his resolution on Jan. 7, 1899, and Senator Vest introducing his resolution on Dec. 10, 1899,"[xx] or publishing the commentary by William James.[xxi]

On March 27, 1902, the Dakota Ruralist printed a letter from an American soldier describing the "water cure" practiced against recalcitrant Filipinos who wouldn't provide information. It details how a victim would be bound, laid on his back and have water, kerosene or coconut oil forced down his throat until he was bloated. He would, according to the description, be kicked or punched in the stomach. A May 15, 1902 front page story in the Dakota Ruralist is equally graphic in its description of the water cure, using it to reinforce its obviously anti-imperialist sentiments:

> An army of brutalized men were sent over to the Philippine Islands, in the name of Christian civilization, to subjugate the people to the United States government, by shooting them down like dogs. The soldiers treat the Filipinos very cruelly. They often receive orders to shoot every human being that comes in sight, man, woman and child. The "water cure" is a new punishment, invented for the sake of finding out secrets from people who know something about the army forces. By the command of an officer, they take a man, bind his hands and feet, take him over to a tank and full his body with water; then some of the soldiers throw themselves upon him, squeeze the water out again, and when he recovers a little, they again do the same thing to him. This is kept up so long till he either tells all he know or dies.

Despite American news reports of such atrocities by its own troops, such as extensive use of torture, the burning of villages and the internment of Filipino civilians in camps, by October 1899 popular support for annexation of the Philippines had gained such momentum in the United States that President William McKinley, initially opposed to it, finally lent it his full support. Speaking in Springfield, Illinois in a classic defense of the concept of Manifest Destiny, McKinley said: "My countrymen, the currents of destiny flow through the hearts of the people. Who will check them? Who will divert them?...And the movements of men, planned and designed by the master of men, will never be interrupted by the American people."

Later McKinley justified his decision to annex the Philippines by saying that, "No imperial designs lurk in the American mind. They are alien to the American sentiment, thought and purpose. Our priceless principles undergo no change under a tropical sun. They go with the flag."[xxii]

As the Philippines insurgency dragged on into 1902, and as newspapers reported mounting casualties, the American public began to lose heart for the campaign. Still support remained strong enough to bring the guerrilla war to a successful conclusion for the Americans, although the effort required 126,500 American troops, of which 4,200 were killed and 2,800 were wounded. On the Philippine side, there were 18,000 partisans killed in battle, and an estimated 100,000 Filipino civilians who died as a result of the fighting and of related hunger and disease. It was a Vietnam-like conflict that grew increasingly unpopular in the United States and resulted in strong sentiments among Americans for granting Filipinos their independence.

It may have been too late to change the public perception about how the war in the Philippines was being carried out. McKinley and his administration had much to defend. Teddy Roosevelt, as war hero and vice presidential candidate in 1900, was one of the chosen apologists for McKinley's foreign policy. He was a natural, since he had done much to lobby for the fight with Spain and the annexation of the Philippines.

It appears, in fact, that the agricultural press, even those papers opposing imperialism, were reluctant to admit that the United States had engaged in ignoble acts with regard to the Philippines. The Sept. 23, 1899, Michigan Farmer, for example, offered:

> There is no question but the commercial results of Dewey's victory in Manila Bay will outweigh anything we had ever imagined as to our Pacific Ocean trade....But this is not the issue at stake. If it is, God pity us! If we cannot justify before the world our position to date in the Philippines, and the policy concerning them, which is generally accredited to the present administration, we shall have to take our place among the nations as a most brutal example of force employed for greed--an example of high promises and unworthy attainment. The issues involved in the Philippine question are moral. We believe the problem will be settled on moral lines.

Press Speculation on Philippine Competition With U.S. Farm Products

Both the Dec. 3, 1898, and Feb. 11, 1899, issues of the Michigan Farmer raised the specter of U.S. farmers competing against those in the Philippines, especially with regard to sugar, and to a lesser degree with regard to tobacco. Under the headline, "Future of the Beet Sugar Industry," the Dec. 3rd story argued that it would be years before U.S. farmers felt the competition from Philippine cane sugar, by which time dropping prices would increase consumption anyway. It did hint, however, that imports eventually could put the domestic sugar growers out of the sugar business. The second article was even less optimistic, concluding that sugar beet farming hinges on contingencies such as development of the sugar industry in our new territories, maintenance of the state bounty, and continuation of the tariff duty on foreign sugar. The story advised farmers to continue growing beets, regardless of the risks, but to avoid investing capital in sugar factories. This was one of the few stories identified in the sample of farm publications that made an attempt at advising farmers. Since sugar was the main export commodity of the Philippines, we suspect it was easier to provide a sound market analysis.

Sugar was the primary concern of farmers with regard to issues of Philippine annexation. Sugar and abaca made up roughly 75 percent of Philippine exports, while tobacco and coffee comprised about 13 percent. American occupation was to lead to preferences for Philippine sugar imports, causing a significant growth in production until the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1934 set quotas for all exporters to the United States[xxiii]

Starting at the end of 1898, when it became clear that the Philippines might be annexed by the United States, the agricultural press began publishing information about farming in the islands. This information generally was printed without editorial comment, so that farmers had to calculate for themselves the degree of threat the Philippines posed with regard to market competition for U.S. products. Both the Dec. 20, 1898, and June 6, 1899 issues of the Progressive Farmer, for instance, included information about agriculture in the Philippines.

The Dec. 24, 1898 Michigan Farmer reported that a federal expert would go to the Philippines to study the agricultural situation there, and the May 27, 1899 issue of that paper published a glowing report of all of the islands' crops and exports, including rice, corn, fruit, coconuts, and cigars. In fact, information about Filipino agriculture seems to have appeared increasingly frequently, including in the Michigan Farmer on Nov. 11, 1899, and in 1900 in the issues for Nov. 11, Feb. 10, May 12, May 26, June 9, July 14, Aug. 11, and Aug. 18. Such stories also appeared in issues of the Massachusetts Ploughman on Nov. 18 and Dec. 30, 1899, and on Jan. 27, 1900.

The Nov. 11, 1899 Michigan Farmer was one of the few publications to provide detailed import and export statistics for each new U.S. possession. For example, it reported that the U.S.

exported 42,289 tons of coal to the Philippines in the first nine months of 1899, versus 11,085 tons during the first nine months of 1898. It also reported exports of 143,293 yards of cotton cloth in 1899 versus 1,714 yards in 1898. The Jan. 27, 1900, Massachusetts Ploughman detailed Spanish exports to the Philippines in 1896, the last year before the American occupation, to provide a base of comparison for markets since the U.S. acquisition of the islands. The newspaper editorialized, "Not only is all this trade likely to come to the United States in the future because of better goods and cheaper transportation, but it is likely to be largely increased by the better condition of the people under our Government...." As was usually the case, the newspaper failed to offer advice on how readers could act to take advantage of these new market conditions.

The powerful sugar lobby was one that generally opposed Philippine annexation and began a struggle for the imposition of tariffs against competitive Philippine products. The Feb. 4, 1899, Michigan Farmer reported such trade debates at length. Under the headline, "Working the Agricultural Press," the publication detailed the objection by some US senators to inserting anti-imperialist articles from the farm press into the Congressional record, saying many of these papers were engaged in “a very systematic and subtle attempt to mislead the people of the country with respect to the question of expansion.” It reported Sen. Charles Fairbanks of Indiana as arguing:

> The agricultural press of the country as a rule has occupied a high position in the confidence of the people, and we are sorry to see its influence used in promoting the projects of any schemer. It will surely end in lowering its own self-respect and forfeiting the good opinion of the agricultural classes. Let us all be frank and honest in expressing our opinions, and fair to those who differ from us, but keep clear of all schemes and combinations, which will assuredly make this great engine of progress and advancement liable to the suspicion of being mercenary and dishonest.

The Indiana senator acknowledges the power of the agricultural press to sway national public opinion and political forces at the time of the Spanish American War, lamenting that many in the rural sector had come to reject colonial expansion.

Summary and Conclusions

It would be assumed that the traditional functions of the agricultural press during the late 19th century were to inform agricultural producers about the economic, legal, meteorological, technological, demographic, and other conditions directly impacting their readers. But a reading of the agricultural press of the Spanish American War period reveals a very limited amount of space devoted to agricultural news. Pages were filled with news and commentary concerned with management of the farm house, medicine, fashion, poetry, and with political and economic news and commentary generally unrelated to farming.

Farm publications, such as those in our sample, were often sold in combination with general interest and general circulation newspapers and magazines, but it appears that the farm press was meant to provide virtually all the reading a farmer or his family would require. This might reflect an inability for most farmers to afford more than one or two publications

A closer reading reveals clearly that the agricultural press was not fulfilling the functions that might be expected of a trade press. In the midst of rapidly expanding import and export opportunities, the agricultural press devoted very little, if any space to import and export information. Even when such information was provided, there was no advice as to how the farmer might act upon it by increasing their profits, decreasing losses, increasing productivity, or lowering their workloads.

Agricultural publications had no need to appear impartial or passive with regard to the possibilities of exploiting new markets overseas. Most of their readers were small farmers assumed to be generally allied against the power elite of politicians, retailers, bankers, transportation executives, although it is true that taking a hard stand against the McKinley Administration's foreign policies and adventurism might in some way alienate major advertisers or Republican political patrons. There was little to indicate that this was the case, however, since there was no particular indication of a strong endorsement for such policies in the papers analyzed.

When these agricultural publications did address foreign trade, such as in articles about beef exports to Cuba, or competition from imported sugar, they provided seemingly factual and statistical detail, but this type of reporting was rare from our observations.

It is also possible that the audience for these publications was relatively uneducated and unable to absorb complex information about the international agricultural market. Again, this assertion could be challenged on the basis of the complexity of much of the other content of the agricultural publications, which included sophisticated news and analysis on hundreds of other topics unrelated to agriculture. The *Dakota Ruralist*, for instance, carried long and complex pieces by Leo Tolstoi, detailing his social and political theories for rural transformation. The papers also carried long analysis pieces on the Spanish American War and its projected effects, along with other international news and commentary.

This paper set out to demonstrate the agricultural sector was very much integrated into the world economic system by the late 1890s, and that the agricultural media reflected the sophistication of this integration. Although it is obvious the rural media was sophisticated in its analysis of the causes and execution of the war, it was unsophisticated in regard to its analysis of issues specific to agricultural economics and market exploitation.

Rural states, despite their physical isolation, fully participated in a collective analysis, through the press, of the factors of American imperialism and colonial expansion, actively supporting President McKinley's foreign policy at the beginning of the Spanish American War. They then tended to turn against these policies as the Philippine Insurrection dragged on. This initial support for the war was the result of rural economic and social conditions at the time, including an agricultural recession resulting from factors of the Panic of 1893. It was also the result of historical factors such as remnant patriotism and nationalism from the recent Civil War era.

Farmers could only get the impression from the papers analyzed that overseas markets such as the Philippines and Cuba would not solve their economic problems. There is clearly a lack of adequate agricultural market information to sustain farmer interest or optimism with regard to the conflict. A farmer could only conclude from the coverage that the war was not producing the agriculture market results that had been predicted in mid-1898, as the war was beginning.

It is most likely that reliable international agricultural market information was simply not available for the Philippines, and what was available was primarily in regard to crops that most farmers weren't producing themselves, or in regard to crops that were unlikely to reach the same markets that these farmers traded in.

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A Content Analysis of *The Jerusalem Post* - Bias in Syria-Related and Har Homa Articles

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Abstract

This content analysis was conducted with two separate samples. The first was a constructed two-week period, representing 1997. The second was a six-day period, beginning July 30 and ending August 6, representing a period of conflict. The highest category of main article theme fell under the "conflict" grouping. Most stories had Isreal as their main focus, with the highest number of proper mentions. A greater number of sentences in the lead of each article fell in the "report/attributed" category, with very few in the inference and judgment categories. More official Isreali sources were used over the entire year, but more Arab sources were used during the conflict period. This study is a demonstration that *The Jerusalem Post* contains elements of bias, however external factors played a role in the results of the content analysis.

Introduction

The Middle East peace process claims that all parties to the Madrid talks agree on the principle that comprehensive peace is priority for Israel and all the Arab neighbors, not just Palestinians. This includes Jordanians, Lebanese and Syrians. Progress between Israel and Syria has been slight to date. Face-to-face talks between the two sides have been suspended since February 1994. Diplomacy dictates that there will be no viable peace unless Syria is a participating party. (Milward, 1996)

The positions of the two nations did not have any significant alteration in the eleven rounds of the Madrid negotiations. Syria wants to regain full control of the Golan Heights captured by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War and since settled by approximately 10,000 Israelis. It wants a commitment by Israel to return this territory, and withdraw from the land it occupies in south Lebanon, before it will discuss possible peace settlements. Israel concedes Syrian sovereignty on the Golan Heights but will only consider a phased withdrawal over a period of years as terms of a Syrian peace agreement are enacted.

Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar has said that the issue of total Israeli withdrawal is not negotiable. Syria coordinates its moves in the peace talks with Lebanon. Syria's position has always been that a common and coordinated, pan-Arab stand in negotiations would achieve the greatest benefit for all, however, Egyptians and Jordanians have broken the coordination rule, signing agreements with Israel. (Milward, 1996)

The risks for Syria in this conflict include the factor of time. Syrian President Assad's age and failing health add pressure to the arrival of a timely settlement. Syria is essentially under one man's political rule and there is almost definitely bound to be in-state fighting over rule upon his death. There is also the danger that peace agreements with Israel will open doors of democratic privilege to a society that is presently without.

The role of media in this situation is considerable and complex. Syrian government allowed national television stations to broadcast live from the rose garden of the White House, including the handshake between King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin on July 25, 1994. Then Prime Minister Rabin's speech to the Congress, including its Hebrew portion, was also permitted across Syrian air waves. This may have been a tool to prepare Syrian citizenry for a settlement with Israel; it may have been a ploy to foster good-will. At any rate, it is obvious that these countries' media are used as propaganda to promote political ideology. The aforementioned Madrid peace talks have been reported to be, "the media event of the year... no diplomatic resolution of issues was in the immediate offering; *the meeting was the message*" (Bennis, 1992,).

For a small country, Israel has a powerful press, which is reflected in that over 85.5 percent of the adult population reads a newspaper on a daily basis (Gallup Israel, 1992). There are eleven Hebrew dailies and one English daily, *The Jerusalem Post* (Kamalipour, Mowlana, 1994).

> ...the operating environment for Israel's Arabic-language press is far more stringent than for the Jewish press (Hebrew and foreign language)... given Israel's sensitivity to its security situation, the Arabic press is held to stricter standards of political 'incitement' and discussion of military-related issues. As a result, Arabic-language newspapers have been closed down for limited periods of time and on a few occasions have been forced to go out of business permanently (Kamalipour, Mowlana, 1994).

The struggle over information in Israel is paramount to this study. Although the state has numerous publications and venues of expression, they are often unbalanced and not representative of the total national inhabitants. The Israeli military censor takes responsibility for all publications which are produced in Israel and the occupied territories.

> ...the restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza are much stricter. Whereas Israeli newspapers are only required to submit materials that relate to security matters, the East Jerusalem papers are required to submit all materials, including crossword puzzles, advertisements, and photos. The decision of the military censor is final and there is no process of appeal (Wolfsfeld, 1988).

Given these readership figures and the Arab press restrictions, it can be deduced that what is printed in the Israeli dailies is of vast importance and widely known. Any incidents of bias or subjectivity could prove to be perilous to Arabs and Israelis alike and the potentially harm the chances of peace accords with Syria and other neighboring countries.

The purpose of this study is to content analyze a constructed, two-week sample of *The Jerusalem Post*, Israel's only English daily, to canvass instances of possible bias in a represented year. The second sample will be taken from a week representing a period of crisis in Israel. Both the front page and news sections will be reviewed. If incidents of subjectivity are found in either time period, the implications could be far-reaching for the state and international affairs, as illustrated above.

Literature Review

In the review of available literature on the topic of media coverage of Arab/Israeli conflicts, many researchers have come to see the topic as a compound, seemingly infinite and never-ending uncertainty. Whether concern lies in type or quantity of news coverage, there is an overall assertion that coverage in its essence is significant to the state of affairs. The State of Israel, established in a military takeover in 1948, is located on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean, bordered on the north by Lebanon, on the northeast by Syria, on the east by Jordan, and on the southwest by Egypt. In 1967 Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, the last remaining parts of Palestine. Its population is approximately 5.2 million, 82 percent Jewish. About 14 percent are Arab Muslims, slightly over two percent are Christian, just fewer than two percent are Druze and there are a small number of black Hebrews, Vietnamese, Samaritans, and Bahai.

Most of the rhetoric of the Middle East in the United States is not depictive of the actual situation at hand. The "average American," as defined by Edward Said in *Peace in the Middle East* (Said, 1992), "the person who watches Peter Jennings, the MacNeil-Lehrer report, or Nightline, or reads the newspaper" may forget that this conflict is not simply an issue of Israelis versus Palestinians. The above mentioned countries are also very much involved with equally high stakes at risk.

Thomas L. Friedman wrote in "Israelis And Palestinians Struggle In The Spotlight" (Friedman, 1989), "The intensity of the spotlight that has been focused on Israel has profoundly affected the way Israelis and Palestinians think of themselves and the way television viewers and readers in the West think of their conflict." Due to their geographical location and their battlefield on "holy land," Palestinians have received immense media coverage that could be seen as both a benefit and a misfortune. Freidman said that after Israel's action in Lebanon and the West Bank, media coverage may have shifted to a less positive tone, which Israeli leaders blame on foreign press, not their own actions.

In an article relating to biases in perception, memory, and reasoning, Holly Stocking and Paget Gross examined errors that may force bias on journalists (Stocking, Gross, 1989). The authors discuss the fallacy of depending on "eyewitness" accounts. While readers may lend high credibility to such statements, the fact is that "Observations can vary and err as a function of a variety of factors such as prejudice, temporary expectations, the types of details being observed, and stress. It is very easy, in other words, for one's observations (an one's memories about observations) to be distorted or flat-out wrong." Hamill, Wilson, and Nisbett (1980) observed that people favor anecdotal information over base rate information, usually because it is more vivid. Readers tend to focus on specific individuals, rather than the culture or population from which the individuals come. Illusory correlation was defined as the readers' connection of two things that are commonly linked together in news stories. For example, if the terms 'Muslim' and 'fundamentalist' are used together often enough, audiences will begin to equate them together involuntarily over time. Fundamental attribution error occurs when a reporter attributes some specified action or behavior to his or her own qualities, rather than to "situational factors." If the same reporters are writing on similarly related issues for an extended period of time, their own biases may eventually factor into the account.

Dennis Lowry studied "administration-related" broadcasts during a three-month summer period in 1969 and a two-month period in 1970 in "Agnew and the Network TV News: A Before/After Content Analysis" (Lowry, 1971). He outlined nine content categories that described individual sentences found in newscasts in terms of type and attribution. Six additional categories were added to three existing ones discussed by S. I. Hayakawa in "Language in Thought and Action." It is significant, for this study, to note that these categories can be applied to international news content and that anything that is not a "report" statement may denote bias.

In "Arab vs. Israeli News Coverage in the New York *Times*, 1976 and 1984," Deborah Barranco and Leonard Shyles examined Mideast coverage and the ways it may influence public opinion formation and, subsequently, Washington's policies (Barranco, Shyles, 1984). Specifically, the authors studied the accuracy of news statements and "aggrandizement" bias in the New York *Times*. A random sample of articles concerning Mideast issues, events, and leaders were collected for six-month periods, beginning May 1976 and January 1984. Articles were evaluated according to two separate news focuses: whether "aggrandizement" bias existed and whether the frequency of Israeli coverage as opposed to ten, individual Arab countries' coverage made the former's issues more salient and prominent in the medium. Proper nouns in headlines were used to tabulate the proportion of articles devoted to covering Israel as compared to that devoted to each Arab nation. "Overall, the Headline Proper Mention analysis demonstrates that almost 40% of all Mideast proper mentions across both periods are devoted to just two countries - Israel and the United States" (Barranco, Shyles, 1984). The authors concluded that,

> Such coverage of the Mideast has the potential to mar the American, as well as the international, comprehension of issues and event in that region. Such a bias not only holds Israel up to unrealistic expectations, but further aggravates Mideastern wounds by infecting the international news agenda with disfigured perceptions of the Mideast (Barranco, Shyles, 1984).

In "Images of Arabs and Israelis in the Prestige Press, 1966-74," Janice Monti Belkaoui conducted a content analysis from a sample of *Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report*, and the Sunday New York *Times* (Belkaoui, 1978). She examined articles concerning Israel and fourteen Arab countries, including Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. One category classified the publications' method of attribution. Judgmental adjectives and descriptive phrases were coded in the Descriptive Image category. "This category represents the publications' most direct editorial means of image creation" (Belkaoui, 1978). The data in both categories were coded as favorable, neutral, or unfavorable. The author concluded that certain words in the press are unquestionably symbolic and create explicit images, especially adverbs and verbs used to attribute statements to their source.

> The verb 'cry,' for example, colors the entire tone of a speaker's message. On one level, the press uses verbs and adverbs in the normal process of attributing information to speakers. On quite another level, it becomes a way to identify a certain manner of behavior with the speaker, a means of dramatizing his style of discourse and of dividing the world into the realms of 'good guys' and 'bad guys' (Belkaoui, 1978).

A study, "Foreign News Coverage in Two U.S. Wire Services," by David H. Weaver and G. Cleveland Wilhoit, examined the differences between coverage of less developed and more developed countries (Weaver, Wilhoit, 1981). The sample was selected from the morning cycle of Associated Press TTS Interbureau wire and the United Press International state wire. The major classification categories dealt with news story topics and themes, and the nationality and position of the main actors within the stories. Coders identified the topic of each story according to 47 subjects, including "politics within states," "military and defense," and "human interest." "Principals in each story were classified into one of 31 possible positions" (Weaver, Wilhoit, 1981). The list of themes included such things as, "espionage" and "nuclear arms proliferation/limitation." The authors found that,

> stories from the less developed countries are significantly more likely than are stories from more developed countries to be about diplomatic/political activity between states, internal conflict or crisis, armed conflict or the threat of it, military aid, and political crime... Radically different definitions of news than those that exist today might help greatly in promoting not only international but also intranational understanding and cooperation (Weaver, Wilhout, 1981).

Statement of Hypotheses

H1a:There will be more conflict-oriented
stories than not in *The Jerusalem Post*
dealing with Syrian - Israeli relations.
H1b: There will be more conflict-oriented stories than not in *The Jerusalem Post* dealing with the Har Homa settlement.

The Weaver and Wilhoit study found that typically, stories from less developed countries focus on, "elections, political violence, internal conflict or crisis, and armed conflict than do stories from the more developed countries." The publication is more likely to maintain status quo and please its predominantly Israeli readership if incidents of crisis and/or conflict are reported regularly.

H2a:There will be a greater number of unlabeled,
inference statements in *The Jerusalem*
Post pertaining to Syria-related articles.
H2b:There will be a greater number of unattributed,
judgment statements in *The Jerusalem*
Post pertaining to Syria-related articles.
H2c:There will be a greater number of unlabeled,
inference statements pertaining to Har Homa.
H2d:There will be a greater number of unattributed,
judgment statements pertaining to Har Homa.

The Lowry article fashioned nine sentence "types," regarding sentence attribution and source. The Israeli publication is under minimal governmental content regulation and need not adhere to the strict codes of assignment dictated to Arab presses.

H3:There will be a greater frequency of mentions of
Israel than mentions of the Har Homa settlement or
mentions of Syria.

The Barranco, Shyles study found that 40 percent of Arab/Israeli content space in the New York *Times* was allotted to U.S. and Israel; the remainder split between ten Arab countries. It is logical to infer that in these stories of Israeli events, Israeli sources were used, giving them more attribution.

H4:There will be more use of Israeli sources than
of Arab sources.
H4a:There will be more use of Israeli "officials"
than Arab "officials" as sources.

The Belkaoui study found that the words immediately following sentence or statement attribution are a significant means of editorializing news content. If *The Jerusalem Post* is indeed a propaganda tool to push the government's message, words following statements that are attributive and the sources that are chosen should illustrate the image the publication is attempting to create of Syrians. More Israeli attribution will be cited to paint a favorable image, and the opposite holds true for Syria-related items.

Method and Research Design

The method that utilized in this study was content analysis. In Content Analysis: An Introduction To Its Methodology, Klaus Krippendorff distinguished the types of content analysis that may be employed to examine data in terms of systems, standards, indices, linguistic representation, communications, and institutional processes (Krippendorff, 1980).

> (1) *Pragmatical Content Analysis* - procedures which classify signs according to their probable causes or effects (e.g., counting the number of times that something is said which is likely to have the effect of producing favorable attitudes toward Germany (or in this case, Israel) in a given audience.)
> (2) *Semantical Content Analysis* - procedures which classify signs according to their meanings (e.g., counting the number of times that Germany (Israel or Syria) is referred to, irrespective of the particular words that may be used to make the reference.)
>
> > (a) *designation analysis* - provides the frequency with which certain objects (persons, things, groups, or concepts) are referred to, that is, roughly speaking subject-matter analysis (e.g., references to German (Israel or Syria) foreign policy).
> > (b) *attribution analysis* - provides the frequency with which certain characterizations are referred to (e.g., references to dishonesty).
> > (c) *assertion analysis* - provides the frequency with which certain objects are characterized in a particular way, that is, roughly speaking, thematic analysis (e.g. references to German (Syrian) foreign policy as dishonest).
>
> (3) *Sign-vehicle analysis* - procedures which classify content according to the psychophysical properties of the signs (e.g., counting the number of times the word German (Israel or Syria) appears).

Berelson (1952) listed seventeen uses of content analysis, among which are,

> to audit communication content against objectives...to expose propaganda techniques...to identify the intentions and other characteristics of the communicators... to determine the psychological state of persons or groups... to secure political and military intelligence...to reflect attitudes, interests, and values ("cultural patterns") of population groups... to reveal the focus of attention...to describe the attitudinal and behavioral responses to communication(Bereslon, 1952).

Mass media, as defined by Denis McQuail in Mass Communication Theory, (McQuail, 1995) are a "power resource." This means that the media have "a potential means of influence, control and innovation in society; the primary means of transmission and source of information essential to the working of most social institutions." McQuail asserted that the media are the arenas where many affairs of public life are played out and they are a major source of definitions and images of social reality. George A. Miller's Communication, Language, and Meaning (Miller, 1973) asserted that communication occurs when different events are closely related and the language used strongly affects psychological perspectives on the subject matter.

> Do we in fact have techniques that enable us to control people? The answer is "yes." There presently exists a behavioral procedure that can exert powerful control over people's thoughts and actions. This technique of control can cause you to do things you would never think of doing otherwise. It can change opinions and beliefs. It can be used to deceive you... language is by all odds the most subtle and powerful technique we have for controlling other people... the *psychology* of communication, therefore, must be concerned with relations between different mental or behavioral events (Miller, 1973).

This illustrates the great importance of studying media content. Content analysis allows for the quantification of data in order to empirically classify messages, their meanings, and possible effects they may induce. For the purposes of this study, a sample of articles from *The Jerusalem Post*, Israel's only English daily, was studied. The data was collected from the publication's on-line Web site, which is archived from January 1, 1997 on. A constructed, two-week period, representative of the entire year (1997), was analyzed. An additional week, July 30 through August 6, was also analyzed for the same categories. The objective was to get a sample of the entire year and during a period of crisis. Both the front page articles and those appearing in the news section of each edition were reviewed. The articles in each time period were assessed for their proper noun contents of "Syria," "Israel," and "Har Homa." "Syria-related" items were defined as all items where the major source of action, or the major subject of the news item were any of the following: Syrian President al-Assad; Syrian foreign ministry or government officials; U.S. or other country negotiations with Syria; or any other mention of the proper noun 'Syria.' These articles were coded in their entirety, in an effort to analyze sentence content, type of sentence, proper noun frequency, and any descriptive characters immediately following or preceding attribution.

Sentence content was defined in the following categories: diplomatic/political activity between nations; internal conflict or crisis; elections, campaigns, appointment, government changes; armed conflict or threat of; peace moves, negotiations, settlements; monetary questions, exchange rates, money supply; military aid, weapons, advisors, training; non-political crime, police, judicial, and penal activity, political crime; religion, human interest, odd happenings, animals, sex, etc. These eleven categories, as taken from the Weaver and Wilhoit study (1981), are exhaustive but not necessarily exclusive. Therefore, the coder determined the category of main emphasis of each article . Sentence type was defined as one of the following: report/attributed; report/unattributed; inference/labeled; inference/unlabeled; judgment/attributed; judgment/unattributed; all other sentences. These seven categories, as taken from the Lowry study (Lowry, 1971), are exhaustive and exclusive and were analyzed through the lead paragraph of each story.

"The Effectiveness of Random, Consecutive Day and Constructed Week Sampling in Newspaper Content Analysis," by Daniel Riffe, Charles F. Aust, and Stephen R. Lacy (1993), compared "20 sets each of sample of four different sizes using simple random, constructed week and consecutive day samples of newspaper content." The authors found that a constructed week is more efficient than random or consecutive day sampling. They further revealed that, "two constructed weeks would allow reliable estimates of local stories in a year's worth of... issues."

The two weeks used as the sample was randomly constructed by placing the numbers 1 through 52 in a hat. The numbers were randomly drawn to represent a particular day of the week and then replaced in the hat. For example, if the number 14 were drawn for a Tuesday, then the fourteenth Tuesday of the year became part of the data set of the constructed week. This was done for each of the days of the week, excluding Saturday because *The Jerusalem Post* does not publish a Saturday edition.

Proper noun frequency was determined as any instances of "proper noun mention," meaning the frequency of Syria's and Israel's appearance in the entire news story. Proper nouns included: Syria, Israel, Syrian, Israeli, any mention of Syrian or Israeli names of officials, towns, or actions, also any mention of Har Homa. This method, modeled from the Barranco and Shyles study (1984) determined the frequency and therefore the legitimacy and attribution allotted to both sides. Sources and their occupation that are cited throughout the story were documented as well. In the Belkaoui study (1978), these categories helped to illustrate disparities in news reporting and stylistic ploys of influencing public opinion. The unit of analysis for Hypotheses one, three and four, was the entire article. The unit of analysis for Hypotheses two was the sentence.

Intercoder Reliability

Intercoder reliability was assured by having another coder analyze 10% of all articles examined in the study. Using Holsti's formula for determining intercoder reliability, it was found to be .89.

Presentation of Results

Table 1

Topic of *Jerusalem Post* news item according to country addressed

	Country					
	Conflict Period			Entire Year		
Topic	Israel	Har Homa	Syria	Israel	Har Homa	Syria
Diplomatic/political activity between states	3.5%	0%	0%	14%	0%	100%
Internal Conflict or Crisis	39	0	0	23	100	0
Elections, Campaigns, Appointments, gvt.	3.5	0	0	5.5	0	0
Armed Conflict or threat	11	0	100	12.5	0	0
Peace moves, negotiation, settlements	7	0	0	12.5	0	0
Monetary, exchange, money	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military aid, Weapons, Advisors, Training	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-political crime, police, judicial, penal activity	11	0	0	5.5	0	0
Political Crime	14	0	0	7	0	0
Religion	11	0	0	9	0	0
Human Interest	0	0	0	11	0	0
	100% n=28	0% n=0	100% n=2	100% n=56	100% n=4	100% n=2

lambda=.78125, s.

Lambda was used instead of x because more than 20% of the cells have ns of 5 or fewer.

This table illustrates a fairly strong correlation between variables with a lambda of .78. During the period of conflict, 100 per cent of the stories concerning Syria fell into the "armed conflict or threat category." There were no mentions of the Har Homa settlement. The greatest number of stories on Israel were in the "internal conflict or crisis" category at 39 percent, followed by "political crime" stories at 14 per cent. The categories of "armed conflict or threat," "non-political crime," and "religion," had the same number of stories, at 11 per cent. The "peace..." and "elections..." categories had fewer stories, at 7 per cent and 3.5 percent respectively. There were no stories in the "monetary," "military," or "human interest" categories. Over the entire year, 100 percent of Syria-related stories were on "diplomatic/political activity between states." In Har Homa-related stories, 100 per cent covered "internal conflict or crisis." Articles about Israel were mostly on "internal conflict" at 23 per cent, followed by coverage of "armed conflict" and "peace moves..." both at 12.5 per cent.

Table 2

Type of Sentence according to subject of article

Subject of Article

Conflict Period

Type of Sentence	Israel	Raw #	Har Homa	Raw #	Syria	Raw #
Report/Attributed	43.75%	(49)	0%	(0)	100%	(8)
Report/Unattributed	45.25	(51)	0	(0)	0	(0)
Inference/Labeled	2	(2)	0	(0)	0	(0)
Inference/Unlabeled	4.5	(5)	0	(0)	0	(0)
Judgment/Attributed	0	(0)	0	(0)	0	(0)
Judgment/Unattributed	4.5	(5)	0	(0)	0	(0)
	100% n=112		0% n=0		100% n=8	

Table 2A

Type of Sentence according to subject of article

Subject of Article

Entire Year

Type of Sentence	Israel	Raw #	Har Homa	Raw #	Syria	Raw #
Report/Attributed	43%	(98)	25%	(3)	87.5%	(7)
Report/Unattributed	41	(94)	25	(3)	0	(0)
Inference/Labeled	5	(12)	8	(1)	0	(0)
Inference/Unlabeled	9	(20)	42	(5)	0	(0)
Judgment/Attributed	0	(0)	0	(0)	12.5	(1)
Judgment/Unattributed	2	(4)	0	(0)	0	(0)
	100% n=228		100% n=12		100% n=8	

Table 2 shows that during the conflict period, approximately half of the sentences used in articles concerning Israel were "report/attributed," with the other half being "report/unattributed." There were very few statements that fell into categories that were not "report" sentences. There were no articles during this period on the Har Homa settlement. All statements in Syria-related articles were "report/attributed." Over the entire year, there was a similar split between attributed and unattributed report sentences concerning Israel. Approximately half (42 per cent) of sentences in Har Homa-related articles were "inference/unlabeled." There were an equal number of "report/attributed" and "report/unattributed" sentences (25 per cent) in Har Homa articles. Concerning Syria-related articles, the majority of sentences fell into the "report/attributed" category, at 87.5 percent. Only one sentence qualified as "judgment/attributed."

Table 3

Frequency of Proper Mentions of country or subject according to time period

Proper Mentions	Conflict Period	Entire Year
Israel	89%	75%
Har Homa	1	11
Syria	10	14
	100% n=102	100% n=256

x^2 =11.3, df=2, p<.01, s.

During the conflict period, 89 per cent of the proper mentions belonged to Israel, leaving 10 percent to Syria and one per cent to Har Homa. Over the entire year, 75 per cent of proper mentions went to Israel, 14 per cent to Syria, and 11 per cent to Har Homa.

Table 4

Occupations according to nationality of sources

	Nationality			
	Conflict Period		Entire Year	
Status of Sources	**Arab**	**Israeli**	**Arab**	**Israeli**
official	84%	74%	69%	88%
non-official	16	26	31	12
	100% n=19	100% n=66	100% n=26	100% n=139

$*x^2$ =5.63, df=1, p<.02, s.
$**x^2$ =.3995, df=1, p>.05, n.s.
$***x^2$ =70.9., df=3, p<.05, s.

*=entire year
**=conflict period
***=combined

The conflict period shows that there were more official Arab sources cited (84 per cent) than Israeli (74 per cent). The opposite is true for non-official sources, with 16 percent being Arab and 26 per cent being Israeli. However, the total number of Israeli sources cited is far greater (n=66) than Arab (n=19). During the entire year period, more Israeli official sources were cited (88 per cent) than Arab officials (69 per cent). The opposite was true for non-official sources, 31 per cent belonging to Arabs and 12 per cent Israeli. Again the total number of sources cited was far greater Israeli (n=139) than Arab.

Discussion and Conclusion

The results of this study indicate that the level of bias in *The Jerusalem Post* is as high as initially perceived. Table 1 shows that the category of "diplomatic/political activity between states" was the most frequent article topic during the entire year of 1997. Regarding the Har Homa settlement, the category of "internal conflict or crisis" was the only one utilized as an article focus. During the conflict period, "armed conflict or threat," was the most used category for Syria-related articles and "political crime" was the most popular in Israel-related articles. A lambda of .78125 indicated a strong association between the variables and support for the hypothesis.

Table 2 suggested that most of the sentences in lead paragraphs of news stories were in the "report/attributed" category. These results were not supportive of the second hypothesis - no unlabeled inference or unattributed judgment sentences were used pertaining to Syria or Har Homa during the conflict period. Over the entire year, there were five unlabeled inferences regarding Har Homa, which made up 42% of all mentions of that particular settlement. During the year, there were no unattributed judgment sentences in lead paragraphs referring to Syria, but there was one attributed judgment sentence - making up 12.5% of all Syria-related mentions.

The third hypothesis was supported in Table 3, with 89% of proper mentions belonging to Israel during the conflict period and 75% over the entire year. However, this may be expected since *The Jerusalem Post* is an Israeli publication. Hypothesis four was supported for the entire year, but not for the conflict period. In the sample representing 1997, approximately 88% official Israeli sources were used, with 12% being non-official. This can be compared to the 69% of Arab official sources and 31% of non-official Arab sources. However, during the conflict period, there were more Arab official sources cited than Israeli. There were also fewer non-official Arab sources used than Israeli non-official sources.

Other aspects of the news article that were not measured in this study must be taken into account. For example, headlines such as, 'There was a smell you'll never forget,' 'Religious dispute holds up terror victim's funeral,' 'Peled urges US to study roots of Islamic terror,' and 'Where terror lurks,' do not lend themselves to favorable perceptions of Syrians or any other Arabs, painting a rather sinister picture of an entire ethnic population. Obviously, in such unfortunate cases as the late July bombing in the Maheneh Yehuda market (the scope of the conflict period sample), self-pronounced Arab terrorist groups like Hamas were indeed fairly defined as suicide bombers. They set off a bomb in attempts to kill civilians and themselves. However, excessive use of derogatory labels, misuse of sources, and basically unobjective reporting is unwarranted and unnecessary. This is particularly harmful in a forum that is looked to as "the newspaper of record" in Israel and believed by so many internationally. Additionally, use of sources leaves a subconscious impression in the minds of readers. In a subsequent review, the author found that out of nineteen Arab sources cited during the period of conflict sample, Yasser Arafat (PA Chairman) was used five times. One individual was quoted more than

26% of all times Arab sources were mentioned, always in the form of a public or officially released statement, that may or may not have been directly applicable to the article's central topic. Israeli sources were often contacted for the specific scope of the article. When a large percentage of Arab attribution is placed on one man (Arafat), who is viewed as a dubious authority by many anyway, and painstaking efforts are made to include an array of Israeli sources, this can by no means be qualified as unbiased reporting of the events at hand. All of the articles were written by the same ten reporters during the conflict period, who are members of *The Jerusalem Post* staff. All ten of the reporters are Israeli. With the same Israeli reporters covering all significant, front page and news section events, it is once again only rational to assume their biases will factor into the news account.

Further article content that may not necessary fall into the categories allotted for this study on bias could have the same affect on readers as those articles that did. For example, in an August 31, 1997 article, it was reported that "...inspired Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu to describe it as potential supplier of oil to Israel and an ally in the multinational struggle against Islamic extremism." A March 24, 1997 article reads, "...while it is difficult to prove Arafat specifically told the radical Islamic organizations to carry out suicide attacks, he met with the leaders of these organizations upon his return from the US two weeks ago and gave them to understand that this was his message." Other allegations can be witnessed in a January 30, 1997 article, "Syrian Vice President

Abdel Khalim Khaddam poured cold water over rising expectations that talks with Israel could be resumed anytime soon..." These unfounded messages, attributed to anonymous sources and "officials," can fuel anger just as much, if not more than, accounts of actual attacks and deaths. While these stories could not be counted in this study, their affects are obvious.

In a battle so steeped in historical conflict, it is imperative that emotion be left out of news reporting. In Israel, Jerusalem especially, there is no forum for Syrian or Arab retaliation. As mentioned before, Arab presses are subject to much greater censorship than Israeli presses and insurgents are harshly punished. In a nation that totes itself as democratic with a free press, such displays of propaganda are inexcusable.

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Sources in *New York Times*' Coverage of China

Before and After June 4th, 1989

A Content Analysis Focusing on Influence of Crisis Situation On Sourcing Patterns of US Media in World News Coverage

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A Content Analysis Focusing on Influence of Crisis Situation On Sourcing Patterns of US Media in World News Coverage

Abstract

This is a study of the *New York Times*' coverage of the students' movement in China in 1989 and focuses on the influence of this political incident on the sourcing patterns of the *New York Times* when covering China. By comparing the *New York Times*' coverage of China in four time periods both before and after the students' demonstration, the author finds that the crisis situation impacted the sourcing patterns of the *New York Times* both during and after the event and has a lingering effect.

Introduction

Unexpected events such as wars, riots, disasters and other drastic social upheavals have been fodder pursued by hungry mass media in most countries, wherever the events occurred. Such events also provide communication researchers with opportunities to study the performance of mass media, because they often enable researchers to focus studies for various purposes. The students' demonstration in China in 1989 was one such event. This study attempted to find out what sources were used by the western press, in this case the *New York Times*, during the crisis situation, how they were used and what is the effect on the sourcing patterns thereafter. It attempts to add to the understanding of the dynamics of the media over time and in a particular historical context.

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Literature Review

Numerous studies have demonstrated that the elites, or the powerful, have been the dominant sources in the media of both the United States and other counties, be they totalitarian states or democracies. Elite sources supply most of the information in both national and state newspapers in the United States (Brownet). A study of the news source use in the stock crash of 1987 found that, even during such a crisis situation, news media favor prestige sources (Losorsa and Reese). Few studies have concentrated on the use of sources during such unexpected or unusual events as wars, riots, natural disasters or other violent social upheavals in a place other than the host country of the reporters. Studies that dealt with such issues failed to look at how such situations impacted the sourcing patterns of foreign press stationed in the host countries of the events in the future.

So far, the majority of the studies of the coverage of world events have focused on the content, which is also a part of this study. A study of the *New York Times*, ABC, NBC and CBS showed that only events that are deviant from American values or of economic and political significance to the US are covered. "World events presented mostly in the news were deviant events and those with economic or political significance to the US. The next most prominent events were deviant, but with low significance" (P. Shoemaker, et al.). Dissidents and demonstrating students apparently fit into this category. Yet, literature review shows that few studies have been devoted to the effect of such skewed coverage on the sourcing patterns of the media themselves. One study found that anonymous attributions are used in 80 percent of both national and international news coverage in *Time* and *Newsweek*. More international stories than national stories contain anonymous attribution. The most frequently quoted anonymous source was some type of official, followed by an aide, diplomat, expert, staffer and advisor (K. T. Wulfemeyer).

Rationale, Questions and Hypotheses

The author has several reasons for choosing this event as the subject of study. First, it is an unexpected event with shocking effects and aftermath. Second, the host country, China, has a drastically different political system and cultural values than the United States. Third, the special relationships between the governments and media of the United States and China may enhance the informativeness of the findings produced from the study.

Both news content and the sourcing pattern were taken into consideration when the study was designed. What issues received the heaviest coverage? What changes have taken place in the content of US media's coverage of China after the Tian'anmen Square crackdown? Who were the most frequently quoted sources during the movement and how were they treated by the press? What changes have taken place in the sourcing patterns both during and after the incident? These are the major questions this study attempted to address.

H1: The coverage of politics and government-related issues and human rights increased drastically during the students' movement and remained dominant in the coverage of China thereafter.

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H2: The citation of non-government sources saw a sharp increase during the crisis situation. Sources that rarely appear in the routine coverage entered the press. Students and dissidents became dominant sources in both 1989 and 1997, which were treated as unusual years.

H3: The frequency of anonymous sources grew substantially in 1989.

The study is also expected to provide insight into other related fields.

Method

The *New York Times'* coverage of China in four years, 1985, 1989, 1993 and 1997 were studied. Four weeks were constructed for 1985 and 1993 respectively, which were treated as normal years. The other two periods were 28 consecutive days in 1989 with the June 4 Incident being the midpoint and 28 consecutive days in 1997 with October 28 being the midpoint. Chinese President Jiang Zemin started a state visit to the United States on October 28,1997. This time period was chosen as a reference framework in an attempt to show if the visit, which happened when the memory of the Tian'anmen Square crackdown remained fresh, might have caused any repercussion of the 1989 movement and thus affect the source use. Only stories that are datelined in mainland China were coded.

Paul J. Deutschmann's category system was modified to define story types in this study. Some points that need clarifying: round-ups and news features, in spite of their content, were categorized as "general human interest" stories. Education, sports, culture and public welfare were collapsed into one category. “Human rights” was singled out as one category. Stories about the students' movement and dissidents were put into this category.

Sources were grouped into either government or non-government sources. A source was either identified or unidentified. Ambiguous or mixed sources were coded as non-government sources. Some points that need clarifying: foreign government refers to any government other than the Chinese government and international organizations. "Official" refers to any Chinese who happened to be an official but did not represent the government when appearing in the news. Journalists were put into this category because of their de facto official status in China. Teachers, students, scholars and artists were grouped into one category.

The sampling and coding of the *New York Times* was done at the microfilm room of a major midwestern university in February and March 1998. Before the coding work began, 12 days, or more than ten percent of the sampled days, were randomly pulled from 1985 and 1997 and 16 valid cases were found. Three graduate students were trained to code the stories at the same time. The intercoder reliability, based on percentage of agreement, ranged from 92 percent to 100 percent. The overall intercoder reliability was 96 percent.

Findings

News content: H1 was confirmed. A total of 129 stories were found in the sampled issues of *the New York Times*, more than 50 percent of which appeared in the four consecutive weeks in 1989, or the crisis situation period. As hypothesized, the coverage of politics and governments and human rights dominated the media content. It is not surprising considering the historical situation and the media performance at that time. Table 1 shows that, of the 129 stories, 42 or 32.6% appeared on the front page. In 1989 nearly half of the stories appeared on the front page. Politics and government received the heaviest coverage, constituting 25.6% of all the stories. Human rights received the second heaviest coverage, constituting 23.3% of the total coverage.

Table 1

year	No of stories	Front page	Economic activity	Politics	Human interest	Education	Crime	Accident	Science	Human rights	Diplomatic affairs	Miscellaneous
1985	17	1, 5.8%		1								
1989	84	37, 44%	1	14	7					13	1	1
1993	17	2, 11.8%			1					1		
1997	11	2, 18%	1								1	
Total	129	42	2	15	8					14	2	1

$X^2 = 7.936$; df = 3, $p \subseteq .005$

Table 2

Value label	Frequency	Valid percent
Economic activity	12	9.3
Politics and government	**33**	**25.6**
General human interest	**26**	**20.2**
Education, sports, culture	3	2.3
Crime	2	1.6
Accident and disaster	1	3.1
Science and invention	7	.8
Human rights	**30**	**23.3**
Diplomatic affairs	10	7.7
Miscellaneous	5	3.87
Total	129	100

The focus on politics and human rights is in conformity with previous studies of US media's coverage of world events.

Sources: H2 and H3 were mostly confirmed. A total of 383 sources were found to be used, consisting of 224 non-government sources and 159 government sources. As Table 3 shows, the percentage of government sources dropped from 84.4% in 1985 to 36.5% in 1989, then climbed from 37.8% in 1993 to 52.3% in 1997. The changes in the percentage of non-government sources goes in the opposite direction, increasing sharply from 15.6% in 1985 to 63.5% in 1989, then sliding to 62.2% in 1993 and further to 47.7% in 1997. It shows that the sourcing pattern during a crisis situation does have a lingering effect, at least in this case. The crisis situation brought about an abrupt change in the sourcing patterns, which remained relatively stable over a period of time and nearly returned to the original pattern gradually. How strong is the effect, how long the effect lasts and in what manner it changes needs further study.

Table 3

Year	1985	1989	1993	1997	Total
Government	27, 84.4%	107, 36.5%	14, 37.8%	11, 52.3%	159
NonGovmnt	5, 15.6%	186, 63.5%	23, 62.2%	10, 47.7%	224
Total	32	293	37	21	383

$X^2 = 29.43$, df = 3, $p \subseteq .0000$

In terms of the attribution of the sources, nearly half of the sources are unidentified or unclear. One hundred and eight one sources or 47.3% of the total are unidentified. Table 4 shows that both the frequency and percentage of unidentified sources are higher during the crisis situation, comprising 56% of the sources used in 1989. Further analysis of the data showed that more non-government sources than government sources are anonymous and more foreign government sources than Chinese government sources are anonymous. Among the most cited anonymous sources are western diplomats, other Chinese and unconfirmed sources or reports. Forty cases, or 30.25%, of the first sources cited in the stories are anonymous. The high frequency of anonymous sources can be interpreted in various ways. A *New York Times* reporter wrote within a week of the June 4 crackdown in the Tian'anmen Square that "confirming information has been particularly difficult these days because sources are drying up in a time of political retrenchment (Nicholas D. Kristof)."

Table 4

Year	1985	1989	1993	1997	Total
Identified	26	128	32	16	202
Unidentified	6	165	5	5	181
Total	32	293	37	21	383

$X^2 = 40.58$; df = 3; $p \subseteq .0000$

Interesting changes were found in the use of non-government sources. As many source studies have found, such elite or empowered people as government officials and executives dominate the sources. This study partly confirmed this contention. In this study, Chinese and foreign executives combined comprised 66.7% of the non-governmental sources in 1985 and 47.8% in 1993, which were treated as normal years. They were the most frequently used sources in the two years. The percentage was 30% in 1997, also the highest of the non-government sources. While in 1989, the percentage of executives among the non-government sources was merely 5.4%, which is stunningly low considering the heavy media coverage during that period.

Table 5

Year	1985	1989	1993	1997	Total
Executive	3, 66.7 %	10, 5.4 %	11, 47.8 %	3	27
Employee	0	11	1	1	13
Dissident	0	7	0	1	8
Teacher, student,	0	54, 29 %	4, 17 %	1	59
Armyman	0	7	0	0	7
Bureaucrat, journalist	0	11	2	1	14
Other Chinese	1	49, 26.3 %	2	2	54
Other foreigner	1	23	3	2	28
Unclear	0	14	0	0	14
Total	5	186	23	10	224

As hypothesized, teachers, students and scholars were the most frequently used non-government sources in 1989, jumping from none in the sample of 1985 to 29% of all the sources in 1989. The percentage of the teachers, students and other scholars of the non-governmental sources in 1993, four years after the students' demonstration, was 17%, second after executives, but then it dropped to 10% in 1997. The hypothesis that Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to the United might impact, or increase, the frequency of students, scholars and dissidents appearing in the US media was not confirmed by this study. A plausible explanation is that only stories dated in China were coded and analyzed, while most news coverage of the visit originated in the Untied States. Ten cases were found during this period. A brief review of the *New York Times'* coverage of the visit during the period will demonstrate another picture.

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Summary and Discussion

These data suggest that a crisis situation does impact both the media content and the sourcing patterns concerning related issues The greater the impact, the slower it tails off. There are complex factors underlying the changes

Obviously, further research of similar events and subjects needs to be done to substantiate the findings and further studies might bring to light more enlightening findings as to such questions as how the sources were used or what they said There is sound reason to believe that how the sources are used will provide more insight into the understanding of the media source use than the mere fact that they are used

The frequency of other Chinese is the second highest in the non-government sources It took up 26 3 percent of the non-government sources in 1989 The frequency of unidentified sources in this category is very high One plausible explanation is the factor of the accessibility of the sources A further breakdown of this category might show us something interesting

How long will be the effect of the crisis situation on the sourcing pattern remains a largely unanswered question Although the study shows that there are obvious changes in the patterns of source use before and after the crisis situation, more samples need to be studied to see how the changes have taken place from year to year

As Guido H Stempel III and Hugh M Culbertson stated in a source study more than a dozen years ago, dominance and prominence might both reflect source assertiveness, credibility (as viewed by reporters), accessibility, quotability and other factors The study of the "other factors" will help us better understand the use of sources

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FINNISH WOMEN AND POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE: WHAT DO THEY KNOW AND HOW DO THEY LEARN IT?

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Finnish women and political knowledge: What do they know and how do they learn it?

CHAPTER 1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

That women learn less than men from mass media political news coverage is a constant finding in American mass media research (Stevenson 1F). But this common finding is often left unexplained. Researchers, it seems, seldom pause to ponder why there is a gender gap in political cognitions. What brings this about? Mass communication theorists have yet to arrive at a substantive answer. Even educational attainment, the variable most commonly used to explain why knowledge gaps exist, can not illuminate the gender gap in political news comprehension between women and men: "The gap was about the same regardless of age or education. Indeed, it widened at higher education levels. Women with college degrees scored about the same as men with high school diplomas" (Boldt E-4).

If not education, what then can explain the gender gap? One commonly cited explanation is the persistence of social and economic differences between the two sexes:

> The "gender gap" metaphor has gained recent notoriety as a political division between men and women, usually operationalized in number of votes cast for particular individuals/issues. Beneath this superficial measurement of differences lie . . . the unused or misused intelligence and experiences of more than one half of the world's population (Rush and Allen xxxii).

This way of approaching the gender gap, often referred to as the feminist paradigm, might hint at some plausible explanations.

At the core of the feminist paradigm is an appeal to information producers and disseminators to mirror the reality of women's lives.

The feminist paradigm's criticism toward the mass media is mostly aimed at the kinds of role models and stereotypes of women the mass media promote. The media practitioners' answer to this criticism is that "the media simply show life as it is, however unpalatable this may be, and that they therefore reflect the reality of women's legal, political, economic and social subordination" (Gallagher 125). However, several research studies indicate that the mass media do misrepresent women "in terms of characteristics, attitudes and behavior" (125).

Women's characteristics, attitudes and behavior in the mass media are usually portrayed through white, middle-class and heterosexual women whose lives do not even begin to reflect the multitude of roles women have today:

> A consistent picture emerges from those research studies which have investigated the media's portrayal of women. At the very best, that portrayal is narrow; at worst, it is unrealistic, demeaning and damaging. . . . Certain cultural differences have been noted and media portrayals have been found to be most positive in those countries with a firm commitment to the social and economic integration of women. With few exceptions, however, research has shown that the media present women as a subordinate sex (105).

Do these narrow stereotypes of women in the mass media affect how much women learn from political news coverage? Cultivation theory seems to predict so and lend credence to the feminist paradigm.

Cultivation theory explains that stereotypes in the mass media are extremely powerful in teaching their audiences the social milieu of their societies; how people live, work and where they belong. According to Gerbner et al. the symbolic nature of the mass media shapes and even cultivates audiences' perceptions of reality:

> The dominant communication agencies produce the message systems that cultivate the dominant image patterns. They structure the public agenda of existence, priorities, values, and relationships. People use this agenda -some more selectively than others -to support their ideas, actions, or both, in ways that, on the whole, tend to match the general composition and structure of message systems (provided, of course, that there is also other environmental support for these choices and interpretations) (569).

The feminist paradigm contends that it is this cultivation of women's realities by narrow stereotypes that alienates them from the societies in which they live, thus "silencing" women from taking part in the public sphere of politics. According to Courtney and Lockeretz, the private sphere that women are stereotyped into in the mass media can be divided into four categories:

1. A woman's place is in the home.
2. Women do not make important decisions nor do important things.
3. Women are dependent and need men's protection.
4. Men regard women primarily as sexual objects (169).

Other researchers also agree that it is the separation of the private and public spheres in the mass media that keeps women from taking a keen interest in politics. Owen argues that "girls are taught, from their earliest years, through covert and subtle signals, that politics is not their realm" (qtd. in Boldt E-4). Dodson concurs by saying that "the way issues are presented and covered by the media don't appeal to women personally. Without that personal stake women don't pay as close attention" (qtd. in Stevenson 1F). Keeter also observes that "despite the nominal acceptance of women, subtle and not-so-subtle messages continue to reinforce the notion that politics is a man's game. All of this raises the costs and lowers the motivation for women to learn about national politics" (1F).

Why is it important for women to be informed about politics? The feminist paradigm proposes that knowledge is power in a democracy. In the words of Delli-Carpini and Keeter,

> Voters who lack political knowledge often unwittingly vote for candidates who don't represent their real interests. This lack of knowledge handicaps women, blacks, the poor and the post-baby boom generation (qtd. in Boldt E6).

Without an understanding of national politics, women and the issues that are important to them will continue to be "silenced."

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Framework

> As the infusion of mass media information into a social system increases, segments of the population with higher socio-economic status tend to acquire this information at a faster rate than the lower status segments so that the gap in knowledge between these segments tends to increase rather than decrease (Tichenor et al., *Differential Growth* 159).

Such is how Tichenor et al. explain the knowledge gap phenomenon.

Gaziano offers a dissenting view. She contends that the majority of knowledge gap studies "support the proposition that *the higher the education, the greater the knowledge of various topics*," a phenomenon, she explains, "that is not the same as described in the knowledge gap hypothesis, which requires a comparison of varying levels of mass media publicity for topics" (472). By this Gaziano means that

> Very little research with data on associations between knowledge and education has involved mass media coverage of issues and news topics as a *variable*. In particular, little is known about changes in the education-knowledge relationship over time as media coverage of topics varies (474).

Her most significant criticism of the original knowledge gap definition has a profound bearing on this study: she proposes that knowledge gap researchers should try to avoid "textbook types of knowledge definitions" and instead use open-ended questions (475). In particular, Gaziano criticizes the assumption that open-ended questions of knowledge do not lead to findings of knowledge gaps. "The only study to use this technique and report little or no effect of formal schooling on knowledge is Palmgreen's, and this occurred only for local issues" (460). She also asserts that if statistical analyses are applied, knowledge and education should then be employed as continuous variables (475).

The significance of Gaziano's criticism of the original knowledge gap to this study is best illustrated in two of her considerations for future research:

1. Knowledge gap measurements should be taken at more than one point in time because the depth of knowledge increases with time.
2. The measurement of knowledge as a simple awareness of topics produces different results than the measurement of depth of knowledge (475-76).

Since knowledge depth can only be attained through the use of valid measures, open-ended questions seem to be the way to measure knowledge of a national political issue that has experienced mass media attention over a period of time.

Causes of Low Political Knowledge: The American Studies

Even though more American women than men vote in presidential elections, "women as a group continue to be less interested in politics than men, feel less efficacious about their participation, and engage in fewer types of political participation beyond voting" (Delli-Carpini and Keeter, *The Gender Gap* 23).

Delli-Carpini and Keeter contend that this phenomenon is a result of a highly patriarchal American society (26). In their study which compared a 1989 telephone survey conducted by the Survey Research Laboratory of the Virginia Commonwealth University and a 1988 in-person interview conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan, they found that approximately half of the men scored higher in political knowledge than three-fourths of the women (26).

Delli-Carpini and Keeter attributed this gender gap in national political knowledge to the social and economic differences between women and men (26). Because men are still more likely to work outside the home, earn more money even in comparable jobs, and have jobs that increase an individual's political interest, men tended to be more politically knowledgeable (26). On the other hand, child care and household responsibilities restrict women's career progress and limit the time and energy available for following and engaging in politics (26). Hence, women tended to register low knowledge scores (26).

Each of these factors, according to Delli-Carpini and Keeter, "individually correlates with attitudes (for example, efficacy or interest in politics) and behaviors (such as reading the news or discussing politics) known to increase political knowledge" (26). Thus, if it is true that attitude leads to behavior, women's interest in politics needs to be raised if an increase in women's involvement in politics is desired (Rokeach 138). Since attitudes are learned, rather than innate, it seems that the only way to change these attitudes that lead to behaviors that cause the gender gap, is through education (Shaw and Wright 8).

However, according to Delli-Carpini and Keeter, studies that have compared women and men with similar educational backgrounds, levels of income and employment status, still indicate a gender gap in knowledge (*The Gender Gap* 26). This is where Delli-Carpini and Keeter concur with the feminist paradigm by explaining that the separation of the private and public spheres is what contributes to this phenomenon (27):

> In pre-suffrage America both the custom and the law held that the 'public sphere' of higher education, the work place, and politics was the province of men, while the 'private sphere' of the home and family was the province of women. It is easy to forget that most of today's adults were raised by parents who were at most one generation removed from the pre-suffrage era. The majority of households in the 1940s, 1950s, and even the 1960s were headed by a father who was engaged in the public world and a mother who was not, a vision of the nuclear family reinforced in the popular culture of the day. Thus, even in the best of circumstances today's adults received mixed messages about the 'proper' role of men and women (27).

In stating so, Delli-Carpini and Keeter explain the genesis of American girls' socialization into roles and behaviors that are incompatible with active political involvement (28). This holds true, they say, except when the issues at hand are of special urgency and when local politics is involved.

Causes of Equal Levels of Political Knowledge: The Case of Finland

Because the goal of this study is to find out if the marginalization of American women, emphasized by the mass media, leads to American women knowing less about national politics than American men, it is essential to find out how women and men and their political knowledge compare in a country that enjoys more gender-equity than the United States. Such a country is Finland.

Most of the social and economic differences between women and men that Delli-Carpini and Keeter list as the reasons why American men score higher in political knowledge than American women, do not seem as formidable in Finland. The first one of these differences, the fact that American men are more likely to work outside the home and earn more money in comparable jobs than American women, is not present in Finland:

> Since the social welfare system offered subsidies to nurseries and kindergartens, and created a comprehensive health care system, women have been able to emerge from home and hearth to conquer the job market. The thought that the birth of a child should mean the end of a professional career is meanwhile totally alien to Scandinavian women (Borchert).

Even historically, the male breadwinner model has been weak in Finland because of agrarianism, wars and high male mortality (Julkunen). "Finnish women have always wanted to work in the same way as men. Stone Age rock paintings depict women hunting, and archaeologists have even discovered a Viking Age grave in which a woman was interred with swords" (Nykänen). It is probably this history of Finnish women working side-by-side with men that has made their presence in the Finnish workforce one of the highest in the world; about 70% of the 15 to 64-year-old Finnish women are employed (Julkunen). Equal wages for Finnish women are guaranteed by law. The 1995 Amended Act on Equality between Women and Men added an employee representative, with independent access to any information on wages and employment relationships, to every workplace (The Equality Act). These employee representatives carry out investigations whenever wage discrimination on the basis of sex is suspected (The Equality Act).

The second difference between women and men identified by Delli-Carpini and Keeter as responsible for American men scoring higher in political knowledge than women, is the fact that American men have jobs that increase an individual's political interest, a condition that also does not prevail in Finland. As early as 1906, Finland became the first country in Europe and the second country in the world to grant women the right to vote. This right to suffrage also made Finnish women the first in the world to stand for elected office (Nykänen). A more recent gain for gender equality in Finland is the March 1, 1995 legislation that set a 40% female gender quota for all of the country's state committees (Matthews). The Speaker of the Parliament of Finland, as well as nearly half of the members of the Finnish Government, are women (Seretin 38). In addition,

> the Governor of the Bank of Finland is a woman, the three biggest cities in the southern conurbation (the highly populated southern part of Finland) have women mayors, two provinces have female governors and eight university-level institutions are headed by women (Seretin 38).

These were probably why, in 1995, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) ranked Finland as one of the top four countries in the world in terms of women's quality of life; the "yardsticks" used were women's access to the job market, training opportunities, and women's influence on political decisions (Borchert).

The third reason why American men are more politically knowledgeable than women is the fact that child care and household responsibilities restrict American women's career progress and limit the time and energy available for following and engaging in politics. Again, this is a situation that does not apply in Finland.

> The Nordic perspective on the securing of equal opportunities for women is not restricted to the formal right to gainful employment. . . . Children are a collective preoccupation in the sense that almost all pre-schoolers are taken care of under some type of publicly funded programme - maternity and parents allowance as well as homecare allowance or public daycare (Julkunen).

The maternity leave in Finland is 11 months, after which a working mother can obtain a childcare leave until the child reaches the age of three (Julkunen). In 1978 Finland was also the first country in the world to introduce a separate fathering leave tied to the birth of a child (Julkunen). In this context it is also important to point out that even single mothers' career progress in Finland is not restricted by child care responsibilities; whereas some 60% of single mothers in America live below the poverty level, only 2% of single mothers in Finland do, which is the same as the percentage for the Finnish population at large (Julkunen).

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Based on the foregoing literature review, therefore, it can be surmised that some of the factors that may contribute to the gender gap in knowledge may be unique and peculiar to the United States. Other cultures may in fact exhibit other antecedent factors.

In a comparative cross-cultural study between Finland and the United States, based on the literature reviewed, it would be interesting to answer the following research questions and test the following hypothesis:

Research question 1: How do Finnish women perceive that the Finnish mass media portray them compared to Finnish men?

Research question 2: How do Finnish women rate their knowledge of national politics compared to Finnish men?

Research question 3: What are the most important predictors of national political knowledge in Finland?

Hypothesis 1: Finnish women are as knowledgeable about national politics as Finnish men.

CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

Sampling

A randomly selected sample of Finnish women and men responded to a one-shot mail survey. Because Finland is a fairly small country and because most of its population (along with its political and industrial centers) is concentrated around the capital city of Helsinki, the survey was conducted in the province where Helsinki is located: Uusimaa.

According to Väestörekisterikeskus, Finland's counterpart census bureau, there were 1,042,628 people living in Uusimaa as of February 28, 1997. Of these, 553,602 were women and 489,026 were men. (These numbers include only people 18 years of age or older; the age that signifies "adulthood" as it relates to voting, driving a car, drinking alcohol, etc.) Also, because of a law that requires the citizens of Finland to register with the government every year, this census is believed to be 99% percent accurate.

According to the University of Helsinki's Communication Department, the usual response rate in Finland for mail surveys is

50%. This survey worked with an initial sample size of 400; 200 women and 200 men. (The division of the sexes was needed for Hypothesis 1.) This sample size resulted in over 200 responses; the minimum number of responses needed for the desired statistical power and to be able to generalize the results.

The respondents for the study were chosen from the total number of women and men in the country broken into two systematic samples that had random starts. That procedure resulted in the following sampling intervals:

$$\text{women: } \frac{553,602}{200} = 2768 \quad \text{men: } \frac{489,026}{200} = 2445$$

Using the table of random numbers in Babbie's The Practice of Social Research, (page A26) the women (vertical) and the male (horizontal) sample began at 2145. The standard error for the two samples was the same (because of the identical sample size) and was calculated as follows:

$$1 \text{ SE} = \frac{.50\ .50}{200} = .035 \quad 2 \text{ SE} = .035 + .035 = .07$$

Therefore, at the 95% confidence level, seven percent of the responses in both of the samples fell within plus or minus two standard errors.

The questionnaire was mailed to the respondents during the week of August 4, 1997. (The time of year did not affect the response rate in this case because in Finland August is considered, and feels like, fall.)

A "reminder" postcard was also sent out the week of September 1, 1997, to those who had not returned their surveys, and a second wave was mailed the week of September 15, 1997.

Participants

According to Ulla-Maija Kivikuru, a professor at the University of Helsinki's Communication Department, the use of Iowa State University (ISU) letterhead probably increased the response rate due to the fact that "the Finnish people are very fond of the United States." In any case, 264 responses were received as of November 29, 1997. Any questionnaires received after that date were not included in the sample.[1]

Of the 264 respondents, 54.9% were women, 43.6% were men and 9 respondents did not report their gender. In terms of education, 26.3% of the respondents had finished a degree comparable to the associate's degree in the United States, while 8% of the respondents had finished a degree comparable to the master's degree. It should be noted here that a degree comparable to the bachelor's degree in the United States is not common in Finland.

In terms of 1996 income, 35.1% of the respondents made 100,001 to 150,000 Finnish marks before taxes. This translates roughly to about US$ 20,001 to US$ 30,000. Slightly over 26% of the respondents made 50,001 to 100,000 Finnish marks (about US$ 10,001 to US$ 20,000), while a mere 0.4% of the respondents earned more than 350,000 Finnish marks (about US$ 70,000). While these figures may seem low compared to United States standards, it should be kept in mind that they are typical of the so-called European social welfare states.

The sample demographic characteristics match those of the Finnish population at large based on the latest available census data (1995). For instance, while 26.3% of the respondents had education levels comparable to the associate's degree in the United States, the population figure is 25.3% (Laiho 14 Aug. 1997). Eight percent of the respondents hold a degree comparable to the master's level. The population figure for this level is a close 8.3% (14 Aug. 1997). In addition, the fact that most of the respondents fell in the US$ 20,001 to US$ 30,000 income category corresponds well with the median Finnish income of US$ 25,397 (Laiho 7 Aug. 1997).

Survey Design

The 21-question questionnaire was first created in English (Appendix) and pre-tested in an ISU undergraduate Journalism and

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[1] In addition, nine returned questionnaires were excluded from the final sample; one because no current address could be found for the respondent, two because they included notes that the respondents did not speak Finnish and that they could not therefore answer appropriately and six because the questionnaires were either returned unanswered or returned with three or less answers.

Mass Communication class. Upon revision, the questionnaire was translated into Finnish and then reviewed by a Finnish high-school English teacher for accuracy. Following this review, the questionnaire was pre-tested again by using a convenience sample of individuals at a Helsinki shopping mall. Based on this second pre-test, a few modifications were made to mainly improve the clarity and readability of the questionnaire.

Operationalization of Variables

Knowledge: The Qualitative Measure

The most difficult variable to measure in this study was knowledge. This was because a pertinent political issue in Finland had to be picked. One that fits this study's purpose was Finland's entry into the European Union (EU).

On January 1, 1995, Finland became a member of the EU. It is a "landmark" event in Finnish history, representing Finland's most crucial peacetime choice since it became independent in 1917 (Matthews). This topic has attracted media attention as it generates great controversy in Finnish society at large:

> In choosing to become part of an integrated Europe, rather than staying on the outside on the northern rim of the continent, this reflected the changing political and economic relationship between Finland and the rest of the world. After suffering the sharpest economic contraction in the industrialized world, and in Finnish peacetime history, following the economic collapse of the Soviet Union and western European recession, its economy showed signs of recovery. Faced with record high levels of unemployment, a rapid increase in central government debts to cover social welfare expenditure and political insecurity, membership was seen as bringing economic stability (Matthews).

Finland's entry into the EU meets several criteria for stimulus selection: (1) it continues to receive heavy coverage in all media; (2) it has a large number of potentially wide-ranging effects and thus could be understood at a number of levels; (3) it has social, political, as well as economic implications; and (4) it is inherently complicated. In short, it is an issue salient enough to be at least somewhat familiar to almost all respondents but also so complex as to bring out a variety of interpretations.

Because of the complexity of this topic and because the "measurement of knowledge, especially knowledge *gain*, is fraught with problems," an open-ended question was used to measure knowledge (Gaziano 475). The question was stated as follows:

> If you had to explain in a town meeting tomorrow, using 50 words or less, what the European Union is and how its membership affects Finland, how would you do it? Please be as specific as you can. Please be sure to explain in your answer both how the European Union membership affects the Finnish individual, and how it affects the Finnish society at large, also.

The coding scheme for the answers to the open-ended knowledge measure was based on a study by Rodriguez (1993) which was revised for this study. Here, the depth of remarks was coded based on the presence of references to (1) history, (2) effects on self, (3) effects on the society at large, (4) effects on the economy and (5) effects on national politics. The amount of details and references to historical, economical, political and social frameworks to link the issues and events related to the topic of Finland's entry into the EU also affected under which category each respondent fell.

Based on these criteria, respondents' discourses were sorted into one of the following three categories:

> **Category 1: Euro-Citizens:** Under this category fall respondents who had followed the development of the EU from its beginning stages to the present and who understood the specific changes that Finland's EU membership has brought to them personally, to the Finnish economy, to Finland's national politics and to the Finnish society at large. These respondents relied on relatively abstract conceptual dimensions as yardsticks against which they evaluated the EU over time. The Euro-Citizens showed, through solid historical frameworks in their responses, that they are capable of putting this issue into context and therefore make sense of it in a spontaneous and unambiguous way.

Category 2: Pick-and-Choosers: This category is occupied by respondents who had superficial knowledge of the topic of Finland and the EU. They generally "picked- and-chose" facets of the issue that supported their opinion on whether Finland should belong to the EU. These respondents' discourses are limited, which raises doubt about the breadth of their understanding of the meanings of the terms this topic engenders. This level of conceptualization was vague, occasional and restricted in the use of working frameworks and concepts.

Category 3: Free-Floaters: Respondents who had little or no knowledge of the topic of Finland and the EU fall into this last category. They generally did not have opinions about Finland's EU membership, nor do they show evidence that they particularly care. These respondents were also seemingly apolitical, admitting their lack of knowledge about the subject matter.

Because of the format of this measurement, three graduate students from ISU's Journalism and Mass Communication Department coded the answers to this open-ended question pertaining to knowledge. They were given a random sample of 20 answers to test whether they could differentiate between the three response categories outlined above. It was decided that an agreement among the three coders 80% of the time would result in an acceptable inter-coder reliability.

To determine the composite intercoder reliability score, the overall expected agreement among the three coders was first calculated as shown in Table 1 (Scott 323). The percentages of the "Total" column were squared and summed to determine the overall expected agreement, which in this study came to 0.135 (Scott 323). Following this determination of the overall expected agreement, Scott's pi was computed for each pair of coders as follows (Scott 323):

$$\text{Scott's pi} = \frac{(\%\ \text{observed agreement}) - (\%\ \text{expected agreement})}{1 - (\%\ \text{expected agreement})}$$

The results are listed in Table 2.

Table 1. Frequency of responses falling into each category

Response Categories	Coder 1	Coder 2	Coder 3	Total
Euro-citizens	10	11	9	30 (50%)
Pick-and-choosers	5	5	5	15 (25%)
Free-floaters	5	4	6	15 (25%)

N = 60

Table 2. Scott's pis for the three sets of coders

The Elements of Scott's pi	Coders 1 and 2	Coders 1 and 3	Coders 2 and 3
Observed agreement	.950	.850	.900
Expected agreement	.135	.135	.135
1 - Expected agreement	.865	.865	.865
Scott's pi	.942	.827	.884

Finally, following Shoemaker, a composite reliability score was computed using N as the number of coders (1982). The average agreement was calculated by dividing the sum of the above three Scott's pis by three.

Composite Reliability =

$$\frac{N\ (\text{average agreement})}{1 + [(N - 1)\ (\text{average agreement})]} = \frac{3(.884)}{1 + 2(.884)} = .958$$

This measurement of intercoder reliability resulted in a 96% agreement among the three coders.

Knowledge: The Objective Measure

Because the response rate to the open-ended question pertaining to knowledge was predicted to be low, a set of ten objective measures of knowledge was also incorporated into the questionnaire. These questions are:

1. What year did Finland become a part of the European Union?

1 IN 1993

2 IN 1994

3 IN 1995

4 IN 1996

5 I DON'T KNOW

2. How many countries (including Finland) belong to the European Union?

   1 13
   2 14
   3 15
   4 16
   5 I DON'T KNOW

3. Which country acts as the "chairperson" of the European Council at the present time?

   1 LUXEMBOURG
   2 ITALY
   3 IRELAND
   4 GREAT BRITAIN
   5 I DON'T KNOW

4. When is Finland's turn to act as the "chairperson" of the European Council?

   1 IN 1998
   2 IN 1999
   3 IN 2000
   4 IN 2001
   5 I DON'T KNOW

5. Who acts as Finland's representative in the European Commission, i.e., the EU Commissioner?

   1 JORMA ROUTTI
   2 RAIMO ILASKIVI
   3 ERKKI LIIKANEN
   4 HEIDI HAUTALA
   5 I DON'T KNOW

6. Kirsi Piha is a member of which organization of the European Union?

   1 EUROPEAN COUNCIL
   2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION
   3 EUROPEAN UNION COURT
   4 EUROPEAN PARLAMENT
   5 I DON'T KNOW

7. What does EMU stand for?

1 EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
2 EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK
2 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
3 EUROPOL DRUGS UNIT
5 I DON'T KNOW

8. What does ecu stand for?

1 EUROPEAN UNION COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
2 EUROPEAN CURRENCY UNIT
3 EUROPEAN UNION VALUE ADDED TAX
4 EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION
5 I DON'T KNOW

9. When will the so-called "third phase" of the European Union Economic and Monetary Union start?

1 IN 1997
2 IN 1998
3 IN 1999
4 IN 2000
5 I DON'T KNOW

10. By what year will the so-called European Union "euro bills" and "coins" be used?

1 BY 1999
2 BY 2000
3 BY 2001
4 BY 2002
5 I DON'T KNOW

CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Measurements of Knowledge

The Quantitative Measure

The ten close-ended questions relating to objective knowledge were coded one for each correct answer and zero for each incorrect answer. The correct answers were then summed for each respondent to create a new variable, "score," the quantitative measurement of knowledge.

The female respondents registered a mean knowledge score of 5.87 (n = 139), slightly higher than the male respondents' mean knowledge score of 5.80 (n = 109). The significance of the difference between these two mean knowledge scores is further discussed under Hypothesis 1.

The Qualitative Measure

The aim of the qualitative measurement of knowledge was to determine the depth of knowledge and thresh out the most commonly occurring frames of reference in peoples' answers. Here, the conceptual integration of the respondents was ascertained by their open-ended answers falling under any of the following categories: (1) Euro-citizens, (2) Pick-and-choosers or (3) Free-floaters (Table 3).

Table 3. Occurrence of the levels of cognitive integration

Level of Cognitive Integration	Frequency	Percent
Euro-citizens (1)	31	24.2%
Pick-and-choosers (2)	38	29.7%
Free-floaters (3)	59	46.1%

N = 128

The first category, Euro-citizens, was made up of respondents whose answers used abstract conceptual frameworks around which they evaluated Finland's participation in the EU over time. These respondents also often mentioned some of the specific changes Finland's EU membership has brought to them personally, to the Finnish economy, to Finland's national politics and to the Finnish society at large. A common theme in the answers that fell into this category was the opinion that if Finland did not join the EU, its economy, along with its culture, would collapse due to its isolation from the rest of Europe. For some, however, this is not an entirely positive move:

> The co-operation of the European nations, even at this level of unionization, is important to the upkeep of our continent's identity in the global political order.
>
> The European Union aims at the formation of inner unity, strength and the coming together of the European nations. Common currency, economy, agriculture and even military connections are the tools to preserve Europe on the political world map, as a key player, while the superpowers divide their world holdings. Finland has to be a part of this development if we want to succeed tomorrow.

> However, the ability of the politicians to affect Finland's domestic policy will decrease, which widens the gap between the decision-makers and the citizens of the country. This inability to decide for our own policies will in turn affect our social security system. Those who work will become richer, but those who cannot work, and who have traditionally been taken care of by the state, will be failed by the new system. This new lack of security will change the Finnish people's outlook on life.

Only slightly over 24% of the respondents' discourses fell into this category.

The second answer category, Pick-and-choosers, consisted of almost 30% of the respondents whose knowledge of the EU was superficial. These respondents picked-and-chose specific information that supported their opinions regarding Finland's EU membership. This lack of a more over-arching framework and concept on which to judge the issue raised questions about the breadth of these respondents' knowledge about it. On the whole, these respondents' answers did not form a steady, consistent idea, but instead they appeared to be a series of unrelated thoughts. The possibility of Finland joining NATO was also on the minds of many of these respondents. An example:

> The EU is an economic union.
>
> Finland's autonomy is gone. The more populated nations have a larger representation and they decide the direction of this union.
>
> The EU will change, little by little, to a political union, and it will demand that Finland join NATO. Russia will not look at that in a positive light. Finland will be forced to act as the "front bumper" of the west. This has been our role before, but now we have to pay huge membership fees to NATO to do that.
>
> One thing that warms my heart is the fact that the Finnish language is now equal with other languages. Swedish will not be force-fed to us anymore.
>
> Once Germany has taken over the whole EU, it will dump its nuclear waste into the bedrock of Finland. This is like giving your little finger to the devil (a Finnish phrase).

Free-floaters, the largest category (46.1%) of respondents, is composed mainly of those who have little or no knowledge concerning Finland's EU membership. These respondents also seemed apolitical and their answers were often notably short. Some examples:

> I feel uncomfortable about talking in front of people, but if I had to explain in a town meeting what the EU is, it would go something like this: the EU is a free trade and monetary union in whose area goods and people have free mobility.
>
> The European Union is the integration of the European nations. It aims at the commonness of goods and currency. So it is like a European USA. If Finland would not be a part of the EU, it would affect our exports negatively. Norway is not a part of the EU, but they have oil and fish, which we do not.
>
> The European Union is a union of nations. It makes trading easier. No customs. It does not affect a private citizen very much, except as a passport-free zone.
>
> The European Union is a union where mobility is easy and eggs are cheap.

Answers to Research Questions and Hypothesis Testing

Research Question 1: How do Finnish women perceive that the Finnish mass media represent them compared to Finnish men?

To answer this research question, a t-test for independent samples was used (Table 4). First, a mean and a standard deviation were calculated for both the female and male respondents based on their agreement with the statement "The mass media portray my gender correctly."

Table 4. T-test for difference in perceived mass media gender portrayal by gender

Gender	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	t-value	df	t-Tail Sig.
Female	145	2.54	.736	-.47	256	.640
Male	113	2.58	.842			

As expected, the t-test did not show a significant difference between the way the female and male respondents perceived the mass media to represent their gender. In fact, both the female and the male respondents felt that the mass media either represent them well, or that they cannot choose the level of representation from the answer categories provided. This finding supports the general belief in Finland that the mass media represent both genders rather equally. It also is the first step on the feminist paradigm's assertion that if the mass media includes women in the public sphere, they will prompt women to take an interest in the issues that affect the general public, foremost of which is politics.

Research Question 2: How do Finnish women rate their knowledge of national politics compared to Finnish men?

This research question on knowledge perception was also answered by a t-test for independent samples (Table 5).

Table 5. T-test for difference in perceived political knowledge by gender

Gender	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	t-value	df	2-Tail Sig.
Female	144	3.47	1.003	6.74	257	.000
Male	115	2.58	1.116			

Clearly, this t-test showed a highly significant difference between the means of the female and male respondents regarding how they perceive their acquired political knowledge.

Contrary to expectations, Finnish women perceived themselves to be much less politically knowledgeable than Finnish men. On a scale from (1) "very well" aware of political issues to (5) "very poorly" aware of political issues, where 3 signifies no awareness either way (i.e., the respondent is unable to decide which category to choose), most of the female respondents perceived themselves to be "poorly" aware of political issues, while most of the male respondents perceived themselves to be "well" aware of political issues. This research question was also cross-checked with a Pearson chi-square, which gave a highly significant value of 44.39355, with 4 degrees of freedom.

So what could possibly cause women as free and independent as the Finnish to doubt their knowledge about politics? It seems that despite the absence of the social and economic issues Delli-Carpini and Keeter listed as the reasons why American women are not as knowledgeable about national politics as American men, this result indicates that full gender-equity has not taken place in Finland either. This might have something to do with a relatively recent development in the workforce.

Even though Finnish women are as likely to work outside the home as Finnish men are,

> The Finnish labour market is divided among lines of gender: women predominate in the textile and food industries and in many sectors managed by the state or local authorities, such as nursing, child care and teaching. Technical fields, in turn, are dominated by men. The predominantly female sectors have lower wages than the male-dominated fields. . . . The economic recession of the past few years has particularly affected fields dominated by women, and greater numbers of women than men are currently unemployed (Nykänen).

Many Finnish women feel that although there are no formal obstacles to increasing the numbers of women in the fields of business and finance, the years of male domination in those occupations make it almost impossible for women to succeed in them.

The answer may still lie on actual political participation, another culprit mentioned by Delli-Carpini and Keeter. Because even though Finnish women are involved in politics, their representation in politics is still not equal with Finnish men. The proportion of women in the nation's Parliament has increased in the last few decades, but it is still only about 40% out of the 200 Parliament members. Currently, only seven out of the 17 ministers in Finland are women (Manninen). And even though the minister of defense is a woman, the majority of female voters believe that true gender-equity can not be reached until a woman is elected prime minister or president.

Finally, the third obstacle Delli-Carpini and Keeter list as one of the reasons American women know less about politics than American men may also ring true for Finland: that child care responsibilities limit women's career progress. As Salmi suggests, the emphasis on organizing daycare and creating "methods of family policy which secure women's chances to participate in the labour market" has not equalized the time and effort mothers and fathers spend taking care of their children:

> This emphasis has had its consequences on the field of equality, for better and for worse. We do have one of the highest rates of women's employment. But women also bear the greater responsibility for children and they have been the main users of the statutory child care leaves. Men have taken advantage of these rights only in a small scale. For example, it has for many years been possible in Finland for parents to divide the parental leave between the mother and the father. Nevertheless, only approximately 3 percent of fathers take this opportunity and take an extended parental leave beyond the two weeks at the birth of the child (Salmi).

In addition, of the total time Finnish parents spend with their small children, only one third is used up by Finnish fathers (Salmi). It is not until the children reach their teen-age years that Finnish fathers start to use about 50% of the total time parents spend with their children (Salmi). This phenomenon, in turn, leaves Finnish mothers with most of the child care responsibilities when the children are young and when their care requires most of the work.

So although Finnish women can be considered less constrained than their American counterparts, they are still not equal with Finnish men. Finland still has barriers to break before its women can feel that politics are as much their sphere as the sphere of their husbands, sons, fathers, brothers and friends. And this, in turn, might cause Finnish women to perceive themselves as "poorly" knowledgeable about politics, while Finnish men perceive themselves as "well" knowledgeable about it. In addition, the psychological tendency of women to underestimate their capabilities in general probably plays a role in this finding.

Research Question 3: What are the most important predictors of national political knowledge in Finland?

The quantitative measure of knowledge was regressed against the three predictor variable groups separately. The first group, which consisted of demographic variables, revealed that income is the single most significant demographic variable that accounted for the variance in quantitative political knowledge, and that demographic variables, as a group, are the best predictors of quantitative political knowledge among Finnish people. The media-related variables strengthened the finding that exposure and attention to mass media are not significant in predicting quantitative political knowledge. In addition, the third category, which consisted of the perceived level of political activity only, appears to contribute significantly to the level of quantitative knowledge (Table 6). This negative relationship between the perceived level of political activity and quantitative political knowledge is reversed as a result of coding. To wit, as the level of perceived political activity goes down, so does the level of quantitative political knowledge.

Hypothesis 1: Finnish women are as knowledgeable about national politics as Finnish men.

To test this hypothesis, stated in the null, the quantitative measurement of knowledge was used as the dependent variable in a t-test for independent samples. In addition, a one-way analysis of variance was used to determine if women and men differ in terms of qualitative knowledge.

The results shown in Table 7 provide support for accepting the null. There is no significant difference between the means of the quantitative knowledge scores between women and men. In fact, the average quantitative knowledge score of women is slightly higher than that of men.

The comparison of this finding to the Delli-Carpini and Keeter study shows a significant difference between the two countries. While the 1988 in-person interview survey conducted by

Table 6. Multiple regression coefficients predicting influence on quantitative knowledge of predictor variables by categories

Predictor Variables	Beta	Cumulative R^2	R^2 Change	F (R^2 Change)
Demographic Variables		.07286	.06098	6.130***
Gender[1]	-.111			
Education[2]	.101			
Income[3]	.232**			
Media-Related Variables		.02512	.00927	1.585
Exposure/ Newspapers[4]	.034			
Exposure/ Television[4]	-.040			
Attention/ Newspapers[5]	-.106			
Attention/ Television[5]	-.084			
Political Variables		.04102	.03717	10.651**
Perceived Political Activity[6]	-.203**			

N = 264

1. income was measured using a Likert scale where 1 = less than 50,000 marks, 2 = 50,001 to 100,000 marks, 3 = 100,001 to 150,000 marks, 4 = 150,001 to 200,000 marks, 5 = 200,001 to 250,000 marks, 6 = 250,001 to 300,000 marks, 7 = 300,001 to 350,000 marks and 8 = over 350,000 marks

2. education was measured using a Likert scale where 1 = no formal education, 2 = finished secondary school, 3 = finished vocational school, 4 = finished high school, 5 = finished college, 6 = finished university, 7 = finished graduate school and 8 = finished some other studies

3. gender was measured as follows; 1 = female, 2 = male

4. exposure to newspapers and television were measured with Likert scales where 1 = 7 times or more, 2 = 5 to 6 times, 3 = 3 to 4 times, 4 = 1 to 2 times and 5 = I rarely or never read the newspapers/watch TV news

5. attention to newspapers and television were measured with Likert scales where 1 = 7 hours or more, 2 = 5 to 6 hours, 3 = 3 to 4 hours, 4 = 1 to 2 hours and 5 = I rarely or never read the newspapers/watch TV news

6. perceived political activity was measured with a Likert scale where 1 = very active, 2 = active, 3 = cannot choose, 4 = passive and 5 = very passive

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**p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 7. T-test for difference in quantitative political knowledge between women and men

Gender	Number of Cases	Mean	SD	t-value	df	2-tail Sig.
Female	139	5.87	2.265	.27	246	.786
Male	109	5.80	1.814			

the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan showed that the relative political knowledge of American men is almost 80%, that of American women is slightly under 50% (Delli-Carpini and Keeter, *What Americans Know* 162). The easiest way to compare this almost 30% difference in political knowledge in America to the study in Finland is by comparing the median percentages of the correctly answered questions. In the American study, the median percentage of correctly answered questions by men was 56.5%, while the median percentage of correctly answered questions by women was 42% (157). This in turn translates into the median percentage of correct answers across all the items by men being 1.35 times that of the median percentage of women (157).

In Finland, the median percentage of correctly answered questions by women was 50.3%, while the median percentage of correctly answered questions by men was 50.1%. Also, the average score for the total Finnish sample was 58.5%, while the average score in the American study was 48.5% (157). Finnish women's knowledge of national politics, compared to Finnish men, therefore, is significantly more equal than that of American women's knowledge of national politics compared to American men.

Based on Delli-Carpini and Keeter's notion that

> The existence of at least some gender difference in political knowledge is not surprising, given the history of women's exclusion from national politics

> and the continuing inequality between women and men in many of the resources that contribute to political integration (203),

it is therefore not surprising that Finnish women are as knowledgeable about national politics as men are. After all, Finnish women who have the motivation to learn about politics can do so without many of the structural and situational barriers that face American women even today. The nature of political socialization among Finnish women is such that it encourages them to take part in the public sphere of national politics.

Next, the gender differences pertaining to the qualitative measurement of knowledge were examined with a Pearson chi-square test (Table 8) which gave an insignificant value of .97287, with 2 degrees of freedom. Therefore, there is no significant difference between the genders in the complexity of their responses to determine how they understood the issue of Finland joining the EU alliance. The interesting part about the cross-tabulation is that even though the difference between women and men in the "Euro-Citizens" category is not significant, women still dominated this category. Consequently, as with the quantitative measurement of knowledge, even though there is no significant difference between Finnish women and men, the women scored slightly higher in absolute terms.

Table 8. Cross-tabulation for the qualitative knowledge answer categories

Answer Categories	Female	Male	Total
Euro-Citizens	58.1%	41.9%	24.4%
Pick-and-Choosers	47.4%	52.6%	29.9%
Free-Floaters	48.3%	51.7%	45.7%
Total	50.4%	49.6%	100.0%

N = 127

To double-check this result, an analysis of variance of the open-ended answer categories by respondent's gender was applied. It produced an insignificant f-value of .618, with 1 degree of freedom (p = .433). This analysis of the qualitative measurement of knowledge further strengthens the case for equal levels of national political knowledge among Finnish women and men.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

Summary

Finnish women perceive themselves as "poorly" knowledgeable about politics although they scored higher, in absolute terms, in both the quantitative and qualitative knowledge test. This is an unexpected finding in a country that prides itself on gender-equity, and which is known worldwide as a leader in women's rights. It would seem logical that the strong representation of women in the Finnish parliament, combined with a society that values both women's private and professional contributions, would prompt Finnish women to have enough confidence to feel knowledgeable about politics.

But gender-discrimination is not easily erased. Even though Finland is, by most accounts, more gender-equal than the United States, it is still a country built on patriarchal values. And those values have made it so that Finnish women, to some extent, still feel that politics is not their sphere. That is, Finnish women are still socialized into thinking that politics is men's domain.

The other interesting finding of this study is that Finnish women are as knowledgeable about politics as Finnish men. This bolsters the feminist paradigm's claim that a society that includes women in the public sphere will also have women that know more about politics. Maybe this could prompt other countries to strive for more gender-equity as they realize what an asset it is to have all citizens function as full members of a society.

Another unanticipated finding of this study is that the mass media do not have an effect on how politically knowledgeable anyone in Finland is. The mass media had no effect on the actual level of quantitative or cognitive knowledge Finnish people have. Instead, the best predictors of political knowledge are the demographic variables of gender, education and income.

It is clear here that mass media effects are constrained by demographic and structural variables and that media practitioners must overcome these to contribute significantly to people's lives. Since, based on the analysis of Research Question 1, most Finnish people already feel that the mass media represent their gender well, it seems that the main demographic characteristics the media has to overcome are education and income. This is a consistent finding of the limited media effects model: that the mass media have limited effects in the formation of public opinion. This model has received empirical support more common in the past decade. It suggests that

> it is critical to investigate the contingencies under which different media messages result in different effects and at different points in time. That is, media effects are unlikely to be found en masse, or to be attributable to any set of factors. Rather, it may be more important to determine which factors are most operative in given communication situations involving given audiences (Rodriguez et al. 110).

In the case of Finland, media effects may be masked by prevailing cultural factors, also. Historically, the Finnish people are mistrustful of anything political and this may have affected media judgments. That is, people may have also become mistrustful of the mass media. This is mostly because two of the three television channels are government owned and because a large number of newspapers are affiliated with a mix of assorted political parties. This assertion, nonetheless, bears more empirical scrutiny.

Comparison to America

In the Delli-Carpini and Keeter study the gender gap in political knowledge was attributed to several social and economic factors in American society.

This study hypothesized that because the social and economic reasons for the gender gap mentioned in the Delli-Carpini and Keeter study are not present in Finland, a gap in political knowledge between genders would not be found. But while Finnish women proved more knowledgeable about national politics, the variables that significantly contributed to level of political knowledge -education, income and perceived level of political activity -are the same as those found in the Delli-Carpini and Keeter study (*What Americans Know* 156). These findings suggest that social and economic factors impinge heavily on how people function in a democratic society.

The major shortcoming of this study is the fact that it is not identical with the Delli-Carpini and Keeter study. Consequently, the comparisons made do not necessarily provide a firm base on which to draw conclusions. It was also beyond the scope of this study to find out whether there are some other cultural factors than those mentioned in the Delli-Carpini and Keeter study that contribute to Finnish women's political knowledge.

While the comparison of the results presented some difficulties, this inter-cultural investigation becomes imperative especially at a time of rapid internationalization and as countries such as Finland undergo tremendous social transformation. In countries undergoing rapid transition, it is important to examine how the mass media play a role at every stage. More intercultural comparisons are expected to provide a tangible contribution to a larger inter-cultural research agenda.

Future research should study how the mass media can have a more positive and significant impact on political cognitions. Longitudinal designs should be able to thresh out the dynamics of media effects over time. To better understand media effects, attempts should be made to determine the specific factors that contribute to effective mass media political news coverage in different cultures.

In addition, the specific factors that contribute to a gender gap in political knowledge in different cultures should be determined. Studies that examine these are expected to demonstrate the barriers to true, gender-equal democracy.

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APPENDIX

First, I would like to ask you how you use the mass media, and what you think of the way they portray certain subjects. (Please circle the corresponding, and only one, number to each of your answers.)

1. How many times a week do you read at least one article in the Helsingin Sanomat or any other newspaper?

1 7 TIMES OR MORE
2 5 TO 6 TIMES
3 3 TO 4 TIMES
4 1 TO 2 TIMES
5 I RARELY OR NEVER READ THE NEWSPAPERS

2. How many times a week do you watch at least one news report on either TV1, TV2 or MTV?

1 7 TIMES OR MORE
2 5 TO 6 TIMES
3 3 TO 4 TIMES
4 1 TO 2 TIMES
5 I RARELY OR NEVER WATCH TV NEWS

3. In a week, how much time do you spend reading the Helsingin Sanomat or any other newspaper?

1 7 HOURS OR MORE
2 5 TO 6 HOURS
3 3 TO 4 HOURS
4 1 TO 2 HOURS
5 I RARELY OR NEVER READ THE NEWSPAPER

4. In a week, how much time do you spend watching TV news?

1 7 HOURS OR MORE
2 5 TO 6 HOURS
3 3 TO 4 HOURS
4 1 TO 2 HOURS
5 I RARELY OR NEVER WATCH TV NEWS

5. The mass media portray my gender correctly.

1 STRONGLY AGREE
2 AGREE
3 CANNOT CHOOSE (FROM THESE CHOICES)
4 DISAGREE
5 STRONGLY DISAGREE

The next two questions deal with your political awareness. (Please circle the corresponding, and only one, number to each of your answers.)

6. I am aware of political issues.

1 VERY WELL AWARE
2 WELL AWARE
3 CANNOT CHOOSE (FROM THESE CHOICES)
4 POORLY AWARE
5 VERY POORLY AWARE

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7. I am politically active.

1 VERY ACTIVE
2 ACTIVE
3 CANNOT CHOOSE (FROM THESE CHOICES)
4 PASSIVE
5 VERY PASSIVE

Now I would like to ask you some background information. (Please circle the corresponding, and only one, number to each of your answers.)

8. Gender: 1 FEMALE 2 MALE

9. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

1 NO FORMAL EDUCATION
2 FINISHED SECONDARY SCHOOL
3 FINISHED VOCATIONAL SCHOOL
4 FINISHED HIGH SCHOOL
5 FINISHED COLLEGE
6 FINISHED UNIVERSITY
7 FINISHED GRADUATE SCHOOL
8 FINISHED SOME OTHER STUDIES, WHAT:________________.

10. What was your approximate net family income from all sources, before taxes, in 1996?

1 LESS THAN 50,000 MARKS
2 50,001 TO 100,000 MARKS
3 100,001 TO 150,000 MARKS
4 150,001 TO 200,000 MARKS
5 200,001 TO 250,000 MARKS
6 250,001 TO 300,000 MARKS
7 300,001 TO 350,000 MARKS
8 OVER 350,000 MARKS

The remaining eleven questions have to do with the European Union and the part Finland plays in it. (Please circle the corresponding, and only one, number to each of your answers.)

11. What year did Finland become a part the European Union?

1 IN 1993
2 IN 1994
3 IN 1995
4 IN 1996
5 I DON'T KNOW

12. How many countries (including Finland) belong to the European Union?

1 13
2 14
3 15
4 16
5 I DON'T KNOW

13. What country acts as the "chairperson" of the European Council at the present time?

1 LUXEMBOURG
2 ITALY
3 IRELAND
4 GREAT-BRITAIN
5 I DON'T KNOW

14. When is Finland's turn to act as the "chairperson" of the European Council?

1 IN 1998
2 IN 1999
3 IN 2000
4 IN 2001
5 I DON'T KNOW

15. Who acts as Finland's representative in the European Commission, i.e., the EU Commissioner?

1 JORMA ROUTTI
2 RAIMO ILASKIVI
3 ERKKI LIIKANEN
4 HEIDI HAUTALA
5 I DON'T KNOW

16. Kirsi Piha is a member of which organization of the European Union?

1 EUROPEAN COUNCIL
2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION
3 EUROPEAN UNION COURT
4 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
5 I DON'T KNOW

17. What does EMU stand for?

1 EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
2 EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK
3 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
4 EUROPOL DRUGS UNIT
5 I DON'T KNOW

18. What does ecu stand for?

1 EUROPEAN UNION COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
2 EUROPEAN CURRENCY UNIT
3 EUROPEAN UNION VALUE ADDED TAX
4 EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION

19. When will the so-called "third phase" of the European Union Economic and Monetary Union start?

1 IN 1997
2 IN 1998
3 IN 1999
4 IN 2000
5 I DON'T KNOW

20. By what year will the so-called European Union "euro bills" and "coins" be used?

1 BY 1999
2 BY 2000
3 BY 2001
4 BY 2002
5 I DON'T KNOW

BEST COPY AVAIL

Only one more question left! (Please answer this question with your own words.)

21. If you had to explain in a town meeting tomorrow, using 50 words or less, what the European Union is and how its membership affects Finland, how would you do it? Please be as specific as you can. Please be sure to explain in your answer both how the European Union membership affects the Finnish individual, and how it affects the Finnish society at large, also.

If you want to add something that relates to political knowledge, and which was not brought forth by your answers, please use this space for that purpose.

Your help with this survey is greatly appreciated. Thank you.

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Beyond Asian Values in Journalism: Towards Cultural Politics in the Asian Media Globalization

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Beyond Asian Values in Journalism: Towards Cultural Politics in the Asian Media Globalization

I. Introduction

Today's epochal issues, such as the end of the Cold War and the increase in global interconnectedness, have been reflected by two major ideas of "the end of history" (Fukuyama, 1989) and "the clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1993). Fukuyama's 'endism,' however, evoked a fallacy due to its neglect of distinctive cultures as well as its tendency toward Eurocentrocism. One of the phenomena irresistibly occurring in the post-Cold War world is value conflicts, especially between the West and Asia, which tend to determine the seriousness of political and economic interactions and the emotions of those involved to a significant degree (Kawato, 1995). This situation seems to be congruent with Huntington's allegation (only if it can be free from cultural absolutism based on traditionalism and fundamentalism, a negative response to modernization). In terms of value conflicts, Western liberal capitalism is being challenged by 'Asian values' upon which many Asian countries have achieved splendid economic development.

Initiated as a counter to U.S. hegemony, however, Asian values have been subscribed by some of Asian leaders to legitimize their exercise of unchallenged authority. It is plausible in this sense to assert that "The Notion of Asian Values is a Myth" (Lam, 1996). Moreover, emphasis on 'Asian values in journalism' may appear as an anachronism if it is an extension of 'developmental journalism.' Indeed, Asia has a multiplicity of cultures and most of Asia are situated in the "third wave of political democratization" (Huntington, 1993a). In addition, any allegations on superiority of

Asian values over Western ones does not sound perusable in the globalization process of the mass media. If not with Asian values, with what can most Asian countries struggle against U.S. hegemony and in particular against U.S. cultural imperialism? How can they protect their political, economic, and cultural sovereignty in a circumstance of liberalization, denationalization, deregulation, and commercialization of media systems? In order to answer these delicate questions, this article will focus on cultural politics of the nationalism, religion and language in the area of cultural practice, especially of the broadcasting media. The cultural politics never disregards Asian values in the mass media, but rather subsumes it in a broader cultural category. It also is concerned with struggles for equality in consumption of media, in particular at a macro-level for this article and at the same time is central to the attempts to construct meanings alternative to those of Western globalization. This article first reviews recent discussions of Asian values in the mass media, next designates the problems concerning Asian values, and then explore cultural politics of the Asian mass media in terms of the nation-state, religion, and language.

II. The Evolution of Asian Values

A wide variety of the current discussions of Asian values in the mass media in general and in journalism in particular seem to be a succession of what some of Asian communication scholars since the mid of the 1980s have developed indigenous ways of looking at the development problems of their vast and varied continent. The 1985 seminar of the AMIC (Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre) on communication theory from the Asian perspective questioned the suitability of the imported Western communication paradigm and contented "The Need for the Study of Asian Approaches to Communication" (Dissanayake, 1986) in the light of Asian culture and traditions. Perhaps this Asian attempt was a reaction of cultural imperialism and "research imperialism" (Halloran, 1994), influenced by Latin American critiques of modernization thesis in terms of dependency theory. Most Asian efforts on the indigenization of communication theory, however, tended to end up with no concrete alternatives to Western communication theories (Chu, 1986). Nonetheless, one side effect of those efforts might be to reinforce to 'developmental journalism' which accorded the media a prominent role in national development.

Confronted with Western transnationalism of contemporary world economic and information systems in the 1980s, most Asian countries invoked national sovereignty, cultural identity, and socioeconomic development to protect the autonomy of the nation-state. Thus, they have emphasized the role of developmental journalism. Sussman (1979) suggested that the three rationales for developmental journalism are:

1. Economic development is essential to the progress - in some countries, the survival - of peoples and nations.
2. Modern societies cannot be mobilized for economic development without gearing the mass communications media to the process of industrialization.
3. Therefore, the domestic mass news media must be controlled by the government; and, if proper information exchanges among developing nations are to be assured, the international news media also must serve developmental objectives (p. 111).

According to developmental journalism as a national communication policy, which was characterized by an intimate media-government partnership, most Asian countries, in particular the Asian NICs - Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan - were successful during the past decades in restricting the inflow of foreign media products through censorship and the imposition of quotas on imported programming, while the actively fostering indigenous cultural productions (Chadha, 1995). This fact illustrates that development strategies are the major governing variables of the national media industry in Korea and Taiwan (Kim, 1989). In a result, developmental journalism included identification with a state rather than a tribe or traditional culture, recognition of a political leader as a symbol of the state, and mobilization of a nation's mass media to support political change. It is not surprising that behind this Asian journalism was religious-philosophical systems, in particular Confucianism which privileges consensual, communal, autocratic, hierarchical, and conservative traditions with its emphasis on duties and obligations to the collective to achieve social harmony (Mehra, 1989). For example, in the Singaporean case in particular and the Asian one in general, the principle of duty becomes a major consideration in the press because access to information is not a right but a privilege (Beng, 1996). Therefore, Confucianism as Asian cultural heritage has served as an ideology for justifying developmental journalism, and in turn attempts of the 1980s to search for Asian perspective of communication theory from Asian culture and tradition lost their significance.

In the post-Cold War world, the value conflicts between the West and Asia that were partly concealed by Soviet-American antagonism became more visible than before. There can be no doubting the growing tension and mistrust between the West and Asia. For example, rivalry between old and deep-rooted politico-religious philosophies has been echoed by critical measurements such as the U.S. move to invoke Article 301 of the Omnibus Trade Act to protect its trade interests and accusations by the U.S. about human rights abuses in Asia. Contradictory to this American expansionism and interventionism, 'Asian values' to which many Asian leaders endorse found formal expression in the

Bangkok declaration on Human rights of April 1993. Ultimately, the Bangkok Declaration challenged the West's assumption that its own notion of human rights was universal and proclaimed that human rights are contingent upon culture, history, the level of economic development and the like, and that the 'West' has no business imposing its views on others (Moody, 1996). In particular, Lee Kuan Yew, senior minister of Singapore, sharply states that "America is no longer a model for Asia" (*NPQ*, 1996, p. 4), alleging superiority of Asian values to Western ones.

In parallel with this political movement to Asian values, there has been journalistic attempts of how news media can best transmit desirable Asian values, preserve and promote them, and spread the understanding and significance of Asian traditions through a recent series of Asian communication conferences. The inception of such attempts seems to have derived from the discussion about the relationship of Singaporean journalism to Asian cultures: for example, the 1990 seminar on 'the Social Role of Singapore Newspapers in Promoting Asian Cultures and Values.' Most recently, AMIC's 1995 seminar on 'Asian Values in Journalism' produced various works for the issue. Most of the works in the seminar sought to explore "values in Asian journalism" (Latif, 1996) from locality unique in each of their countries rather than either to find a definition of Asian values or to promote the debate over value differences in journalism between the West and Asia. Another inevitable tendency on Asian values, however, is to emphasize Asian journalism as an significant instrument for the development of Asia. An exemplar is Singapore's media agenda which puts its significance in tough media laws and policies. It is not surprising that this agenda appears to be an extension of developmental journalism.

III. Problematic Asian Values in Journalism

Asian values have been considered by many Asian leaders as a rationale for economic success. For Asian leaders, the Asian values of hard work, thrift and reliance on family, not on government, are clearly in sync with the demands of today's competitive global economy (Crovitz, 1994). These values, of course, derive largely from a Confucian morality based on virtue. Thus, in contrast to the liberal priority of the right over the good, Confucians emphasize the primacy of virtues over rights, the primacy of substantial justice over procedural justice, and the primacy of the common good over rational self-interest (Lee, 1996b).

Confucianism has played a role in legitimating political ideology of many Asian authoritarian regimes and in promoting an economic ideology that has brought about rapid economic growth of the region. Even though the Asian politicians have recently approved of democratization, they want to continue to run their states through soft-authoritarianism by emphasizing Asian values. For example, the Kim Young-Sam government (1992-1997) of South Korea, the first civilian government, announced its adoption of a libertarian policy towards the mass media, but it did not give up efforts to exercise control over the media. As Yoon (1994) states, "[Means of media control] were subtle in the sense that the government manufactured the media's consent and established their conformity to its policy goal without making them feel controlled" (p. 20). Furthermore, while standard bearers of Asian values develop their economies along Western lines, they point to a newly appreciated common Confucian ethos that somehow binds Asia but does not bond well with the West.

The rejection of Western values by proponents of Asian values, in particular by Singaporean politicians, is based on the contention that respect for individual liberties and minority rights is an inherently dangerous Western imposition on Asian cultures. This contention, however, has a key pitfall. In other words, ideas of individual rights and resistance to tyrannical governments are not solely or consistently Western, but can be found in Asia's own cultural history. For example, Armentrout (1995) agrees that Confucius was, to a large extent, a dissident judging from his speech and actions. Therefore, the notion, that the Western is democratic and the Asian is anti-democratic, is a myth of Western Orientalism. Armentrout (1995) thus argues that Asia can experience freedom without looking West.

This problematic notion of Asian values as well is reflected by debates over Asian values in journalism. One of the questions posed by the values guiding the Asian mass media system is that although the presence of Asian values presumes a shared value system for media scholars and practitioners in Asian countries, to define Asian values relative to the mass media as a universal term for all Asian countries is very difficult. As Ali (1996) puts it, "Asia's diversity of religions, ideologies, traditions, political systems, and levels of development make it almost impossible to define a set of values applicable to all of Asia" (p. 30). How Confucian are Malay Muslims, Japanese Zen Buddhists, and Philippine and South Korean Christians? This heterogeneity of Asia may be a problem to those who see Asian values only as Confucian.

Another question of Asian values in journalism is that many Asian politicians and authorities are willing to subscribe Asian values. Asian leaders are favorable to Asian values to the extent that they support the assertion of control over the media. They support "an Asian-centered perspective" from which Asian governments can counter the intrusion of foreign transnational broadcasts by satellites into their market (Beng, 1994). This perspective may constitute a veritable paradigm of 'Asiancentrocism' through which the Asian media can redefine the region's representation in the world, apart from the Eurocentric model (Beng, 1993). However, Asiancentrocism as an Asian media policy may fall into a danger of hindering global cooperation and of legitimating Asian depositism. An exemplar of this policy is Singapore's media regionalization through which the national media industry is consciously working towards reducing its reliance on Western media sources and exporting its programming to the Asian audience via satellite, but without domestic freedom of the press. Although Asian values in journalism may sound good to Asians, they are vulnerable to being an instrument for the Asian leaders. It is significant to hear what Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, said to the Freedom Forum in Hong Kong in 1995: "It is altogether shameful, if ingenuous, to cite Asian values as an excuse for autocratic practices" (Ali, 1996, p. 30).

The last question about Asian values in journalism is that discourses of them may be outdated because they appear to be an extension of developmental journalism. In the globalization era, trans-border flows of U.S.- and Japanese-produced audio-video signals via DBS (Direct Broadcasting System) and a global trend on media privatization - i.e., denationalization, liberalization, commercialization, and deregulation - are largely uncontrollable for many Asian governments. Moreover, intensifying global competition and cooperation forces Asian states to change their role in the mass media. Therefore, developmental journalism cannot make its room in the globalization era.

IV. Toward Cultural Politics of the Asian Mass Media

Rather than Asian values in the mass media generally and in journalism particularly, 'cultural politics' appears to be more appropriate for resisting global powers such as foreign transnational media corporations (TNMCs) and the WTO (World Trade Organization) in the process of the Asian media globalization, especially in East Asia. It also can serve to implement more appropriate and diverse, economic and political policies toward culture in a globalization era in which the global and the local interact to produce new social and cultural constellations. In particular, the proliferation of new communications technologies and the emergence of a new global market economy with the collapse of the Soviet Union have resulted in the convergence of economic and political forces into culture whose meaning and role are being reconstructed by "global flows" (Appadurai, 1990) such as people, technologies, images, money and capital, and ideologies and state politics. Cultural politics then is concerned with political policies pursuing difference and otherness in culture as an 'economic' as well as 'ideological' entity. This section shall attempt to provide the concept of cultural politics with a global-local dynamic and apply it through nationalism, religion, and language to the Asian media circumstance facing the rapid globalization process.

1. The Reconceptualization of Cultural Politics

Contemporary globalization of the economy, the polity, and culture is increasingly invoking the significance of cultural politics and the necessity of its reconceptualization. The development of a new global market economy and the shifting system of nation-states and the resultant rise of global culture are producing new identities, whether collective or individual, associated with power and culture.

It is first of all worthwhile to note that culture itself, as Cvetkovich and Kellner (1997) argue, is being redefined by the interaction of the global and the local within time-space compression. More specifically, culture is accelerated toward the process of commodification by economic globalization in which global forces produce 'spatialization'[1] and homogenization of their institutions and organizations; it goes through a process of politicization by which contemporary politics of identity and difference is constructed with local cultures. Accordingly, it is right to say that "culture *is* the economy" (Schiller, 1986) and at the same time that it is 'political' due to its impact on identity formation. Then, today's culture is a site of subsuming both economic and political realms, blurring the traditional boundaries between them.

More concretely, culture is a very complex and contested terrain, relying on the intersection of the global and the local. While global political economic institutions define cultural form and content, cultural differences have economic consequences in that they influence to change consumption patterns of cultural products (Schlesinger, 1993). This understanding of culture eventually leads to the dialectical relationship between the global as dominance and the local as resistance. With this new perception of culture, cultural politics can be re-conceptualized in the globalization process.

In a conventional way, cultural politics has focused on "the exercise of power in both institutional and ideological forms and the manner in which 'cultural practices' relate to this context" (Angus and Jhally, 1989, p. 2), or as "struggle over meanings, values, forms of subjectivity and identity" (Jordan and Weedon, 1995, P. 19). This traditional cultural politics, however, is inappropriate for dealing with a spatial economy of power, since it confines itself into national or local contexts within which cultural commodities are consumed. It also has largely concentrated on agencies, such as gender, race, and class, to construct subject-positions within systems of difference, regardless of their impacts of the changing time-space perception. When globalizing forces permeate national or local contexts, however, the existing politics of representation becomes obsolete. In this regard, a call for a new cultural politics is inevitable in the globalization era.

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[1] According to Mosco (1996), spatialization, from the perspective of the political economy of communication, refers to the institutional extension of corporate power in the communication industry. For more detail, see Mosco, Vincent (1996). *The Political Economy of Communication: Rethinking and Renewal*, London: Sage, pp. 173-211.

A new cultural politics must inquire into the nexus of the global and the local in the dialectic that oscillates between the two spheres and address the way in which the consumption of cultural materials including both political and economic forces constitutes and reproduces local, national, and global relations. Furthermore, it must provide a more appropriate cultural policies toward media globalization and localization. The new cultural politics also rejects extreme discourses over cultural relativism as well as over cultural and media imperialism often described as Americanization, since the former tends to overlook the domination and universality of global forces and the latter disregards local resistance. Subjects central of contemporary cultural politics, especially with consideration on the process of Asian media globalization, comprise of nationalism, religion, and language. These key subjects can implement cultural policies with the active dialectic of the global and the local, especially in East Asian countries, such as China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.

2. The Application of a New Cultural Politics in the East Asian Mass Media

1) Nationalism

Held (1991) argues that "[t]he importance of the nation-state and nationalism, territorial independence and the desire to establish, regain, or maintain 'sovereignty' does not seem to have diminished" (p. 148). For example, the recent transformation of the political regimes of Eastern Europe has regenerated a cluster of states, all asserting their independence and autonomy.

In East Asia, there has been the growth of a new nationalism. Before decolonization, nationalism was the prime inspiration behind movements for independence throughout Asia. It has also been an invaluable catalyst for nation-building after independence was achieved. Most recently, Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia ruled through a soft authoritarianism under nationalism (Zakaria, 1994). Japan's new nationalism, in contrast to the extreme pacifism that Japan imposed upon itself following its enduring trauma of its wartime defeat, means constructing an economy-oriented towards "New Asianism," under which Japan's postmodern return to Asia connotes economic and cultural dominance over Asia through a strategy of "global localization" (Iwabuchi, 1995).

An emergent China has launched a new nationalism campaign to regain its power in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protest. China's new nationalism is replacing communism as a national ideology and is largely driven by patriotic sentiments. Thus, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is pursuing a campaign of "patriotic education," under the slogan of "renewing China" in order to build a "politically, economically and culturally unified nation-state when foreign and largely Western influences are seen as eroding the nation-state's very foundation" (Chanda and Huus, 1995, p. 21). In more detail, the major aims of this new nationalism include strengthening the government through recentralization, maintaining party rule through transforming the revolutionary party into an administrative one, combining Chinese traditional values and Chinese Marxism as a dominant ideology, opposing radical marketization in the economy, and emphasizing the national interest and patriotism in the international arena (Zheng, 1993). China's new nationalism, however, has stimulated Taiwan's new nationalism which asserts national independence from the mainland. For example, the 1996 presidential election in Taiwan, in which President Lee Teng-hui was re-elected, completed Taiwan's transition from dictatorship to democracy while highlighting its differences with China. In this sense, "to mention the China-Taiwan issue is only to name the hottest of the terrestrial hot spots. Therefore, the nation-state as territoriality is still valid" (Ashley, 1996, Aug. 22).

The new Asian nationalism ultimately has been linked to the political reaction to economic globalization. The most obvious consequence of economic globalization is global competition and the apparent weakening of the economic sovereignty of nation-states. The current tendency of domestic politics toward this consequence may be characterized as a reassertion of "economic nationalism" in new forms (Cable, 1995). Cable (1995) suggests four variants of economic nationalism: defensive and positive nationalism, the competing nation, and federalism.

Defensive nationalism is represented by national struggles against decisions of GATT or its successor WTO. One example of defensive nationalism was a protest against direct distribution of Hollywood films to South Korea. Although the 1988 decision on such direct distribution was preceded by years of negotiations between the U.S. and South Korea that forced changes in South Korea's film laws, a number of Korean directors, scriptwriters, and civilians protested against United International Pictures, which was the first major American distributor of a US film in Korea (Park, 1988). This nationalism, however, runs the risk of isolating the country from the mainstream of globalization.

Positive nationalism is a reconceptualization of the old mercantilist philosophy that imports (goods, capital, people) are bad, but exports are good. The postwar experiences of Japan and the Asian NICs have lent some credibility to the idea that

> it is possible to be mercantilist in an outward looking and economically successful way; that globalization can be controlled by 'national' companies for national ends; and that wise governments can steer resources to enhance long-term growth (Cable, 1995, p. 47).

The Asian NICs have shown a tendency toward mercantilist nationalism by imposing importation and programming limits on foreign media products. This tendency has also been implemented by the U.S. through "strategic trade policy." For example, U.S. government financial support to the film industry (Guback, 1985b), government support of the filmed-entertainment industry in its anti-piracy drive (Bettig, 1990), and the use of the Special 301 trade provision to open national media markets of other countries can be linked to the larger role the government plays in helping U.S. capital secure foreign markets.

The competing nation is a subtly different version of positive nationalism. It fully recognizes the role of TNCs as major actors in global economy, but confronts them with a sense of national economic purpose. Thus, the competing nation operates in an open economy, while some economic sectors are controlled by its government. For example, although Singapore has fostered economic growth under liberal free trade policies, it controls its media sector through a regionalization policy to promote an alternative to the globalization of Western mass media. One major problem for governments following this paradigm is a balance among generating a strong sense of national cohesion and purpose while operating within the constraints of global rules and accepting the verdict of global markets.

Federalism, as the final variant of economic nationalism suggested by Cable (1995), is an approach used by small and medium-sized countries to recreate a sense of national identity and cohesion. Federalism, however, seems to be a term confined only to the European situation including the EC (the European Community). Regionalism is a more appropriate term to refer to the regional phenomena including NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement), EC (the European Community), APEC (the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), and ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Today, more countries are banding together to form "free-trade areas." Although regionalism and globalism appear complementary, they can be contradictory because of a danger of regional "blocs" becoming a platform for new forms of exclusive nationalism, which undermines globalization and lays the basis for conflict.

Indeed, the phenomenon of globalization has led to a reduction of maneuverability of national governments in a growing number of fields. Such a reduction in the mass media field comes both from the possibilities for diversified viewing made available by the new communications technologies themselves and from the opportunities for market penetration due to deregulation and privatization. On the other hand, globalization appears to enhance national identities through the importance of geopolitics and the pursuit of economic nationalism. Likewise, even in the globalization of communications, the nation-state and nationalism remain the primary source of regulatory action in governing the mass media. Therefore, they are expected to retain its power wherever there are economic power imbalances inherent to late capitalism.

2) Religion

Religion plays a significant role in forming a religious community in which identity is determined. Today's globalization gives rise to a resurgence of religions as a politics of identity. Examining the relationship between religion and globalization, Beyer (1994) addresses five complex and quite different religio-social movements: the New Christian Right in the U.S., the Latin American liberation-theological movement, the Iranian revolution, contemporary religious Zionism in Israel, and religious environmentalism. The revival of religions throughout the world is prevalent, but some of them are exclusive and extreme. Turning to Asia, however, one can find another religious revival: Confucianism. Confucianism is different from other exclusive religions because it is syncretic and allows for "dual religious citizenship."[2] Thus, Confucianism can be characterized as providing an emerging sense of "multiple identity" within which people reconcile the various claims on themselves in the increasingly complex, blurred world of globalization (Cable, 1995). The Asian NICs have sustained Confucianism as a purveyor of multiple identities in the political, economic, and mass communication spheres. In this context, therefore, it is not likely that globalization of American mass media will bring about total cultural homogenization in the Asian NICs. If Western domination over the national media market of the Asian NICs through media globalization destroys the indigenous culture and its traditional system of social obligations and relationships, cultural imperialism should have by this time rendered the Asian NICs decidedly less Confucian than they might have been in the absence of Western influences. However, Confucianism, as this study has demonstrated so far, has persisted in politics, economics, and the mass media of the Asian NICs. Furthermore, Pan, et al.'s (1994) study of cultural values in the U.S. and China reveals that despite the heavy infusion of Western media, the Confucian tradition is alive and well in the Asian NICs.

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[2] According to Kung, dual religious citizenship means that one can belong to two or more religions at the same time. Today the revival and cotinuation of Confucianism in Asia may be attributed to the dual religious citizenship of the Asians. See Kung, Hans (1988).

3) Language

As another bearer of cultural identity, language plays an important role in unifying the people of the nation-state by inspiring national consciousness. Language provides the politics of difference for ethnic groups. Quebec nationalism constitutes a clear case of ethnonationalism in the developed world. Thomson (1995) argues that ethnic movements are motivated primarily by a need to establish a positive social identity through their own language as the principle vehicle of ethnic assertiveness. In Asia, "Greater China"[3] benefits from the same Chinese language - though divided into Mandarin and Cantonese dialects - to circulate media products within its boundaries. In Hong Kong, the Cantonese

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"Epilogue," *Christianity and Chinese Religions*, Eds., Hans Kung and Julia Ching, New York: Doubleday.

[3] The term "Greater China" is most commonly used to refer to an economically integrated geographical area comprising the 120 million inhabitants of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian in southern China. See Chang, Maria Hsia (1995).

language programs broadcast by TVB's Jade Channel draw over 90 percent of the prime-time audience, despite the presence of STAR TV (Hughes, 1994). Singapore as well as Hong Kong export their Chinese language programming to regional neighbors such as China, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia via satellite. Taiwan also takes advantage of language (Yeung, 1990). This use of a common language by local media capitalists is consistent with the logic of the market in the Asian context. Local media products are chosen on the grounds that while foreign programming tends to be in English - a language that is used by a very small percentage of westernized elites - the local programs are produced in local languages that the majority of Asians use to communicate (Chan, 1994). As Sarah Rechin, media consultant, states,

> It is language and culture, in varying degree that determine what Asian audience will or will not choose to watch. People basically watch whatever seems closest to their lives and makes the most sense to them in terms of their own culture.... This is particularly the case in Asia (Karp, 1994, pp. 68-70).

Indeed, the politics of cultural identity enhances audience preference for local cultural production. In South Korea and Singapore, local programming dominates the television ratings, drawing 85 to 88 percent of the television households, while foreign TV programming, both satellite delivered and terrestrial, rarely attracts more than 15 to 20 percent of the viewers at any time (Clifford, 1993). In particular, Waterman and Rogers' (1994) analysis of broadcast television programming in nine Far East Asian countries suggests that in comparison to Western Europe and Latin America, countries of the Asian

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"Greater China and the Chinese 'Global Tribe'," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXV, No. 10, pp. 995-967.

region as a whole have a relatively low dependence on imported programming. In the globalization era, language definitely must be a fundamental site of struggle for choosing media programs.

V. Conclusion

To date, this study has pointed out that the pursuit of Asian values in mass media in general and in journalism in particular might be inappropriate in the Asian globalization process of mass media in which global forces interact with the local. It has put forward new cultural politics as a strategy for media policies of East Asia, an alternative of Asian values. The new cultural politics embraces both the concern to preserve the distinctiveness of existing cultural identities at a national level and the apparently irresistible pressure of global forces, considering culture an economic as well as an ideological form. It accepts the reality of local media institutional and organizaitional transformations in terms of the entry of transnational media corporations into local media markets through deregulation and liberalization, but at the same time makes an attempt in preserving and fostering national identity and the local media industry by virtue of nationalism, religion, and language for local resistence. Nationalism is concerned with economic interests in the Asian mass media, while religion and language are favorable of sustaining cultural and ideological identity.

Although new cultural politics takes into account of a balance between global forces and local contexts, it may overlook a "hybridization"[4] process of Asian culture by which the third culture is shaped. Hybridization of culture can result from the confrontation between global culture and national culture. In East Asia, the phenomena of hybridized culture should be the objects of studying mass media and reflecting on cultural policies.

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[4] Hybridization is defined as the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices. See Rowe, W and Schelling, V. (1991). *Memory and Modernity: popular culture in Latin America*, London: Verso.

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